Category: Koen van Wijk
Nationalism is rising, but sectarianism won’t fade quickly
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) June 9 organized a discussion on issues of nationalism and sectarianism in the Middle East. The Sectarianism, Proxies & De-sectarianization project (SEPAD) co-organized; its director Simon Mabon joined the panel as an expert on Saudi Arabia. Together with two experts on Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, he assessed the state of sectarianism and nationalist projects in these three countries. Iraq and Lebanon are experiencing grassroots protest movements to overcome sectarianism while Saudi Arabia is seeing a major top-down drive through the Vision 2030 project spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Should these be understood as attempts to let national identity overcome sectarianism in politics? If so, can we expect them to be successful? The panel agreed that these issues are unlikely to be solved quickly or by MbS’s preferred economic means, but a clear shift in political thinking is occurring in the younger generations.
The speakers were:
Geneive Abdo
Visiting Fellow
AGSIW
Simon Mabon
Chair in International Politics
Lancaster University
Director
Richardson Institute
Director
SEPAD
Maha Yahya
Director
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Kristin Smith Diwan (moderator)
Senior Resident Scholar
AGSIW
Two protest movements and one grand vision
As Simon Mabon explained, SEPAD analyzes the events in the modern Middle East and tests the theory that secularist national identities are replacing sectarian political identities. The focus for his talk lay on the three countries Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. As Abdo and Yahya indicated, Lebanon and Iraq are experiencing major protest movements that attack the corruption, lack of accountability, and cronyism in their countries. Both have democratic systems that reserve political positions and parliamentary representation to specific sectarian groups. In practice, as Yahya said, this “turned the relationship between individuals and their state into one that is mediated by sectarian community.” The political system has become a way to divide the cake among power brokers, who in Lebanon are referred to as ‘mafia’.
The protest movements in both of these countries self-identify as secular. As Abdo underlined, Iraqi protesters are overwhelmingly Shia and use Shia religious symbolism (such as references to the martyrdom of Shia Imam Hussein) in their demonstrations. Moreover, the Shia clergy in Iraq openly supports and collaborates with the protest movement. In this younger generation there is a clear division between personal religious identity and political identity. It is in the latter that desectarianization has occurred. Furthermore, the protesters emphasize that their agenda is issue-based.
Maha Yahya noted that Lebanon differs. The current protests go beyond clear-cut issues (such as the Whatsapp-tax that triggered the current protest movement) and aim at a complete overhaul of the sectarian political system. The individual controversies and issues that abound in Lebanese politics are seen as symptoms of a broken regime.
The situation in Saudi Arabia might appear unrelated. The Arab Spring saw some demonstrations in the Shia East of the country, but nothing on the scale of the other two countries discussed here. MBS is seeking to transform and modernize his country under his ambitious ‘Vision 2030’ project. Funded by billions of petrodollars, MBS wants to wean Saudi Arabia off its reliance on oil and modernize its economy. His vision includes relaxation of the strict religious laws for economic and political purposes. MBS hopes to transform Saudi citizenship to a secularist, civic nationalism in which both Sunni Wahhabi and Shia groups participate. According to Mabon, the ambitious pace and huge investments that go along with this show that MBS believes he has a ‘magic switch’ that can achieve this transformation of identities.
Sectarianism won’t go away easily
The panel agreed it would be naïve to think that deep-seated sectarian social and political systems will go away quickly. Vision 2030 aims to remove sectarian divisions by offering everyone a seat at the economic table, and therefore a stake in the state. The systems of marginalization and othering cannot be undone with a ‘magic switch’ and some ‘bread and games’, and centuries of repression cannot so easily be erased. Investing hundreds of millions into shopping malls in Shia areas could be seen as tokenism and introduces new issues of gentrification and marginalization along class lines. Nonetheless, a less cynical view could see these as the first steps towards change according to Mabon.
In Lebanon and Iraq, a major obstacle is the lack of unity within the protest movements. Groups and proto-parties are forming, aiming for Iraqi elections planned for October and Lebanese parliamentary elections to come in 2022. However, the grassroots movements have not yet coalesced into clear protest parties. Yahya and Abdo agreed that in both Lebanon and Iraq the political system discourages new parties, and the existing political establishment is unlikely to disappear in one electoral cycle. Yahya is cautiously optimistic in the medium term about the grassroots developments in Lebanon. Abdo indicated that Iraqi proto-parties are also emerging and receiving donations. However, there is a serious debate on whether the protesters should boycott the elections or try to get as many seats as possible. Iraq’s 2018 elections had an official turnout of 44%, although the real number is estimated to have been as low as 20%, meaning that turnout is already a critical issue for the established elite’s legitimacy. Moderator Diwan pointed out that boycotts in the region (such as in Bahrain or Kuwait) haven’t generally been a successful way to challenge entrenched elites.
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NATO 2030: focus on cyber, Russia, and China
On June 4, the German Council on Foreign Relations together with the Brookings Institution hosted NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg for a keynote address on NATO in 2030. This address was held ahcommead of the NATO summit in Brussels on June 14, when a new policy paper will be published. The Secretary General provided an overview of NATO’s key challenges and opportunities, emphasizing. He emphasized NATO’s achievements and ambitions in the field of cyber security, as well as the new focus on China as a global competitor. In the Q&A, he acknowledged the differences between certain NATO allies on democracy and human rights, but stressed the alliance’s strength in finding common ground.
The speakers were:
John R. Allen (opening remarks)
President
Brookings Institution
Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook (introduction)
Designated Director and CEO
German Council on Foreign Relations
Constanze Stelzenmüller (moderator)
Fritz Stern Chair, Center on the United States and Europe
Brookings Institution
Jens Stoltenberg (keynote)
Secretary-general
NATO
The keynote: achievements, challenges, ambitions
Secretary General Stoltenberg acknowledged the challenges facing NATO today. While the Alliance leaving Afghanistan, its longest mission ever, it faces authoritarian threats from Russia and China. Russia threatens the Arctic Circle and perpetrates cyber attacks. China’s rise is obvious to all. It will soon be largest economy and already has the second largest military. Beijing doesn’t necessarily see NATO as an enemy. Cooperation on issues such as arms control or climate change is possible. Nonetheless, Beijing’s rise poses a challenge as it does not share NATO’s values of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty. None of NATO’s members can face these challenges alone, but Stoltenberg declared “the countries of Europe and North America are not alone. We stand together.”
He then proceeded to outline the key areas NATO will focus on in the next decade in nine points:
- NATO is the key theater in which to tackle transatlantic challenges such as Syria and Iran. Even if NATO does not intervene directly, its members still coordinate on such issues. After all, “NATO is not just a military alliance, but a political-military alliance.” It therefore has to resolve its differences and enhance cooperation.
- NATO will boost its collective response to threats and invest in modernizing and expanding its capacities.
- NATO members must strengthen their domestic resilience against outside interference. “Strong societies are our first line of defense.”
- Transatlantic innovation must be given a boost as well. NATO’s technological edge should be sharpened and gaps between allies need to be prevented. For this purpose, the Alliance will establish a Transatlantic Defense Accelerator in which members will cooperate in innovation.
- NATO will play its part in upholding the rules-based international order and speak with one voice to defend its values and interests. This means encouraging others to play by the rules; upholding freedom of navigation, as well as a safe and secure cyber space; and setting rules and standards for emerging technologies.
- NATO will continue capacity building in friendly neighboring states, as conflict in NATO’s periphery undermines its safety. Examples include Georgia and Iraq.
- NATO recognizes that climate change is a crisis multiplier and must confront its security implications. The Alliance will integrate climate change considerations into its operations. Sustainable technologies will be prioritized in procurement. NATO will work with industry to create climate neutral capabilities that eventually lead to net-zero emissions.
- NATO will develop its next strategic concept. It will recommit to its values and consider its changing purpose in a changing world.
- To achieve all this, NATO members will have to invest more. Developments on this front are on the right track, as defense spending has increased in seven consecutive years after decades of cuts. NATO will “not just invest more, but invest better,” doing so collectively, as NATO is a force multiplier. This increases efficiency, and sends a clear message of unity and resolve to adversaries.
The Q&A: overcoming internal challenges
Many of the public’s and moderator Stelzenmüller‘s questions focused on the apparent internal disunity in NATO. Stoltenberg made it clear that NATO is a group of 30 different nations and that it will never speak as one. These are democracies and their disagreements and internal discussions are part of their strength. That said, it is important that the allies remain unified on the main issues. They need to rally behind their core values and stand up to authoritarian encroachments by Russia, China, and others, as the regime plane hijacking in Belarus recently demonstrated. Ukraine is a key partner on this front. While the Secretary General shied away from giving explicit commitments, his main message to Kiev is to focus on domestic reform and combating corruption. These matters are valuable in themselves, but also key to eventual NATO accession.
Several questions addressed Turkey’s apparent disregard for NATO’s core democratic values. Stoltenberg has expressed his concerns on this front in Ankara, as have other allies, and he believes that NATO can also be a platform to have open discussions on such issues. However, Turkey remains a key member of the Alliance. It is the only state to border Syria and Iran. It plays a key role in combatting ISIS and the refugee crisis. NATO’s presence in the Aegean, where it provides a bridge between Greece and Turkey, showcasesits capacity for resolving and preventing conflicts when views diverge.
Cyber threats
NATO has explicitly refocused on cyber as a military domain. Cyber attacks can trigger NATO’s article 5 (which considers an attack on one of its members as an attack on all) in the same way as kinetic attacks. Stoltenberg was not explicit on the threshold, as this would only be a favor to adversaries. However, NATO’s message is clear: cyber warfare is warfare.
China and Russia
The Secretary General promised that the communiqué to be issued at the coming NATO summit will mention China more often and more explicitly than ever before. He considers this a major oversight of previous strategy papers. Cooperation with Pacific states such as Australia will be increased, as will resilience against the domestic threats that China poses to member states. NATO will not look to declare China an enemy. There are many fields in which cooperation and trade with China are possible and beneficial. The differences in opinion on such matters between, for example, the US and Germany, will not undermine the Alliance’s consensus or resolve. The same is true for Russia. NATO will continue to talk to Russia while challenging it. “There is no contradiction between being clear-eyed about the threat that Russia poses, and the need to talk to them.” At the core, NATO must acknowledge changing global power dynamics, which have real consequences for the Alliance.
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Conservative will likely win, but foreign policy will change little
Candidates in Iran’s presidential election scheduled for June 18 were vetted more heavily than before. Only seven were allowed to run out of some 500 applicants. Most are prominent conservatives. Judiciary chief Ibrahim Raisi is likely a shoe-in. If and how will these elections affect the negotiations in Vienna and Iran’s regional activities? How do Iranians view this process and what should we make of the predicted record low turnout?
A Chatham House panel convened June 9 agreed the election will consolidate the regime in a conservative direction. However, foreign policy and Iran’s activities in Syria, will change little, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have long been in firm control of those projects. The domestic implications of the elections are significant, not due to the results but rather to the vetting process and the public’s increasing apathy.
The speakers were:
Nazila Fathi
Independent journalist;
Non-resident scholar
Middle East Institute
Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst in Iran and Persian Gulf affairs
Congressional Research Service
Vali Nasr
Majid Kadduri Professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
Non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council
Raz Zimmt
Research fellow
Institute for National Security Studies
Sanam Vakil (moderator)
Deputy director and senior research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme
Chatham House
A predictable outcome, but nonetheless significant
The panel agreed that Rais is the likely winner, though Nasr warned that surprises are possible, as the 1997 and 2005 elections demonstrate. Nazila Fathi also pointed out that the greater freedom to criticize one another that exists among the candidates could hurt Raisi.
The real shock in this election cycle was the vetting process, according to Zimmt. The regime prevented any serious moderate or reformist candidates from running. Fathi pointed out that the reformists (such as former president Khatami) have been isolated and persecuted since the protest movement that followed Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent re-election in 2009. Rouhani was not considered part of the reformist camp. His transition towards more moderate viewpoints is what caused the regime to remove moderate and even some conservative candidates from the roster this year. A particular surprise was the exclusion of the conservative former speaker of the parliament Larijani, who the regime considered to be at risk of moderating, according to Fathi.
Rather than the winner, voter turnout might be an indicator of public sentiment. Vakil cited a recent poll that indicates turnout could be as low as 38%. This would be a record low for Iran, where turnout has never fallen below 50%. Fathi affirmed that disillusionment within Iran is high. Due to the impact of COVID and economic hardships, there were calls to boycott the election even before the vetting process was completed. The 2019 parliamentary elections also contributed, as the stringent vetting process then led to harshly repression of protests.
Nasr warned that voter turnout is a bigger issue to Western observers than to the Iranian regime. Engineering an election can be done after the vote (as in 2009), but this led to major resistance. This is why the regime used the vetting process this time, after testing the waters with the parliamentary elections of 2019. The deep state understands that a low-turnout election is advantageous to conservative candidates. Its primary goal is to end up with a reliable, and controllable president. Raisi is the ideal candidate for this purpose. He has few connections, as Rouhani had within the religious establishment in Qom and even within the IRGC.
The core issues for Iranians are economic. Runaway inflation and price hikes on primary goods force people to work multiple jobs. This hit the middle classes as much as the poor. According to Fathi Iranians only care about the JCPOA to the extent that it contributes to economic improvements. The candidates have failed to put forward any clear plans for solving these issues.
The role of the new president
As for the new president’s role and significance, the panel saw a clear divergence between domestic and foreign affairs. Nasr suggested Iran is on the cusp of a ‘Third Islamic Republic’ for three reasons:
- Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advanced age indicates that his decades-long rule might soon be over, potentially leading to a constitutional overhaul, as after Khomeini’s death.
- Iran is moving to relieve maximum pressure, which will lead to major changes in its economic and foreign outlook.
- The deep state is increasingly strengthening its grip on the country.
The IRGC is starting to look more like the Pakistani military, controlling key foreign policy agendas and exerting major influences on the political process. They are positioning themselves for the post-Khamenei era.
A new president will have little influence on Iran’s foreign policy. As Katzman warns “these elections are not for the ‘leader’ of Iran.” The real leader, Khamenei, has indicated that Iran will recommit to the JCPOA if the US does so. The negotiations in Vienna are not at risk. Nasr indicated that the key foreign policy dossiers are all in the hands of the IRGC. Iran’s regional activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen fall under IRGC control. The same is true for the Saudi-Iranian negotiations now underway in Baghdad, where the Saudis are talking with top IRGC brass, rather than the Foreign Ministry.
The view from Israel and Washington
According to Zimmt, the outcome of these elections matter little to Israel, which viewed Ahmadinejad as a wolf in wolf’s clothing, while Rouhani was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Israel is mainly concerned with the nuclear program, Iran’s regional activities (particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza), and its long-range missile capabilities. None of these issues are controlled by the government or president, but rather by the deep state.
For Israel a controversial, conservative president is preferable because it makes it easier to rally support against Iran. Ahmadinejad was Israel’s biggest asset, because he openly denied the Holocaust and the existence of homosexuals in Iran. Raisi’s controversial viewpoints and his involvement in the 1988 prison massacres could serve a similar purpose. Nasr also thought that a post-JCPOA Iran seeking to establish trade relations with the world might be served poorly by a controversial president.
The Biden administration does follow these elections with interest according to Katzman, who spoke in an official capacity. According to him, Iran is becoming a major regional and even supra-regional power. Its missile and drone capacities are extensive and sophisticated, and Tehran has extended them to allies and used them itself. The attacks on Saudi oil in Abqaiq, as well as the strike on the American al-Asad base in Iraq, were examples. Katzman called the strike on al-Asad “the most significant missile strike on American troops in American history.”
Iran’s serious capacities mean that they should be taken seriously by the US. Meanwhile, US sanctions have had no effect on Iran’s regional strategy or Iran’s regional influence. In 2014 Iran was under sanctions but became more involved in Syria and Yemen. When sanctions were lifted these policies continued. Iran’s regional activities are extremely inexpensive and sanctions don’t affect them significantly.
The key is to get some resolution to regional conflicts. Iran has expressed an interest in doing so. Iran won’t project power if there are no opportunities or interests that require it.
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Engagement with armed groups is necessary, “good” or “bad”
The Crisis Response Council and the Brookings Institution’s Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors June 3 convened a discussion on challenges posed by armed groups to security sector reform (SSR) in the Middle East and beyond. Panelists agreed that SSR too frequently views armed groups from a unidimensional perspective. Militias are not inherent spoilers whose power is limited to the security sector. They are more often politically or socially embedded potential power brokers. State monopolies on violence are an anomaly in post-conflict states. Armed groups can contribute positively to SSR and governance.
The speakers were:
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors; Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Brookings Institution
Frederic Wehrey
Senior fellow, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bernadetta Berti
Head of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General
NATO
Yaniv Voller
Senior Lecturer in the Politics of the Middle East
University of Kent; Stanford University
Ranj Alaaldin (moderator)
Visiting Fellow – Brookings Doha Center; Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institution
The present: thriving and misunderstood
Vanda Felbab-Brown highlighted the Corona pandemic’s effect on armed groups around the world. The associated economic downturn has pushed some states to their limits. 200 million people have been pushed into poverty, and many of those will be forced to engage in criminal activities to scrape together a living. Under these conditions, armed groups thrive. Hundreds of millions of people already live under total, partial, or shared control by armed groups. As state spending on social welfare, but also security provision, shrunk, armed groups moved in to fill the gaps.
Wehrey discussed the case of Libya, where armed groups have thrived in part because they were misunderstood by outsiders. Emerging after the fall of Gadhafi, they were useful security providers, but politicized and prone to state capture and corruption. The Libyan case could have ended more positively if the ‘prizes’ for militias had been placed under better oversight. Oil revenues, ministerial positions, ports, airports were targets for militia competition. Protection of such prizes could have prevented the militia growth that Libya has seen.
Multiple efforts to “train and equip” a Libyan army from scratch have failed. Such an effort takes years and the security vacuum that exists before its completion is sure to be filled up by someone. Furthermore, in Libya new armies have often recruited from specific tribal, communal, or political backgrounds. These are less national armies and more new militias. This is something Wehrey sees happening now with Turkish support for the Tripoli-based armed forces. The current effort to defer security issues while working on political unity is reminiscent of 2012. The outcome might be similar: a relapse into violence.
The panel agreed that armed groups are not anomalies and they will not go away. Ahram suggested states do not necessarily want to be centralized. There are many examples of leaders deliberately fragmenting power. Militia fighters are not unlucky souls whose dream is to join the regular army and leave the militia life behind them. These groups are an embedded part of their communities and not easily fixable aberrations.
What makes an armed group “good” or “bad”?
The exact drivers of armed groups are poorly understood by academia and policy makers. Voller focuses his research on the question of why certain pro-government militias act predatorily, while others do not. Rather than an inherent inclination to violence, he believes that a core determinant is whether an armed group acts in a theater where its constituency is present. The predominantly Shia PMF in Iraq became predatorial when they entered the Sunni northwest in the fight against ISIS, while the Kurdish Peshmerga refrained from doing so as they always operate among their Kurdish communities. Felbab-Brown countered that other factors must also be important, as there are plenty of examples of armed groups acting predatorily among their own communities. She posits that any armed group gets feedback from its community, even if it is only by means of resistance to violence. If a community lacks social cohesion, this feedback can be unclear or weak, allowing greater predatory behavior.
Wehrey warned against an overly economic focus when it comes to controlling militias. Paying off armed groups to steer them, or turning off their incomes to force their hand, only treats part of the reality. These groups are embedded in and motivated by communal identity, religion, and history. Ahram agreed. He added that armed groups are also not merely political, as there are many cases of armed groups engaging in negotiations or elections and still continuing their armed struggles. Normative motivations are also part of the equation, as local norms, national laws, and even international law (and the fear of a Hague tribunal) are all considered by militias. Ahram believes that the onus is on researchers to identify which of these different levers matter under which circumstances, and how they can be used effectively.
Berti joked that she would enjoy this academic exercise, but that the policy maker in her called for a different course of action. She warned that all of these tools are highly context specific. What works best in practice is a willingness to enter a long-term commitment to a peace building effort. An intervening power needs to engage in a dynamic relationship with local power brokers and be willing to deal with new actors and change course when the situation calls for it.
Policy makers’ task: flexibility and pragmatism
The panel agreed that thinking in terms of “good” or “bad” militias is a fruitless exercise. Voller emphasized once more that militias are embedded in their communities. He used the example of Syrian militias that might align with Assad and engage in repression in order to protect their own constituencies. We might not call these actors “good”, but we can understand what motivates them. Felbab-Brown explained that it is better to think in pragmatic terms of available alternatives. An armed group might be odious, yet be the best option in terms of service provision, behavior, and accountability. Local populations as a rule adapt to harsh and illiberal actors if they provide stability and security.
The task that faces policy makers is a daunting one, as current tools and theories are poorly equipped to deal with the realities. The key is to be flexible and to accept militias as an embedded part of society. Berti and Ahram underlined this. We often speak of ‘allowing’ armed groups to exist or participate in a society. In practice, however, we usually have little influence over their existence. Voller emphasized that engaging with a militia directly as the state, rather than condemning and ignoring it, is usually the best way to have a positive influence on its behavior. Using the example of the Lebanese Hezbollah, however, Berti warned us to beware of who’s steering whom in these dynamics.
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Peace Picks | June 07-11, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Ultimate Authority: The Struggle for Islamic Institutions in the Arab World | June 08, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Carnegie’s Middle East Program convenes this seminar to mark the launch of its new edited volume which examines the interplay between religious establishments and governance in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco. Arab rulers are increasingly asserting control over Islamic institutions with administrative and coercive tools. These top-down policies are framed by authoritarian regimes as “reforms,” but are often calculated attempts to eliminate potential sources of dissent in ministries, seminaries, mosques, and other religious entities. At the other end of the spectrum, Islamic institutions in conflict-wracked Arab states have become prizes for competing factions to bolster their authority and popular support. Understanding these dynamics has important implications for countering violent extremism and resolving conflict, as well as appreciating evolving state-society relations across the Arab world.
Speakers:
Nathan J. Brown
Professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University
Annelle Sheline
Research fellow in the Middle East program, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
Journalist; non resident fellow, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies
Laila Alrefaai
Writer and researcher specializing in religious affairs
Frederic Wehrey (moderator)
Senior fellow in the Middle East Program, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
2. International Relations and the Middle East: US, China, and Regional Powers | June 08, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
This event marks the launch of the sixth wave of the Arab Barometer. It will bring together experts from the US and Middle East alongside Michael Robbins, Director of Arab Barometer, to delve into the results as they pertain to regional rivalries, great power competition, and prospects for regional cooperation and conflict deescalation. How has a year of global lockdown and ongoing conflict shaped regional attitudes about conflict deescalation and the need for conflict resolution channels? How do Arabs see external powers such as China, Russia, and the US as playing a future role in their countries? Have new opportunities or challenges arisen in the last year?
Speakers:
May Darwich
Lecturer of International Relations of the Middle East, University of Birmingham
Michael Robbins
Director, Arab Barometer
Randa Slim
Senior fellow and director of the Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues program, MEI
Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein (moderator)
Senior vice president, MEI
3. Untapped Potential: Women, Leadership, and Water Diplomacy in the Middle East | June 09, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
The Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program and Middle East Program, with co-sponsor EcoPeace Middle East, organize this discussion on the inclusion of women in water leadership and diplomacy in the Middle East. A panel of experts will speak on the enhancement of regional diplomacy and a movement for inclusive resource decision-making. Women play a critical role in water resource management and decision-making at the community level. Yet, they are often absent from high-level water-related negotiations and agreements. By excluding women from the decision-making processes, the sustainability and effectiveness of these agreements—which are essential to broader peace and security—is undermined. What steps can country leaders and stakeholders take to ensure that women’s leadership is realized in water diplomacy?
Speakers:
Maysoon Al-Zoubi
International water and water diplomacy expert, Arab Dar Engineering Company
Natasha Carmi
Lead water specialist, Geneva Water Hub
Dalit Wolf Golan
Deputy Israel director and regional development director, EcoPeace Middle East
Martina Klimes
Advisor on water and peace, Stockholm International Water Institute
Merissa Khurma (introduction)
Program director of the Middle East Program, Wilson Center
Lauren Herzer Risi (moderator)
Project director of the environmental change and security program, Wilson Center
4. Iran’s presidential election: Domestic and international implications | June 09, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Chatham House | Register Here
The next presidential election in Iran set for 18 June 2021 takes place in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and worsening economic conditions due to fiscal mismanagement and sanctions imposed by the United States. It will also be held during ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran over the future the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) also known as the Iran nuclear agreement. Against this backdrop voter turnout is expected to be a significant factor impacting the outcome of this election.
In this Chatham House seminar, experts discuss Iran’s political map ahead of the 18 June presidential election and the ballot’s regional and international implications.
Speakers:
Nazila Fathi
Independent journalist; Non-resident scholar, Middle East Institute
Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst in Iran and Persian Gulf affairs, Congressional Research Service
Vali Nasr
Majid Kadduri Professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Non-resident senior fellow, Atlantic Council
Raz Zimmt
Research fellow, Institute for National Security Studies
Sanam Vakil (moderator)
Deputy director and senior research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
5. Sectarian Identities and the Rise of Nationalism in the Middle East | June 09, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | Register Here
In recent years, there has been increasing promotion of nationalist identities over sectarian schisms. In Lebanon and Iraq, anger at the prominence of sectarian identities prompted the emergence of protest movements cutting across sectarian lines, united by chants such as “all of them means all of them.” In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has sought to promote a Saudi nationalism inclusive of previously marginalized Shia communities. In this joint AGSIW-SEPAD webinar, panelists will discuss these issues and more.
Speakers:
Geneive Abdo
Visiting fellow, AGSIW
Simon Mabon
Chair in international politics, Lancaster University; Director, Richardson Institute; Director of the sectarianism, proxies and de-sectarianisation project, AGSIW
Maha Yahya
Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Kristin Smith Diwan
Senior resident scholar, AGSI
6. Iran’s Arab Strategy and American Policy Options | June 10, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Since 1979, the foreign policy focus of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been disproportionately on the Arab World. It is also in the Arab World – in countries like Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen – where the United States and Iran have over the years competed for influence and often engaged in a zero-sum game contest for regional power. Meanwhile, the costs of Iran’s interventions in the Arab World are significant both in direct and indirect terms. Can Iran stay the course? What is the impact of Iran’s Arab policy on Arab countries? Finally, what policy challenges does Tehran’s commitment to maintaining a strong hand in the Arab World represent to Washington? MEI organizes this panel to discuss these issues.
Speakers:
Hanin Ghaddar
Friedmann fellow in the Geduld Program on Arab Politics, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Nader Uskowi
President, Sagewood Consulting; non-resident senior fellow, Atlantic Council
Mohsen Sazegara
Iranian journalist and political activist
Alex Vatanka (moderator)
Director of the Iran Program, MEI
7. Migration in Perpetuity: Yemeni Voices from the Diaspora | June 10, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
the Middle East Institute Arts and Culture Center hosts this panel exploring migration and relocation through the photography and art practice of three of the most exciting young Yemeni contemporary women artists practicing today; Shaima Al-Tamimi, Thana Faroq, and Yasmine Nasser Diaz, who are joined by the New York City-based Yemeni chef/storyteller Akram Said.
The exposition Migration in Perpetuity: Yemeni Voices from the Diaspora provides a rare exploration of a war-torn country, through the beautiful work of four vibrant Yemeni contemporary artists, as they navigate their complex relationship to the homeland and the tensions of growing up in diaspora.
Speakers:
Shaima Al-Tamimi
Artist
Thana Faroq
Artist
Yasmine Nasser Diaz
Artist
Akram Said
Artist
Lila Nazemian (moderator)
Independent curator; Special Projects Curator, ArteEas
8. Israeli Politics in the Post-Netanyahu Era | June 10, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
After four elections in two years, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid, head of the centrist Yesh Atid party, has agreed to form a broad-based, national unity government with Naftali Bennett’s far-right Yamina party, likely putting an end to the political stalemate of the last two years as well as the 12-year reign of Benjamin Netanyahu, the longest-serving prime minister in Israel’s history. Under the terms of the agreement, the ultra-nationalist Bennet will serve as premier for the first two years—assuming the coalition holds up that long—before handing the premiership to Lapid. The new “change government” includes an unprecedentedly diverse set of parties ranging from the pro-two state solution Meretz Party on the left to the pro-annexation Yamina on the far right, and will for the first time include an Arab party, Mansour Abbas’s United Arab List, in the ruling coalition.
How durable will the new coalition government be? What does a Naftali Bennett premiership mean for the future of a two-state solution and the Israeli occupation? How will Netanyahu deal with his new role as Israel’s opposition leader? MEI hosts this panel discussion to address these issues.
Speakers:
Thair Abu Rass
Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland
Dr. Shira Efron
Senior research fellow, Institute for National Security Studies; Special advisor on Israel, RAND Corporation; Adjunct scholar at the Modern War Institute, West Point
Paul Scham
Director of the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies, University of Maryland; Professor of Israel Studies, University of Maryland; Non-resident fellow, MEI
Khaled Elgindy (moderator)
Senior fellow and director of the Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs, MEI
9. Report Launch: Shifting Gears: Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition | June 11, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The Atlantic Council Global Energy Center marks the launch of its new report Shifting Gears: Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition. Driven largely by technological advancements and policies aimed at decarbonization, the prospect that oil demand will peak in the not-too-distant future has become a topic of debate in energy circles over the past several years. So-called “peak demand” would have significant geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences for oil-producing and importing nations alike. Shifting Gears examines major geopolitical questions related to the prospect of a peak in oil demand that include the likely redistribution of oil market share between major producers; the potential for failed states or material internal political instability in major oil-producing countries; and the geopolitical impact of peak demand on major oil-consuming nations.
Speakers:
Randolph Bell (opening remarks)
Director of the Global Energy Center and Richard Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security, Atlantic Council
Robert Johnston (keynote and moderator)
Managing director of Energy, Climate, and Resource, Eurasia Group; Nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council
Håvard Halland
Senior economist, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Amy Myers Jaffe
Research professor and managing director of the Climate Policy Lab at the Fletcher School, Tufts University
10. Iran in an Emerging New World Order: A Book Talk with Ali Fathollah-Nejad | June 11, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
MEI hosts author Ali Fathollah-Nejad to discuss his new book, with Professor Anoush Ehteshami joining him on the panel as a discussant. Accounting for both domestic factional politics and the international balance of power, Ali Fatollah-Nejad’s book examines the drivers behind Iranian foreign policy since 9/11. He also examines Iran’s relations with non-Western great powers and offers a critique of the “Rouhani doctrine” and its economic and foreign-policy visions. What can we detect about Iranian geopolitical imaginations and what do we know about the competing visions of various foreign policy schools of thought in Iran? Why was Rouhani’s so-called neoliberal-inspired developmental model doomed to fail? Will the “Look to the East” political faction deepen Tehran’s pursuit of its interests in regards to ties to China in the post-Rouhani period? What does this all mean for American policy calculations vis-vis-Iran in the coming years?
Speakers:
Ali Fathollah-Nejad
Political scientist, analyst, author; non-resident senior research fellow, Afro-Middle East Centre (AMEC)
Professor Anoush Ehteshami
Director for the Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham University
Alex Vatanka (moderator)
Director of the Iran Program, MEI
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Taking score of the GCC at 40: better on economics than politics
On 05/27, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) celebrated this weeks’ 40 year anniversary of the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council by discussing the organization’s origins, achievements, and future challenges. A Eurocentric approach to the GCC yields few results. The member states’ and region’s different dynamics make an EU benchmark counterproductive. Nonetheless, the panel agreed that this anniversary should be an opportunity to reconsider and renew the GCC’s Charter and mission. The GCC’s achievements are many. As the recent inter-GCC conflict showed, however, it faces serious challenges for the future too.
The speakers were:
Abdullah Baabood
Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies & Visiting Professor
School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University
Matteo Legrenzi
Professor of International Relations
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Emma Soubrier
Visiting Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kristin Smith Diwan
Senior Resident Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
The GCC’s origins: no ‘Gulf-EU’
Matteo Legrenzi thinks it is important to acknowledge the different factors that led to the GCC. It is true that worries about Iran were a key reason. However, Gulf cooperation had been on the rise since independence from the UK in the 1970s. Furthermore, the GCC was intended to keep Iraq out, as much as it was intended to unite against Iran. Iraq had been seeking inroads in the Gulf in the context of its Arab nationalist leadership aspirations. Keeping Iraq out of the GCC was a clear signal in the context of the Iran-Iraq War. Diwan remarked that ironically the GCC’s secretary-general’s speech this week emphasized the efforts underway to involve Iraq in the GCC more. Baabood added that the Arab state system’s instability at the time also contributed to the Gulf’s desire for cooperation. Egypt’s peace with Israel and the Arab League’s outrage at the time put regional security on shaky footings.
Emma Soubrier explained that the GCC never became a regional security system, nor was it intended to. It did achieve a strong Gulf identity alongside the prevailing Arab identity of the time. This succeeded both domestically and internationally. Abdullah Baabood commented that the GCC achieved a tariff and trade union. It managed to become greater than the sum of its parts and outperformed expectations in doing so.
Matteo Legrenzi took some time to emphasize the differences between the GCC and the EU model. The domestic organization of GCC states – where a small ruling class wields absolute power – allows quick action to be taken when leaders agree. However, GCC institutions should not be expected to develop supra-national powers. All countries freely admitted to this from the start. Because of this, certain fields see less cooperation than others. Security and defense are less integrated than trade and economics for this reason.
Facing today’s challenges
The Middle East faces a new security order today. Rather than a post-US order, this is a multipolar order in which the US plays a definite part, according to Soubrier. We should therefore not be afraid to be a little US-centric. The conclusion of the al-Ula agreement (which ended the blockade of Qatar) mere weeks before Biden took office is no coincidence, for example. The conflict surrounding Qatar is a major elephant in the room in the GCC.
Baabood acknowledged that it is unprecedented. Its scope went beyond the political to include the societal and public opinion. It hurt the Khaleeji (Gulf) identity that the GCC had so successfully helped establish. Furthermore, it went directly against the GCC common market, without using any GCC mechanisms for resolving disputes. This seriously harmed the trust the GCC is built upon. Much remains to be restored after al-Ula particularly between Qatar and the UAE. Soubrier did emphasize that the GCC leaves much room for bilateral projects and cooperation. This “integration at different speeds” is one of the GCC’s strengths.
The war in Yemen is another conflict in which the GCC might play a part. However, Legrenzi warned that the GCC should not be expected to play a role in political resolutions. Rather, its strength will be in reconstruction of the Yemeni economy, once the political disputes have been resolved. Yemeni accession to the GCC is unlikely because the monarchical model is central to the GCC.
The future
The panel concluded with discussion of the directions the GCC could and should take in the near future. Soubrier emphasized the need for more human-based security. Humanitarian issues in the region are at a peak and the disconnect between Gulf leaders’ vision and public sentiment – e.g. on the recent Gaza war – shows the need for a new focus. Legrenzi and Baabood agreed that the 40th anniversary would be a good occasion to review the GCC Charter. As Legrenzi noted, the charter is a product of the 1970s and 80s. It is full of language relating to Arab nationalism, making it a historical document rather than a modern guideline. There are some mechanisms and aspirations mentioned in the charter which never came to fruition. The GCC countries should take the opportunity to reassess their vision for the organization. This could reinvigorate the project in the process.
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