Category: Maithili Bagaria
A nomad life: Indian, Thai or American?
Middle East Intern Maithili Bagaria was born in India, raised in Thailand and is currently a rising senior at Rice University in Houston, Texas. She writes:
As I feel another spasm of pain, I grab my phone on the bedside table and call my uncle, ranting to him about my terrible stomach cramps and begging him to think of a solution. He tells me to go to the emergency room if the pain is unbearable. I tell him I think it’ll pass within the hour. He then advises me to set up an appointment with a primary care provider and asks me to make sure my insurance will cover the visit.
I put the phone down in confusion. Insurance? How was that related to anything? I begin to recall the annual health insurance charged to my father as part of college tuition. I remember the Aetna plastic card that came in the mail during the first week of classes. I furiously rummage through my wallet and locate the plastic card, grateful that I had the common sense not to throw it away. My journey in American health care is off to a good start.
Logging in to Aetna’s website, I am stormed by various tabs that mean nothing to me. After locating the “Find a doctor” tab, I’m confused as to which insurance plan I possess. I go back through my records and find that I’ve been charged for student health insurance and try searching that instead. This time I’m taken to a website that allows me to locate doctors that are partnered with Aetna Student Health.
I call a university hospital and am quickly set up for an annual physical Aetna covers. At my appointment, my doctor tells me she’ll send a prescription to the nearest CVS. When I pick up my medicines, I find my insurance covers those too. All in all, I’ve been charged $0 for my visit.
In Thailand, the hospital process would have easily cost me $100. I would have had to pay for the doctor, the medicine and the administrative fees out of my pocket. The idea of health insurance for non-Thais living in Thailand is out of the question. Even many wealthy Thais opt out of health insurance and pay the hospital fee upfront when need be. Now, it is true that medical care costs less in Thailand than the US, but health care without insurance—which is common—can easily cost hundreds, if not thousands of dollars.
In my experience, doctors in Asia–certainly in Thailand and India–are less likely to prescribe medicines for “minor pain.” Doctors in Bangkok have often told me that if I can bear the pain, I should avoid taking medicines. In Washington DC, I was told there is no need to tolerate any pain. Daily medicines can easily fix the issue. I subscribed to the American model when the pain started interfering with my work schedule.
The question of which medical recommendation is better is more than a conflict between Western and Eastern medicine. It is a conflict between disparate cultures, ideologies and histories, which I face everyday as a modern-day nomad. By giving in to my American doctors’ recommendation, am I becoming a victim of American work culture and allowing my schedule to dictate crucial health decisions? Or am I simply being practical by embracing modern-day medicine?
The people around me had no trouble trying to put me in a box. On my first day at Rice University, a member of the cleaning staff started talking to me in rapid Spanish after she saw I was dark-skinned and understood what “hola” meant. American friends attributed my vegetarianism to my religion, even though I’m a practicing Hindu in name only. Indian family members assumed I had lost respect for Indian customs and traditions as an Indian who had grown up abroad.
It seemed I could never please anyone, except I could please everyone. The disparate philosophies embedded in me allow me to relate comfortably with others. I can understand the warmth one feels from living amongst 15 other people just as much as the independence one feels from living alone. I can transition from a direct and transparent communication style to one that demands more subtlety. And most importantly, I can listen without many preconceived notions, because I know the costs of trying to put people in a box. A modern day nomad’s life is full of internal cultural conflicts, but also one of rewarding connections with other people.
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Iran’s return to oil markets
Thursday, the Wilson Center focused on “Middle East Energy: Beyond an Iran Nuclear Deal,” which explored the oil and gas sectors’ future given Iran’s possible sanctions relief. Speakers included David Goldwyn, President of Goldwyn Global Strategies LLC, David Gordon, Senior Advisor of the Eurasia Group, Julia Nanay, Principal at Energy Ventures LLC and Jean-Francois Seznec, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. The event was moderated by Jan H. Kalicki, Wilson Center Public Policy Fellow and Energy Lead.
Gordon talked about potential energy market responses with the entry of Libya and Iran into the market. Libya’s entry last year put downward pressure on oil prices. The country is currently in the process of building up its export volumes, but the political and security fragility remains. Iran’s market impact is also uncertain. There may be competition between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states for market share. Iran’s success is far from assured. The current uncertainty ends up being bearish for energy markets, which will lead to the strengthening of the US dollar. Only the risk of supply disruption and failure of nuclear talks could be bullish for markets.
If sanctions are lifted, Nanay thinks Iran’s key goal is to become the second largest producer in OPEC. Saudi Arabia’s oil production amounts to 10.3 million barrels a day, while Iran is at 2.8 million barrels a day. Iraq’s is a bit higher. Iran might bring back 700-800,000 barrels a day, with 20 million barrels released quickly and efficiently. Sanctions have also prevented oil revenues from flowing back to Iran. There may be as much as $100 billion that could be released quickly, possibly half from China. International oil companies (IOCs) also owe large sums to Iran.
Possible losers from sanctions relief are the Saudis, Russians, Nigerians and Kuwaitis. The Saudis and Russians have been able to capture some exports to China. Sanctions relief would decrease the market share of all oil exporting countries that have benefited from having Iran off the oil market.
Iran has several stalled projects with significant market potential in the oil and gas sectors. A South Pars project requires 24 phases to develop fully, of which 11 phases have already been done without sanctions removal. Iran is looking to complete more phases by next year. Iran has also planned three big Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects. Iran can ship this LNG to Europe and supply its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but politics may complicate partnerships. The only neighbor Iran has a good relationship with is Oman. An Iran-Oman gas pipeline is possible, but the countries may disagree on price.
Seznec disagreed with Nanay on Iran’s potential in the oil market. Iran will require technology and investment that would make it dependent on IOCs. Instead, Iran can emphasize natural gas, which both Iran and the Gulf states need. The GCC states—especially Saudi Arabia—could partner with Iran in the gas sector. The Saudis have the technology and money to help the Iranians redevelop their gas fields. The Kingdom is seeking to avoid overdependence on crude oil. Instead, it wants to add value by building capacity for refined products and chemicals. Their vision is eventually to get out selling crude and leave Iran and Iraq as the “third world countries” that produce raw materials.
Goldwyn commented on Iraq’s position in the oil market. He believes Iraq might increase production by completing the revamp of the Al Faw Peninsula, but that is an $8-10 billion dollar project.
On the Baghdad-Kurdistan Regional Government deal, Goldwyn pointed out two reasons for the unraveling:
- Baghdad hasn’t paid Kurdish forces what it owes.
- The Kurds are not exporting the agreed-upon average of 550,000 barrels per day.
If Iraq is unable to increase production much and Iran produces an additional 500-800,000 barrels a day, there is no need for OPEC quota renegotiation, Goldwyn said. There is room for rapprochement on economics between Iran and the Gulf states. But first there must be rapprochement on security. If Iran reduces its involvement in Yemen and Iraq, there is potential for détente with the Saudis, who would also have to do their part in reducing the flow of funds to Al Qaeda and ISIS. If both parties deliver, an economic deal is on the horizon. Otherwise, the current situation will continue, with the Saudis better financed and more competitive than any other player in the Gulf.
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Peace picks July 13-17
1. The Future of the U.S.-India Partnership: Ten Years After the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative | Monday, July 13th | 8:15-5:00 | Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Confederation of Indian Industry for a conference on the future of the U.S.-India partnership, ten years after the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. Speakers include: William J. Burns, President, Carnegie Endowment, Chandrajit Banerjee, Director General, Confederation of Indian Industry, Arun K. Singh, Ambassador of India, Nisha Desai Biswal, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian and Central Asian Affairs, Condoleeza Rice, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, R. Nicholas Burns, Professor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Shyam Saran, Chairman, National Security Advisory Board, Indian Government, Philip D. Zelikow, Professor, University of Virginia, Sumit Mazumder, President, Confederation of the Indian Industry, Rajiv I. Modi, Chairman, Cadila Pharmaceuticals, Deep Kapuria, Chairman, Hi-Tech Gears Ltd., Kaushik Basu, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, World Bank, Stephen J. Hadley, Chairman, Board of Directors, USIP, M.K. Narayanan, Governor of West Bengal in India, Shivshankar Menon, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Thomas E. Donilon, Vice Chair, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Robert M. Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities, Eliot A. Cohen, Professor of Strategic Studies , School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Vikram J. Singh, Vice-President, National Security and International Policy, Center for American Progress and Sukaran Singh, Managing Director and CEO, Tata Advanced Systems. Moderators include: Stephen E. Biegun, Corporate Officer and Vice President of International Governmental Affairs, Ford Motor Company, Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, Research Fellow, Cato Institute, William J. Burns, President, Carnegie Endowment and David E. Sanger, Chief Washington Correspondent, New York Times.
2. Why Human Rights Matter in Policy toward North Korea | Monday, July 13th | 12:00-2:00 | National Endowment for Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The 2014 report of the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on human rights in North Korea successfully brought international attention to the severity of the Kim regime’s human rights violations and the plight of the North Korean people, and highlighted the need for the international community to do more to address human rights in the isolated country. At the same time, the impact of the COI report on the attitude of the international community is yet to be seen, while nuclear issues remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea. In his presentation, Yoshihiro Makino will describe the little understood political situation inside North Korea and discuss how the repression of basic rights is fundamental to the regime’s grip on power. Mr. Makino will base his analysis on information gathered through extensive interviews with North Korea specialists, diplomats, and direct sources with first-hand knowledge. He will then offer suggestions on how the US and the international community can use this knowledge to more effectively address human rights issues in North Korea. His presentation will be followed by comments by Bruce Klingner. Speakers include: Yoshihiro Makino, Expert on East Asian Security, National Endowment for Democracy, Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Heritage Foundation and Lynn Lee, Senior Program Officer, National Endowment for Democracy.
3. Oil Price Trends and Global Implications | Tuesday, July 14th | 9:00-10:15 | Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The sharp drop in oil prices is one of the most important global economic developments over the past year. While oil’s long term price outlook remains highly uncertain, a substantial part of its decline is expected to persist into the medium term. Aasim M. Husain will discuss implications of these developments for the global economy and financial markets, as well as recommended policy responses for key country groups. He will be joined by Mark Finley and Uri Dadush to discuss market trends as well as their economic and political implications for oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Carnegie’s Michele Dunne will moderate. A light breakfast will be served. Speakers include: Aasim M. Husain, Deputy Director, Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund, Uri Dadush, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment, Mark Finley, General Manager, Global Energy Markets and U.S. Economics at BP. Moderators include: Michele Dunne, Senior Associate, Carnegie’s Middle East Program.
4. The Struggle for Democracy in Myanmar/Burma | Tuesday, July 14th | 9:30-11:00 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Myanmar/Burma is in the fourth year of a historic transition out of military rule that began after the junta dissolved itself in March 2011, replaced by an elected parliament and the government led by President Thein Sein. New elections are expected in November for its second government under the 2008 constitution. While expressing commitment to holding a free and fair election, the Thein Sein government has left in place a constitutional obstacle to allowing Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), from becoming the country’s next president. The NLD seems likely to emerge from the new elections with the most seats in the legislature, but may fall short of its landslide victory in the 1990 election, which was not accepted by the ruling military junta.On July 14, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host a discussion of Myanmar’s progress over the past four years and the prospects for strengthening democratic rule under the next government. Delphine Schrank, a former reporter with The Washington Post, spent four years among dissidents in Myanmar/Burma and has written a narrative nonfiction account about their epic multi-generational fight for democracy. Her book ‘The Rebel of Rangoon; A Tale of Defiance and Deliverance’ (Nation Books, 2015) will set the stage for the discussion. Speakers include: Ted Piccone, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Lex Rieffel, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Priscilla Clapp, Former Chief-Of-Mission, U.S. Embassy in Burma and Richard Bush, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies.
5. Hearing: Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (Part III) | Tuesday, July 14th | 10:00-1:00 | Rayburn House Office Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In announcing the series of hearings, Chairman Royce said: “As we anticipate a congressional review of the Administration’s possible nuclear agreement with Iran, we’ll be looking to see how the Administration has done on Congress’ red lines. Did we get anywhere, anytime inspections? Full Iranian transparency regarding its past nuclear activities? No large-scale, immediate sanctions relief; but guaranteed, workable sanctions snap-backs? Meaningful restraints on Iran’s nuclear program that last decades? This hearing will be the first in a series the Committee will hold should the Administration strike what might be one of the most significant agreements in decades. As I have said, no deal is far better than a bad deal.” Speakers include: Joseph I. Lieberman, Co-Chair of the Foundation, Defense of Democracies, General Michael V. Hayden, Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency and R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.
6. Can the IAEA Effectively Verify an Agreement Between Iran and the P5+1? | Wednesday, July 15th | 9:30-11:00 | The Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Atlantic Council Iran Task Force and Search for Common Ground invite you to a discussion on the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor a nuclear agreement with Iran. A key issue arising during nuclear negotiations with Iran is the international community’s ability to verify Iran’s compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. Former IAEA Safeguards Official Thomas Shea will discuss a new paper on the evolution of techniques used to verify a country’s compliance with nuclear safeguards and other non-proliferation obligations. Panelists will also discuss other potential methods to detect – and thus deter – Iran from violating the terms of an agreement. Speakers include: William Green Miller, Senior Advisor, US-Iran Program, Search for Common Ground, Thomas Shea, Former Safeguards Official, International Atomic Energy Agency, Jim Walsh, Research Associate, Security Studies Program, MIT. Moderators include: Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
7. The Kuwait Crisis 25 Years Later | Wednesday, July 15th | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Twenty five years ago this summer, Iraq provoked a crisis with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, demanding debt cancellation and higher oil prices. It proved to be a ruse for a far more daring plan. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait. Around the world, people feared that Saddam Hussein’s armies would move on to Saudi Arabia. In response, President George H. W. Bush deployed hundreds of thousands of American troops to the Kingdom, recruited an international alliance to support them, and gained United Nations and U.S. congressional support to liberate Kuwait. The Gulf War fundamentally altered American policy toward the Middle East and laid the foundation for the many successes and failures that followed. Today, Americans continue to wrestle with the legacy of the Gulf War and the dilemma that the Middle East has posed to U.S. foreign policy in the years since. On July 15, the Brookings Intelligence Project will host Brookings Senior Fellows Kenneth Pollack and Bruce Riedel to reflect on the Kuwait crisis a quarter century later, looking back on 1990 and forward from 2015. They will discuss this crucial turning point and its significance for the region and the United States. Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project, will moderate the discussion. Following their remarks, Pollack and Riedel will take questions from the audience. Speakers include: Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution and Bruce Riedel, Director, Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution.
8. Considerations and constraints for U.S., EU and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucusus | Wednesday, July 15th | 10:30-12:00 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Harsh geopolitical realities and historic legacies have pushed the South Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia back onto the foreign policy agendas of the United States, the European Union (EU), and Turkey, at a time when all three have pulled back from more activist roles in regional affairs. Western disengagement has exacerbated some of the more negative regional trends by signaling disinterest and a lack of commitment toward resolving ongoing conflicts and challenges. These current dynamics create several policy challenges for the region and beyond, including whether the festering crises in the Caucasus will feed into broader conflagrations; whether the United States, EU, and Turkey re-evaluate their involvement in the region in light of Russia’s assertive new foreign policy; and whether given other priorities, can the West muster sufficient political will to re-engage, within limits, in high-level regional diplomacy?
On July 15, the Brookings Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) will host a panel to discuss a new report, Retracing the Caucasian Circle, co-authored by Fiona Hill, Kemal Kirişci, and Andrew Moffatt. In the paper, the authors provide an overview of the geopolitical and security issues facing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and their consequences for relations with the West. The report advocates that in spite of major challenges these three actors should not give up on their engagement of the region and should adopt realistic approaches which can be sustained. Speakers include: Fiona Hill, Director, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution, Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. State Department, Unal Cevikoz, President, Ankara Policy Center and Klaus Botzet, Head of the Political, Security and Development Section, Delegation of the European Union to the U.S. Moderators include: Kemal Kirisci, Director, Turkey Project, Brookings Institution.
9. Religious Freedom: Rising Threats to a Fundamental Human Right| Thursday, July 16th | 9:30-4:15 | Copley Formal Lounge | REGISTER TO ATTEND | According to the Pew Research Center, governmental and social restrictions on religion continue to rise. Today 77 percent of the world’s population lives in religiously repressive countries. This conference will examine the severe and growing challenges facing minority religions around the world—including in the Middle East, Western Europe, Myanmar, and Russia—and will give special attention to how religious persecution affects women and girls. A central question will be whether and how US international religious freedom policy can improve conditions for religious minorities abroad and the societies in which they live. Speakers include: Ken Starr, Baylor University, Congressman Keith Ellison, House of Representatives (D-Minnesota), Katrina Lantos Swett, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Engy Abdelkader, Rutgers University and American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Rabbi Andrew Baker, AJC Thomas Farr, Religious Freedom Project, Georgetown University , Brian Grim, Religious Freedom and Business Foundation , Elizabeth Cassidy, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Aisha Rahman, KARAMAH, Jacqueline Rivers, Harvard Kennedy School, Frank Wolf, Baylor University and retired House of Representatives (R-Virginia) , Mark Schickman, American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Timothy Samuel Shah, Religious Freedom Project . Moderators include: Richard Foltin, American Jewish Committee (AJC) and American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities and Claudia Winkler, Religious Freedom Project, Georgetown University.
10. Civil Resistance and Peacebuilding: How They Connect| Thursday, July 16th | 10:00-11:00 | United States Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The rise of nonviolent, people power movements around the world has become a defining feature of the 21st century. While some have deteriorated into violent conflict, organized citizen campaigns using nonviolent methods are challenging formidable opponents: unaccountable governance, systemic corruption, institutionalized discrimination, environmental degradation, dictatorship, foreign military occupation, and violent extremism. Their “weapons” are not guns or bombs, but rather protests, boycotts, sit-ins, civil disobedience, building of alternative institutions, and hundreds of other nonviolent means. Combined with the use of traditional political and legal approaches, these movements continue to shape political, social, and economic change across the globe.
This panel will explore how nonviolent civil resistance and peacebuilding reinforce each other. How does civic mobilization fit into the larger peacebuilding agenda? How have nonviolent campaigns and movements contributed to long-term peace and stability? What are the theoretical and practical linkages that might prevent violent conflict and advance a “just peace”? Speakers include: Nancy Lindborg, President, USIP, Kerri Kennedey, Associate General Secretary for International Porgrams, American Friends Service Committee, Manal Omar, Acting Vice President, Center for Middle East and Africa, USIP. Moderators include: Maria Stephan, Senior Policy Fellow, USIP.
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Containment in the Middle East
Tuesday the Atlantic Council hosted an event on its report “The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security” featuring Bilal Saab, Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council, Barry Posen, Director of the Security Studies Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Barbara Starr, Pentagon Correspondent for CNN, moderated the event.
Containment is the best strategy
Saab explained that the report is based on four preconditions:
- There will be no lasting security or stability in the Middle East as long as religious hubris, economic mismanagement and abrupt political changes dominate the region.
- The US cannot and should not be an agent pushing for change.
- Reforms cannot happen without addressing security challenges first.
- The US cannot address security challenges alone—it needs partners.
The Iraq invasion in 2003 was proof that the US does not have sufficient economic resources or know-how for nation-building and US presence de-legitimizes this process.
Given these preconditions, the best option is a US containment strategy with six pillars:
- Prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Deter large-scale military conflict. If deterrence fails, then consider military intervention.
- Limit escalation between Israel and Hamas and between Israel and Hezbollah.
- Reduce the scope and severity of civil wars.
- Degrade violent extremist groups and leave the “hard work” to regional stakeholders, so they can develop their own political narrative and ideology.
- Limit Iran’s destabilizing influence.
Saab added that though US participation will be limited to containing conflicts, it must help the Middle East develop a new regional security architecture that is conducive to US interests.
Iran nuclear deal
On the Iranian nuclear deal, the three panelists had differing opinions. Haass claimed if there is a deal, it would restrict ‘nuclear Iran,’ not ‘imperial Iran.’ He said lifting sanctions would grant Iran more resources, which would fuel its existing activities and exacerbate the challenges it poses. Additionally, managing the nuclear deal would become a consuming challenge for future American presidents as it would become a permanent part of American statecraft. Elements of the Iranian nuclear program would remain intact, which would allow nuclear activity in a region by a government whose stability is uncertain.
Posen argued that no deal would prolong the arduous task of sustaining the sanctions regime, which requires a lot of side payments. He also warned that if the deal crashes, constituencies in the US and abroad would call for a military strike. The consequence of maintaining the current status quo is more uncertainty about Iranian capabilities than if the deal happened. Furthermore, Posen urged that the US consider its interests first. American partners may frown on good Iran-US relations, but they would benefit the US.
Saab said that there would be uncertainty regardless of whether there is or isn’t a deal. America’s partners do not feel sure about their relationships with Washington. The Saudis have begun talking about launching their own nuclear program.
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
There was more consensus on the security threat ISIS poses. Saab said ISIS does not pose a direct and imminent threat to the homeland. However, rooting ISIS out will be challenging to say the least. ISIS is a byproduct of the ills of the Arab state system, including political decay, economic mismanagement and corrupt governments. It is not just a consequence of Al Qaeda. Degrading ISIS is only the first step—and the US isn’t even good at that—but eliminating ISIS could take years.
Posen talked about ISIS’s expansionist nature—it “grabs” wherever it perceives weakness. ISIS has both ideological affinity and subversive capability, which make it costly to annihilate the group. Nevertheless, the US can spy on it and contain it by supporting coherent groups willing to fight against it.
Saudi Arabia, Posen thought, is paying alarmingly little attention to ISIS, even though the Kingdom is likely high on ISIS’s subversion list. He was surprised by the Saudis’ immense effort in Yemen compared to its actions against ISIS. Haass agreed with this assessment, adding that Saudi Arabia is too focused on Iran and manifestations of Iranian power, which is a misallocation of resources.
Saab claimed that Saudi Arabia does indeed care. Riyadh launched one of the world’s biggest counterterrorism operations against Bin Laden and has undergone many internal changes to be better equipped to deal with the ISIS threat.
Regional security
Haass was cynical about change in the Middle East’s security system, claiming it is premature. He explained the creation of a system requires balance of power and a shared concept of legitimacy—neither of which exists in the Middle East.
Posen doesn’t think the Iranian regional challenge amounts to much. Most of the places where Iran exercises influence are places deeply divided by problems not of Iranian creation. Iran did not create the Yemen civil war, even if it might gain some benefits from it.
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The devil is in the details
My current Middle East Institute interns Maithili Bagaria and Eddie Grove have combed through the many publications asking questions about the impending Iran nuclear deal. Here is their matrix indicating the main issues that need to be resolved:
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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Parameters |
Contentious Points |
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Reducing Breakout Time |
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Natanz will be the only uranium enrichment facility for the next 10 years. Enrichment levels will not exceed 3.67% — insufficient for a bomb, but useful for civilian purposes. The number of centrifuges will be reduced by ⅔ to 5,060, as well as the stockpile of low-enriched uranium from 10,000 to 3,000 kg. |
How exactly will Iran reduce its uranium stockpile? Will it ship it to another country or reduce it through some mechanism domestically? |
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The Arak and Fordow nuclear facilities will be converted into research sites for 10 years. |
What are the restrictions on the scope of research and whether these restrictions will remain after 10 years? |
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Redesigned Arak reactor that will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. |
What will the details of the remodeling be and what will be the level of reduction in plutonium production? |
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Byproducts of fission from the Arak reactor will be shipped out. |
How will this be verified? |
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Iran has committed to not pursue reprocessing indefinitely and to not conduct reprocessing R&D.
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What does indefinitely mean? Does this mean for the duration of the deal? |
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After 10 years, Iran will be bound by a long-term enrichment and R&D for enrichment program shared with the P5+1. |
Most of the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program are lifted after 10-15 years. Iran’s breakout time beyond this point will be contingent on the details of this long-term program, which have not been announced. |
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Eliminating Sneakout Possibility |
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Suspected breaches in the agreement by Iran will lead to sanctions snapback. |
What is the time frame and mechanism for the snapback sanctions? How will the P5+1 members prevent any of the UN Security Council’s permanent members from vetoing a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions? |
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Architecture of US Sanctions will be maintained for much of the duration of the deal to allow for snapback sanctions. |
What does “much of the duration of the deal” mean and why not the entire duration? |
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The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities and the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. |
Given the resistance within the Iranian leadership to international inspection, how will the IAEA and P5+1 enforce regular access? How frequently will “regular access” take place? |
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UN Security Council Resolutions regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program will be voided and replaced with a new Security Council Resolution that will endorse the JCPOA, and keep core provisions from previous Resolutions that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities. |
Given that previous Resolutions called on Iran to cease enrichment entirely and to not build heavy water reactors, what “core provisions” are going to be retained in this new resolution? |
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The slough of despair
The Wilson Center Tuesday hosted a panel on Ukraine and its challenges. Speakers included former Ambassador to Lithuania John Cloud, now Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, his colleague Professor Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Matthew Rojansky, Director of the Kennan Institute at the Wilson Center, who also moderated the event.
Rojansky shared insights from his recent travel to Ukraine. He warned that the media’s portrayal of Ukraine is different from events on the ground. From the Ukrainian point of view, the conflict is about values and the survival of Western civilization. There is a culture war between neo-Soviet culture and the resurgence of Western Ukrainian ideas and history.
Rojansky also emphasized the severe cognitive dissonance in the country, where there are people experiencing the impact of war every day, as well as those who are isolated from it. He claimed that macro-level psychological impacts, such as cognitive dissonance and untreated post traumatic stress, could be extremely unhealthy for Ukrainian society.
Cloud talked about his experience visiting bordering areas of Ukraine, near Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. He explained the slow and painful process of reforms, wracked by poor coordination. Reforms have been on and off for a long time with few concrete results, resulting in public distrust of the government.
The need for economic reform is acute, given Ukraine’s high levels of inflation and budget deficit. Oligarchs continue to do well and therefore are resistant to change. Cloud suggested three solutions:
- Prosecute or force the oligarchs to leave the county,
- Strike a deal with them, or
- Create a thriving middle-class, which is the hardest solution of the three options.
Cloud also discussed the European Union’s “donor fatigue.” Although Ukraine is only entering its second year of conflict since the revolution began, the EU has been assisting Ukraine for the past 24 years. The Commission has nevertheless put together a $1.2 billion macroeconomic assistance program—the largest such package the EU has ever provided.
This does not mean the EU has severed relations with Russia. The Union has made concerted efforts to keep Russia content, notably by inviting Russia to join discussions on the impact of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)—a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine.
Gvosdev described three important themes of the Ukraine-Russia crisis. First, he viewed the European conflict as a “crisis of rules,” in which the enforcement of EU rules is imposing a cost that the Europeans are unwilling to pay. He cautioned, however, against avoiding enforcement, as it carries a higher cost in the long-term.
Second, the EU lacks unity. The further west and south one goes in Europe, the less Ukraine is an issue. This disparity has made it difficult to create an EU framework agreed by both Poland and Spain. Building a unified response to Ukraine will require compromises and concessions from all EU member states. Another point of disagreement is the resettlement of migrants. Eastern European countries are very resistant to accepting Ukrainian migrants and worry about radicalized refugee flows.
Third are the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of the crisis. Geopolitically, Russia is challenging post-Cold War stability and threatening the current world order. Economically, many business interests are at stake, including the Asia-Pacific “Silk Road,” which will pass through Russia. Many businesses lack confidence in North America’s shale gas and would like to keep Russia as Europe’s energy supplier.
A huge sense of fatigue and pessimism casts a shadow on the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Gvosdev said that Euro-Atlantic solidarity is questionable and the US is unlikely to play a major role as it gets caught up in domestic politics with the nearing presidential elections.
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