Category: Uncategorized
Normalization >> license plates
Nevena Bogdanovic of REF/RL asked for my view of today’s failed dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. I replied:
The “emergency” talks appear to have failed to reach agreement both on the specific issue of license plates and on the broader French-German proposal that would normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU has blamed primarily Kosovo for the failure on license plates and is hoping that the proposal will be implemented despite the lack of agreement.
I hope so too. My understanding is that it includes an end to Serbia issuing license plates for communities inside Kosovo as well as delay in Kosovo’s crackdown on those who do not use the correct license plates. That would be progress.
The far more important issue is normalization. My understanding has been that Belgrade has rejected the French-German proposal for normalization, which of course would have to include exclusive Pristina authority to issue license plates on its territory. Certainly the license plate issue on its own is not worth risking violence that the Pristina authorities might be unable to control. The consequences have already been negative, with Serb withdrawal from Kosovo institutions.
Pristina needs now to consider how it might defuse the situation and prevent itself from being blamed by the EU for a breakdown on the lesser issue, when it is the greater issue that really counts.
Kosovo also needs its Serb citizens back in its institutions. Belgrade controls them. The EU and US should be doing everything they can to ensure that they re-enter the Kosovo institutions if Pristina shows flexibility on the license plates.
Stevenson’s army, November 8

HuffPost lists the states which are regularly slow to count ballots. Don’t expect results in close races tonight.
PM Trudeau says China interferes in Canadian elections.
I urge you every now and then to go on fas.org and look for recent CRS reports. Here’s a new one on emerging military technologies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, October 28 and 29
– Fed Kaplan critiques the nuclear posture review.
– Atlantic Council team has good menu of options related to Russian nukes in Ukraine.
– Robert Draper worries about the GOP.
– WaPo says Russians are undermining Moldova.
– National Security Archive has more on how JFK lied to keep Cuban missile deal secret.
I failed to post yesterday’s edition:
– DOD released its new National Defense Strategy. Here’s NYT analysis. The Guardian notes the nuclear posture section.
– National Security Archive has JCS documents during Cuban missile crisis.
– House Veterans Affairs Committee warns of extremists in the military.
– House GOP plans tough China policy.
– Somalia wants more US drone strikes.
– Army strategist has good ideas for defense innovation.
NYT has good background on micro-targeting of political ads.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Minimal results despite the effort
Here is the video of the event I did with the Gulf International Forum today on Biden’s Middle East trip, with Kristian Ulrichsen, Abdullah al Shayji, Anna Jacobs, and Douglas London. Below are my conclusions from the event.
President Biden’s trip to the Middle East last week was no great triumph. At best, it got the US and Saudi Arabia past a rough patch in their relations. The Americans were annoyed with the Saudis for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and for the Yemen war. It has caused a lot of civilian deaths and misery. The Saudis were annoyed that the Americans criticized the Kingdom’s human rights record and failed to defend it from Houthi attacks, launched from Yemen.
Mohammed bin Salman’s broad grin at the multilateral meeting in Jeddah tells you most of what you need to know about how it went. He got what he wanted, but so did Biden: an end to the rough patch.
The Israelis made it hard
Things might have gone better but for the first stops on Birden’s trip, in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. In Jersalem, Biden reiterated his declaration that he didn’t have to be Jewish to be a Zionist. Those are still fighting words in much of the Arab world. He also reiterated, as the Israelis wanted, the promise to use all elements of national power to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. The Gulf Arabs mostly share with Israel distaste for the Iran nuclear deal. But they definitely do not want war as they are well within firing range of Tehran’s missiles.
The Israelis gave Biden nothing at all on the Palestinian issue. He merely announced innocuous assistance to Palestinian hospitals. There was no hint at criticism of Israeli treatment of Palestinians or the occupation of the West Bank. He didn’t both mentioning the murder of Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. That confirmed the insincerity of American human rights concerns. Biden claimed to have raised the Khashoggi murder in private with MbS.
The Israelis talked up in advance of the visit security cooperation they claim is under way with Arab Gulf partners. No doubt Israel is providing internal security technology in the Gulf. There is likely also nascent air defense cooperation, at least of the intelligence-sharing sort. That is something the Saudis would not want to miss. But the Gulf Arabs don’t want that advertized. So they minimized both the present activities and future prospects.
The Saudis didn’t help either
The Saudis also made it clear that political normalization–in particular mutual recognition and establishment of embassies–will not happen until Israel agrees with the Palestinians on a two-state solution. Biden wants that. But he and everyone else understands that the conditions today are not ripe and the future possibility is dim.
Biden wanted something on oil production (and hence prices). But the Saudis are claiming they have limited spare capacity (one million barrels per day?) and can do little to help. They are also sticking with OPEC+, which gains leverage on oil prices with Russian participation.
The silver lining
Perhaps the most promising outcome of this Middle East trip was talk of more technological and economic cooperation. Saudi Arabia is a modernizing autocracy. It needs Western technology and investment to achieve its Vision 2030 goals, including diversification away from oil and gas as well as adjustment to climate change. The Americans can be helpful up to a point, though in the end most decisions in the economic arena are up to the private sector.
Reaching for the Heights, but failing
I enjoyed a discussion today at USIP prompted by Fred Hof’s Reaching for the Heights. The book treats Fred’s ultimately failed negotiation for peace between Israel and Syria. It would have returned the Golan Heights (and more) to Syria in exchange for Syria’s strategic reorientation away from Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas. Chet Crocker presided. Barbara Bodine and Bernie Aronson provided perspective on Yemen and (mostly) Colombia. My assignment was the Balkans. Here are the talking points I prepared, but used only in part:
- First: compliments to Fred for this forthright, interesting, and well-written account of an important but failed negotiation. We need to understand what makes things go wrong, even when so much has been done to make them go right.
- My role here is to comment on how Fred’s experience compares and contrasts with that in the Balkans. I am struck in the first instance by the stark differences.
Stark contrasts
- Both the Bosnia and Kosovo outcomes happened in the unipolar moment when the U.S. could do pretty much whatever it wanted, at least when it came to countries with a few million inhabitants. Working after America was weakened in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fred dealt with a potent ally and a substantial adversary, backed by Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas.
- Richard Holbrooke in the 1990s wielded all the levers of American power—not only diplomatic but also political, military, and economic. Fred at no time had all the levers of American power in his hands: his role was diplomatic and vaguely economic, not military or even political.
- Holbrooke’s objective in Bosnia was to end a war both sides were tired of fighting. Fred was trying to do something harde. After a long but not very hurting stalemate, entice Syria to reorient itself strategically, cutting ties with Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas that had helped the Assads survive in power for four decades. He was also trying to get Israel to give up attractive real estate on which it had settled tens of thousands of citizens.
- Other contrasts: the soft-spoken, detail-oriented, and considerate George Mitchell and Dennis Ross vs. the bold, egotistical, and bombastic Holbrooke, the zero-sum territorial equation in the Middle East vs. the identity-focused Bosnian conflict and the sovereignty-focused Kosovo one, the static stance of the Middle Eastern protagonists vs. the rapidly changing situations on the ground in the Balkans, the deep knowledge of Syria that Fred brought to the challenge vs. Holbrooke’s comparatively superficial grasp of the Balkans.
Parallels: the negotiating framework
- But there are also some enduring parallels. Most important is that negotiations need a mutually agreed framework. Holbrooke achieved this in a series of meetings leading up to Dayton that defined basic parameters: one country, two entities, mutual diplomatic recognition, return of DPs and refugees, a powerful international intervention.
- Fred achieved it by building on a framework that John Kerry initiated. Holbrooke likewise often used Congressional pressure from both sides of the aisle to good advantage in the Balkans. State Department officers often complain about Congress but woe to the American diplomat who hasn’t learned to use Congressional clout with foreign governments!
Parallels: key US roles
- The agreed frameworks in both the Balkans and the Syria/Israel negotiation were vulnerable to mutual mistrust and to domestic politics. The U.S. as guarantor was vital in both. Washington needed to be ready to play a major role not only in the negotiations but also in the implementation of any agreement.
- In Bosnia, Holbrooke delivered America’s friend, Izetbegovic, to an unsatisfactory agreement. Only the side-agreement equipping and training Bosnian forces made that possible. The side-letter between Israel and the U.S. would have played a similar role in the Syria negotiation, but delivering Israel was certainly a heavier lift.
- Fred notes the importance of “top cover,” protection from those in your own government who might have ideas of their own or not like yours. Holbrooke frightened off potential meddlers. That is different from the protection rooted in respect that Dennis Ross provided to Fred, but the effect was similar. Without top cover, no American negotiator can survive. It seems half an international negotiation is always with Washington.
- Relief from sanctions played a key role in the Balkans, as it would have had to do also vis-à-vis Syria. Lifting sanctions is at least as important as imposing them if you want to get results.
Failure is always an option
- It was Bashar’s violent crackdown on the demonstrators that made lifting sanctions impossible for Washington. Milosevic’s violent repression of the Kosovo rebellion did likewise in the Balkans. We shouldn’t expect autocrats to behave differently when challenged domestically. .
- One concluding thought, admittedly beyond my remit.
- Fred hasn’t entirely convinced me, or himself, that Bashar would have been able to reorient Syria in the Western direction, even if he regained every inch of territory he sought. The Iranians and Hezbollah would have made Assad’s life—and maybe his death—very difficult if he tried. Nor am I, or Fred, convinced that Bibi was prepared to give up the Golan Heights.
- Such re-orientations more often come before international agreements, not because of them. That is what happened with Sadat’s Egypt. That also happened throughout Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and with Ukraine, though of course in Ukraine we haven’t yet seen whatever international settlement will emerge.
- My reservations about Fred’s assessment of the situation only increase my admiration for what he tried to do. Negotiations are never a sure thing. The Dayton agreements were completed in penalty time. Kosovo was settled only after a negotiation failure at Rambouillet.
Courage merits admiration
- Fred faults himself in the end for failing to convince American policymakers of the contribution a Syria/Israel peace agreement would have made to U.S. national interests and to a more comprehensive Israel/Arab peace.
- My bottom line is different. Fred Hof is a courageous man who tried to do the right thing on the issue entrusted to him. This book enables his substantial successes and his ultimate failure to educate those who come next. I am grateful for the book and admire the courage.
Stevenson’s army, July 12
– The House takes up the NDAA this week, with over 1200 amendments filed.
– GOP resists Democratic proposals for increased aid to UN to counter China.
– Big LDP win foreshadows revisions to Japan’s constitution.
– US says Iran is shipping drones to Russia.
– Putin goes to Tehran for meetings including Turkey.
– WSJ says US is working to reform WTO.
– WaPo says ISIS planned attacks in Western Europe.
– NYT sees Ukraine war turning into test of stamina.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).