The Balkans are simmering
My ten days in the Balkans June 18-28 visiting Sarajevo, Skopje, Tetovo, and Pristina constituted my first trip there in more than five years. I’ll try to summarize my impressions/findings here. I won’t reveal sources and methods, but it is no secret that I have talked with prominent politicians in and out of power, government officials, diplomats, thinktankers, civil society people, and university professors and students. My focus is on the conflicts: are they over? getting worse? staying the same? metamorphizing?
Sarajevo is mostly looking good…
In Sarajevo I found the wars of the 1990s fading both in memory and in physical representation. The city shows few scars or even memorials from the siege of 1992-95. The young mayor is a woman better known for her work in academia than politics when the city council selected her. She and her family lived on the confrontation line during the war. The city is almost entirely restored, the confrontation line erased, and the metropolitan area significantly expanded, especially to Ilidza in the west. That is where the much-lauded Sarajevo School of Science and Technology resides (photo by DAVOR BILANDŽIĆ, a local guide, as I neglected to take one):
Serbs I talked with are living comfortably in the city. Many more are commuting from Republika Srpska to the east, where Bosniaks are also said to be buying apartments because they are cheaper. Bosniaks have even returned to Stolac in southern Bosnia, from which Croats ethnically cleansed them in 1993.
…but
But political life in Bosnia still revolves around ethnic identity. A big gap is opening between the society, where individuals speaking a more or less common language get along without much friction, and politics, which organizes and mobilizes around whether you are Serb, Croat, Bosniak (Muslim, whether religious or secular), or Other. The worst interethnic violence I heard cited was that someone had slashed tires on some Serbian-plated vehicles. Reprehensible, but not a war crime. It isn’t clear who did it, but it caused the Orthodox prelates to boycott the Inter-religious Council. The Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish members continue to meet.
Some pessimists suggest that the ethnic groups are just waiting for the next opportunity to slaughter each other. I hope that is not true, but we can’t be sure. The Dayton constitution under which the country is governed enshrines ethnic identity as a major factor in politics. Generations of living under that system has empowered ethnic nationalists, with consequences that could be catastrophic. Some think young people are even more nationalist than their parents. I find that hard to believe of the many 20- and 30-somethings noisily frequenting the bars in central Sarajevo until late at night, but that indicator may not reflect the rest of the country.
Skopje is restored too, but with a difference
In what is now officially North Macedonia, which never saw serious fighting in the capital, Skopje shows many signs of two conflicts that have plagued the country for decades. In 2014, the government launched a much-needed reconstruction of the center of the city. An ethnic nationalist government adorned it with grotesquely large statues of Greek heroes and a triumphal arch.
These monuments underlined the false claim that modern Macedonia, whose majority population is Slav rather than Greek, has roots in ancient history. That not only annoyed Greece but increased the sharp contrast between the mainly Macedonian part of the city and the more traditional other side of the river:
The construction of an Orthodox Church on the grounds of Skopje’s large, mainly Ottoman-era fortress remains stalled due to Albanian claims that the work is destroying an ancient Illyrian site. A colleague who has spent her career working on Macedonian/Albanian relations suggested to me that the “social distance” between citizens of different ethnicities is growing, due in part to separate schools, mutually incomprehensible languages, and little concern with inter-ethnic comity. But the politicians cooperate in coalitions that always include both Macedonians and Albanians. So the situation is the inverse of that in Sarajevo: the political class cooperates reasonably well, but ethnicity increasingly governs the society.
Pristina celebrates its own modern heroes
Pristina, which also suffered no widespread destruction, sports monuments to Kosovo’s conflict with Serbia. The monumental statues of Kosovo heroes, both nonviolent leader Ibrahim Rugova and Kosovo Liberation Army fighters, are prominent:
There are also now giant portraits of Kosovo’s former President Thaci and its former Parliament Speaker Veseli, both on trial in The Hague for war crimes. Statues of Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright, who supported Kosovo in the 1990s, occupy prominent spots, and Bill Clinton Boulevard interests with (Senator) Bob Doll (sic) Street. The commercial bustle distracts attention from all these monuments and portraits, but they are not hard to find.
Nevertheless, Serbs now circulate safely and freely in Pristina, despite the still high interethnic tension in the northern four municipalities, which are majority Serb and contiguous with Serbia. Few young Albanians learn Serbian. Even fewer Serbs learn Albanian. Physical separation is the rule rather than the exception. Most Serbs live in Serb-majority municipalities. There is little political cooperation at any level.
Ambitions are similar…
In all three countries, I found similar government goals. Economic development is the top priority. Politicians in the capitals all agree that their citizens want jobs created and corruption reduced.
Kosovo’s prime minister is generally regarded as having clean hands. The country’s rule of law scores have been improving. But more than one person suggested that the administration lacks expertise and competence, both at the national and the municipal levels. The prime minister seems to his opponents to value loyalty more than capability.
The new prime minister in Macedonia is proud that the mayors from his political party who gained election two years ago have not garnered criticism for corruption. The party he inherited in 2017 was both broke and corrupt. He has rebuilt it and would be unlikely to welcome back his predecessor, who has fled to Hungary. The new government will include Albanians who have mostly been in opposition, displacing an Albanian party that had been in power for all but two of the past 12 years. That party had garnered a lot of criticism for arrogance and patronage.
…but Bosnia is different
In Bosnia, the situation is more complicated, as usual. The US has sanctioned the President of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb 49% of the country, for corruption, along with members of his family. The economy in much of the RS–which depends heavily on Russian financing–is moribund. Its eastern wing is depopulated. Corruption also plagues the main Croat nationalist political party, but evidence has proven hard to find. Its leader is careful not to leave his name on paper.
For reasons I find hard to fathom, the US and the international community High Representative preferred when they got a chance to torpedo the head of the main Bosniak party, not the Croat or Serb. The only explanation I heard was that its leader allegedly opposed meaningful state-building. A puzzling first choice for international ire, he is now in opposition but has maintained his command of a main Bosniak political party. The other two ethnic leaders are still on the target list.
Geopolitics heighten tensions
In all three countries, the US and EU are in competition with Russia and China. The Russian objective is to de-stabilize and thereby cause Washington grief. It does this using politicians in Belgrade, including the President, as proxies. Serbia seeks dominance of the Serb populations in neighboring countries. This “Serbian world” objective is a carbon copy of Putin’s “Russian world” that justified the invasion of Ukraine. The Chinese are looking to use the Balkans, especially Serbia, as a trade route into the EU, which is still the region’s (and Serbia’s) main trading partner.
The US declares that it wants to see all the countries of the Balkans in the Western camp. But Washington has turned a blind eye to Serbia’s definitive turn in the last couple of years towards the East. Belgrade happily takes weapons from Russia and investment from China. The EU claims to want all the states of the Western Balkans to become members, but that prospect is far off. In the meanwhile, Brussels fails to use sanctions and even verbal condemnation against those standing in the way of EU accession.
Macedonia in the middle
Moscow will be pleased with the new Macedonian government. It includes a deputy prime minister who is a vigorous Russophile, as well as two others close to Moscow. A Hungarian bank said to have Russian financing granted a 1 billion euro loan to the new government immediately after it was sworn in. The newly installed President has refused to use the country’s official name, North Macedonia. The 2018 agreement with Greece to use that name was a major EU achievement.
The new prime minister in Skopje is nevertheless at pains to emphasize his Western orientation, his ambition for EU membership, and North Macedonia’s fidelity to NATO membership. His Albanian coalition partners will insist on those points. A deputy prime minister can either be someone important or someone the prime minister wants to keep an eye on.
Macedonia’s biggest current international issue is with EU member state Bulgaria. Sofia is insisting that Skopje recognize in its constitution the fewer than 1000 citizens who identify as Bulgarians. The new prime minister campaigned against that. But he may be willing to do it in the final stage of EU accession, when the Bulgarians can’t afterwards raise additional issues. In the meanwhile, some optimists hope the Bulgarians will be willing to absent themselves from decisions on Macedonia’s accession process. That is what Hungarian Prime Minister Orban did on EU aid to Ukraine.
Bosnia is split, as always
The Russians will also be pleased with the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs and Croats there combine often to do things Moscow enjoys, including the defanging of the judicial system. The Europeans have been reluctant to use their considerable leverage in Bosnia, thinking that the accession process will fix everything. Brussels has not sanctioned the Serb leader, despite Washington pressure. Moscow seems ready to continue giving him money, with little prospect of ever getting it back.
The Bosniak and other participants in the current government of the 51% of the country they control in condominium with the Croats owe their position to the Americans. But they are a weak reed to lean on. While the Federation’s economy is doing better than that of the RS, its politics are still far from functioning at what we like to think of as a Western level.
Pristina is bandwagoning without benefits
Unlike Belgrade and the RS, the authorities in Pristina have no option to hedge their bets. Kosovo necessarily “bandwagons” (that’s the technical term) with NATO and the EU.
But the current prime minister is unhappy with Washington and Brussels for appeasing Belgrade. The results are felt keenly in the EU-sponsored and US-supported “dialogue” between Pristina and Belgrade. Kosovo wants Belgrade to withdraw a letter disowning an agreement on political normalization reached last year. Pristina asks that Serbia sign the agreement and transfer for trial the self-confessed organizer of a September 2023 terrorist plot. The prime minister has made these legitimate desires a condition for re-engaging in a dialogue that has produced precious little. That angers the EU and US, which see the dialogue as an end in itself, not just a means.
The result is anomalous. Kosovo is in the dialogue mainly to improve relations with the US and EU. But its conditions for participating are doing the opposite. This is not the first time Pristina has displeased its closest friends. Somehow it needs to find a way to make demands of Belgrade without alienating Brussels and Washington.
American leadership is decisive, but so too is European vigor
Most everyone I talked with recognized that America’s November election will be decisive for the Balkans. President Trump favored partition of Kosovo and will no doubt continue in that direction if re-elected. His willingness to surrender part of Ukraine to Russia will re-open the partition question in the Balkans.
Trump’s reliance on Serbophile Richard Grenell for advice on the Balkans and his son-in-law’s investment in Belgrade will guarantee support for Serbia’s ambitions. That would precipitate challenges to Serbia’s borders as well as Bosnia’s and perhaps Montenegro’s and Macedonia’s. Such challenges will spark violence, ethnic cleansing, and ultimately war. The simmering Balkans will boil over into instability, and even regional war if Trump gets another chance to pursue ethnic partition.
President Biden, while in my view too soft on Serbia, has maintained nominal support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the Western Balkan states. In a second term, he should correct course. He should give up on political normalization between Kosovo and Serbia, which is a bridge too far, and stiffen policy towards Serbia. He should also try to get past the Dayton constitution in Bosnia and pressure Bulgaria to postpone its hope for constitutional change in Macedonia.
The EU is appointing Estonia’s anti-Russian* prime minister as the new High Representative for foreign affairs. That will give Washington a stronger reed to lean on than the incumbent. He and his chief negotiator came from two countries, Spain and Slovakia, that do not recognize Kosovo. They both leaned towards appeasing Serbia. Kaja Kallas will be far more vigorous in countering Moscow’s influence. Biden will get along well with her. Trump won’t.
*A careful reader writes:
One small quibble – Kallas is not “anti-Russian,” she is anti-Kremlin or anti-Putin, or anti-Russian imperialism.
I accept that amendment.
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Talk should focus on the possible
Here are the remarks I prepared for today’s panel in Pristina, Kosovo on “The Future of the Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia: the possibilities for new dynamics in the process and the impact of new US and EU elections.” The Group for Legal and Political Studies sponsored the event.
- Here in Pristina I face a great challenge. I need to say something sensible about the Dialogue in front of people here in Pristina who have spent years observing it and engaging in it.
- Fellow panelist Sonja Biserko is also closer to the Dialogue than I am. She has been observing the political moods in Belgrade since before my first trip to Kosovo in 1998, as war was brewing.
- Anything I say will be from a more distant, professorial perspective.
- That perspective tells me there is no better alternative than a peaceful and friendly relationship between Belgrade and Pristina.
- When I said this to Kosovo Albanian friends during and soon after the war they laughed grimly. They said they would never want to talk with Belgrade again.
- But it soon became clear that Serbia was Kosovo’s biggest security threat, an important factor in its economy, and a major influence on its Serb population.
- Not to mention its influence on other countries, which has prevented universal recognition of Kosovo independence.
- Neighbors don’t have the privilege of ignoring their neighbors if they want security, prosperity, the loyalty of their minority populations, and international recognition.
- I participated in the first training for talks with Belgrade around 2004, for the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Bajram Rexhepi, then Prime Minister of the provisional institutions, was a participant, along with several other ministers and directors general. Maybe some of you were there.
- I soon after helped to train Serbian foreign service officers for their engagement with Kosovo.
- But quite rightly the international community decided that independence needed to come first. And so it did, as Martti Ahtisaari recommended, along with his EU and American collaborators.
- Then of course there was the need to ensure implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, a process that the International Civilian Office supervised well.
- So it was 2011 before the dialogue with Belgrade officially began. This was the technical dialogue, which Edita Tahiri and Borko Stefanovic led.
- The goal of the technical dialogue was to improve the lives of people in both countries.
- It produced a lot of agreements by 2013, many of which were not fully implemented in the timeframes foreseen.
- These included agreements on civil registry books, cadastral records, freedom of movement, recognition of diplomas, custom stamps and duties, regional representation, telecommunications, and energy.
- In 2013, the participants raised the level of the dialogue and set a new goal: political normalization.
- This political dialogue resulted in the 2013 Brussels agreement, which famously included the Association of Serb Municipalities.
- But the Association was not a standalone, unilateral proposition.
- Kosovo agreed to create it in exchange for Serb participation in Kosovo’s institutions, especially municipal elections, the police and judiciary, as well as non-interference by either side in the other’s progress toward the EU.
- Since 2013 there has been some progress on implementing the technical agreements. But there has been virtually none in meeting the goal of political normalization. I would even say that Belgrade has reversed some progress.
- It has reneged on all the 2013 commitments. It has maintained de facto governance over the Serb population in the Serb-majority communities of northern Kosovo. Serbia organized the boycott of municipal elections there. Belgrade has withdrawn Serb officials from the police and courts. And Serbia has done everything it could to block and reverse recognition of Kosovo and its entry into the Council of Europe.
- Pristina has done nothing to implement its commitment to create the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities.
- For the past three years, Gabe Escobar and Miroslav Lajcak have tried to pressure Pristina into creating the Association, with no success. That should not be surprising, as the agreement to create it included obligations for Belgrade as well.
- Instead of fulfilling those, Serbia has chosen to make things worse, through purposeful violence. Last year it kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, rented a mob to attack NATO peacekeepers inside Kosovo, and organized a terrorist attack that was supposed to provide the excuse for a Serbian military intervention.
- Most recently, Belgrade has torpedoed the proposal to re-call the non-Serb mayors in the north and conduct new elections.
- It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the technical dialogue was far more productive than the political one.
- I have to ask: why is this the case?
- Belgrade, it seems to me, is not ready for political normalization. By the end of last year, President Vucic was expressing his hope for changed geopolitical conditions that would enable Serbia to retake part or all of Kosovo. The newly inaugurated Serbian government includes vocal supporters of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It also includes the leading advocate of the “Serbian world,” a euphemism for Greater Serbia.
- President Vucic has de facto achieved the Serbian world in half of Bosnia and in all of Montenegro. Why wouldn’t he want to extend that success at least to northern Kosovo?
- I am not convinced that Pristina is ready for political normalization either.
- Albanian Kosovars first want to hear that Serbia regrets what Slobodan Milosevic did in 1998 and 1999. They want to see Belgrade encourage Kosovo Serbs to look to Pristina for governance, including law and order. Pristina wants Belgrade to be ready to give Albanians in southern Serbia comparable privileges and representation to those Serbia enjoys inside Kosovo for Serbs.
- I suppose if Belgrade were to fulfill its obligations under the 2013 agreement Pristina would too. But that isn’t going to happen.
- EU and US policy needs a reset. While I don’t expect diplomats to admit it, they need to return to a more practical, less political, dialogue. Political normalization is a bridge too far. Serbia won’t be interested in surrendering its sovereignty claims until the war in Ukraine ends the Russian annexations there. Kosovo won’t be interested in forming the Association until it is confident that Serbia accepts its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- But both Belgrade and Pristina can welcome smoothing movement of people, goods, and finance through their mutual border and enabling more licit trade, investment, and commerce.
- Pristina has rightly begun to insist on the use of its official currency, the euro, in transactions in Kosovo. But that is creating problems for the Serb communities, which receive subsidies from Belgrade for health and education—and likely other things as well—in Serbian dinars.
- This is the kind of practical issue the EU and US should focus on. Belgrade and Pristina need to agree on transparency for Serbia’s subsidies and a scheme for how they can proceed smoothly.
- Both Belgrade and Pristina should be interested in a serious crackdown on organized crime that exploits the lack of law and order in northern Kosovo.
- Now would be a good time for Belgrade to ensure that Milan Radoicic pays for his crimes and is unable to recover politically. Serbia should turn him over to Kosovo for trial. No doubt Serbia could name some Albanian candidates for similar treatment.
- Another issue I’d like to see discussed in the Dialogue is Belgrade’s intimidation of Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force or police. It is high time to put an end to the threats and violence that they and their families suffer at the hands of Belgrade’s proxies.
- That is the practical direction in which prospects for success lie. Saying farewell to failure requires getting the priorities right.
- Political normalization will come when Pristina and Belgrade are ready for it. My guess is that Belgrade will be first, because its EU accession will depend on recognition of Kosovo.
- More than one of the 27 member states of the EU will insist on it, even if the member states do not adopt it as EU policy.
- In the meantime, the Dialogue should focus on practical problems that can be solved in practical ways. It is a mistake to require politicians to do more than they are ready to do.
- That’s my professorial take.
I added a few extemporaneous remarks about the US election:
- The good thing about American elections is that we know the outcome only after we count the votes.
- Our 18th-century constitution makes predictions difficult, because of close races in a few battleground states.
- A Biden election will lead to continuity in defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Western Balkan states.
- A Trump election will lead to surrender of Ukraine to Russia, unqualified support for Israel’s war on Gaza, and doubts about US commitment to NATO and Asian allies.
- And it will lead to revival of partition ideas in the Western Balkans, with catastrophic consequences.
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Is the sun setting on the West?
These are the thoughts I offered at today’s University of Tetovo conference on “The Future of the Western Balkans after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”:
- It is a great pleasure to be with you here in Macedonia, and in particular at the University of Tetovo.
- Yes, I said I am in “Macedonia,” because article 7 paragraph 5 of the Prespa agreement protects my personal right to call the country what I want. The “North” part is for official usage. I hope your new President will respect that.
- But her reluctance is part of the issue I want to talk about today: is the sun setting on the West? By the West, I mean those countries that are liberal democracies that base their open political systems on individual rights safeguarded by independent judiciaries.
- Lest I be misunderstood, let me say at the outset that my answer is “no.”
- But there are certainly a lot of reasons why someone might come to the erroneous conclusion that liberal democracy as a governing system is in trouble.
- First, there is the US: Donald Trump is seeking re-election on the false premise that the 2020 election was “stolen,” his recent trial was “rigged,” and everyone but him is “corrupt.”
- His campaign is anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and anti-Muslim. But the pollsters are telling us he may do relatively well among immigrants, minorities, and Muslims, all of whom are important in the “swing” states that will decide the election.
- He will certainly lose the popular vote. He did last time by about 10 million.
- But because of an 18th-century compromise embedded in the U.S. constitution he could still win in the Electoral College, where less populous, former slave states of the south get greater weight than their populations.
- Yes, the U.S. constitution contains an illiberal system for electing the president that makes some individual votes count more than others.
- A Trump win will unquestionably put liberal democracy as a governing system on the ropes. He has promised to govern as a dictator on day one. If he gets away with that, you don’t have to ask how he will govern on day two.
- He is skeptical about NATO, friendly to Vladimir Putin, and an enemy of free trade and international agreements and institutions in general.
- A Trump victory would have inevitable repercussions in the Balkans. He and his minions are ethnic nationalists. They will favor ethnic nationalists in the Balkans, in particular of the Serbian variety.
- Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, will have good economic reasons to do so once he has his hands on prime property in downtown Belgrade.
- Richard Grenell, Trump’s handmaiden, has made no secret of his political allegiance not only to Trump but also to President Vucic.
- So yes, if Trump wins you can expect his second administration to back genocide-deniers, Serbian world supporters, and pro-Russian miscreants throughout the Balkans.
- But I don’t really think Trump will win. The campaign has begun but won’t peak until fall.
- One of the good things about American elections is that we don’t know the outcome until after the votes are cast. Polls this early mean little.
- The media loves the campaign horse race they create, but only Election Day counts.
- Whatever the outcome, the fate of Ukraine will be important to you here in the Balkans. Trump would no doubt surrender Ukraine, or part of it, to Putin. Biden will not.
- America is not the only uncertainty.
- The European Union election results forebode a shift toward ethnic nationalism in Europe this year and next.
- Germany and France are at risk of bringing to power people who would abandon Ukraine and, like Trump, befriend ethnic nationalists in the Balkans.
- That would make support for Ukraine and resistance to its partition more difficult.
- A partitioned Ukraine would promote similar ambitions elsewhere, including the Balkans.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina would be at risk. So too would Kosovo and Macedonia.
- The return of Trump, resurgent ethnic nationalism in the EU, and the outcome of the Ukraine war are the big far-away problems for the Balkans, but the nearer problems in the Balkans are worth noting too.
- First and foremost is Alexandar Vucic’s Serbia.
- I was among those who hoped when Vucic first came to power that he would turn Serbia in a definitively Western direction.
- I arranged his first public appearance in Washington at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where I teach.
- I went to see him a year later in Belgrade, after writing a paper on the things Serbia needed to do to consolidate its democracy: free the media, establish the independence of the judiciary, and commit itself to the reforms required to accede to the European Union.
- He has done none of those things. Quite the opposite.
- The media in Serbia are not only under government tutelage but are also blatantly pro-Russian and racist, especially towards Albanians and Bosniaks. They are not much better towards me.
- The judiciary is little improved, if at all.
- And progress on implementing the acquis communautaire has been minimal.
- Vucic today rules a Serbia that is ethnic nationalist, irredentist, and increasingly autocratic. It can’t even pretend to administer a decent municipal election in Belgrade.
- The Serbia Against Violence movement is courageous, but Vucic has for now no viable Western-oriented opposition.
- And Serbia is aligned increasingly with Russia and China on the international stage.
- In addition, Vucic has managed, without firing a shot, to take over the governments in Podgorica and Banja Luka, thus realizing de facto the first stage of the Serbian world.
- He won’t be able to do that in Kosovo, but he has tried with violence: the kidnapping of two Kosovo police, the rent-a-riot against NATO peacekeepers, and the September 24 terrorist action.
- All those efforts failed, but he will continue trying.
- Unfortunately, the Americans and Europeans are still seeking to pacify Serbia and have not done anything to punish its resorts to violence in Kosovo.
- Vucic will likely also be active here in Macedonia. Increasing tension between Macedonians and Albanians will be his preferred mode of operating.
- Russia will back these efforts. But I think it a mistake not to recognize that in addition to serving Putin’s purposes Vucic has his own reasons for stoking ethnic strife in the Balkans.
- A successful, democratic Kosovo next door that respects the rights of Serbs is unwelcome to Vucic.
- So too is a successful, democratic North Macedonia that can aspire to EU membership before Serbia.
- Exacerbating ethnic tensions in Macedonia could help Vucic to gain de facto control of Skopje, which would need Serbian backing if it steps back from the West.
- I hope that day does not come. But if it does, I hope the citizens of Macedonia will do as they have in the past. At critical junctures, they have chosen to support the Macedonian state and ensure that it treats all minorities with respect.
- That in my view is the right reaction to Serbia’s ambitions. Macedonia has little to gain from Serbia or Russia.
- It has a great deal to gain from NATO and eventually EU membership.
- The problem in Macedonia is common throughout the Balkans, as well as in the United States and the European Union. Our Western systems leave the electoral door open to people who don’t support liberal democracy.
- They prefer ethnic rule without any serious possibility of alternation in power.
- The counterweights to autocratic ambitions in liberal democracies are strong institutions, especially the justice system, and vigorous civil society.
- Both should be focused mainly on individual rights, which make the political system far more fluid and more difficult to dominate.
- But even in a long-established democracy like the United States institutions can be hijacked and civil society repressed.
- Doing that is easier in relatively new democracies like Serbia, which can no longer claim to be one.
- Montenegro is headed in the same direction: a democracy in form but an autocracy in practice.
- Bosnia has never really achieved what I would term a democratic system, and 49% of the country is an ethnic autocracy.
- This is despite the fact that among Bosnia’s citizens there is remarkably little ethnic tension.
- I came to Macedonia Friday night from Sarajevo, where an enormous gap is opening up between the politics and the society.
- Ethnic nationalism dominates the politics. Mutual respect and even friendship is more common among the citizens, who however have failed to vote out people who do not really represent their own respect for individuals and their rights.
- Your challenge as citizens is to prevent something similar happening in Macedonia. The sun will begin to set on the West here earlier than in the United States.
- I wish you well in meeting your responsibilities to defend the institutions, invigorate civil society, and protect the rights of all.
- That is what will prevent the sun from setting on the West!
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Getting to post-Dayton Bosnia
Here are the talking points I prepared for myself for today’s conference in Sarajevo on The Biden Administration’s Bosnia Policy: 30 Years of Federation of BiH sponsored by the US-Europe Alliance and the International University of Sarajevo:
- It is a great pleasure to be back in Sarajevo, truly one of the most beautiful and welcoming cities on earth.
- A great deal has changed since I first came here in November 1994, during the war, and even since I was here five or six years ago.
- I was the US embassy’s most frequent visitor during the war.
- The streets then were empty of both cars and people, the city was divided and isolated from its so-called suburbs, shelling was frequent, most shops were closed, heat and electricity were at best sporadic, telephones had stopped working, civilians needed to learn where they could walk without being targeted by snipers. Thousands of civilians were killed.
- Small arms fire hit my UN plane while landing the first time I came to Sarajevo.
- Things have changed a great deal. My compliments to those who have made it happen.
- I find Sarajevo much enlivened, younger, and more cosmopolitan. It is good that so many tourists are making their way here, that you have a Sarajevo School of Science and Technology that grants British as well as Bosnian degrees, that the Vijecnica is restored and occupied by a young woman who has more experience as a university professor than as a politician.
- But it is also true that the Dayton agreements froze the warring parties in place by institutionalizing the political divisions among Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.
- Each group has a veto on almost everything at the state level and in the Federation.
- Dayton also reduced the role of people who refused to identify themselves with one of the three major groups, preferring to think of themselves as individuals with inalienable rights.
- I believe it is high time to correct those mistakes.
- The two entities are the warring parties of 1995. One is now threatening secession. The other is threatened with division by those who want a third entity.
- These objectives are ethnic war by political means. That is better than war by military means, but it is still not the best option available.
- You will later in this conference discuss the legal strategy aimed at reforming Dayton Bosnia, which has been notably successful at the European Court of Human Rights but remains largely unimplemented, due to the ethnic nationalist vetoes.
- That however should not be the only strategy aimed at making Bosnia a more functional and effective state.
- Others may talk today about economic strategies. Any Bosnian enterprise with ambition should be unhappy with today’s Dayton Bosnia.
- A serious company should want a more unified economic space with improved relations with the rest of the world, especially Europe but also the United States.
- But I want to focus mainly on political reforms, which I think are needed in two dimensions.
- One is reform within Bosnia’s political parties, which are largely fiefdoms of the party leaders.
- More competitive contests for party leadership would open up the existing political parties, enable them to have more policy and programmatic focus, and reduce the dominance of the political parties within the Bosnian state.
- Political party reform would also reduce the risks of state capture by people exploiting public resources and patronage. And it would reduce the risks that state investigations of corruption would be blocked.
- The second dimension of needed political reform is cross-ethnic cooperation.
- This is not entirely lacking. Croat and Serb ethnic nationalists cooperate quite well these days, as they did in southern Bosnia during the war.
- What is needed is creation of a more civic-oriented multiethnic coalition, one that would reinforce the legal strategy that has produced good results at the ECHR.
- Such a civic coalition would focus on improving governance, not only at the national level but also in the municipalities.
- That is where citizens and government interact most frequently. A coalition that proves it can meet citizen demands at the municipal level will have a much greater chance of winning at other levels.
- Despite my wartime role as Mr. Federation, I am no longer a friend to the entities or the cantons. It seems to me Bosnia and Herzegovina could be more effectively governed at the municipal level and at the state level.
- The state government should have full authority to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communautaire.
- The municipalities, in accordance with the European principle of subsidiarity, should have responsibility for everything else.
- It is not clear to me how you get to that kind of post-Dayton Bosnia from where things stand now.
- It will take political courage and smart strategy, beginning with redefinition of Bosnians as citizens rather than ethnic groups.
- Yes, you are correct in thinking that the Americans imposed the Dayton system on Bosnia. Some of you will want to fix what we broke.
- But we imposed what the wartime leadership said they would accept.
- Twenty-nine years later neither the Americans nor the Europeans have the clout to change the system.
- Nor do they have the incentive to do so. Many fear instability and some have confidence in the transformational power of the EU.
- It is now up to Bosnians to change the political system. There are good legal, political, and economic reasons to do so.
- The simple fact is that Dayton Bosnia will not be able to join the European Union or NATO.
- Many in the current political leadership know that but don’t mind. They fear their own political and economic fortunes would end in a Bosnia with strong judicial, legislative, and executive institutions.
- It is Bosnia’s citizens who are going to have to do the heavy lifting.
- The Americans and European should be prepared to help.
- The Americans tried with European support in 2006 when they supported the negotiation of what became known as the April package.
- That failed to get a 2/3 majority in parliament by just two votes.
- The EU tried more recently with American support through the Citizens’ Assembly, municipal versions of which have also convened in Banja Luka and Mostar.
- Much more of this kind of effort is needed to build a cross-ethnic constituency for peace.
- Let me turn now to the hard part. I regret to say Bosnia also needs to be ready for war, in order to prevent it.
- Milorad Dodik and Aleksandar Vucic have made their intentions clear. They are creating a de facto Serbian world that would remove Republika Srpska from any oversight by Bosnian institutions.
- This is a clever scheme, with each step kept below the level at which it might stimulate a negative European or American reaction.
- Nor would I rule out a military dimension to the Serb strategy like the attempt at Banjska in Kosovo last September. That would be a provocation intended to provoke a reaction that enables Republika Srpska or Serbia to justify intervention.
- The Bosnian Army, EUFOR and NATO also need to be ready for what we call in Washington “little green men” used to infest Brcko in a kind of stealth takeover.
- Only if Dodik and Vucic understand that there will be a rapid and effective US and EU military reaction can we be sure they won’t try these Moscow-inspired gimmicks.
- Preserving the peace requires both military strength and political reform. Getting beyond the Dayton state in Bosnia will require commitment and inspiration.
- Bosnia has come a long way in the past 29 years. But it still has a way to go before it is a normal democratic country, one without a High Representative, one whose unity and territorial integrity citizens of all ethnicities defend, and one in which individual rights are protected for everyone.
- I am not suggesting something less than what I myself want. I would never trade my individual rights—protected by the judicial, legislative, and executive branches—for group rights.
- I wish you well undertaking the worthy effort of creating a post-Dayton, civic Bosnia. One that can join the European Union and NATO without looking back!
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The real threat to Israel is…
One of my sharpest readers questions, “do you seriously believe that Hamas can destroy the state of Israel?” I had cited that concern to account for Israeli policy in Gaza.
The answer is “no,” I don’t. But I do think it useful to acknowledge that concern in accounting for what the Israelis are doing. A state can justify almost anything if it can convince its population that its enemies are ready to destroy it. Hamas and its enablers in Tehran have said that is their objective. Those threats and Hamas’ homicidal behavior on October 7 have fed Israeli indifference, and even support, for the human rights abuses occurring in Gaza today.
The multi-front war
That behavior is generating a far greater threat to Israel than the October 7 attack. The West Bank is boiling. Yemeni Houthi and Lebanese Hizbollah attacks are escalating. Iran is enriching more uranium to close to weapon-usable levels. Israel’s international isolation is growing. The Gaza war has lasted already much longer than the Israelis anticipated. Does the Israeli Defense Force really want to fight on two or more fronts for the next six months or so?
Things are no better for Israel in the US. Prime Minister Netanyahu may imagine that the shift of Muslim votes away from President Biden will bring his favored candidate to power in Washington. But Netanyahu’s upcoming visit to the US will no doubt give American Muslims pause. The Republicans in Congress will rain praise on the Prime Minister. Some Democrats will not attend or walk out. Trump will have no compunction about supporting Israeli abuses in Gaza. The Christian evangelicals will back him. But liberal Jews, who are the majority in the US, will not. I hope Muslims will join them in voting for Biden.
The alternatives
What is the alternative for Israel? Jerusalem (that really is Israel’s capital, even if I would have preferred Trump not move the US embassy there until a final settlement) could announce that it is pausing the fighting and injecting massive humanitarian assistance into Gaza. The Israel Defense Forces have announced a temporary suspension along one vital route. That is a step in the right direction, but far from sufficient. Israel needs to put the onus on Hamas to also stop its attacks. A massive flow of aid would give Gazans an opportunity to loosen Hamas’ grasp and begin to determine their own fate.
Jerusalem could in addition seek a settlement on Israel’s northern border, one that ends the ti-for-tat bombardments and returns the area to relative calm. Rather than escalating to re-establish deterrence, as is their habit, the Israelis could do what they did with Iran: reduce their retaliation. This would signal to Hizbollah readiness to accept a return to the status quo ante. US envoy Amos Hochstein is seeking to calm things on the Israel/Lebanon border. Let’s wish him success.
It is much harder to know what to do about the Houthis. They seem determined to assert their role in “the resistance.” They are using Iran’s military technology to attack both shipping in the Red Sea and Israel, with relatively little effect on military targets but considerable damage to commercial shipping and world markets. The Houthi menace, and it is a menace, is likely to outlast both the Hamas and Hizbollah threats.
As for the American front, support for Israel is rapidly becoming a partisan issue, with part of the Democratic Party doubtful about unconditional assistance. This is entirely out of keeping with past practice and not good for Israel, which needs a Prime Minister who can speak to Congress without anyone walking out.
The real threat
The real threat to Israel is Netanyahu and his determination to continue the Gaza war until he can declare victory and stave off any challenge to his hold on power. Israelis are unhappy with him because of the government’s failure on October 7 to protect its citizens. They need to begin to realize that his policies toward the Palestinians are just as disgraceful. In addition, they aggravate the Hamas, Hizbollah, and Houthi threats.
Unfortunately, no replacement prime minister on the horizon today seems willing or able to lead Israelis in the direction of resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. Nor do the citizens seem ready to support anyone who does. At this point, Israel is more a threat to itself than is Hamas.
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What good is a norm if it will be breached?
My cousin by marriage, Bill Caplan, is an engineer and former hi-tech business owner. After selling his business, he dared in retirement to get a master’s degree in architecture. He has devoted himself for years to unraveling the mysteries of energy conservation in buildings and how the world should respond to global warming. He is convinced that our current efforts are inadequate.
Smarter and better
But he is not urging faster and more. He is urging smarter and better.
Watch the video above. Bill argues that just constructing a building that uses less energy is pointless by itself, and even sometimes counterproductive. This is because production and transportation of the building materials emit so much carbon dioxide even before construction starts. That’s my crude account of his argument. Best to listen to him.
I have no doubt that he is correct on the merits. But I doubt that his proposed solution is adequate. He has devoted himself to raising the consciousness of practicing architects. That merits applause. They could correct some of the worst abuses. But you would have to give a lot of American Institute of Architect lectures to reach any significant number of them. We can hope the video embedded here gets lots of viewers.
The solution
A carbon tax can be more widely effective. It could raise the cost of materials whose production and transportation uses carbon and discourage at least some of the practices Bill cites. The European Union is implementing a carbon tax in 2026. Canada and twenty of the EU member states had already levied carbon taxes by 2023. Here are the European numbers:
I don’t know if these taxes are high enough or sufficiently well-designed to avoid unintended consequences. But the US would be well-advised to figure it out and follow suit. Our national habit of bemoaning high energy prices and avoiding gasoline taxes slows the transition to non-carbon fuels. Refusal to tax carbon also incentivizes subsidies to wind, solar, and nuclear. Better to make the polluter pay and allow the market to drive carbon reduction.
A norm is better than none
Bill is discouraged, as he sees the breach of the 1.5 degrees centigrade norm looming soon. That is bad. But I still think we are far better off than in the past. We knew the mechanisms and prospects of global warming when I worked on the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Nothing was done to prevent the consequences for decades thereafter.
Now at least we have an agreed global norm that virtually every country on earth accepts, with the notable exception of Donald Trump’s America. Knowing that we are going to breach a norm is better than not having a norm at all. Avoiding 1.5 degrees of warming has mobilized a great deal more effort to slow global warming than previously. It might even eventually motivate a carbon tax in the US.
For more from Bill, see his Environmental Law Institute book Thwart Global Warming Now: Reducing Embodied Carbon Brick by Brick. For more on international norms, see my own Strengthening International Regimes: the Case of Radiation Protection, which discusses the 1.5 degree norm.
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