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The real but strange superbowl is next week

The impending Russian attack on Ukraine will trigger a war for geopolitical dominance in Europe between Russia and the United States. But Washington will not be fighting with its own troops. Ukraine will get lots of help from the US and its NATO allies, but Kyiv is not a member of the Alliance and therefore not entitled to its collective defense.

Russian war plans

Russia has wisely chosen a relatively weak adversary, as it did also in Georgia in 2008. Kyiv is a bit more than 100 miles from Russia-allied Belarus (less as the crow flies), where Moscow has mounted a substantial invasion force. It would be foolhardy for Russia to try to capture Kyiv. Doing so would cause massive destruction to a city where Moscow will want to install a post-war puppet government. But a feint from the north is inevitable, to keep Ukrainian forces pinned down there. A smaller move from Moldova in the west is also likely.

In the meanwhile, Russian forces from Crimea, the rebel areas of Luhansk and Donetsk, and amphibious landing ships will aim for Mariupol and other towns along the Sea of Azov littoral. A land bridge to Crimea will be their objective. If they succeed at that, they may try to go all the way to Odesa. Cut off from the Black Sea, surrounded, and defeated, Ukrainian forces would surrender, the government would flee or fall, and Moscow would be in charge of the entire country.

The Ukrainians have a chance

None of this is inevitable. The Ukrainians may surprise the Russians with stiff resistance and newly acquired advanced weapons, including Turkish drones and American anti-tank Javelins. While surrounded, the Ukrainians have the advantage of shorter interior lines of communication. They will also be fighting on their home turf. It is anyone’s guess how many thousands of troops Putin can lose before abandoning the invasion. But it is wise to remember this:

Stalin, Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible especially, all of whom not only both glorified the state while abusing its people, but also, literally killed (Ivan), or were involved in killing (Stalin and Peter) their own offspring. 

Once he starts, Putin will be hard to stop, no matter what the losses.

Diplomacy isn’t working yet

He is proving hard to stop even before the attack. There is no sign yet of Russian second thoughts. Moscow continues to prevaricate, saying it has no plans for an invasion of Ukraine. President Biden has done an admirable job of lining up the NATO allies. But only time will tell whether they are ready and willing to impose serious sanctions on Russia, cutting it off from the international financial system and from revenues of the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline.

President Biden is in a difficult spot. Americans don’t want to defend Ukraine. But in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, a Russian takeover in Kyiv will underline American weakness. Biden needs either to convince Putin not to invade Ukraine, or make the sanctions that ensue far more punishing than the usual. The pre-emptive use of intelligence on Russian false flag operations and military deployments is a clever tactic. It has made clear to Western audiences who will be at fault for the Russo-Ukrainian war. But that won’t save Biden from ferocious criticism if it happens.

This is a geopolitical contest with one adversary fighting with both hands tied behind its back, or geopolitics by proxy. The real but strange superbowl more than likely kicks off next week.

Time is running out but it is not over yet

President Putin has four objectives in deploying Russian troops to Ukraine’s borders:

1. Get the US to pay attention to him and his demands.
2. Prevent Ukraine from ever joining NATO.
3. Split the Alliance.
4. Distract domestic attention from his economic failures and corrupt behavior.

How is he doing?

US attention

He has succeeded in getting US attention. Washington and Moscow are now exchanging papers addressing European security issues. That’s good from Putin’s perspective, as he regards Russia and the US as first-rank powers. Everyone else in Europe is a bit player. The Russians have succeeded in setting part of the agenda for bilateral talks. For Putin, that signals the return of Russia to great power status.

But it also alerts the US and Europe to Russia’s broader objectives. Moscow seeks to reverse 30 years of eastward movement of Western democracy and values. It wants a neutralized sphere of influence surrounding Russia. Its neighbors should present no models of successful governance that might inspire rebellion inside the Russian Federation. We used to call such states “satellites.”

Ukraine NATO membership

On Ukrainian membership in NATO, the results so far (and likely in the future) are mixed. Many NATO members are more reluctant to consider Ukraine for membership with a Russian invasion force now poised on Kiev’s borders. NATO defense of Ukraine would not be an easy task. But the Ukrainian population, at least those not under Russian rule in Donbas and Crimea, has become far more pro-NATO. Ukraine will not get membership anytime soon. But it will be coordinating its defense plans with the Alliance for at least a generation to come, unless Moscow were to be successful in again installing a puppet regime in Kiev.

Splitting the Alliance

Alliance members are not opening their arms to Ukrainian membership, but they are lining up solidly in favor of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The only visible split in the Alliance is Germany’s reluctance to allow arms it manufactures to be transferred to Ukraine from third countries. This is a product of German internal politics. The Berlin government, which includes parties friendly to Russia and reluctant about arms trade, also fears war will interfere with putting the Nordstream 2 pipeline from Russia into operation. Nordstream 2 is vital to German’s future gas supplies and its ability to meet climate change goals. Washington has explicitly said an invasion would end the hopes of bringing Nordstream 2 on line.

Despite the German reservations, the Alliance has held together pretty well. If there is a major Russian intervention, Putin can anticipate a firm response focused on economic sanctions. His best bet for splitting the Alliance is a more modest intervention. As President Biden inopportunely said in his last press conference, the Alliance would then face dissension on the strength of the sanctions. A Russian push along the coast of the Sea of Azov towards Crimea could both gain territory and split the Alliance.

Domestic politics

Putin needs some sort of military move to distract domestic attention. Russians aren’t supportive of war against Ukraine, but Putin hopes they will rally around the flag if an intervention is successful. What Putin needs to worry about domestically is not war but failure. If he moves on Mariulpol but is not be able to take it, Russians could turn on him, especially if he gets a lot of young men killed. Putin will use “hybrid war” maneuvers to increase the odds of military success. Among his options are protests and bombings throughout Ukraine, cyberattacks on vital infrastructure, financial manipulation against the Ukrainian hryvnia, and massive propaganda about Ukrainian malfeasance.

Time is running out, but it’s not over yet

There is little visible progress in the diplomacy, but the Russians are still hesitating. They won’t want to keep their troops mobilized and ready for an invasion too long. It’s expensive, tiring for the troops, and logistically challenging. The Americans say they are trying to given the Russians an “off ramp.” But there is little they can do to satisfy Putin’s demand for a legally binding commitment that Ukraine will never join NATO. Nor will they want to reverse NATO’s three decades of expansion eastward.

The main question now is whether deterrence will work. Has the West done enough to ensure doubt about whether Russia will win a war with Ukraine? Is the prospect of sanctions sufficiently daunting for Moscow to prefer standing down? Can Putin back down without suffering serious domestic political consequences?

What Macron meant to say

President Macron of France said Wednesday that the countries of the Western Balkans should be given a clear perspective on joining the EU within a reasonable timeframe. France has been reluctant on enlargement. So the press in the countries concerned has highlighted the statement and wondered what it means.

My guess is less than many might hope. Macron omitted the when, where, and how.

Macron also underlined on the same day that European culture evolved through Christianity:

But we come from Ancient Greece to the Roman Empire, from Christianity to the Renaissance and to the Enlightenment, heirs of a singular way of envisaging the human adventure. 

https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/french-president-emmanuel-macron-s-speech-at-the-european-parliament-strasbourg-19-january-2022/

He makes no mention of Europe’s considerable debt to the Islamic world. That casts a shadow on any hope Macron’s statement applies to the three Muslim-majority countries of the Western Balkans: Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. All three are already laggards in adoption of the acquis communautaire compared to Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.

Macron could have signalled openness to their EU accession. Kosovo has fulfilled the hundred or so requirements the EU levied as preconditions for the visa waiver. France has blocked it, making Kosovars the only Balkanites who need visas to enter the EU. Albania is awaiting a date to start its accession negotiations. Macron might have promised that. He didn’t.

My guess is that the excitement over Macron’s “opening” to the Western Balkans is unjustified. If France does anything to fulfill Macron’s promise, it will accelerate Serbia’s accession and perhaps Montenegro’s. They are both Christian-majority. This would be little more than continuation of longstanding French policy, which favors Belgrade’s interests over those of other Western Balkan countries. Liberté, égalité, fraternité for Christians is what Macron meant to say.