Democracy matters, but so does the candidate

2024 is a year replete with elections. The most important, not only for the US but also for much of the rest of the world, is not until November 5. We are already more than halfway there. How are things going?

The good news

Pretty well. In India, France, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Pakistan, Macedonia, Mexico, and Taiwan electorates have demonstrated reduced support for regimes in power while either maintaining the incumbents or installing reasonable moderates.

Even in Iran, where elections are unfair due to prior regime selection of candidates and unfree due to regime control of the media, voters chose a relative moderate.

The European Parliament has likewise remained mainly in the hands of relative moderates, despite gains by right-wing nationalists:

These are by my lights good outcomes.

The bad news

Unfree and unfair elections elsewhere did what elections do in autocracies. They confirmed the autocrats. Vladimir Putin and Bashar al Assad enjoy that, but it convinces no one but themselves of their legitimacy.

In the US, we are in the midst of a chaotic campaign. Joe Biden’s poor debate performance has shaken some of his Democratic supporters, hurt his fundraising, and reduced his odds against Donald Trump:

The situation is even worse in battleground states that will decide the outcome in the Electoral College. Both candidates are unpopular, but Biden is more unpopular:

This is strange. The former president gave tax breaks to the rich, responded with confusion to the COVID-19 epidemic, hired many officials who have been indicted for felonies, failed to fulfill many promises, and diminished American prestige and influence abroad. The current president has presided over a dramatic economic recovery, provided relief to the middle class, mobilized against climate change, and made America the envy of much of the world.

However much I may disagree with the prevailing judgment about the candidates, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Biden is in serious trouble.

That could change

That could change of course. Americans could wake up and realize that Trump is more cognitively impaired than Biden. He rarely completes an intelligible sentence. No one really knows what he wants. Voters could start wondering about someone whose supporters aim to eviscerate the civil service, ban abortion and then birth control countrywide, and impose more tariffs American consumers will pay on imported goods. Or my fellow-citizens could develop a sudden aversion to someone convicted of 34 felonies and indicted on dozens of other felony counts in multiple jurisdictions. Not to mention his decades of partying with Jeffrey Epstein and underage girls.

Americans could also wake up to President Biden’s virtues. The economy has more than fully recovered from the COVID-19 recession, taxes, medical expenses, and student loan payments for middle and lower income Americans are down, and inflation is cruising to a soft landing. Pete Buttigieg gets it right:

Not many Transportation Secretaries can do this.

But the odds aren’t good

All that said, Biden is in trouble. Kamala Harris is a viable candidate. Rob Reiner has echoed George Clooney well:

We love and respect Joe Biden. We acknowledge all he has done for our country. But Democracy is facing an existential threat. We need someone younger to fight back. Joe Biden must step aside.

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Yes, things have changed, but…

I’ve been skeptical about the prospects for a ceasefire in Gaza. I wrote just three weeks ago that the conditions for a negotiated outcome did not exist. Those three conditions are a mutually hurting stalemate, a mutually enticing outcome, and security for the belligerents. Has something changed?

What has changed

Yes, as usual. War is dynamic affair.

For Israel, the big change is on its northern border with Lebanon. The tit-for-tat strikes across that border with Hizbollah are escalating. Yesterday Hizbollah fired 200 rockets into Israel, in retaliation for an Israeli assassination of one of its field commanders. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) leaders are rightly concerned about fighting on two fronts at the same time. Having achieved what they could in Rafah, at the southern end of Gaza, the IDF is open to quieting Gaza so it can focus on Hizbollah. A temporary ceasefire has become more attractive than it was three weeks ago.

It is more difficult to fathom Hamas’ current attitude. It has certainly suffered more losses in the last three weeks, but there is no evidence it has suffered a clear defeat. More important than its military losses may be the growing complaints about Hamas among Palestinians. A ceasefire would provide a much-needed opportunity to improve living conditions conditions in Gaza.*

What has not changed

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu remains opposed to a ceasefire, despite the IDF attitude. He still wants to fulfill Israel’s war objectives: an end to Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. That presumably includes the death (or maybe exile) of Hamas’ military and political leaders, which would give Netanyahu the victory he needs to try to ensure his own hold on power.

Hamas leaders want any ceasefire to be permanent and complete, thus enabling their own survival. No outcome that leaves Israel free to continue striking in Gaza will be attractive to them.

The known unknown

What we know we don’t know are the details of the negotiations. Negotiators were supposedly assembling again in Doha today. But the Mossad chief has already returned to Jerusalem. The latest draft agreement I’ve seen is from June 6, when Israel was still proposing “a sustainable calm which would achieve a permanent ceasefire.” That was not acceptable to Hamas, which wanted a guaranteed permanent ceasefire.

Now @DavidMakovsky, for whom I have a lot of respect, is suggesting the question of a limited hostage/prisoner exchange may advance without a ceasefire, or perhaps a limited one. Certainly that is what Netanyahu would want. He stands to gain a great deal politically with release of more hostages, as Hamas does with release of Palestinians from Israeli prisons.

So yes, things have changed, but the outcome is still unclear. It could be far short of the negotiated end to the Gaza war many of us would like to see.

*The Wall Street Journal adds that Qatar has threatened to throw Hamas’ political leadership out of Doha and Turkey has refused to take them in. It also notes that Israeli seizure of the Philadelphi corridor on Gaza’s southern end may be heightening pressure on Hamas.

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Harris would be a solid candidate

I thought everything that could be said about President Biden’s poor debate performance last week had been said. Until I read my son Adam’s call for Biden to resign now. Caveat emptor: I’m his father. But he makes the case well. If Biden is too old to debate effectively, he is too old to govern. And his yielding the presidency to Vice President Harris would help her to gain traction after a late start. Her polling is already about as good as Biden’s, and incumbency would give her additional advantages.

A constitutional glitch

The glitch in this scheme is the 25th amendment to the US constitution. It requires a majority of both Houses of Congress to confirm nomination of a Vice President before s/he takes office. This looks doable in the Senate, where the Democrats have a slim majority.

But in the House of Representatives the Republicans have a slim majority. We can hope that at least a few Republicans would vote to confirm. But if they don’t Harris would presumably remain in the Presidency as “Acting” for a few months. Otherwise there is a real risk of discontinuity at the apex of the US government. That would not benefit no one.*

Harris’ record

As a California Senator, Harris voted the same way as Bernie Sanders 93% of the time. That puts her on the Democratic left. But prior to that she spent decades as a tough-on-crime prosecutor, albeit one who increasingly opposed charging minor crimes. As Vice President, she has been leading on reproductive rights, voting rights, and the southern border. None of those issues has provided triumphs, but her positions on them will solidify Democratic support. Republican criticism will be especially focused on southern border issues. The Republicans are trying to duck on abortion and voting rights, both of which they oppose.

Harris has also racked up more tie-breaking votes in the Senate than any other vice president in American history. That is more a reflection of the slim Democratic majority than any vice or virtue on her part. But it also means that her experience in Congress is longer than the four years she served as a Senator. And watching Joe Biden work the Hill since 2021 is excellent training.

Harris’ virtues

Harris has a lot of electoral virtues. She is clear-headed and would make mincemeat of Donald Trump in a debate. She is both Black (Jamaican) and Indian (Tamil Nadu) by parentage, married to a Jewish Second Gentleman. At 59 she looks considerably younger. She is a graduate of Howard University, a leading Black institution of higher learning in the US.

Shoring up Black support is an important Democratic objective for November. Harris will have an advantage in doing that. She is also a Californian, but that won’t help as its electoral votes a virtual certainty for the Democrats.

Foreign policy won’t weigh heavily in this election. But Harris was relatively early in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. That could help her with Arab Americans. Their votes in Michigan and a few other states could be decisive. She has been stalwart and blunt in supporting Ukraine:

She stood in for Biden at Ukraine’s recent Peace Summit.

For my Balkan readers: there is no way Harris would support ethnic nationalist proposals for segregation by means of moving borders in the Balkans. I imagine the current Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Jim O’Brien, would remain in place in a Harris administration.

Bottom line

There are still four months before the election. Harris would have immediate access to the resources of the Biden/Harris campaign. She could credibly take credit for the good things Biden has done, including on climate change, student loans, countering inflation, and job creation. Democrats could rally around her faster and easier than around one of the many other admittedly qualified aspirants. Harris is not a shoo-in, but she would be a solid candidate.

*This is wrong. I misread the 25th Amendment. The Vice President would become President on Biden’s resignation. It is a new Vice President who would have to be confirmed in Congress.

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The Balkans are simmering

My ten days in the Balkans June 18-28 visiting Sarajevo, Skopje, Tetovo, and Pristina constituted my first trip there in more than five years. I’ll try to summarize my impressions/findings here. I won’t reveal sources and methods, but it is no secret that I have talked with prominent politicians in and out of power, government officials, diplomats, thinktankers, civil society people, and university professors and students. My focus is on the conflicts: are they over? getting worse? staying the same? metamorphizing?

Sarajevo is mostly looking good…

In Sarajevo I found the wars of the 1990s fading both in memory and in physical representation. The city shows few scars or even memorials from the siege of 1992-95. The young mayor is a woman better known for her work in academia than politics when the city council selected her. She and her family lived on the confrontation line during the war. The city is almost entirely restored, the confrontation line erased, and the metropolitan area significantly expanded, especially to Ilidza in the west. That is where the much-lauded Sarajevo School of Science and Technology resides (photo by DAVOR BILANDŽIĆ, a local guide, as I neglected to take one):

Serbs I talked with are living comfortably in the city. Many more are commuting from Republika Srpska to the east, where Bosniaks are also said to be buying apartments because they are cheaper. Bosniaks have even returned to Stolac in southern Bosnia, from which Croats ethnically cleansed them in 1993.

…but

But political life in Bosnia still revolves around ethnic identity. A big gap is opening between the society, where individuals speaking a more or less common language get along without much friction, and politics, which organizes and mobilizes around whether you are Serb, Croat, Bosniak (Muslim, whether religious or secular), or Other. The worst interethnic violence I heard cited was that someone had slashed tires on some Serbian-plated vehicles. Reprehensible, but not a war crime. It isn’t clear who did it, but it caused the Orthodox prelates to boycott the Inter-religious Council. The Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish members continue to meet.

Some pessimists suggest that the ethnic groups are just waiting for the next opportunity to slaughter each other. I hope that is not true, but we can’t be sure. The Dayton constitution under which the country is governed enshrines ethnic identity as a major factor in politics. Generations of living under that system has empowered ethnic nationalists, with consequences that could be catastrophic. Some think young people are even more nationalist than their parents. I find that hard to believe of the many 20- and 30-somethings noisily frequenting the bars in central Sarajevo until late at night, but that indicator may not reflect the rest of the country.

Skopje is restored too, but with a difference

In what is now officially North Macedonia, which never saw serious fighting in the capital, Skopje shows many signs of two conflicts that have plagued the country for decades. In 2014, the government launched a much-needed reconstruction of the center of the city. An ethnic nationalist government adorned it with grotesquely large statues of Greek heroes and a triumphal arch.

These monuments underlined the false claim that modern Macedonia, whose majority population is Slav rather than Greek, has roots in ancient history. That not only annoyed Greece but increased the sharp contrast between the mainly Macedonian part of the city and the more traditional other side of the river:

The construction of an Orthodox Church on the grounds of Skopje’s large, mainly Ottoman-era fortress remains stalled due to Albanian claims that the work is destroying an ancient Illyrian site. A colleague who has spent her career working on Macedonian/Albanian relations suggested to me that the “social distance” between citizens of different ethnicities is growing, due in part to separate schools, mutually incomprehensible languages, and little concern with inter-ethnic comity. But the politicians cooperate in coalitions that always include both Macedonians and Albanians. So the situation is the inverse of that in Sarajevo: the political class cooperates reasonably well, but ethnicity increasingly governs the society.

Pristina celebrates its own modern heroes

Pristina, which also suffered no widespread destruction, sports monuments to Kosovo’s conflict with Serbia. The monumental statues of Kosovo heroes, both nonviolent leader Ibrahim Rugova and Kosovo Liberation Army fighters, are prominent:

There are also now giant portraits of Kosovo’s former President Thaci and its former Parliament Speaker Veseli, both on trial in The Hague for war crimes. Statues of Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright, who supported Kosovo in the 1990s, occupy prominent spots, and Bill Clinton Boulevard interests with (Senator) Bob Doll (sic) Street. The commercial bustle distracts attention from all these monuments and portraits, but they are not hard to find.

Nevertheless, Serbs now circulate safely and freely in Pristina, despite the still high interethnic tension in the northern four municipalities, which are majority Serb and contiguous with Serbia. Few young Albanians learn Serbian. Even fewer Serbs learn Albanian. Physical separation is the rule rather than the exception. Most Serbs live in Serb-majority municipalities. There is little political cooperation at any level.

Ambitions are similar…

In all three countries, I found similar government goals. Economic development is the top priority. Politicians in the capitals all agree that their citizens want jobs created and corruption reduced.

Kosovo’s prime minister is generally regarded as having clean hands. The country’s rule of law scores have been improving. But more than one person suggested that the administration lacks expertise and competence, both at the national and the municipal levels. The prime minister seems to his opponents to value loyalty more than capability.

The new prime minister in Macedonia is proud that the mayors from his political party who gained election two years ago have not garnered criticism for corruption. The party he inherited in 2017 was both broke and corrupt. He has rebuilt it and would be unlikely to welcome back his predecessor, who has fled to Hungary. The new government will include Albanians who have mostly been in opposition, displacing an Albanian party that had been in power for all but two of the past 12 years. That party had garnered a lot of criticism for arrogance and patronage.

…but Bosnia is different

In Bosnia, the situation is more complicated, as usual. The US has sanctioned the President of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb 49% of the country, for corruption, along with members of his family. The economy in much of the RS–which depends heavily on Russian financing–is moribund. Its eastern wing is depopulated. Corruption also plagues the main Croat nationalist political party, but evidence has proven hard to find. Its leader is careful not to leave his name on paper.

For reasons I find hard to fathom, the US and the international community High Representative preferred when they got a chance to torpedo the head of the main Bosniak party, not the Croat or Serb. The only explanation I heard was that its leader allegedly opposed meaningful state-building. A puzzling first choice for international ire, he is now in opposition but has maintained his command of a main Bosniak political party. The other two ethnic leaders are still on the target list.

Geopolitics heighten tensions

In all three countries, the US and EU are in competition with Russia and China. The Russian objective is to de-stabilize and thereby cause Washington grief. It does this using politicians in Belgrade, including the President, as proxies. Serbia seeks dominance of the Serb populations in neighboring countries. This “Serbian world” objective is a carbon copy of Putin’s “Russian world” that justified the invasion of Ukraine. The Chinese are looking to use the Balkans, especially Serbia, as a trade route into the EU, which is still the region’s (and Serbia’s) main trading partner.

The US declares that it wants to see all the countries of the Balkans in the Western camp. But Washington has turned a blind eye to Serbia’s definitive turn in the last couple of years towards the East. Belgrade happily takes weapons from Russia and investment from China. The EU claims to want all the states of the Western Balkans to become members, but that prospect is far off. In the meanwhile, Brussels fails to use sanctions and even verbal condemnation against those standing in the way of EU accession.

Macedonia in the middle

Moscow will be pleased with the new Macedonian government. It includes a deputy prime minister who is a vigorous Russophile, as well as two others close to Moscow. A Hungarian bank said to have Russian financing granted a 1 billion euro loan to the new government immediately after it was sworn in. The newly installed President has refused to use the country’s official name, North Macedonia. The 2018 agreement with Greece to use that name was a major EU achievement.

The new prime minister in Skopje is nevertheless at pains to emphasize his Western orientation, his ambition for EU membership, and North Macedonia’s fidelity to NATO membership. His Albanian coalition partners will insist on those points. A deputy prime minister can either be someone important or someone the prime minister wants to keep an eye on.

Macedonia’s biggest current international issue is with EU member state Bulgaria. Sofia is insisting that Skopje recognize in its constitution the fewer than 1000 citizens who identify as Bulgarians. The new prime minister campaigned against that. But he may be willing to do it in the final stage of EU accession, when the Bulgarians can’t afterwards raise additional issues. In the meanwhile, some optimists hope the Bulgarians will be willing to absent themselves from decisions on Macedonia’s accession process. That is what Hungarian Prime Minister Orban did on EU aid to Ukraine.

Bosnia is split, as always

The Russians will also be pleased with the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs and Croats there combine often to do things Moscow enjoys, including the defanging of the judicial system. The Europeans have been reluctant to use their considerable leverage in Bosnia, thinking that the accession process will fix everything. Brussels has not sanctioned the Serb leader, despite Washington pressure. Moscow seems ready to continue giving him money, with little prospect of ever getting it back.

The Bosniak and other participants in the current government of the 51% of the country they control in condominium with the Croats owe their position to the Americans. But they are a weak reed to lean on. While the Federation’s economy is doing better than that of the RS, its politics are still far from functioning at what we like to think of as a Western level.

Pristina is bandwagoning without benefits

Unlike Belgrade and the RS, the authorities in Pristina have no option to hedge their bets. Kosovo necessarily “bandwagons” (that’s the technical term) with NATO and the EU.

But the current prime minister is unhappy with Washington and Brussels for appeasing Belgrade. The results are felt keenly in the EU-sponsored and US-supported “dialogue” between Pristina and Belgrade. Kosovo wants Belgrade to withdraw a letter disowning an agreement on political normalization reached last year. Pristina asks that Serbia sign the agreement and transfer for trial the self-confessed organizer of a September 2023 terrorist plot. The prime minister has made these legitimate desires a condition for re-engaging in a dialogue that has produced precious little. That angers the EU and US, which see the dialogue as an end in itself, not just a means.

The result is anomalous. Kosovo is in the dialogue mainly to improve relations with the US and EU. But its conditions for participating are doing the opposite. This is not the first time Pristina has displeased its closest friends. Somehow it needs to find a way to make demands of Belgrade without alienating Brussels and Washington.

American leadership is decisive, but so too is European vigor

Most everyone I talked with recognized that America’s November election will be decisive for the Balkans. President Trump favored partition of Kosovo and will no doubt continue in that direction if re-elected. His willingness to surrender part of Ukraine to Russia will re-open the partition question in the Balkans.

Trump’s reliance on Serbophile Richard Grenell for advice on the Balkans and his son-in-law’s investment in Belgrade will guarantee support for Serbia’s ambitions. That would precipitate challenges to Serbia’s borders as well as Bosnia’s and perhaps Montenegro’s and Macedonia’s. Such challenges will spark violence, ethnic cleansing, and ultimately war. The simmering Balkans will boil over into instability, and even regional war if Trump gets another chance to pursue ethnic partition.

President Biden, while in my view too soft on Serbia, has maintained nominal support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the Western Balkan states. In a second term, he should correct course. He should give up on political normalization between Kosovo and Serbia, which is a bridge too far, and stiffen policy towards Serbia. He should also try to get past the Dayton constitution in Bosnia and pressure Bulgaria to postpone its hope for constitutional change in Macedonia.

The EU is appointing Estonia’s anti-Russian* prime minister as the new High Representative for foreign affairs. That will give Washington a stronger reed to lean on than the incumbent. He and his chief negotiator came from two countries, Spain and Slovakia, that do not recognize Kosovo. They both leaned towards appeasing Serbia. Kaja Kallas will be far more vigorous in countering Moscow’s influence. Biden will get along well with her. Trump won’t.

*A careful reader writes:

One small quibble – Kallas is not “anti-Russian,” she is anti-Kremlin or anti-Putin, or anti-Russian imperialism.

I accept that amendment.

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Talk should focus on the possible

Here are the remarks I prepared for today’s panel in Pristina, Kosovo on “The Future of the Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia: the possibilities for new dynamics in the process and the impact of new US and EU elections.” The Group for Legal and Political Studies sponsored the event.

  1. Here in Pristina I face a great challenge. I need to say something sensible about the Dialogue in front of people here in Pristina who have spent years observing it and engaging in it.
  2. Fellow panelist Sonja Biserko is also closer to the Dialogue than I am. She has been observing the political moods in Belgrade since before my first trip to Kosovo in 1998, as war was brewing.
  3. Anything I say will be from a more distant, professorial perspective.
  4. That perspective tells me there is no better alternative than a peaceful and friendly relationship between Belgrade and Pristina.
  5. When I said this to Kosovo Albanian friends during and soon after the war they laughed grimly. They said they would never want to talk with Belgrade again.
  6. But it soon became clear that Serbia was Kosovo’s biggest security threat, an important factor in its economy, and a major influence on its Serb population.
  7. Not to mention its influence on other countries, which has prevented universal recognition of Kosovo independence.
  8. Neighbors don’t have the privilege of ignoring their neighbors if they want security, prosperity, the loyalty of their minority populations, and international recognition.
  9. I participated in the first training for talks with Belgrade around 2004, for the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Bajram Rexhepi, then Prime Minister of the provisional institutions, was a participant, along with several other ministers and directors general. Maybe some of you were there.
  10. I soon after helped to train Serbian foreign service officers for their engagement with Kosovo.
  11. But quite rightly the international community decided that independence needed to come first. And so it did, as Martti Ahtisaari recommended, along with his EU and American collaborators.
  12. Then of course there was the need to ensure implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, a process that the International Civilian Office supervised well.
  13. So it was 2011 before the dialogue with Belgrade officially began. This was the technical dialogue, which Edita Tahiri and Borko Stefanovic led.
  14. The goal of the technical dialogue was to improve the lives of people in both countries.
  15. It produced a lot of agreements by 2013, many of which were not fully implemented in the timeframes foreseen.
  16. These included agreements on civil registry books, cadastral records, freedom of movement, recognition of diplomas, custom stamps and duties, regional representation, telecommunications, and energy.
  17. In 2013, the participants raised the level of the dialogue and set a new goal: political normalization.
  18. This political dialogue resulted in the 2013 Brussels agreement, which famously included the Association of Serb Municipalities.
  19. But the Association was not a standalone, unilateral proposition.
  20. Kosovo agreed to create it in exchange for Serb participation in Kosovo’s institutions, especially municipal elections, the police and judiciary, as well as non-interference by either side in the other’s progress toward the EU.
  21. Since 2013 there has been some progress on implementing the technical agreements. But there has been virtually none in meeting the goal of political normalization. I would even say that Belgrade has reversed some progress.
  22. It has reneged on all the 2013 commitments. It has maintained de facto governance over the Serb population in the Serb-majority communities of northern Kosovo. Serbia organized the boycott of municipal elections there. Belgrade has withdrawn Serb officials from the police and courts. And Serbia has done everything it could to block and reverse recognition of Kosovo and its entry into the Council of Europe.
  23. Pristina has done nothing to implement its commitment to create the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities.
  24. For the past three years, Gabe Escobar and Miroslav Lajcak have tried to pressure Pristina into creating the Association, with no success. That should not be surprising, as the agreement to create it included obligations for Belgrade as well.
  25. Instead of fulfilling those, Serbia has chosen to make things worse, through purposeful violence. Last year it kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, rented a mob to attack NATO peacekeepers inside Kosovo, and organized a terrorist attack that was supposed to provide the excuse for a Serbian military intervention.
  26. Most recently, Belgrade has torpedoed the proposal to re-call the non-Serb mayors in the north and conduct new elections.
  27. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the technical dialogue was far more productive than the political one.
  28. I have to ask: why is this the case?
  29. Belgrade, it seems to me, is not ready for political normalization. By the end of last year, President Vucic was expressing his hope for changed geopolitical conditions that would enable Serbia to retake part or all of Kosovo. The newly inaugurated Serbian government includes vocal supporters of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It also includes the leading advocate of the “Serbian world,” a euphemism for Greater Serbia.
  30. President Vucic has de facto achieved the Serbian world in half of Bosnia and in all of Montenegro. Why wouldn’t he want to extend that success at least to northern Kosovo?
  31. I am not convinced that Pristina is ready for political normalization either.
  32. Albanian Kosovars first want to hear that Serbia regrets what Slobodan Milosevic did in 1998 and 1999. They want to see Belgrade encourage Kosovo Serbs to look to Pristina for governance, including law and order. Pristina wants Belgrade to be ready to give Albanians in southern Serbia comparable privileges and representation to those Serbia enjoys inside Kosovo for Serbs.
  33. I suppose if Belgrade were to fulfill its obligations under the 2013 agreement Pristina would too. But that isn’t going to happen.
  34. EU and US policy needs a reset. While I don’t expect diplomats to admit it, they need to return to a more practical, less political, dialogue. Political normalization is a bridge too far. Serbia won’t be interested in surrendering its sovereignty claims until the war in Ukraine ends the Russian annexations there. Kosovo won’t be interested in forming the Association until it is confident that Serbia accepts its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  35. But both Belgrade and Pristina can welcome smoothing movement of people, goods, and finance through their mutual border and enabling more licit trade, investment, and commerce.
  36. Pristina has rightly begun to insist on the use of its official currency, the euro, in transactions in Kosovo. But that is creating problems for the Serb communities, which receive subsidies from Belgrade for health and education—and likely other things as well—in Serbian dinars.
  37. This is the kind of practical issue the EU and US should focus on. Belgrade and Pristina need to agree on transparency for Serbia’s subsidies and a scheme for how they can proceed smoothly.
  38. Both Belgrade and Pristina should be interested in a serious crackdown on organized crime that exploits the lack of law and order in northern Kosovo.
  39. Now would be a good time for Belgrade to ensure that Milan Radoicic pays for his crimes and is unable to recover politically. Serbia should turn him over to Kosovo for trial. No doubt Serbia could name some Albanian candidates for similar treatment.
  40. Another issue I’d like to see discussed in the Dialogue is Belgrade’s intimidation of Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force or police. It is high time to put an end to the threats and violence that they and their families suffer at the hands of Belgrade’s proxies.
  41. That is the practical direction in which prospects for success lie. Saying farewell to failure requires getting the priorities right.
  42. Political normalization will come when Pristina and Belgrade are ready for it. My guess is that Belgrade will be first, because its EU accession will depend on recognition of Kosovo.
  43. More than one of the 27 member states of the EU will insist on it, even if the member states do not adopt it as EU policy.
  44. In the meantime, the Dialogue should focus on practical problems that can be solved in practical ways. It is a mistake to require politicians to do more than they are ready to do.
  45. That’s my professorial take.

I added a few extemporaneous remarks about the US election:

  • The good thing about American elections is that we know the outcome only after we count the votes.
  • Our 18th-century constitution makes predictions difficult, because of close races in a few battleground states.
  • A Biden election will lead to continuity in defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Western Balkan states.
  • A Trump election will lead to surrender of Ukraine to Russia, unqualified support for Israel’s war on Gaza, and doubts about US commitment to NATO and Asian allies.
  • And it will lead to revival of partition ideas in the Western Balkans, with catastrophic consequences.
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Is the sun setting on the West?

These are the thoughts I offered at today’s University of Tetovo conference on “The Future of the Western Balkans after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”:

  1. It is a great pleasure to be with you here in Macedonia, and in particular at the University of Tetovo.
  2. Yes, I said I am in “Macedonia,” because article 7 paragraph 5 of the Prespa agreement protects my personal right to call the country what I want. The “North” part is for official usage. I hope your new President will respect that.
  3. But her reluctance is part of the issue I want to talk about today: is the sun setting on the West? By the West, I mean those countries that are liberal democracies that base their open political systems on individual rights safeguarded by independent judiciaries.
  4. Lest I be misunderstood, let me say at the outset that my answer is “no.”
  5. But there are certainly a lot of reasons why someone might come to the erroneous conclusion that liberal democracy as a governing system is in trouble.
  6. First, there is the US: Donald Trump is seeking re-election on the false premise that the 2020 election was “stolen,” his recent trial was “rigged,” and everyone but him is “corrupt.”
  7. His campaign is anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and anti-Muslim. But the pollsters are telling us he may do relatively well among immigrants, minorities, and Muslims, all of whom are important in the “swing” states that will decide the election.
  8. He will certainly lose the popular vote. He did last time by about 10 million.
  9. But because of an 18th-century compromise embedded in the U.S. constitution he could still win in the Electoral College, where less populous, former slave states of the south get greater weight than their populations.
  10. Yes, the U.S. constitution contains an illiberal system for electing the president that makes some individual votes count more than others.
  11. A Trump win will unquestionably put liberal democracy as a governing system on the ropes. He has promised to govern as a dictator on day one. If he gets away with that, you don’t have to ask how he will govern on day two.
  12. He is skeptical about NATO, friendly to Vladimir Putin, and an enemy of free trade and international agreements and institutions in general.
  13. A Trump victory would have inevitable repercussions in the Balkans. He and his minions are ethnic nationalists. They will favor ethnic nationalists in the Balkans, in particular of the Serbian variety.
  14. Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, will have good economic reasons to do so once he has his hands on prime property in downtown Belgrade.
  15. Richard Grenell, Trump’s handmaiden, has made no secret of his political allegiance not only to Trump but also to President Vucic.
  16. So yes, if Trump wins you can expect his second administration to back genocide-deniers, Serbian world supporters, and pro-Russian miscreants throughout the Balkans.
  17. But I don’t really think Trump will win. The campaign has begun but won’t peak until fall.
  18. One of the good things about American elections is that we don’t know the outcome until after the votes are cast. Polls this early mean little.
  19. The media loves the campaign horse race they create, but only Election Day counts.
  20. Whatever the outcome, the fate of Ukraine will be important to you here in the Balkans. Trump would no doubt surrender Ukraine, or part of it, to Putin. Biden will not.
  21. America is not the only uncertainty.
  22. The European Union election results forebode a shift toward ethnic nationalism in Europe this year and next.
  23. Germany and France are at risk of bringing to power people who would abandon Ukraine and, like Trump, befriend ethnic nationalists in the Balkans.
  24. That would make support for Ukraine and resistance to its partition more difficult.
  25. A partitioned Ukraine would promote similar ambitions elsewhere, including the Balkans.
  26. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be at risk. So too would Kosovo and Macedonia.
  27. The return of Trump, resurgent ethnic nationalism in the EU, and the outcome of the Ukraine war are the big far-away problems for the Balkans, but the nearer problems in the Balkans are worth noting too.
  28. First and foremost is Alexandar Vucic’s Serbia.
  29. I was among those who hoped when Vucic first came to power that he would turn Serbia in a definitively Western direction.
  30. I arranged his first public appearance in Washington at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where I teach.
  31. I went to see him a year later in Belgrade, after writing a paper on the things Serbia needed to do to consolidate its democracy: free the media, establish the independence of the judiciary, and commit itself to the reforms required to accede to the European Union.
  32. He has done none of those things. Quite the opposite.
  33. The media in Serbia are not only under government tutelage but are also blatantly pro-Russian and racist, especially towards Albanians and Bosniaks. They are not much better towards me.
  34. The judiciary is little improved, if at all.
  35. And progress on implementing the acquis communautaire has been minimal.
  36. Vucic today rules a Serbia that is ethnic nationalist, irredentist, and increasingly autocratic. It can’t even pretend to administer a decent municipal election in Belgrade.
  37. The Serbia Against Violence movement is courageous, but Vucic has for now no viable Western-oriented opposition.
  38. And Serbia is aligned increasingly with Russia and China on the international stage.
  39. In addition, Vucic has managed, without firing a shot, to take over the governments in Podgorica and Banja Luka, thus realizing de facto the first stage of the Serbian world.
  40. He won’t be able to do that in Kosovo, but he has tried with violence: the kidnapping of two Kosovo police, the rent-a-riot against NATO peacekeepers, and the September 24 terrorist action.
  41. All those efforts failed, but he will continue trying.
  42. Unfortunately, the Americans and Europeans are still seeking to pacify Serbia and have not done anything to punish its resorts to violence in Kosovo.
  43. Vucic will likely also be active here in Macedonia. Increasing tension between Macedonians and Albanians will be his preferred mode of operating.
  44. Russia will back these efforts. But I think it a mistake not to recognize that in addition to serving Putin’s purposes Vucic has his own reasons for stoking ethnic strife in the Balkans.
  45. A successful, democratic Kosovo next door that respects the rights of Serbs is unwelcome to Vucic.
  46. So too is a successful, democratic North Macedonia that can aspire to EU membership before Serbia.
  47. Exacerbating ethnic tensions in Macedonia could help Vucic to gain de facto control of Skopje, which would need Serbian backing if it steps back from the West.
  48. I hope that day does not come. But if it does, I hope the citizens of Macedonia will do as they have in the past. At critical junctures, they have chosen to support the Macedonian state and ensure that it treats all minorities with respect.
  49. That in my view is the right reaction to Serbia’s ambitions. Macedonia has little to gain from Serbia or Russia.
  50. It has a great deal to gain from NATO and eventually EU membership.
  51. The problem in Macedonia is common throughout the Balkans, as well as in the United States and the European Union. Our Western systems leave the electoral door open to people who don’t support liberal democracy.
  52. They prefer ethnic rule without any serious possibility of alternation in power.
  53. The counterweights to autocratic ambitions in liberal democracies are strong institutions, especially the justice system, and vigorous civil society.
  54. Both should be focused mainly on individual rights, which make the political system far more fluid and more difficult to dominate.
  55. But even in a long-established democracy like the United States institutions can be hijacked and civil society repressed.
  56. Doing that is easier in relatively new democracies like Serbia, which can no longer claim to be one.
  57. Montenegro is headed in the same direction: a democracy in form but an autocracy in practice.
  58. Bosnia has never really achieved what I would term a democratic system, and 49% of the country is an ethnic autocracy.
  59. This is despite the fact that among Bosnia’s citizens there is remarkably little ethnic tension.
  60. I came to Macedonia Friday night from Sarajevo, where an enormous gap is opening up between the politics and the society.
  61. Ethnic nationalism dominates the politics. Mutual respect and even friendship is more common among the citizens, who however have failed to vote out people who do not really represent their own respect for individuals and their rights.
  62. Your challenge as citizens is to prevent something similar happening in Macedonia. The sun will begin to set on the West here earlier than in the United States.
  63. I wish you well in meeting your responsibilities to defend the institutions, invigorate civil society, and protect the rights of all.
  64. That is what will prevent the sun from setting on the West!
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