Category: Nick Wade
Corruption and concessions
On July 9 the American Enterprise Institute held a panel discussion about the intersection between authoritarian corruption, dictatorial regimes, terrorism, and criminal abuse of free markets. The panel guests included Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University and a senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, and Daniel Twining, President of the International Republican Institute. The panel was moderated by Clay R. Fuller, Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at AEI, where he researches authoritarian governance, illicit finance, and corruption.
Mesquita noted that the traditional perpetrators of corrupt acts are not limited to autocrats, terrorists or drug dealers. Even democratically elected leaders present corruption risk, especially when they make deals with corrupt actors, even though the deals are meant to further the interests of a democratic nation. This is one of the reasons it is so difficult to combat corruption. To solve the problem, countries must address the question of how to please constituents on key policy issues without “concessions” to corruption. Corrupt government leaders can pay their cronies, to the detriment of the citizens.
Twining said that when democratic countries support corrupt governments through concession payments to further foreign policy agendas, there is a spillover into surrounding countries. Terrorism, migration, and human trafficking can be tracked to corrupt and kleptocratic governance.
Fuller discussed corruption more broadly, noting that corruption is not unique to kleptocratic, despotic, and authoritarian regimes. Rather, corruption in these systems of governance is more visible and perhaps more detrimental to large swathes of the populace because it privileges a small group, granting them nearly all legitimate government powers.
With regards to how to mitigate corruption, Mesquita focused on the promotion of transparency. More government transparency drives accountability, which can spur the development of good governance. Constituents can play an important role in democratic states. It is important to educate their publics about the effects that corruption has in authoritarian countries, and the way that concession payments can contribute to corruption. Education on this issue will increase the priority that democratic governments give to better governance overseas, rather than just a blind pursuit of foreign policy goals.
Furthermore, Mesquita believes that the promotion of democracy is key to good governance abroad. While the United States has tried to promote democracy, past attempts have frequently fallen short. Mesquita thinks that US efforts have not been sincere; autocrats will comply more readily to US policy in exchange for money if there are no stipulations regarding changes in government. However, the biggest barrier to dealing with corruption is the fact that despots rely on few people to stay in power. Corrupt leaders allow their cronies to steal, launder money, and pad their coffers at the expense of citizens as long as they remain loyal.
Twining discussed the effect that the Chinese Belt and Road initiative is having on corruption globally. Specifically, in parts of Asian, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, authoritarian leaders are taking Chinese loans, aid, and investments. These deals contribute to corruption in local politics because they are often not transparent. Furthermore, they involve a potential loss of sovereignty, especially if they default on loans. He concluded that the United States has an important role to play in buttressing transparency and accountability globally. The desire for freedom and good governance is universal.
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Peace Picks July 15 -July 19
1. After Sistani and Khamenei: Looming Successions Will Shape the Middle East|July 15 2019|12:00pm|Atlantic Council |Register Here
At a time of rising tensions between the United States and Iran, Iran and the wider Shia world are facing important successions for leadership that will impact a number of issues. These include how independent Iraq will be of foreign influence, whether Iran finally succeeds in exporting its unique system of government, whether Iran continues to comply with a 2015 nuclear agreement, and the nature of both countries’ relations, or lack thereof, with the United States. Please join us for a discussion of these issues and the release of a new report, “After Sistani and Khamenei: How Looming Successions Will Shape the Middle East,” by Abbas Kadhim and Barbara Slavin.
Moderator: Moshen Milani, Executive Director, Center for Strategic & Diplomatic Studies
Panelists:
Kadhim: Director, Iraq Initiative, Atlantic Council
Barbara Slavin: Director, Future of Iran Initiative
Mohammed Ayatolahi Tabaar: Associate Professor, Bush School of Government and Public Service
2. US-Colombia Partnership: From Venezuela’s Crisis to Counter-Narcotics Efforts|July 16, 2019|9:00am|Atlantic Council|Register Here
Colombia is a strategic leader in Latin America and an indispensable partner for the United States. Its role in working to find a solution to the crisis in Venezuela is vital, while, domestically, Colombia continues to absorb more Venezuelan migrants. The Duque administration is also demonstrating an increased commitment to eradicating coca crops.
How can the US-Colombia strategic partnership further advance regional stability? What is the current Colombian perspective to finding a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela? What new steps has Colombia deployed to reduce coca cultivation?
Join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the United States Institute of Peace for on Tuesday, July 16, 2019, from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. (EDT) for a timely conversation on the US-Colombia partnership and its broader importance.
Speakers: To be confirmed
3. War in Syria: The Kurdish Perspective|July 17, 2019|12:00pm|National Press Club 529 14th Street Northwest First Amendment Lounge Washington, DC 20045|Register Here
Please join Turkish Heritage Organization on July 17th, 2019 as we host a panel on the war in Syria. More details to come.
Moderator: Katherine Brumund, Turkish Heritage Organization
Panelists:
Abdullah Kedo: Mebmebr of the Yekiti Party and the Political Commission of ENKS
Abdulaziz Tammo: President, Independent Syrian Kurdish Association
Farouk Belal: Syrian Activist, Co-Founder of the Syrian Cultural House
Shlomo Bolts: Policy and Advocacy Officer, Syrian American Coucil
4. U.S. and Turkey Relations |July 15, 2019|11:00am|National Press Club 529 14th Street Northwest First Amendment Lounge Washington, DC 20045|Register Here
Please join THO on July 15, 2019 from 11 AM-12:30 PM as we hosts Former Military Representative of Turkey to NATO, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ergin Saygun for a discussion on U.S.-Turkey Relations on the Third Anniversary of the Attempted Coup in Turkey. More speakers to be added in the coming days.
Moderator: Mark Hall: Filmmaker and Lawyer
Panelists:
H.E. Edward Whitfield: Co-Founder of Turkish Caucus, Former U.S. Congressman
General (Ret.) Ergin Saygun: Former Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff
5. Prospects for U.S.-Russia Relations: A Perspective from Moscow|July 15, 2019|3:00pm|Center for Strategic and International Studies|Register Here
The conclusion of the Mueller investigation renewed President Trump’s desire to meet with Vladimir Putin and to intensify U.S.-Russian dialogue in general. Both countries face numerous problems, from Venezuela to strategic stability, that require management. Is more effective management of these problems and bilateral relations as such possible? How will Russia approach relations with the U.S. leading up to the 2020 elections and beyond? Does Russia have a strategy vis-à-vis the U.S., and if so, what are its major elements? Lastly, how will the election interference issue impact U.S.-Russia relations after the publication of the Mueller report, and how is Moscow going to address it?
Speakers:
Dmitry Suslov: Deputy Director, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
Jeffery Mankoff: Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program
6. The Future of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: A Conversation with representatives Abigal Spanberger and Michael Waltz |June 11th , 2019|2:00pm-3:30pm|National Endowment for Democracy, 1025 F Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004|Register Here
Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Transnational Threats Project for a dialogue on U.S. counterterrorism strategy with Representatives Abigail Spanberger (D-VA) and Michael Waltz (R-FL). Seth G. Jones, Harold Brown Chair and Director of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project, will moderate a discussion between Rep. Spanberger and Rep. Waltz, who will offer their assessments on the current global terrorism landscape as well as the successes and enduring challenges of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
While growing strategic focus on great power competition with China and Russia is warranted, a parallel leadership effort is needed to address the future of the global fight against terrorism and extremism. Topics for discussion include managing the enduring threats posed by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, defining a suitable end state in Afghanistan, developing a comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism, and responding to homegrown violent extremist threats.
Moderator: Seth G Jones: Harold Brown Chair; Director, Transnational Threats Project; and Senior Adviser, International Security Program
Speakers:
Abigail Spanberger: United States Congresswoman (D-VA)
Michael Waltz: United State Congressman (R-FL)
7. U.S.-Taiwan relations: Reflections on 40 Years of the TRA|July 19, 2019|12:00pm|The Stimson Center|Register Here
Since President Jimmy Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act into law in 1979, the United States and Taiwan have maintained unofficial relations, including trade, people-to-people exchanges, and cultural ties. In the forty years since the Act was signed, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has been a long-standing friendship between two democracies, surviving periods of tension with China. Looking towards the future, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship will be increasingly important particularly as challenges intensify. Taiwan and the U.S.’s policies towards each other on economic and security issues as well as their shared values will be important factors in determining how these challenges are met.
Panelists:
Bonnie Glaser: Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Shelley Rigger: Ph.D., Brown Professor in the Political Science Department of Davidson College
Janice I. Chen: Deputy Director of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party Mission in the U.S.
8. Reporting on Civilian Casualties in the War Against ISIS|July 16, 2019|12:00pm|New America|Register Here
Reporters at U.S. media outlets strongly believed that civilian harm should be a central component of war coverage. Yet, civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes have been patchily covered during the war against so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. This is one of the key findings in a new report by Airwars entitled, News in Brief: U.S. Media Coverage of Civilian Harm in the War Against ISIS. Authored by investigative journalist Alexa O’Brien, the report draws on new research and interviews with reporters at major U.S. media outlets, providing editors with recommendations for improved coverage. News in Brief is the result of a six-month study funded by the Reva and David Logan Foundation in the U.S. and the J. Leon Philanthropy Council in the U.K.
Moderator: Peter Bergen: Vice President, New America
Panelists:
Alexa O’Brien: Author, News in Brief
Azmat Khan: Future of War Fellows, Arizona State University & New America
Greg Jaffe: National Security Correspondent, Washington Post
Chris Woods: Executive Director, Airwars
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A bad barometer reading
On June 26 the Atlantic Council held a panel to discuss the release of opinion poll data collected by the Arab Barometer about the state of the economy, migration, governmental performance, corruption, and other topics in the Middle East. Survey data was collected in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. Presentation of data was followed by a panel discussion that included Mark Tessler, professor of political science at University of Michigan, Kathrin Thomas, Research Associate at the Arab Barometer, Abbas Khadim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, and Faysal Itani, Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council. Vivian Salam, reporter at the Wall Street Journal, moderated.
There is little optimism about the economy improving in the Levant. In Jordan, 70% of respondents cite the economy as a primary concern. In all three countries, (Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon) more than 85% percent of respondents perceived the governments of their respective states to be corrupt.
Survey data also noted a slight upwards trend in desire to emigrate from the Levant region. An uptick in a desire to emigrate can be explained by the “brain drain” phenomenon in which highly educated youths seek to leave their home countries due to lack of high-level employment opportunity. Respondents indicated that “economic reasons”, “political reasons” and “security reasons” were the primary drivers for the choice to emigrate.
The survey catalogued a slight increase in support for women’s rights and prominence in politics and business. 60% of respondents would support a female head of state, with Lebanon the most supportive of the notion at a rate of 77%. Despite this, 66% of respondents in the Levant said that men inherently make better political leaders than women.
Since 2016 there has been a decline in the belief that the Middle East and North Africa would benefit from stronger relations with the United States. Survey data revealed that people in the Levant widely believe that Iraq is a proxy of Iran, despite the fact that the Shia in Iraq have not sided with Iran.
Itani notes that the economic anxiety present in the region, specifically in Lebanon, is a reminder to Western policy makers that issues of chief importance to the West (Hezbollah, etc), do not necessarily take precedence in the region. The expectation of poor economic performance will have implications for future investment and growth. Itani attributes Lebanese decrease in willingness to strengthen ties with Washington to US policy in region, specifically US dealings with Israel and the change in American leadership in 2016.
Khadim spoke more specifically to the Iraqi data. Surveys confirm sentiments Iraqis usually express only through social media or encrypted messengers. There is a divergence of opinions held regarding the United States government and US citizens. Iraqis view American citizens more favorably than the American government, which Khadim says can open avenues in the realm of public diplomacy and good faith action between the two countries. On the Iraq-Iran relationship, he says GCC media have ascribed an affinity between Iraq and Iran that does not necessarily exist. Iran does have influence over certain discrete groups in Iraq, but that influence is not as widespread as many believe.
Tessler and Thomas, the administrators of the data collection, focused on the ways in which the data can be used to determine if there are links between different variables. Specifically, they expect a link between corruption perceptions and education levels as well as support of Iran depending on religion. While they had not yet conducted the analysis on these variables, they expect to confirm Khadim’s assertion that support for Iran in Iraq is contained to certain demographics and is not a widespread sentiment. Tessler further notes that the trend of declining support for strengthening relations with a United States dates to 2006.
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South Sudan’s six month delay
June 18 the United States Institute of Peace held an event discussing the political, military, and humanitarian situation of South Sudan following a May agreement wherein ruling and opposition parties extended the pre-transitional period of the peace agreement by six months. Under the agreement, the ruling and opposition parties will work to form a unified Government.
The panel included David Acouth, founder of the Council on South Sudanese-American relations, Brian Adeba, Deputy Director of Policy at the Enough Project, Mark Ferullo, Senior Advisor at the Sentry, Morgan Simpson, Deputy Director of Programs at Democracy International, and Emily Koiti, a frequent representative at South Sudanese peace talks. Susan Stigant, Director of Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion.
Adeba shared general sentiments of people on the ground in South Sudan regarding the peace agreements and recent events. As violence has subsided in the wake of the peace agreement, there is a general sense of optimism in South Sudan. However, he stressed that humanitarian issues, lack of resource provision, and the lingering threat of latent military groups are still present. The biggest challenge facing the people of South Sudan is the subtle increases in militarization of certain opposition groups, despite the peace agreement. Adeba suspects that because many of these groups have access to complicated weapons, they may have connections to various politicians within the ruling party, further complicating peace proceedings.
Acouth echoed Adeba’s sentiments regarding the general attitudes of the South Sudanese regarding the peace agreement. The message of decreased violence has reached people living in camps, prompting their hasty return to the cities and homes they abandoned. This has exacerbated humanitarian and economic issues, since there is not enough food or employment in metropolitan areas. Adeba theorizes that the issues that there is a larger underlying economic and humanitarian crisis in the absence of widespread fighting. Koiti continued this line of argument, noting that a reduction in violence has not translated into amelioration of other problems in the country. People leaving camps are not aware of the challenges that they might face when they return home. In addition to economic issues and food shortage, many locales and residences are still occupied by armed groups.
Morgan believes that the decision to extend the pre-transitional period by 6 months was the correct decision. Compared to the failed peace process of 2015, there is more movement to implement the polices detailed in the peace agreement. There is also greater participation of civil society groups, scholars, and women. However, the issues of security sector reform and the redrawing of state lines are still stagnant. Morgran believes that in order to form a new, functional government, cantonment sites in civilian areas must be dismantled. Furthermore, transitional justice mechanisms are difficult to implement because of their emphasis on accountability.
Koiti is less optimistic about the situation and does not believe that ruling and opposition forces will be able to form a unified government at the end of the six-month period in November. The government is not allocating the resources needed to address pressing issues like security sector reform and cantonment sites. Furthermore, she notes that the responsible commissions are opaque about why they are unable to achieve goals.
Adeba believes the lack of reform provisions for the National Security Service of South Sudan in the peace agreement is particularly concerning. The organization is oppressive and infringes upon civil rights—often holding people indefinitely and without trial. There is also a “parallel army” emerging for the sole purpose of serving the President. On paper, it answers to the National Security Minister, but in reality they are responsible to the President and are funded through his budget. This is concerning because the president’s budget is private, making oversight of this branch of the security services difficult, and contributing to a general lack of transparency.
Regarding the future of South Sudan, Ferullo describes two areas of key importance. First is the formation of a committee to deal with the issue of drawing state boundaries. The way that boundaries are drawn will determine resource allocation, governance, and the economy of South Sudan. A focus on transparency is needed to ameliorate some of the economic woes of the country. Increases in transparency can be accomplished through building an “e-transparency” system to track financial transactions of government departments, and by providing more support to local civil society groups. He posits that civil society groups are more familiar with the needs of specific locales and can direct funding more effectively and equitably than a larger, centralized body might.
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Basra protests and the future of Iraq
June 6 the Middle East Institute hosted Akeet Abbas, professor at the American University of Iraq, Basma Alloush, advocacy and communications officer at the Norwegian Refugee Council USA, James “Mac” Skelton, director at the Institute of Regional and International Studies, and Bilal Wahab, fellow at The Washington Institute on Near East Policy for a panel on rising tension and unrest in Iraq in the wake of the 2018 Basra protests. Randa Slim, senior fellow and director of the Program on Conflict Resolution and Track II dialogues at the Middle East Institute moderated the discussion.
Skelton explained that the rhetoric of the Basra protestors was aimed at overturning the entire governance system. Protestors targeted not only government office buildings, but also political party offices. People felt that the traditional patronage system that operates through the party system has failed them because of rampant co-option of abundant resources (i.e. oil) in Basra. This vying for control is cyclical in nature between political parties. For example, currently the Hikma party “owns” the oil fields as well the Basra Oil Company (BOC), but before them it was the Dawa party.
According to Skelton, the resultant dynamic is “government dysfunction at every level.” So many actors capture the state that no project can be completed. Lack of electricity and clean water were among the rallying calls of protesters. Skelton also pointed to a closed network of jobs and opportunities as catalysts for the Basra protests.
Abbas explained that while protests were not a novel occurrence in Iraq, the 2018 protest in Basra was the first time that popular dissent gained traction within the Shia majority. Before Basra, the Shia elite did not take protests seriously, as it was easy to demonize Sunni fringe groups to retain legitimacy. The protests also called into question the effectiveness of the Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi, who was elected because of his promise to root out corruption in Iraq. Abdul-Mahdi’s perceived inability to deliver on his promises sparked a movement in Basra headed by the Sadrists, which other groups soon joined. Abbas predicted that political reform is not possible if the task is left to the current political elite in Iraq. Rather, reform can only come from either or external or internal pressure. Abbas believes that internal pressure in the form of protests is the catalyst for change, given that the United States has all but washed its hands of governance in Iraq.
Alloush focused on the water network in Basra, and the ways that resource shortage contributes to unrest. Water shortage in Iraq is a regional issue—dams built upstream by Syria, Turkey, and Iran limit water flowing into Iraq by 50%. Climate change, drought, and contamination of the Tigris and Euphrates further exacerbate the waster issue. Furthermore, poor water management practices in cities like Basra ensure that contamination increases, and that clean water is not distributed. Alloush also noted that loss of rural livelihoods contributed to a rise in migration of rural youth to urban areas, but they lack the skills to be competitive in an already saturated urban job market, adding to discontent.
Wahab echoed Skeleton’s statements regarding the ineffectiveness of sectarian patronage networks. They are able to provide money, employment, and legitimacy to their supporters, but they were not able to provide governance. Political parties cannot provide resources like water, electricity, and production. Rather, only cohesive government can provide these things. This lack of governance is why protests in Basra targeted all political parties. Abbas complimented this point, mentioning that even the Popular Mobilization Units, credited with the defeat of ISIS, was not spared from citizen dissatisfaction.
Skelton offered some insights about the future. First, he noted that the issues that sparked protests in Basra in 2018 have not been resolved. Second, he notes that the Sadrists who incited the 2018 Basra protests did not expect to garner so much popular support. The unexpected popularity of the protests illustrate how unpredictable social movements in Iraq are. While Skelton is certain future protests will occur, the extent to which they will spread remains to be seen.
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Defeated, yet still a threat
June 5 the Middle East Institute hosted Ambassador James Jeffery, Special Envoy for the Coalition to Defeat ISIS and Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Edmund Fitton-Brown, coordinator for the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on ISIS, Al-Qaeda & Taliban, and Jessica Lambert-Gray, First Secretary for Counter-Terrorism and Extremism at the British Embassy for a conversation on countering terrorism in the Middle East. Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, moderated the panel.
Jeffery qualified the declaration of the Islamic State (ISIS)’s defeat. Although it should be lauded and the US-led coalition of over 80 countries praised for their efforts, the United States and other international forces ought to remain wary of ISIS affiliates and pockets of resistance in Syria and Iraq. The US will need to continue to arm and train Iraqi soldiers to fight ISIS resistance. The US will also continue to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), despite the recent withdrawal of close to 95% of US ground support in Syria. A small force of American troops and strategic personnel will remain to stabilize and secure the SDF-controlled areas along the Euphrates.
Jeffery touched on how broader political issues in the Middle East catalyzed the formation of ISIS. He pointed specifically to how the Assad regime, backed by Iran, lashed out against peaceful protesters in Syria in 2011, fomenting the unrest needed to strengthen ISIS.
Lambert-Gray echoed Jeffery’s statements, positing that while the caliphate is gone, the threat is not. Her analysis portends the rise of “Daesh (ISIS) 2.0” and “Al-Qaeda 3.0” if international forces do not maintain pressure on these groups in Iraq and Syria. She fears that both groups may be able to expand, evolve, and rise again.
Lambert-Gray notes that ISIS’s most concerning weapon is its ability to inspire extremism and terrorist attacks globally. The production of online propaganda has become key to the survival of ISIS during its current “hibernation.” Regarding the Al-Qaeda, Lambert-Gray argues that the threat had never actually subsided. Its Iran-based leadership is becoming increasingly powerful, but she declined to provide any further details, stating that her team is still researching the issue.
In an effort to reduce risks, the UK has banned travel to Syria and provides no diplomatic support to citizens who elect to travel without authorization. The UK is also trying to diminish the online presence of ISIS. Countering Daesh can only be achieved with strategic patience and by an unrelenting drain of their resources.
Fitton-Brown complemented Lambert-Gray’s comments, noting that the “Islamic State’s covert network is forming now in Syria as it did in Iraq in 2017.” He also fears that ISIS will be able to further spread its network through the ongoing refugee crisis at the border of Turkey. In Iraq the government is having trouble containing and trying detained IS fighters. With the prospect of extremism re-emerging in the Levant and possibly spreading into Turkey, Fitton-Brown identifies building inclusive governments for Sunni citizens as the key challenge for Iraq and Syria. Detaining, trying, and eventually releasing foreign ISIS fighters in Iraq and the possibility for further radicalization present additional challenges.
The key message from the panel is that extremism in the Levant still poses a serious threat , with the potential to generate unrest globally. Mitigation of extremist activity has seen modest success, but continued pressure is essential to ensure that groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda do not recover. Among the most dangerous and far-reaching tools that extremist groups can employ are online propaganda and recruiting campaigns.
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