Category: Uncategorized
An agreement without agreement
I did this interview last Tuesday for Arbnore Zhushi of Kosovo daily Bota Sot:
Q: Mr. Serwer, on March 18, Kosovo and Serbia agreed at the Ohrid meeting on the implementation plan of what is known as the Agreement towards the normalization of relations between them. How do you see this Agreement?
A: The March 18 agreement is devoid of substance and focuses on procedure, without however setting deadlines. It is a weak agreement, if it is any agreement at all.
Vucic has been clear on one point
Q: How did you see the opposition of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic to sign the Ohrid “agreement” on paper, do you think that this will be a stable and applicable agreement for both parties?
A: No. Vucic has made it clear he will not implement parts of the February agreement, which is the main one.
Kurti hasn’t been clear yet on the Association
Q: The parties agreed on one of the most important points – the immediate launch of the creation of a self-management mechanism for the Serbian community in Kosovo. How will this mechanism be implemented, since Serbia wants an Association with executive powers, while for Kosovo this constitutes a constitutional violation?
A: The agreement provides for immediate launch of negotiations on the self-management mechanism. I see no possibility of an “association” with executive powers. Kosovo municipalities already have a good deal of self-management authority. I’d be interested to know what more Serbia is asking for, provided it complies with the Kosovo constitution, and whether Belgrade is prepared to offer reciprocal arrangements to Albanian communities in southern Serbia.
Q: How do you evaluate the whole role of Prime Minister Albin Kurti, in this agreement, what should Kurti have (not) done that he has not done, in your opinion?
A: I’m not going to play professor to the prime minister, but I think the time is coming when a proposal on “self-management” is in order. Kurti says it won’t be territorial or monoethnic. I am interested in learning what he has in mind.
The EU will go easy on Serbia
Q: How do you think it will affect the integration processes and visa liberalization for Kosovo, if the latter does not implement the point related to the self-management of the Serbian community in Kosovo?
A: That is up to the EU, which hasn’t been generous with Kosovo.
Q: Although European diplomats confirmed that the parties are obliged to fully implement every article of the Agreement, Vucic warned that he will not implement the part of the agreement related to Kosovo’s membership in the UN. Do you believe that there will be sanctions against Serbia for the “red lines,” or will the “caress” from the EU continue?
A: No. Appeasement will continue. There seems to be no limit.
The Church needs a settlement
Q: How do you see the request for officializing the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo from Article 7 of the European plan? Do you think this represents a danger for Kosovo?
A: No. I think the Church’s status is an important issue that needs to be resolved, including the property of the monastery at Decan/Decani.
De facto recognition is better than nothing
Q: Although it does not include mutual recognition, the Franco-German plan was described as very beneficial for both sides, especially for Kosovo. In your opinion, is this plan expected to lead to mutual recognition and when?
A: My view is that Serbia has already de facto recognized Kosovo, but not de jure. I can’t predict when it will cross that barrier. Likely only after Vucic is gone.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Renewing the old may be better than new
A distinguished group of colleagues has offered “a new policy framework” for Syria to President Biden and Secretary Blinken. It advocates a more robust Western effort in Syria focused on security (including both stabilization in the northwest and northeast as well as continuing the fight against ISIS), increased humanitarian and early recovery assistance, and continued pushback against the Assad regime.
US troops would stay in northeastern Syria. Implicit is that President Assad would remain in power in Damascus, but the group opposes “normalization,” which several Arab states are pursuing.
The virtues
There is great virtue in many of the specific ideas offered. More cross-border assistance, if need be outside the UN framework, is needed. Better international coordination and cooperation with Turkiye is vital. Repatriating ISIS prisoners and their familities is important to reducing the threat of resurgence. Accountability for war crimes and missing people is indispensable.
These are not new ideas. The group is essentially recommending that the Biden Administration take more seriously its existing objectives and pursue them more aggressively. They take it to task for failing to meet its own objectives:
The Biden administration’s foreign policy priorities of great power competition, international and Middle East stability, human rights, humanitarianism, or combating food insecurity are insufficiently advanced through the current Syria policy.
The new policy framework is mostly the old framework, renewed.
The defects
That said, there are some defects as well. The group advocates a formalized ceasefire, without however specifying how it would be monitored and enforced. They also advocate renewed civilian stabilization assistance in the northeast, where conflict between Iranian proxy forces and the Americans is growing. Civilian assistance requires civilian presence, which is becoming more difficult, not less. They urge accounting for 100,000 missing Syrians, without however specifying a mechanism.
A lot of what the group suggests would require more Western focus on Syria. The more than ten years of war and chaos there as well as the requirements in Ukraine militate against Europe and the US paying greater attention. Three American presidents have decided that US interests in Syria are not a priority. The group is not asking for a major new effort. But even a marginally increased push in Syria may lie beyond what President Biden’s limits. Pressure for removal of the US troops is more likely to increase than decrease.
Alternatives
What are the possible alternatives? That is always an important question, especially when the obstacles to success are formidable. Let me offer a few, without however recommending any of them:
- Negotiated withdrawal of US troops: At some point, maybe now, US troops in northeastern Syria will reach the point of diminishing returns in the fight against ISIS. The US could negotiate with the Russians and the Syrian regime withdrawal of US troops in exchange for commitments to their Kurdish and Arab allies, promising “normalization” in exchange. Of course there would be little guarantee that the commitments would be kept once the withdrawal is complete.
- A big push for stabilization and reconstruction in the northeast: The US could pour a few billion into civilian stabilization and reconstruction directed by their Kurdish and Arab allies. This would create a de facto state in the northeast, financed on a continuing basis by revenues from the oil produced there. That parastate would attract however the enmity of both the regime and Turkiye, making its survival in the long term parlous.
- Back a Turkish takeover of the entire border area and the northeast: President Erdogan has long been threatening another invasion of segments of the northern Syria border Turkiye does not already control. Washington could back his ambition in exchange for commitments to its Kurdish and Arab allies. Such commitments would however likely prove worthless. The Turks see the Kurds as terrorists, not freedom fighters.
- Renew the civilian and military effort against the Assad regime: The US and Europe could urge Gulf partners to renew the armed rebellion against President Assad and Syrian activists to return to the streets. But neither the Arab partners nor anti-regime Syrians are anywhere near ready to do this.
It is easy to see why the group that wrote yesterday’s statement stuck with more modest proposals. All the more dramatic ones have obvious downsides.
Conclusion
It is not satisfying to propose more and better when you know that something else is needed. But under current circumstances, enewing the old may be better than new.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Normalization >> license plates
Nevena Bogdanovic of REF/RL asked for my view of today’s failed dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. I replied:
The “emergency” talks appear to have failed to reach agreement both on the specific issue of license plates and on the broader French-German proposal that would normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU has blamed primarily Kosovo for the failure on license plates and is hoping that the proposal will be implemented despite the lack of agreement.
I hope so too. My understanding is that it includes an end to Serbia issuing license plates for communities inside Kosovo as well as delay in Kosovo’s crackdown on those who do not use the correct license plates. That would be progress.
The far more important issue is normalization. My understanding has been that Belgrade has rejected the French-German proposal for normalization, which of course would have to include exclusive Pristina authority to issue license plates on its territory. Certainly the license plate issue on its own is not worth risking violence that the Pristina authorities might be unable to control. The consequences have already been negative, with Serb withdrawal from Kosovo institutions.
Pristina needs now to consider how it might defuse the situation and prevent itself from being blamed by the EU for a breakdown on the lesser issue, when it is the greater issue that really counts.
Kosovo also needs its Serb citizens back in its institutions. Belgrade controls them. The EU and US should be doing everything they can to ensure that they re-enter the Kosovo institutions if Pristina shows flexibility on the license plates.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, November 8
HuffPost lists the states which are regularly slow to count ballots. Don’t expect results in close races tonight.
PM Trudeau says China interferes in Canadian elections.
I urge you every now and then to go on fas.org and look for recent CRS reports. Here’s a new one on emerging military technologies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, October 28 and 29
– Fed Kaplan critiques the nuclear posture review.
– Atlantic Council team has good menu of options related to Russian nukes in Ukraine.
– Robert Draper worries about the GOP.
– WaPo says Russians are undermining Moldova.
– National Security Archive has more on how JFK lied to keep Cuban missile deal secret.
I failed to post yesterday’s edition:
– DOD released its new National Defense Strategy. Here’s NYT analysis. The Guardian notes the nuclear posture section.
– National Security Archive has JCS documents during Cuban missile crisis.
– House Veterans Affairs Committee warns of extremists in the military.
– House GOP plans tough China policy.
– Somalia wants more US drone strikes.
– Army strategist has good ideas for defense innovation.
NYT has good background on micro-targeting of political ads.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Minimal results despite the effort
Here is the video of the event I did with the Gulf International Forum today on Biden’s Middle East trip, with Kristian Ulrichsen, Abdullah al Shayji, Anna Jacobs, and Douglas London. Below are my conclusions from the event.
President Biden’s trip to the Middle East last week was no great triumph. At best, it got the US and Saudi Arabia past a rough patch in their relations. The Americans were annoyed with the Saudis for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and for the Yemen war. It has caused a lot of civilian deaths and misery. The Saudis were annoyed that the Americans criticized the Kingdom’s human rights record and failed to defend it from Houthi attacks, launched from Yemen.
Mohammed bin Salman’s broad grin at the multilateral meeting in Jeddah tells you most of what you need to know about how it went. He got what he wanted, but so did Biden: an end to the rough patch.
The Israelis made it hard
Things might have gone better but for the first stops on Birden’s trip, in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. In Jersalem, Biden reiterated his declaration that he didn’t have to be Jewish to be a Zionist. Those are still fighting words in much of the Arab world. He also reiterated, as the Israelis wanted, the promise to use all elements of national power to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. The Gulf Arabs mostly share with Israel distaste for the Iran nuclear deal. But they definitely do not want war as they are well within firing range of Tehran’s missiles.
The Israelis gave Biden nothing at all on the Palestinian issue. He merely announced innocuous assistance to Palestinian hospitals. There was no hint at criticism of Israeli treatment of Palestinians or the occupation of the West Bank. He didn’t both mentioning the murder of Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. That confirmed the insincerity of American human rights concerns. Biden claimed to have raised the Khashoggi murder in private with MbS.
The Israelis talked up in advance of the visit security cooperation they claim is under way with Arab Gulf partners. No doubt Israel is providing internal security technology in the Gulf. There is likely also nascent air defense cooperation, at least of the intelligence-sharing sort. That is something the Saudis would not want to miss. But the Gulf Arabs don’t want that advertized. So they minimized both the present activities and future prospects.
The Saudis didn’t help either
The Saudis also made it clear that political normalization–in particular mutual recognition and establishment of embassies–will not happen until Israel agrees with the Palestinians on a two-state solution. Biden wants that. But he and everyone else understands that the conditions today are not ripe and the future possibility is dim.
Biden wanted something on oil production (and hence prices). But the Saudis are claiming they have limited spare capacity (one million barrels per day?) and can do little to help. They are also sticking with OPEC+, which gains leverage on oil prices with Russian participation.
The silver lining
Perhaps the most promising outcome of this Middle East trip was talk of more technological and economic cooperation. Saudi Arabia is a modernizing autocracy. It needs Western technology and investment to achieve its Vision 2030 goals, including diversification away from oil and gas as well as adjustment to climate change. The Americans can be helpful up to a point, though in the end most decisions in the economic arena are up to the private sector.
RSS - Posts
