Getting to post-Dayton Bosnia

Here are the talking points I prepared for myself for today’s conference in Sarajevo on The Biden Administration’s Bosnia Policy: 30 Years of Federation of BiH sponsored by the US-Europe Alliance and the International University of Sarajevo:

  1. It is a great pleasure to be back in Sarajevo, truly one of the most beautiful and welcoming cities on earth.
  2. A great deal has changed since I first came here in November 1994, during the war, and even since I was here five or six years ago.
  3. I was the US embassy’s most frequent visitor during the war.
  4. The streets then were empty of both cars and people, the city was divided and isolated from its so-called suburbs, shelling was frequent, most shops were closed, heat and electricity were at best sporadic, telephones had stopped working, civilians needed to learn where they could walk without being targeted by snipers. Thousands of civilians were killed.
  5. Small arms fire hit my UN plane while landing the first time I came to Sarajevo.
  6. Things have changed a great deal. My compliments to those who have made it happen.
  7. I find Sarajevo much enlivened, younger, and more cosmopolitan. It is good that so many tourists are making their way here, that you have a Sarajevo School of Science and Technology that grants British as well as Bosnian degrees, that the Vijecnica is restored and occupied by a young woman who has more experience as a university professor than as a politician.
  8. But it is also true that the Dayton agreements froze the warring parties in place by institutionalizing the political divisions among Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.
  9. Each group has a veto on almost everything at the state level and in the Federation.
  10. Dayton also reduced the role of people who refused to identify themselves with one of the three major groups, preferring to think of themselves as individuals with inalienable rights.
  11. I believe it is high time to correct those mistakes.
  12. The two entities are the warring parties of 1995. One is now threatening secession. The other is threatened with division by those who want a third entity.
  13. These objectives are ethnic war by political means. That is better than war by military means, but it is still not the best option available.
  14. You will later in this conference discuss the legal strategy aimed at reforming Dayton Bosnia, which has been notably successful at the European Court of Human Rights but remains largely unimplemented, due to the ethnic nationalist vetoes.
  15. That however should not be the only strategy aimed at making Bosnia a more functional and effective state.
  16. Others may talk today about economic strategies. Any Bosnian enterprise with ambition should be unhappy with today’s Dayton Bosnia.
  17. A serious company should want a more unified economic space with improved relations with the rest of the world, especially Europe but also the United States.
  18. But I want to focus mainly on political reforms, which I think are needed in two dimensions.
  19. One is reform within Bosnia’s political parties, which are largely fiefdoms of the party leaders.
  20. More competitive contests for party leadership would open up the existing political parties, enable them to have more policy and programmatic focus, and reduce the dominance of the political parties within the Bosnian state.
  21. Political party reform would also reduce the risks of state capture by people exploiting public resources and patronage. And it would reduce the risks that state investigations of corruption would be blocked.
  22. The second dimension of needed political reform is cross-ethnic cooperation.
  23. This is not entirely lacking. Croat and Serb ethnic nationalists cooperate quite well these days, as they did in southern Bosnia during the war.
  24. What is needed is creation of a more civic-oriented multiethnic coalition, one that would reinforce the legal strategy that has produced good results at the ECHR.
  25. Such a civic coalition would focus on improving governance, not only at the national level but also in the municipalities.
  26. That is where citizens and government interact most frequently. A coalition that proves it can meet citizen demands at the municipal level will have a much greater chance of winning at other levels.
  27. Despite my wartime role as Mr. Federation, I am no longer a friend to the entities or the cantons. It seems to me Bosnia and Herzegovina could be more effectively governed at the municipal level and at the state level.
  28. The state government should have full authority to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communautaire.
  29. The municipalities, in accordance with the European principle of subsidiarity, should have responsibility for everything else.
  30. It is not clear to me how you get to that kind of post-Dayton Bosnia from where things stand now.
  31. It will take political courage and smart strategy, beginning with redefinition of Bosnians as citizens rather than ethnic groups.
  32. Yes, you are correct in thinking that the Americans imposed the Dayton system on Bosnia. Some of you will want to fix what we broke.
  33. But we imposed what the wartime leadership said they would accept.
  34. Twenty-nine years later neither the Americans nor the Europeans have the clout to change the system.
  35. Nor do they have the incentive to do so. Many fear instability and some have confidence in the transformational power of the EU.
  36. It is now up to Bosnians to change the political system. There are good legal, political, and economic reasons to do so.
  37. The simple fact is that Dayton Bosnia will not be able to join the European Union or NATO.
  38. Many in the current political leadership know that but don’t mind. They fear their own political and economic fortunes would end in a Bosnia with strong judicial, legislative, and executive institutions.
  39. It is Bosnia’s citizens who are going to have to do the heavy lifting.
  40. The Americans and European should be prepared to help.
  41. The Americans tried with European support in 2006 when they supported the negotiation of what became known as the April package.
  42. That failed to get a 2/3 majority in parliament by just two votes.
  43. The EU tried more recently with American support through the Citizens’ Assembly, municipal versions of which have also convened in Banja Luka and Mostar.
  44. Much more of this kind of effort is needed to build a cross-ethnic constituency for peace.
  45. Let me turn now to the hard part. I regret to say Bosnia also needs to be ready for war, in order to prevent it.
  46. Milorad Dodik and Aleksandar Vucic have made their intentions clear. They are creating a de facto Serbian world that would remove Republika Srpska from any oversight by Bosnian institutions.
  47. This is a clever scheme, with each step kept below the level at which it might stimulate a negative European or American reaction.
  48. Nor would I rule out a military dimension to the Serb strategy like the attempt at Banjska in Kosovo last September. That would be a provocation intended to provoke a reaction that enables Republika Srpska or Serbia to justify intervention.
  49. The Bosnian Army, EUFOR and NATO also need to be ready for what we call in Washington “little green men” used to infest Brcko in a kind of stealth takeover.
  50. Only if Dodik and Vucic understand that there will be a rapid and effective US and EU military reaction can we be sure they won’t try these Moscow-inspired gimmicks.
  51. Preserving the peace requires both military strength and political reform. Getting beyond the Dayton state in Bosnia will require commitment and inspiration.
  52. Bosnia has come a long way in the past 29 years. But it still has a way to go before it is a normal democratic country, one without a High Representative, one whose unity and territorial integrity citizens of all ethnicities defend, and one in which individual rights are protected for everyone.
  53. I am not suggesting something less than what I myself want. I would never trade my individual rights—protected by the judicial, legislative, and executive branches—for group rights.
  54. I wish you well undertaking the worthy effort of creating a post-Dayton, civic Bosnia. One that can join the European Union and NATO without looking back!
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The real threat to Israel is…

One of my sharpest readers questions, “do you seriously believe that Hamas can destroy the state of Israel?” I had cited that concern to account for Israeli policy in Gaza.

The answer is “no,” I don’t. But I do think it useful to acknowledge that concern in accounting for what the Israelis are doing. A state can justify almost anything if it can convince its population that its enemies are ready to destroy it. Hamas and its enablers in Tehran have said that is their objective. Those threats and Hamas’ homicidal behavior on October 7 have fed Israeli indifference, and even support, for the human rights abuses occurring in Gaza today.

The multi-front war

That behavior is generating a far greater threat to Israel than the October 7 attack. The West Bank is boiling. Yemeni Houthi and Lebanese Hizbollah attacks are escalating. Iran is enriching more uranium to close to weapon-usable levels. Israel’s international isolation is growing. The Gaza war has lasted already much longer than the Israelis anticipated. Does the Israeli Defense Force really want to fight on two or more fronts for the next six months or so?

Things are no better for Israel in the US. Prime Minister Netanyahu may imagine that the shift of Muslim votes away from President Biden will bring his favored candidate to power in Washington. But Netanyahu’s upcoming visit to the US will no doubt give American Muslims pause. The Republicans in Congress will rain praise on the Prime Minister. Some Democrats will not attend or walk out. Trump will have no compunction about supporting Israeli abuses in Gaza. The Christian evangelicals will back him. But liberal Jews, who are the majority in the US, will not. I hope Muslims will join them in voting for Biden.

The alternatives

What is the alternative for Israel? Jerusalem (that really is Israel’s capital, even if I would have preferred Trump not move the US embassy there until a final settlement) could announce that it is pausing the fighting and injecting massive humanitarian assistance into Gaza. The Israel Defense Forces have announced a temporary suspension along one vital route. That is a step in the right direction, but far from sufficient. Israel needs to put the onus on Hamas to also stop its attacks. A massive flow of aid would give Gazans an opportunity to loosen Hamas’ grasp and begin to determine their own fate.

Jerusalem could in addition seek a settlement on Israel’s northern border, one that ends the ti-for-tat bombardments and returns the area to relative calm. Rather than escalating to re-establish deterrence, as is their habit, the Israelis could do what they did with Iran: reduce their retaliation. This would signal to Hizbollah readiness to accept a return to the status quo ante. US envoy Amos Hochstein is seeking to calm things on the Israel/Lebanon border. Let’s wish him success.

It is much harder to know what to do about the Houthis. They seem determined to assert their role in “the resistance.” They are using Iran’s military technology to attack both shipping in the Red Sea and Israel, with relatively little effect on military targets but considerable damage to commercial shipping and world markets. The Houthi menace, and it is a menace, is likely to outlast both the Hamas and Hizbollah threats.

As for the American front, support for Israel is rapidly becoming a partisan issue, with part of the Democratic Party doubtful about unconditional assistance. This is entirely out of keeping with past practice and not good for Israel, which needs a Prime Minister who can speak to Congress without anyone walking out.

The real threat

The real threat to Israel is Netanyahu and his determination to continue the Gaza war until he can declare victory and stave off any challenge to his hold on power. Israelis are unhappy with him because of the government’s failure on October 7 to protect its citizens. They need to begin to realize that his policies toward the Palestinians are just as disgraceful. In addition, they aggravate the Hamas, Hizbollah, and Houthi threats.

Unfortunately, no replacement prime minister on the horizon today seems willing or able to lead Israelis in the direction of resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. Nor do the citizens seem ready to support anyone who does. At this point, Israel is more a threat to itself than is Hamas.

What good is a norm if it will be breached?

My cousin by marriage, Bill Caplan, is an engineer and former hi-tech business owner. After selling his business, he dared in retirement to get a master’s degree in architecture. He has devoted himself for years to unraveling the mysteries of energy conservation in buildings and how the world should respond to global warming. He is convinced that our current efforts are inadequate.

Smarter and better

But he is not urging faster and more. He is urging smarter and better.

Watch the video above. Bill argues that just constructing a building that uses less energy is pointless by itself, and even sometimes counterproductive. This is because production and transportation of the building materials emit so much carbon dioxide even before construction starts. That’s my crude account of his argument. Best to listen to him.

I have no doubt that he is correct on the merits. But I doubt that his proposed solution is adequate. He has devoted himself to raising the consciousness of practicing architects. That merits applause. They could correct some of the worst abuses. But you would have to give a lot of American Institute of Architect lectures to reach any significant number of them. We can hope the video embedded here gets lots of viewers.

The solution

A carbon tax can be more widely effective. It could raise the cost of materials whose production and transportation uses carbon and discourage at least some of the practices Bill cites. The European Union is implementing a carbon tax in 2026. Canada and twenty of the EU member states had already levied carbon taxes by 2023. Here are the European numbers:

I don’t know if these taxes are high enough or sufficiently well-designed to avoid unintended consequences. But the US would be well-advised to figure it out and follow suit. Our national habit of bemoaning high energy prices and avoiding gasoline taxes slows the transition to non-carbon fuels. Refusal to tax carbon also incentivizes subsidies to wind, solar, and nuclear. Better to make the polluter pay and allow the market to drive carbon reduction.

A norm is better than none

Bill is discouraged, as he sees the breach of the 1.5 degrees centigrade norm looming soon. That is bad. But I still think we are far better off than in the past. We knew the mechanisms and prospects of global warming when I worked on the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Nothing was done to prevent the consequences for decades thereafter.

Now at least we have an agreed global norm that virtually every country on earth accepts, with the notable exception of Donald Trump’s America. Knowing that we are going to breach a norm is better than not having a norm at all. Avoiding 1.5 degrees of warming has mobilized a great deal more effort to slow global warming than previously. It might even eventually motivate a carbon tax in the US.

For more from Bill, see his Environmental Law Institute book Thwart Global Warming Now: Reducing Embodied Carbon Brick by Brick. For more on international norms, see my own Strengthening International Regimes: the Case of Radiation Protection, which discusses the 1.5 degree norm.

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Why a negotiated Gaza peace isn’t happening

Israel has been backing away from the Gaza peace plan the Americans say it proposed. After indicating it welcomed the proposal, Hamas is asking for major changes. Here are the good reasons why a negotiated peace in Gaza is not possible right now:

  1. No mutually hurting stalemate.
  2. No mutually enticing way out.
  3. No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents.

Any of these factors might change. But for now all the usual pre-conditions for a successful negotiation are missing.

No mutually hurting stalemate

Neither Hamas nor Israel is hurting enough to prefer negotiations over continued fighting. Military leader Yahya Sinwar thinks civilian casualties help Hamas. He is prepared to continue fighting, as he believes he has the Israelis where he wants them. Israeli officials are letting everyone know the war might last until the end of this year. Prime Minister Netanyahu figures that will postpone an Israeli election that might bring down his government. He imagines an election only after he can claim credit for a complete Israeli victory.

There isn’t even a stalemate. The Israelis are continuing their offensive into Rafah. Hamas is resorting to guerilla tactics in several parts of Gaza. The military situation is still dynamic. It is far from the kind of stasis that would convince belligerents think they can gain more from talking than fighting.

No mutually enticing way out

Even if there were a mutually hurting stalemate, it is hard to imagine a mutually enticing way out that could convince the belligerents to try to negotiate a deal. Israel wants to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas might give up the governing role, but it cannot give up its military capability without surrendering completely. Hamas wants to destroy Israel. No one in Jerusalem will agree to that.

Hamas and Israel did live side by side since 2007, albeit with repeated attacks and small wars (compared to the current one). But going back to that from the current situation seems impossible. Hamas isn’t going to trust Israel to leave it alone. Israel isn’t going to trust Hamas to leave the Jewish state alone.

No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents

The only way to square that circle is with outside military and police forces committed to keeping the peace. Tens of thousands would be required. The 4000 police would need to be Arabic-speaking. The 32,000 soldiers would need to be well-equipped and trained. These would need to operate in coordination with 7500 local troops and 4500 local police. Where do you get those in Gaza? Wouldn’t any you find there likely be Hamas-affiliated, one way or the other? The Palestinian Authority has fewer than 10,000 police in the West Bank. What percentage of those could be moved to Gaza?

These are among the issues Tony Blinken is criss-crossing the Middle East to discuss. The Gulfies will likely be willing to write checks, but will the Saudis, Qataris, or Emiratis be putting thousands of their police and soldiers into Gaza? The Egyptians won’t want to either. They controlled Gaza until 1967 and were glad to give it up. They don’t want to re-acquire it.

Scholarship demonstrates that belligerents won’t want to negotiate a settlement that spells doom to themselves. Both Israel and Hamas have reason to fear a settlement without a heavy enforcement presence would do just that.

Wishing Tony Blinken well

I do hope Tony Blinken succeeds, despite the odds. But the circumstances suggest he won’t. The Hamas/Israel war seems destined to continue without a negotiated settlement, until there is a mutually hurting stalemate, a mutually enticing way out, and security for whatever remains of the belligerents. Nothing less will allow a successful negotiation.

Victory by one side or the other is still a possibility. But not one likely to happen soon.

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Mealy-mouthed won’t work, riot act will

Yesterday Nevena Bogdanović of RFE/RL asked for my comments on the “Declaration On The Protection Of National And Political Rights And The Common Future Of The Serbian People.” I find the full text in English at https://twitter.com/NationalIndNews/status/1799467259133317379). Her deadline was too tight for my schedule. So I am recording here my reactions not only to the Declaration but also to the contrasting responses of the American embassies in Sarajevo and Belgrade.

The Declaration is what it says it is

The Declaration is the product of an effort to institutionalize pan-Serb institutions in an Assembly (to meet every two years) and a National Council of the Serbian People. The Assembly includes representatives of the widespread Serb diaspora. But the Council is constituted of officials from the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade) and the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska (headquartered in Banja Luka). The purpose of their cooperation is spelled out:

The Pan-Serbian Assembly recommends that the institutions of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska act unitedly and in coordination and make efforts to stop the assimilation of Serbs in the countries of the region, as well as around the world.

https://twitter.com/NationalIndNews/status/1799467259133317379

The Assembly also recognizes the Serbian Orthodox Church as a pillar of “national, cultural, and spiritual identity.” It supports Serbia in efforts to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, declaring Kosovo and Metohija “inalienable.”

The Assembly also wants reversion in Bosnia to the Dayton peace agreements as signed. That means without the many decisions the High Representative, the Sarajevo parliament, and the entity assemblies have made since 1995. The Declaration explicitly challenges the appointment of the current High Representative.

Greater Serbia by another name

I could go on, but essentially this document is a manifesto for the Serbian World, or Greater Serbia. The references to the broader Serb diaspora are a thin veil. Most Serbs who live in Australia are already “assimilated.” They vote in elections there, serve in its armed forces and other Australian institutions, and describe themselves as Australian, even while preserving their identity as Serbs.

The real purpose of this declaration is to prevent Serbs in the neighboring countries (Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo) from professing and acting on loyalty to the countries in which they live. That is a prerequisite for any future union, which is the ultimate Serb aim. The good news is that someone thinks the Serbs might be loyal to the countries in which they live.

The embassy statements, one right and one wrong

US Embassy Sarajevo got it right:

…the conclusions adopted at the All-Serb Assembly as they relate to the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are rooted in legal disinformation and riddled with errors. They do not constitute a defense of the Dayton Peace Agreement, as the authors claim, but are a deliberate attack on that agreement and the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is dangerous.

https://x.com/USEmbassySJJ/status/1800222971526623266

US Embassy Belgrade got it wrong. I am told this is what the Ambassador said in response to a question about the Declaration:

The focus of everyone who cares about Serbia and its future should remain on creating a peaceful and prosperous future for the entire Western Balkans, increasing regional cooperation with EU integration as the final goal. Serbia has a constructive role to play in that process and we welcome the many examples of its leaders pledging to do so.

While this is true, you wouldn’t know that Serbia is already “rapidly veering off course” for EU accession.

I haven’t found a comment from US Embassy Pristina. It correctly retweeted Sarajevo’s denunciation.

Squeeze Republika Srpska

Which is the real American position? At present, both are. Washington is trying to appease Vucic and burn Milorad Dodik, the secessionist President of Republika Srpska. This effort to distinguish between them has not worked. Nor will it, since their objective is the same: Greater Serbia, de facto if not de jure.

Embassy Sarajevo has consistently said the right things about Dodik, whom the US has sanctioned. But it has not really done anything more about him. Washington should be squeezing Republika Srpska’s finances as tight as it can. And getting the EU and UK to do likewise. My compliments if they are doing that quietly.

Read Belgrade the riot act

The Americans are appeasing Serbia these days because they want Belgrade to continue exporting ammunition to Ukraine. But Serbia is also exporting electronic components to Russia that are needed to manufacture weapons. Belgrade deserves little credit for doing what it should want to do, especially if it continues doing what it knows it should not do.

Some Americans also believe mollifying Vucic will work better than criticizing him. I know of no basis for this belief. It is inconsistent with his own past behavior as well as that of his mentor, Slobodan Milosevic. I had hoped when he first came to power that Vucic would become a real democrat. But he dashed those hopes long ago.

The Americans should read Vucic the riot act, that is warn him loudly and publicly. Washington should oppose European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) funding for Serbia unless he decides to end irredentist claims to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The Americans should also lobby hard against European Investment Bank (EIB) and EU Growth Plan funding unless that condition is fulfilled.

Save some money and dignity

The Balkans are far down on America’s list of priorities these days. Saving some tens of millions there should be welcome. Cutting funding to those who oppose American and European objectives in the region should be easy. Benefits of Western institutions should go to those who merit them. It is embarrassing that they are going to people who don’t.

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What’s missing from the Gaza peace plan

The Israeli proposal for “General Principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and restoring a sustainable calm” in Gaza seems stalled, despite President Biden’s concerted efforts. What are its prospects?

Security, security, security

In real estate, it’s all about location, location, location. In post-war stabilization and reconstruction, it’s all about security, security, security.

The first security concern is that of the belligerents. They won’t agree to an end to the fighting if they think their own security will be at greater risk. This is especially true in the current case, as Israel has vowed to eliminate Hamas and Hamas’ strategic goal is the elimination of Israel. If Israel is responsible for security in Gaza after the ceasefire, Hamas has good reason to fear the Israel Defense Force will continue to target it, especially its leaders.

The second security concern focuses on civilians. The international community should not be interested in a ceasefire that fails to improve conditions for non-Hamas affiliated Gazans. They need not only to be housed and fed but also protected from gangs and chaos. That requires some sort of police force and rudimentary justice system. Without them, civilians have no recourse when a guy with a gun steals their food, water, shelter, and property.

The third security concern is the region. If war ends in Gaza only to start up between Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel, the Middle East will have gained little. The broader war the region has long feared is already brewing. Iran’s allies and proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have all been attacking Israel. The missile and drone tit for tat between Iran and Israel in April suggested what a broader war might entail.

The gaping hole in the draft agreement

The peace plan lacks provisions for the first two categories of security. It details the time lines for hostage/prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of Israeli forces, humanitarian relief, return of Gazans to the north, and other requirements. But it refers only vaguely to Egypt, Qatar, and the US as “guarantors” of the agreement. That means little if it doesn’t include provision of security, or at least a leadership role in doing so.

But it is hard to see what those three countries can realistically do about security. Whoever does that will need to speak Arabic. The US has individuals but no military or police units who speak Arabic. Qatar’s army has fewer than 12,000 soldiers. It is hard to picture Doha providing more than 10% to a peacekeeping presence in Gaza. It is much more likely to write the necessary checks. Egypt has many more soldiers, but Cairo does not want to deploy troops in Gaza, for fear of ending up in charge there, as it was until 1967.

Using Jim Dobbins’ numbers for a heavy peace enforcement operation, Gaza would require something like 32,000 troops and 4000 police, in addition to 7500 local troops and 5500 local police. As the available local forces in Gaza would be mostly Hamas-affiliated, which Israel will not allow, the international presence will have to be beefed up accordingly.

I just don’t see how to fill that gaping hole. Are the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis going to deploy large parts of their armies to Gaza?

The other security requirement

The third security requirement is the regional one. This need not be in the plan, but it has to be real. The US has worked hard to prevent the wider regional war, but Israel and some of Iran’s friends seem increasingly eager for one. Israel wants to move Hizbollah back from its border so that tens of thousands of civilians can return to their homes in the north. The Houthis want to demonstrate their importance in the region and gain additional aid from Iran.

The Iranians will elect a new president June 28. The Supreme Leader will retain control of foreign and security policy. But that election will likely provide some indication of the direction Tehran wants to take in the future. If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its way, which seems likely, the regional situation could deteriorate quickly.

Prove me wrong

I’ll be glad to be wrong. I hope this peace plan succeeds. But I wouldn’t bet on it.

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