Category: Uncategorized
Differing agendas
Delvin Kovač of the online Vijesti.ba asked questions; I responded:
- Kako biste ocijenili rezultate Općih izbora u Bosni i Hercegovini?
SERWER: Rezultati još uvijek nisu potvrđeni, ali nisu bili ni dobri. Imam osjećaj da oni predstavljaju volju većine Bosanaca, koji se ipak ne slažu oko mnogo čega. U FBiH je došlo do značajnog usitnjavanja političke scene, ali mi je i dalje nejasno šta će to značiti za formiranje vlasti, koje je u parlamentarnim sistemima često otežano i prolongirano.
2. U naredne četiri godine dužnost članova Predsjedništva BiH obnašat će Šefik Džaferović, Željko Komšić i Milorad Dodik. Vaš komentar?
SERWER: Kao i na prethodnim izborima u BiH, rezultati su bili dvosmisleni. U Predsjedništvo su se vratili ljudi sa vrlo različitim programima. Dodik i Komšić su na suprotnim krajevima nacionalnog političkog spektra. Džaferović se, pod pretpostavkom da će nastaviti Izetbegovićevom linijom, nalazi negdje između.
3. Kakva budućnost očekuje BiH s Dodikom u njenom Predsjedništvu? Smatrate li da će on blokirati put BiH ka evropskim i NATO integracijama?
SERWER: Dodik će učiniti sve što je u njegovoj moći da odvoji Republiku Srpsku, ali će to raditi djelomično pokušavajući i pripremiti RS za članstvo u EU. Stoga se nada da će pridobiti simpatije i podršku u Briselu za ideju o odvajanju RS-a od FBiH. Neće ništa učiniti u pogledu članstva BiH u NATO-u i pokušat će da to spriječi ukoliko nekim čudom dođe do takvog scenarija.
Šta bi po Vašem mišljenju mogao biti naredni potez Dodikovog koalicionog partnera Dragana Čovića, nakon što je poražen u trci za člana Predsjedništva BiH iz reda hrvatskog naroda?
SERWER: Pretpostavljam da će Čović pokušati koristiti poziciju HDZ-a da bude kočničar. Ustav BiH pruža mu mnoge mogućnosti u tom pogledu.
Here it is in English:
1. How did you see the Bosnian 2018 elections results in general?
Results still aren’t confirmed, but they weren’t pretty. My sense so far is that they represent the will of most Bosnians, who don’t agree on a lot of things. There was considerable scatter to non-major parties in the Federation. It is not clear to me yet what this will mean for government formation, which is often difficult and prolonged in parliamentary systems.
2. In the next four years, we will have Željko Komšić, Šefik Džaferović and Milorad Dodik as it’s tripartite Presidency members? What is your comment?
Like previous elections in Bosnia, the results were ambiguous: for the presidency, they returned people with very different agendas. Dodik and Komsic are at opposite ends of the ethnic nationalism political spectrum. Dzaferovic, assuming he will continue Izetbegovic’s line, is somewhere in between.
3. How bright is Bosnian future with Milorad Dodik being member of it’s Presidency? Do you think he is going to try and block Bosnia and Herzegovina on it’s path towards European union and NATO integrations?
Dodik will do everything he can to establish RS’s separateness, but he will do that in part by trying to prepare the RS for EU membership. He thereby hopes to win sympathy and support in Brussels for the idea of separating from the Federation. He will do nothing for NATO membership and try to obstruct it if by some miracle it starts to happen.
4. Since Dodik’s coallition partner Dragan Čović lost the elections and is no more a Presidency member, what do you think will be the next Čović’s move?
I assume Covic will try to use the HDZ’s position as a spoiler. The Bosnian constitution may provide him with ample opportunities to do that.
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A Syrian plea
I received today this “Statement to the Public Opinion from Syrian Political & Civil Forces”:
Supported by Russia, al-Assad Regime continues the mobilization of its forces around Idlib Governorate and its countryside, to complete the Russian plans of a military windup and fait accompli imposition.
We, being Syrian institutions, organizations and activists, condemning the statements of the Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, that plainly justify a military invasion by the Regime and its allies and call for the United Nations’ participation in the resulting forced displacement, we remind everyone that any military action on Idlib, under any designation or pretext, threatens the life and safety of more than 3 million civilians, who approximately half of them were forcibly displaced from other areas fleeing the military operations of al-Assad Regime and its allies.
Signatories of this Statement call on the International Community, in general, and the United Nations and Security Council members, in particular, to undertake their responsibilities in protecting the civilians and preventing war crimes against them.
Committing ourselves into finding solutions for the protection of civilians and guarantee of their safety, we propose that the international community:
– Provide the needed support to the local actors in Idlib in order to eliminate any extremist forces in the area, in parallel with preventing al-Assad’s forces, Iran and Russia from exploiting the situation to achieve any gains on the ground and forcing them to respect the De-escalation Agreement by ceasing any land or aerial bombardments on the area.
– Support the local civic institutions, to manage the area and begin the reconstruction process, as well as to establish a free democratic model that represents the desires and expectations of the people.
The International Community and United Nations have lost many opportunities to save the Syrian People from numerous crimes committed against it, and to hold the perpetrators accountable. Despite our great frustration and lack of trust in the international entities, we still hope that these institutions and current international system undertake their responsibilities this time to save the Syrian People from further crimes and disasters.
Signatories:
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Ahl Horan
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Ahrar – The Working Group for Syria
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Al Kawakibi Organization for Human Rights
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Al Sharqia Patriotic Grouping – Political Committee
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Assyrian Democratic Organization
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Baytna Syria
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Damir Movement
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Free Syria
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General Union of Syrian Students
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Ghaith Charitable Organization
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Idlib Political Committee
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Idlib Provincial Council
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Idlib Revolutionary Movement Committee
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Local Development and Small-Projects Support (LDSPS)
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Muatana Current
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Rethink Rebuild Society
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Shaml Syria Civil Society Coalition
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Sound and Picture Organization
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Syrian Declaration for National and Democratic Change
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Syrian Democratic Coalition
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Syrian Democratic Movement
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Syrian Network for Human Rights
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Syrian Patriotic Coalition
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Syrian Patriotic Democratic Coalition
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Syrian Women Network
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Syrians Coalition
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The Day After Association
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The Patriotic Coalition of the Revolutionary Forces of Hassaka
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The Syrian Women’s Political Movement
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Together Movement for a Free and Democratic Syria
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Watan Plan
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Zaiton Magazine
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Peace Picks – July 30 – August 5
1. Where Do We Go From Here? One Year after the Rohingya Crisis | Monday, July 30, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | Heritage Foundation | Register Here
On August 25, 2017 violence broke out in Rakhine State that led to the mass exodus of more than 700,000 Muslim Rohingya from Burma. Thousands of fleeing Rohingya men and boys were brutally murdered, women and girls were raped and sexually abused, and babies were killed before their family’s eyes at the hands of the notorious Burmese military. The United Nations calls the situation ethnic cleansing. And according to The Economist the refugee flow from Burma was faster than the exodus from Rwanda in the midst of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The United States has responded by providing substantial humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering. As the protracted crisis continues, it will be critical for the U.S. to implement a comprehensive long-term strategy to address the Rohingya crisis. That may require a larger-scale shift in broader U.S. strategy toward Burma. Please join us for a conversation nearly a year after the crisis began to discuss solutions to the long-term challenges facing Rohingya.
Speakers:
Keynote: Kelley E. Currie – Representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, and Alternate Representative of the United States to the General Assembly of the United Nations
Moderator: Walter Lohman – Director, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation
Francisco Bencosme – Asia Pacific Advocacy Manager, Amnesty International
U Kyaw Min – Former Member of Parliament, Burma
Olivia Enos – Policy Analyst, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation
2. The Nuclear Future: Can There Be Order Without Trust? | Monday, July 30, 2018 | 12:30pm – 2:00 pm | Stimson Center | Register Here
Developments in relations between major powers and nuclear-armed states in tense regions render the future of arms control, nuclear confidence-building, and U.S. leadership in the global nonproliferation regime uncertain. Please join the Stimson Center for a luncheon discussion addressing trust deficits in the global nuclear order. Our featured speaker, Heather Williams, lecturer in Defence Studies, Kings College London, will offer recommendations for how the United States can rebuild trust within the global nuclear order, to include increased transparency and unilateral measures in the absence of new treaties. Justin Anderson, senior research fellow, National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Rebecca Gibbons, post-doctoral fellow, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Sara Kutchesfahani, senior policy analyst, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, will offer comments. Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, will convene our luncheon meeting, and Hannah Haegeland, a South Asia analyst at Stimson, will moderate the discussion.
3. Governing the Ungovernable: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance in Pakistan | Monday, July 30, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | Wilson Center | Register Here
Why has Pakistan experienced an extended economic slowdown since 1990? Why has it suffered through volatile and inequitable growth over the last 25 years? In his new book, Governing the Ungovernable, Ishrat Husain, a distinguished Pakistani economist, Wilson Center global fellow, and former Wilson Center public policy fellow, argues that the answer lies in the decay of institutions of governance. At this event, Dr. Husain will discuss his new book, which proposes a selective and incremental approach for reforming key public institutions in Pakistan in order to make them perform better. This event will be moderated by Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center.
4. Yemen’s Silent Crisis: Elevating Local Perspectives | Tuesday, July 31, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | International Center for Religion and Diplomacy | 740 15th St NW #900, Washington, DC, 20005 | Register Here
As Yemen continues to unravel, discussions of the crisis in media and policy circles too often focus solely on the geopolitics, and overlook the realities on the local level. Even in the absence of resources and functioning national institutions, Yemeni community leaders are finding ways to confront dire humanitarian and security challenges. With no political resolution to the conflict in sight, it is more important than ever to examine this crisis through the eyes of those who are impacted most directly.
The International Center for Religion & Diplomacy (ICRD) will host a discussion with Yemen experts and civil society leaders from across a range of disciplines and sectors, in order to take a holistic view of what has been happening at the local level. As Yemen faces a crisis on multiple fronts – famine, civil war, terrorism, political and economic instability – it is important to bring together voices from distinct fields of work.
In this event, panelists will elevate stories of resilience and adversity from Yemeni communities, touching on issues of conflict transformation, humanitarian relief, and the role of civil society in filling the gaps left by absent governing institutions.
Speakers:
Moderator: James Patton – ICRD President & CEO
Fatima Abo Alasrar – Senior Analyst at the Arabia Foundation
Anwar Khan – President of Islamic Relief
Salwa Alssarhi – Independent Consultant – Yemen
5. The Code of Putinism | Wednesday, August 1, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
What is Vladimir Putin up to? In the new book The Code of Putinism, Brian Taylor argues that we can only understand Putin’s Russia if we understand the set of ideas, emotions, and habits that influence how Team Putin views the world. Key features of Russian politics today–such as increasing authoritarianism, Putin’s reliance on a small group of loyal friends and associates, state domination of the economy, and an assertive foreign policy–are traced to the worldview and mindset of Putin and his close associates. The Code of Putinism also shows how Putin’s choices, guided by this mindset, have led to a Russia that is misruled at home and punching above its weight abroad.
Speakers:
Moderator: Jeffrey Mankoff – Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS
Brian Taylor – Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Maxwell School, Syracuse University
Stephen Hanson – Vice Provost for International Affairs, College of William and Mary
Olga Oliker – Senior Advisor and Director, Russia and Eurasia, CSIS
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Outrageous and incredibly stupid
Here’s an interview I did Thursday for Alexander Gupta of UATV (Ukrainian government English-language service).
I didn’t know yet that President Trump had played down his personal concern about Ukraine in his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, saying that “American critics” cared about it. The Russians will have read this as approving their invasion of Crimea and thinly veiled occupation of Luhansk and Donetsk, not to mention their shooting down of a Malaysian passenger plane. It is difficult to imagine what I might have said about this, but here I’ll just say it is outrageous and incredibly stupid.
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The difference between Jews
I spent an hour today with two really smart guys: Dov Waxman of Northeastern University and Ilan Peleg of Lafayette College. The occasion was a Middle East Institute event we hosted at SAIS on Dov’s newly published book, Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel. I can’t review it, because I haven’t read it yet, but the two professors certainly gave me a good deal to think about.
I confess I was uncomfortable with the book’s title. I don’t regard myself as a member of a tribe but rather as an individual who has chosen to be what my parents were: Jews and Americans. Many years ago a co-worker referred to the Jewish owner of the factory we worked in as my Landsmann. That grates to this day. Of course I share with at least some Jews many things: history, culture, beliefs, norms, and support for the state of Israel. But I also share those things with many non-Jews. And I differ from many Jews on some of those things. I am not indifferent to the religious connection, just not willing to prioritize it over everything else and assume a familial tie to someone I had never met.
This turned out to be one of Dov’s main points: many American Jews, especially the millennial generation (of which I am definitively not a member), feel the way I do. We prioritize liberal values rather than ethnic connections. In so doing, we are increasingly at odds with an Israel that has returned to its 19th century roots as a Jewish national movement, especially but not only under Benyamin Netanyahu’s leadership. We want to see Palestinians treated in accordance with liberal values as equals endowed with inalienable rights. Bernie Sanders expressed this view last night in the debate with Hillary Clinton.
So why, I asked, do so many American politicians, like Clinton, support Israel so unconditionally? Even Barack Obama has been assiduous, more so than his predecessors, in protecting Israel from undesired UN Security Council resolutions. Part of the answer is that they get vital support and money from doing so. I’m not going to be able to match Sheldon Adelson as a political donor, but in addition I wouldn’t prioritize Israel as my top issue. He will. Passion counts and most of it is on the side of those who want unconditional support for Israel as the Jewish state. They don’t much care about how Palestinians are treated.
They even deny that they exist, saying they are really just Jordanians. If anyone argues that with you, tell them to talk with a Jordanian and ask what Jews who lived in the Holy Land were called before Israeli independence in the 1948. The answer will shock: they were called Palestinians, albeit Jewish rather than Arab ones. The term “Arab Jew” then applied to the many Jews whose native language was Arabic. Today many use the Hebrew term: Mizrahi Jews, which includes Jews from other than Arab countries.
More important is that Christians, in particular evangelicals, have lined up solidly in more or less unconditional support of Israel. Bernie of course doesn’t have to worry about them, because they will never support him. He is much more interested in that millennial generation, including the young New York Jews he wants to vote for him on Tuesday. So he grabbed the third rail of American politics with both hands and seems to have survived the immediate shock, though I won’t be surprised if Clinton beats him in New York on Tuesday.
Apart from the domestic political issues arising from the palpable split in the American Jewish community, there are potentially serious foreign policy issues. Ilan pointed to the split between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu over the Iranian nuclear deal and Dov mentioned Israeli opposition to the American role in the fall of Egyptian President Mubarak in 2011. On the Iranian nuclear deal, it seems to me the split is already partly healed: Netanyahu has become a cheerleader for strict implementation, since that is manifestly in Israel’s interest.
But the healing is only partial, because the President is inclined to allow at least a partial return of Iran to something more like its traditional role in the region (in exchange for postponement of its nuclear ambitions) while Netanyahu is increasingly aligned with the Sunni Arab states in actively resisting that. He has also begun to imitate some of their less liberal practices in cracking down on Israeli civil society and making life hard for those who speak out against excessive use of force against Palestinians. That really offends my liberal sensibilities.
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Inclusive governance matters
Lebanon’s Assafir newspaper asked a few questions the other day. I answered:
Q: How do you explain the continuous US delay for the Mosul battle ?
A: I would find it easier to explain the Iraqi Government’s setting of unrealistic deadlines, which it does in an effort to prevent political criticism. The Americans are not in a hurry, because they know this will be a big and difficult job fraught with risk. They want it done right.
Q: Many see that Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria are interrelated battles. Why? And what do you think?
A: These are the two centers of gravity of the Islamic State. It can’t afford to lose either one, and if it does it will retreat to the other.
Q: How do you explain that the US is leading the military effort in western Iraq, and the Russians are doing the same in the preparation in eastern Syria?
A: I’m not really sure that is correct. US and Coalition aircraft and US-backed ground forces have been very active in eastern Syria. So far as I know, Russian intervention there is limited to relatively few bombing runs. Moscow’s main effort has been against moderate rebel forces in the west.
Q: How do you see the contradictions in the US war on terrorism when it comes to Syria and Iraq?
A: In Iraq the US is backing a government it thinks sincerely committed to fighting terrorism. In Syria, Washington is backing rebels it thinks are sincerely committed to fighting terrorism. I wouldn’t describe that as a contradiction.
The biggest issue in my mind is how territories taken back from the Islamic State will be governed. I think Haider al Abadi will try to govern in an inclusive way. I doubt Bashar al Assad will.
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