Category: Uncategorized
Stevenson’s army, June 19
Politico says WH froze aid to Ukraine just before the summit. WH denies story. You decide.
WSJ says US is withdrawing significant military assets from Middle East. No denials yet.
Iranian ships no longer heading to Venezuela.
Hard-liner wins Iran presidency.
FP says France & US differ over Sahel policy.
Lawfare writer discusses legal aspects of US China sanctions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Two does not a trend make, but there is hope
Two so-called populist, definitely corrupt, would-be autocrats have fallen: Trump and Netanyahu. What are the prospects for others of their ilk?
- Indian President Narendra Modi has declined markedly in popularity, mainly due to COVID-19. The epidemic is beginning to ebb in India and he doesn’t face an election until 2024, so it is impossible to predict his fate.
- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is in a less comfortable spot. The epidemic has hit Hungary hard and tanked its economy, but he is offering lots of goodies in advance of next year’s parliamentary elections. His party is still strong, but the opposition is more united than in the past.
- Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is in worse shape, due to the virus and the economy. If former President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva returns to the hustings, Bolsonaro could be in big trouble come next year’s presidential election.
- Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is not in much better condition. Turkey was already in economic trouble before the epidemic, which has hit hard. The opposition, not fully unified, is gaining on him but the presidential election is still far off: June 2023.
- And for the sake of my Balkan readers, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic looks to be in good shape for next year’s presidential election, as the opposition is fragmented and he moved quickly to secure Chinese and Russian vaccines. Nor is there much hope of seeing the back of Bosnia’s Serb President Milorad Dodik, who has lost some traction but likely still has enough grip to hold on in next year’s polls. Both are enjoying lots of Russian financing and protection while Europe and the US twiddle their thumbs, uncertain what to do.
The already autocrats are in better shape:
- Chinese President Xi Jinping has done likewise and has no limit on how long he can serve.
- Russian President Vladimr Putin is holding his own, despite COVID-19. In any event, he is already eliminating any serious opposition to his hold on power in the next presidential election, which isn’t due until 2024.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini is firmly in charge. The presidential election Friday includes no “opposition” or even bona fide moderates. Repression and cooptation have won the day.
- Syrian President Bashar al Assad has survived a decade of both moderate and extremist rebellion. He is now nominally in charge of perhaps 40% of Syria, but his regime is tattered and in desperate need of rebuilding.
- Belarusan President Alexander Lukashenko is weathering massive demonstrations and depends for his survival on Putin, whose efforts to jail or otherwise eliminate any serious opposition Lukashenko imitates.
- Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s coup leader, is trying to do likewise, despite persistent demonstrations.
President Biden has devoted his week in Europe to rallying the G7 to the cause of demonstrating that they can deliver for citizens better than the autocracies. Next week he’ll do the same with the broader audience of NATO allies before confronting Putin. The American economy is reviving rapidly if somewhat sporadically. The G7 has committed itself to a billion vaccine doses for poorer countries, improved public health preparations, and worldwide infrastructure efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road.
I don’t really have much hope that the autocrats will fall, even if Biden demonstrates unequivocally the superiority of liberal democracy. That’s not how the world works. Autocrats are autocrats in order to prevent that outcome. But the fall of a few more populist and corrupt would-be autocrats is certainly not out of the question. The world would be a lot better off if their citizens opted for true democracy. Two does not a trend make, but there is hope.
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Conservative will likely win, but foreign policy will change little
Candidates in Iran’s presidential election scheduled for June 18 were vetted more heavily than before. Only seven were allowed to run out of some 500 applicants. Most are prominent conservatives. Judiciary chief Ibrahim Raisi is likely a shoe-in. If and how will these elections affect the negotiations in Vienna and Iran’s regional activities? How do Iranians view this process and what should we make of the predicted record low turnout?
A Chatham House panel convened June 9 agreed the election will consolidate the regime in a conservative direction. However, foreign policy and Iran’s activities in Syria, will change little, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have long been in firm control of those projects. The domestic implications of the elections are significant, not due to the results but rather to the vetting process and the public’s increasing apathy.
The speakers were:
Nazila Fathi
Independent journalist;
Non-resident scholar
Middle East Institute
Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst in Iran and Persian Gulf affairs
Congressional Research Service
Vali Nasr
Majid Kadduri Professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
Non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council
Raz Zimmt
Research fellow
Institute for National Security Studies
Sanam Vakil (moderator)
Deputy director and senior research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme
Chatham House
A predictable outcome, but nonetheless significant
The panel agreed that Rais is the likely winner, though Nasr warned that surprises are possible, as the 1997 and 2005 elections demonstrate. Nazila Fathi also pointed out that the greater freedom to criticize one another that exists among the candidates could hurt Raisi.
The real shock in this election cycle was the vetting process, according to Zimmt. The regime prevented any serious moderate or reformist candidates from running. Fathi pointed out that the reformists (such as former president Khatami) have been isolated and persecuted since the protest movement that followed Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent re-election in 2009. Rouhani was not considered part of the reformist camp. His transition towards more moderate viewpoints is what caused the regime to remove moderate and even some conservative candidates from the roster this year. A particular surprise was the exclusion of the conservative former speaker of the parliament Larijani, who the regime considered to be at risk of moderating, according to Fathi.
Rather than the winner, voter turnout might be an indicator of public sentiment. Vakil cited a recent poll that indicates turnout could be as low as 38%. This would be a record low for Iran, where turnout has never fallen below 50%. Fathi affirmed that disillusionment within Iran is high. Due to the impact of COVID and economic hardships, there were calls to boycott the election even before the vetting process was completed. The 2019 parliamentary elections also contributed, as the stringent vetting process then led to harshly repression of protests.
Nasr warned that voter turnout is a bigger issue to Western observers than to the Iranian regime. Engineering an election can be done after the vote (as in 2009), but this led to major resistance. This is why the regime used the vetting process this time, after testing the waters with the parliamentary elections of 2019. The deep state understands that a low-turnout election is advantageous to conservative candidates. Its primary goal is to end up with a reliable, and controllable president. Raisi is the ideal candidate for this purpose. He has few connections, as Rouhani had within the religious establishment in Qom and even within the IRGC.
The core issues for Iranians are economic. Runaway inflation and price hikes on primary goods force people to work multiple jobs. This hit the middle classes as much as the poor. According to Fathi Iranians only care about the JCPOA to the extent that it contributes to economic improvements. The candidates have failed to put forward any clear plans for solving these issues.
The role of the new president
As for the new president’s role and significance, the panel saw a clear divergence between domestic and foreign affairs. Nasr suggested Iran is on the cusp of a ‘Third Islamic Republic’ for three reasons:
- Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advanced age indicates that his decades-long rule might soon be over, potentially leading to a constitutional overhaul, as after Khomeini’s death.
- Iran is moving to relieve maximum pressure, which will lead to major changes in its economic and foreign outlook.
- The deep state is increasingly strengthening its grip on the country.
The IRGC is starting to look more like the Pakistani military, controlling key foreign policy agendas and exerting major influences on the political process. They are positioning themselves for the post-Khamenei era.
A new president will have little influence on Iran’s foreign policy. As Katzman warns “these elections are not for the ‘leader’ of Iran.” The real leader, Khamenei, has indicated that Iran will recommit to the JCPOA if the US does so. The negotiations in Vienna are not at risk. Nasr indicated that the key foreign policy dossiers are all in the hands of the IRGC. Iran’s regional activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen fall under IRGC control. The same is true for the Saudi-Iranian negotiations now underway in Baghdad, where the Saudis are talking with top IRGC brass, rather than the Foreign Ministry.
The view from Israel and Washington
According to Zimmt, the outcome of these elections matter little to Israel, which viewed Ahmadinejad as a wolf in wolf’s clothing, while Rouhani was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Israel is mainly concerned with the nuclear program, Iran’s regional activities (particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza), and its long-range missile capabilities. None of these issues are controlled by the government or president, but rather by the deep state.
For Israel a controversial, conservative president is preferable because it makes it easier to rally support against Iran. Ahmadinejad was Israel’s biggest asset, because he openly denied the Holocaust and the existence of homosexuals in Iran. Raisi’s controversial viewpoints and his involvement in the 1988 prison massacres could serve a similar purpose. Nasr also thought that a post-JCPOA Iran seeking to establish trade relations with the world might be served poorly by a controversial president.
The Biden administration does follow these elections with interest according to Katzman, who spoke in an official capacity. According to him, Iran is becoming a major regional and even supra-regional power. Its missile and drone capacities are extensive and sophisticated, and Tehran has extended them to allies and used them itself. The attacks on Saudi oil in Abqaiq, as well as the strike on the American al-Asad base in Iraq, were examples. Katzman called the strike on al-Asad “the most significant missile strike on American troops in American history.”
Iran’s serious capacities mean that they should be taken seriously by the US. Meanwhile, US sanctions have had no effect on Iran’s regional strategy or Iran’s regional influence. In 2014 Iran was under sanctions but became more involved in Syria and Yemen. When sanctions were lifted these policies continued. Iran’s regional activities are extremely inexpensive and sanctions don’t affect them significantly.
The key is to get some resolution to regional conflicts. Iran has expressed an interest in doing so. Iran won’t project power if there are no opportunities or interests that require it.
Watch the recording of the event here:
https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=197859625537872&ref=watch_permalink
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My non-paper will delight none and restrain all
This nonpaper presents a proposal for a joint US/EU/UK effort to resolve the last remaining war and peace issues in the the Western Balkans: normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade centered on mutual recognition and constitutional reform to create a more functional state in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both require adherence to four fundamental principles:
- Statehood: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the current independent states in the Western Balkans.
- Minority rights: state sovereignty rooted in respect for the rights of all citizens, regardless of ethnicity.
- Reciprocity: whatever one state asks for itself it should be willing to give the equivalent to the other.
- Subsidiarity: social and political issues should be dealt with at the lowest level consistent with their resolution.
It is important for the West to act now, because Russian trouble-making and Chinese financing are undermining Serbia’s democracy, reigniting Belgrade’s regional ambitions, weakening Montenegro and Bosnia’s statehood, and unraveling the post-war settlements in Bosnia and Kosovo. If the region is left on autopilot, we can expect growing instability, ethnic strife, state weakness, increased migration, and authoritarian restorations. There is no better place on earth to demonstrate the viability and benefits of democratic governance than in the Western Balkans, where most of the countries have already accomplished much of the required transition, the citizens want open and democratic societies, and their problems need relatively low, often diplomatic, investments to complete the process.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
There is no hope of making Bosnia a more functional state without constitutional change to weaken if not eliminate the stranglehold on governance of the ethnically defined parties, granted to them at Dayton. The way forward is indicated in the Sejdic-Finci decision of the European Chamber for Human Rights and other court judgments. All individuals should be eligible for any position in the state without regard to ethnicity, and all citizens should be able to vote for whom they want regardless of ethnicity. Power-sharing arrangements that ensure the hold of ethnically defined political parties should be eliminated, along with the unnecessary and burdensome levels of governance that exist mainly to provide those political parties with patronage and opportunities for corruption. Redistribution of their functions should follow the priniciple of subsidiarity, which will mean enhanced local as well as central governance.
None of this can be accomplished by international fiat, but a strong guiding hand is required. That should in large part come from the High Representative, who will need clear goals and unequivocal support from the US, EU, and UK. Their support should come not only in the form of “carrots” but also in willingness to cut off financial and political assistance, sanction and prosecute individuals, and name and shame those who are preventing the necessary constitutional reforms. The internationals should also be prepared to support a broad popular effort to discuss and propose constitutional reforms based on the above principles and counter anti-democratic interventions by neighbors, illiberal EU governments, and authoritarian powers.
2. Kosovo
The existing EU-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina has made virtually no progress for eight years, during four of which it was distracted by apparent divisions between Washington and Brussels. There is no need to rush to revive it. President Vucic has made clear that he will not recognize Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state before the next Serbian presidential election in the spring of 2022.
The year until then is needed to prepare the ground in the EU as well as in Serbia and Kosovo for normalization based on mutual recognition. The US, UK, and the EU member states that recognize Kosovo need to increase the pressure on the five non-recognizers and at least ensure that the visa waiver is extended to Kosovo, as well as additional recognitions. In Serbia the year should entail a far more serious discussion than has occurred so far on how and why sovereignty over Kosovo was lost under Milosevic and why it can’t be restored now. In Kosovo, the year should be used for a far more serious discussion about ensuring the rights and respect of its Serb population as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church and why union with Albania is not just a bad idea but a ruinous one. The EU-sponsored dialogue should continue once both capitals are ready, but only if both are prepared to be mutually supportive instead of undermining each other at every turn, as they do today.
In the end, Serbia will need to arrange for Kosovo membership in the UN and establish formal diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. Nothing less should be acceptable to the US, EU, and UK.
3. The region
Whether in CEFTA or mini-Schengen or bilaterally, there is a compelling need to lower barriers to trade, people, services, and investment throughout the Western Balkans. A regional single market is no subststitute for EU accession, but it will improve competitiveness, increase incomes, and enhance mutual interdependence while awaiting improved conditions for EU enlargement. That day will come: once COVID-19 and the associated recession pass, Europe will be looking for cheaper labor and increased competitivity, as it did in eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Balkans are an obvious source. The non-EU members in the Balkans should get ready now.
The Western Balkans have come a long way in the past two decades. Far less time than that lies ahead before all its sovereign states can hope to become members of the EU. Now is the time to redouble Western commitment, not let it flag.
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Back to the future in the Western Balkans
The State Department issued this statement yesterday:
The United States is committed to supporting the countries of the Western Balkans on their path to European integration and membership in key European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. We are working with Western Balkan countries and our European partners to advance the governance, rule of law, and anti-corruption reforms – as well as the promotion of independent media and vibrant civil societies – that will reinforce the region’s European perspective and advance the long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
We are committed to helping the countries of the Western Balkans deepen their own regional economic partnerships, achieve their climate goals, counter Russia’s energy coercion through diversification and clean energy development, and combat corruption and organized crime. We also want to help the region grow and prosper while protecting strategic infrastructure and industries against China’s malign practices.
In addition to our strong economic ties to the region, the United States values its partnerships in the defense and security space, including with our newest NATO Allies, Montenegro and North Macedonia. We intend to further enhance that cooperation through joint training, exercises, deployments, and procurements.
We welcome the progress made by Albania and North Macedonia on critical reforms and continue to support the opening of EU accession negotiations with both countries in June.
The United States stands ready to support work towards a comprehensive, binding normalization agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, centered on mutual recognition, that lays the foundations for lasting cooperation and prosperity. We support the EU-facilitated Dialogue and encourage the parties to reengage in this process with a sense of urgency to address both technical and political issues. We will work with Serbia and Kosovo to implement their Washington Commitments in support of the goal of full normalization.
The United States is working with the international community to support Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuing the reforms that will enable it to prosper and secure EU candidate status, including electoral reforms. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), which was established 25 years ago under the Dayton Peace Agreement, has contributed significantly to peace and stability there. We continue to support the important role of OHR in advancing the 5+2 agenda, with a renewed focus on anticorruption as key to entrenching the rule of law.
As we have seen, recent unwarranted speculation about changing borders in the Balkans along ethnic lines risks fostering instability in the region and evokes memories of past tensions. A stable, prosperous future for the Western Balkans must be based on good governance, rule of law, multi-ethnic democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
https://www.state.gov/u-s-commitment-to-the-western-balkans/
What’s new here? Not much. This statement represents an explicit return to pre-Trump policies in the Western Balkans established by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama. It is a repudiation of proposals to move borders to accomodate ethnic differences. It is also adapts prior policies to new circumstances, in particular challenges from Russia and China. It reasserts partnership between the US and Europe in building a Europe whole and free.
What is missing? There is no clear indication here of Balkan culprits. The statement of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board yesterday partly fills that gap by explicitly denouncing those who advocate dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But there is still missing any explicit reference to President Vucic’s all too clear turn away from the EU and towards autocracy. Nor is there any clear reference to the new Montenegrin government’s Russophilic and anti-NATO inclinations. State is trying to keep the mood upbeat and positive. But until Washington explicitly acknowledges the indigenous forces in the Balkans working against democratic reforms and Western values with Russian and Chinese help, it will fail to counter them effectively.
So yes, the statement is good, as far as it goes. But let’s get back to the future: it will require more vigorous action as well as happy talk.
PS: A reader points out that the statement lacks a clear commitment to close cooperation with Europe. It should have been included.
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Iraq in a far better place than Yemen and Syria
Evan Horn, a first-year master’s student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes:
The Brookings Institution February 26 hosted a webinar on “The Middle East and the New US Administration: Dealing with conflicts and their aftermath.”
Panelists included:
• Daniel L. Byman (moderator), Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy
• Jomana Qaddour, Nonresident Senior Fellow and Head of Syria Portfolio, Atlantic
Council
• Marsin Alshamary, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institute
• Gregory D. Johnson, Nonresident Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy
Summary
This topical discussion revolved around three cases – Yemen, Syria, and Iraq – and featured experts on each to inform listeners on the geopolitical and humanitarian situations unfolding . Focal points included Iranian influence and the new administration’s outlook. Key takeaways from each
country expert are below.
Yemen
Johnson was pessimistic that Yemen can be reconstituted as a single state, let alone as two separate states. He asserted that there are “seven or eight different Yemens on different trajectories right now.” While we talk about one war, there are actually three:
1) the US-led counterterrorism effort,
2) the Saudi regional war, and
3) the local Yemeni civil war.
Key points included:
Despite the focus on the Saudi effort, this war will end at some point and the local Yemeni civil war will take center stage. The anti-Houthi coalition led by the Saudis is fracturing, and once the Saudis withdraw, different armed groups and warlords will use violence to seize power and territory.
The world’s worst humanitarian crisis is escalating as the Saudis prevent food and medical supplies from entering Yemen, hoping the people will rebel against the Houthis, but this isn’t likely.
The US needs to work on ending the civil war or “risk Humpty Dumpty not being put together again.” It should prioritize safe passage and delivery of humanitarian supplies. The US should also use its leverage to end the Saudi-led regional war and open up the country to transport of food, goods, and supplies.
Syria
Qaddour outlined the situation in Syria by highlighting the vast economic challenges posed by US and European sanctions on an “unresponsive regime that doesn’t intend to capitulate,” 13 million refugees and displaced persons, and a spiraling humanitarian situation. The new Biden administration has all but flatly stated that it doesn’t consider Syria a priority despite its being the center of US foreign policy objectives, including great power competition, the need to curb Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the Middle East, and strengthening
multilateral institutions.
Key points included:
• Syria remains a setting for Russian expansionary influence (Moscow serves as chief broker) and China also offers an autocratic source of support in contrast to the US.
• Iran “saved” the Syrian regime by supplying troops and holds a lot of sway.
• The US can play a key role in deterring Iranian aggression by continuing targeted strikes against Iran’s militia activity and by engaging this “parallel track” to a return to the JCPOA (or whatever next incarnation is reached).
This suggests finding a way to keep talks alive while preventing Iranian proxies and militias from continuing to repress activists, assassinate dissidents, and engage in other destabilizing measures.
Iraq
Alshamary emphasized that Iraq is in a very different position than the situations in Yemen and Syria. Unlike the previous two, it is not at the height of its respective wars or humanitarian crises. It is not yet a democracy, but rather in the process of democratization, and is undergoing
the arduous path to achieve it.
Key points included:
• Number one priority must be security and stability, as a sustainable economy cannot be reached until the prerequisite of a safe and secure environment is maintained.
• The US and regional allies can promote stability first and foremost by finding a resolution with Iran, as their disagreements and disputes tend to have a destabilizing effect on everyone else.
• Considering Iraq’s unique cultural and religious relationship with Iran, she added that Iraq could serve as a mediator between the US and Iran
• Emphasized the need to preserve Iraqi sovereignty while supporting local civic leaders who have power due to weak national leadership
• Role for the US: support education, freedom of speech, and ability to protest in a safe & secure environment.
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