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Stevenson’s army, May 23
– Biden says US will defend Taiwan, aides say no change in policy.
– NYT explains IPEF. So does WSJ.
– US may use special forces to defend Kyiv embassy.
– Israel evicts Palestinians in advance of Biden visit.
– NYT reports on Ukraine peace ideas.
– Here’s the list of Americans sanctioned by Russia.
– WSJ reports on China’s subsidies to businesses.
– Politico has interesting report on how aides plan foreign travel by the president.
– History lessons: Politico argues the Scopes trial mirrors current fights over what can be taught in schools. And Jill Lepore has a good short history of the trial.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Russia’s aggression won’t help Kosovo
Colleagues I respect think I got it wrong. Earlier this week I doubted Serbian President Vucic was prepared to reach a comprehensive normalization agreement with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti. So I thought I would consider the arguments.
What my critics argue
My critics think Vucic is not so hard over, in current circumstances. They argue that his patron, Vladimir Putin, is in trouble both in Ukraine and Russia. Moscow has even compared the Ukrainian provinces of Luhansk and Donestk to Kosovo. This implies that the Russians might accept Kosovo’s secession if the West accepts the declarations of independence of the Ukrainian provinces. Belgrade fears Russia might cut a deal at Serbia’s expense. So Vucic needs the West more than ever. He might even accept Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence in exchange for a vaguely defined Association of Serb-majority Municipalities. Pristina agreed to that in 2013, but current Prime Minister Kurti has ruled it out.
It doesn’t make sense
I admit the Belgrade tabloids are showing a lot of concern about the shakiness of Russia’s support for Serbia’s claim of sovereignty over Kosovo. But still, the argument doesn’t really make sense to me.
If Belgrade is concerned about the Russians maintaining their veto over Kosovo UN membership, they can readily look to China. Beijing has been providing a lot of financing and military hardware to Belgrade lately. The Chinese also oppose Kosovo independence, because of the implications for Taiwan. It wouldn’t make sense for Vucic to turn to the West, which will surely insist on recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence while China won’t.
Besides, for Belgrade the important precedent is Russia’s seizure of territory where ethnic Russians live. That could be used, if Moscow wins in Ukraine, as a precedent for Serbia’s seizure of northern Kosovo. Or at least formation of a “Serb Republic of Northern Kosovo” that declares independence and accepts Russian peacekeepers on the northerns side of the Ibar River.
Can the Americans intervene decisively?
My critics also argue this is a good moment for America to put forward a plan Vucic cannot refuse. Could the Americans intervene decisively with Serbia to force recognition of the Republic of Kosovo? I doubt it. So far, the Biden Administration has shown little inclination to do more than return to past, pre-Trump US policy, which was supportive of the EU-sponsored normalization dialogue.
The Americans have also turned favorable to the Belgrade-Tirana proposal for Open Balkans, which is still an ill-defined slogan for increasing intra-Balkans trade more than a clear plan to resolve outstanding issues. Balkan leaders have discussed trade issues ad infinitum in the German-sponsored Berlin process as well as in CEFTA (the Central European Free Trade Agreement). The EU and US are pressing Kosovo hard to join Open Balkans. But alas, Belgrade and Tirana have never sent a formal invitation to Pristina. They can’t agree on how to address it. That does not augur well.
Nor does American pre-occupation with Ukraine and its ramifications. Kosovo has supported Ukraine, but Serbia has not. Washington will fear that any move towards Kosovo independence will drive Serbia in the wrong direction. That is the advantage of Vucic’s “two stools” strategy. He can always sit on the other one.
First to applaud
I’ll be the first to give a standing ovation to whoever is able to get Serbia to recognize Kosovo within its present borders and in harmony with its current constitution. But I don’t think Ukraine is helping. To the contrary: Russia’s launch of an irredentist war of aggression bodes ill for stability in the Balkans.
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Stevenson’s army, April 9 and 10
April 10:
Reading about the Russian law limiting what can be said about the conflict in Ukraine, I remembered that America’s record has blemishes, despite the first amendment. Read Geoffrey Stone’s Perilous Times. And look at the Sedition Law of 1918.
– In preparation for our discussion of the media in week 11, think about the NYTimes’ announcement by Executive Editor Dean Baquet this week limiting its reporters’ use of Twitter, discussed at CJR. In the memo, Baquet said that while Twitter can play a “helpful role,” particularly when it comes to “highlighting the concerns of underrepresented groups,” it has also had deleterious effects on the Times, its work, and its staff in four main ways, with journalists over-relying on Twitter echo chambers in their reporting, worrying too much about feedback from other users, damaging the paper’s reputation (and their own) with “off-the-cuff responses,” and suffering there from harassment and attacks.
– Also worth your time is Ezra Klein’s interview about Ukraine with Fiona Hill. [I’m linking the transcript; it’s from a podcast]
-WSJ reports on Israel’s 4-year air war across the Middle East.
April 9:
I’m concerned that many Americans are taking an overly narrow and naively optimistic view of the Ukraine war. Our media coverage comes mostly from the Ukraine side; we see the war as they do, brutal but with bravery. We’re understandably sympathetic to that side. But…remember that support for Ukraine is limited and perishable. Outside of Europe, governments are indifferent or even hostile [that is, pro-Russian]. Why? Because it’s in their interests.
Josh Rogin is mad at Israel. But already, disruptions in Ukrainian food supplies is already hurting people across the globe.
Even in Europe, Hungary’s pro-Putin Orban easily won reelection. And Marine Le Pen might become president of France. Remember that NATO requires unanimity for big decisions.
Even in America, nearly 1/3 of House Republicans opposed a mere sense of Congress resolution supporting NATO. And the current consensus is that Democrats will lose massively in the midterm elections.Trust in government is higher in Russia than US.
Can the current support for Ukraine continue in Germany, America, and elsewhere until the fall? Into next year?
Problems to be overcome: Shortage of 152 mm artillery. A new Russian general with Syria experience. Chinese expansion of its nuclear arsenal.
Meanwhile, take heart from this analysis of how Kyiv prevailed.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, April 6
– Paul Pillar notes how hard a Ukraine peace deal because of disagreements over war aims on all sides. More on that from WaPo.
– Gen. Milley disagrees with Biden budget cut to nuclear cruise missile.
– 63 House Republican oppose resolution supporting NATO.
– DOD officials admit inflation estimate too low.
– Kori Schake wants 50% increase in defense spending.
– Incoming South Korean president wants return of US nukes.
– Japan has moved radar closer to China.
– WSJ says Czechs have sent tanks to Ukraine.
– With LePen surging in polls, GMF has survey of presidential candidates’ views on foreign policy.
– Andrew Exum explains Russian atrocities.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, April 5
– WSJ describes some of the US planning about release of intelligence information.
-Reuters reports US blockage of Russian debt payments.
– FP writer on the options for arms control now.
– NYT reports on China’s pro-Russia propaganda.
– In WSJ Walter Russel Mead discusses “Biden’s ugly options” in Ukraine. Of course they are the West’s ugly options as well.
The first option, helping Ukraine win, is the most emotionally appealing and would certainly be the most morally justifiable and politically beneficial, but the risks and costs are high. Russia won’t accept defeat before trying every tactic, however brutal, and perhaps every weapon, however murderous. To force Russia to accept failure in Ukraine, the Biden administration would likely have to shift to a wartime mentality, perhaps including the kind of nuclear brinkmanship not seen since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. With China and Iran both committed to weakening American power by any available means, a confrontation with the revisionist powers spearheaded by Russia may prove to be the most arduous challenge faced by an American administration since the height of the Cold War.
But the other two options are also bad. A Russian victory would inflict a massive blow to American prestige and the health of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, especially if the West were seen as forcing Ukraine to surrender to Russian demands. Freezing the conflict is also perilous, as this would presumably leave Russia holding even more Ukrainian territory than it did following the 2014 invasions of Crimea and the Donbas. It would be hard to spin this as anything but a partial victory for Russia—and Mr. Putin would remain free to renew hostilities at a time of his choosing.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The nice thing about winning elections
I can do no better than the OSCE in evaluating Serbia’s presidential and parliamentary elections. They were conducted on an “uneven playing field” that favored the incumbent President and parliamentary majority. Media coverage and government resources favored them. There was not much more than a token opposition. Alternation in power was not a real possibility. Serbia has reverted to semi-authoritarianism of a contemporary sort. Lots of political brouhaha, but little real competition.
Serbia’s shame
This is a shame, as it make Serbia a less than ideal candidate for what it says it really wants: EU membership. The EU will be lenient. That is its longstanding habit with Belgrade, which has the great virtue of implementing much of the acquis communautaire. Where Serbia is wanting is implementation of the Cophenhagen criteria for democratic governance.
Not only is its electoral playing field uneven, but Belgrade continues to laud war criminals and fails to prosecute human rights violations during the now more than two-decade-old conflict in Kosovo. It hasn’t even prosecuted the murderers of the American Bytyqi brothers killed in Serbia in 1999. Its press not only ignores past Serbian human rights violations but continues to use hate speech against Kosovars.
In addition, the incumbent government coalition has been enthusiastic for what it terms the “Serb world,” which amounts to little less than Slobodan Milosevic’s Greater Serbia. We see in Ukraine the consequences of irredentist ambitions of this sort. Russian President Putin is likewise fond of the idea of a “Russian world” that denies the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The result is war and war crimes. The “Serbian world” idea forebodes nothing better. It is a clear and present danger to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
Vucic won his first presidency on a pro-EU platform. He won the second on a pro-Russian one. He has refused to join in sanctions against Russia, while paying lip service to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It’s a pretty trick, if you can pull it off.
Success entails choices
Still, there is little reason to doubt that President Vucic has the support of the majority of the Serbian electorate. The question is what he will do with his electoral success. He can continue to encourage Serbian world fantasies, or he can decide to make Serbia into a serious candidate for EU membership. The latter will take courage. Vucic’s main political competition comes from ethnic nationalism and ultra-nationalism, not from liberal democrats. The nationalists are not only a political threat, but also a physical one. They killed Prime Minister Djindjic for fear he would give Kosovo away. They could kill again.
Tough choices in Kosovo too
Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti likewise has strong political support. He faces a domestic political scene that generally opposes concessions to Belgrade. He too needs to choose whether to take the political risk of reaching an agreement that will entail compromise with the enemy. The EU, which has been ungenerous to Kosovo in denying it a visa waiver program, complicates his calculus. Whether Brussels would reward Kosovo for an agreement with Serbia is doubtful, not least because countries like France, the Netherlands, and above all Hungary are hostile to Pristina. Promises made might not be kept, as with the visa waiver.
The nice thing about winning elections
Both Vucic and Kurti are now in a position to make choices. I really don’t know what they will do. If the past is a guide, neither will pursue a definitive agreement that ends the standoff between Pristina and Belgrade. But the past is only a guide if people don’t change their minds. We’ll have to wait and see. The nice thing about winning even unfair elections is that you can do what you want.
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