Belgrade needs to do its part
Besnik Velija of Pristina’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I responded yesterday:
Q: As an analyst with long experience and who has followed the politics of the Balkans for so long, what does the fact that Prime Minister Albin Kurti refused to move forward with the Association Draft even though it cost him the loss of membership in the Council of Europe. And what does it mean for the relationship of trustworthiness between the parties, given that the internationals were not even convinced by two letters with promises and demanded substantial and tangible steps for the Association?
A: The Prime Minister’s relationships with the Europeans and Americans is lacking confidence and effectiveness. That said, I think it is a colossal mistake for the Americans and Europeans to insist on creation of the Association of Serbian-Majority Municipalities, which is Belgrade’s top priority in the dialogue, without any benefits for Pristina. All concerned should reread the 2013 Brussels agreement, which required not only the Association but also Belgrade recognition of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory, participation of Serbs in Kosovo’s institutions, and non-interference in Kosovo’s path toward the European Union. Belgrade has fulfilled none of those requirements.
Q: How do you see everything that happened around the Lajcak Draft for the Association? Do you think that Kosovo will ever implement that Draft, considering that Kurti was able to fail the membership in the Council of Europe and not send that Draft to the Constitutional Court?
A: I don’t see how the Association can move forward without at least de facto if not de jure recognition of Kosovo by Serbia.
Q: How did you see Foreign Minister Gervalla’s offer in the last few hours? She first said that Kosovo is writing a Draft inspired by the FES draft, then at the conference she said that there is nothing concrete and that it is only in the proposal phase. Does such an approach show frivolity on the Kosovo side and how do you comment on the fact that there was no coordination with the President of Kosovo for such a proposal?
A: I’ll leave the coordination issue up to those involved. I do think Kosovo should prepare a draft that it would find acceptable, provided Belgrade fulfills its obligations under the 2013 Brussels agreement.
Q: Now that the CoE application is gone, what do you think that the EU and US can do in order to convince Kosovo to move forward with ASM implementation?
A: They can convince Belgrade to do its part.
Q: If there will be no steps toward ASMM, Do you think that there could be space for a return of the land-swap idea if former US president Donald Trump will be back in office in WH?
A: I have no doubt the land swap idea will arise again if Trump is re-elected, whether or not there are steps toward ASMM.
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One key to Gaza’s future is inside Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu refuses to define an end-state for Gaza, beyond Israeli control of security there. But it is becoming clear what he intends. Along with his extreme-right coalition partners, Netanyahu wants to reproduce something like the West Bank in Gaza. The Palestinians would be limited to relatively small enclaves. Israeli security forces, possibly with support from Jewish settlements, would control corridors that separate them. The first of those already exists. Israel would control all movement in and out of the Strip, including from Egypt and the Mediterranean.
Occupation is occupation
In the West Bank, the Palestinians control security and civil administration only in Area A, which represents 18% of the territory. That control is often merely nominal. Nothing like it will be allowed in Netanyahu’s concept for Gaza. At best, the model for Gaza is Area B, where Israel controls security and the Palestinians nominally control civil administration. That represents 22% of the West Bank. But the reality will more than likely be close to Area C, where Israel controls both security and civil administration. Area C makes up 59% of the West Bank.
This is a formula for occupation but without the protection the 4th Geneva Convention affords. Israel claims the Convention does not apply because Palestine was not a state or legitimately part of one before Israel occupied it. Whatever the legalities, the fact is that Israel has not respected the Convention in the West Bank or Gaza in the past and cannot be expected to do so in the future. But occupation is occupation, even if you claim the Convention does not apply.
What could prevent it?
Netanyahu’s intentions are not however the only factor in determining what is going to happen. America, Europe, Arab states, Iran and its allies, and the rest of the world all have some influence. So too do the Palestinians.
US concurrence in this formula is possible if Donald Trump is re-elected. President Biden’s constituency would object vehemently. But Biden has demonstrated little capacity to influence the Israelis, even when he has had the will. Would he really cut off arms supplies to get a better deal for the Palestinians in Gaza? The Europeans have been mostly supportive of Israel so far. They aren’t likely reverse course. Even if they did, their influence is negligible.
Arab states will be under greater popular pressure not to accept Netanyahu’s ambitions. But they have not been willing during the war to levy any serious pressure on Israel. The fact is they are mostly glad to see Hamas battered. They are also interested in normalization with a state that will help them maintain internal security and improve their economic and technological prospects. The popular pressure has proven manageable. Why say or do anything that might make it less so?
Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen will speak up loudly against Israeli occupation and lob occasional missiles and drones at the Jewish state. But they have not been effective during the war and are unlikely to improve their performance afterwards. China and Russia will also shout denunciations of Israeli behavior, but they too have not been very effective in the past.
The rest of the world doesn’t like Israel’s occupation of the West Bank or Gaza, but what can they do about it?
Opposition has to come from within Israel
Within Israel, the main preoccupation so far among Netanyahu’s opponents has been the hostages. Israelis want them back. Netanyahu says military pressure will achieve that. A plurality of Israelis prefer a deal with Hamas. That implicitly would leave Hamas intact, even if weakened.
This situation is changing. Within the last week, Israeli officials, including the Defense Minister, have let it be known they are unhappy with not having a plan for how the war will end. They do not want the responsibility for a permanent occupation. Now Benny Gantz, by default Netanyahu’s key political rival, has demanded the Prime Minister enunciate a post-war plan by June 8.
Israelis would do well to contemplate what the failure to produce one could mean. Gaza may already be ungovernable. Chaos next door is never a good strategy. Burning down your neighbor’s house is a dangerous thing to do. Repression forever is no better. Like any agglomeration of more than 2 million people, Gaza reconstruction will need water, shelter, food, health, education, and security. That will require a major international effort. It is well past time to have begun thinking about it and organizing for it.
The odds of success for such a reconstruction effort are not high. But the outcome, even if only partly successful, would be a lot better than chaos or re-imposed occupation.
Resistance will continue
Whatever the Israelis decide–chaos, repression, or reconstruction–Palestinian resistance will continue until the Palestinian state becomes a reality. Jews should understand that better than they do, and better than those who have not suffered oppression, dispossession, and displacement. The question is whether the Palestinians will choose a more moderate path than the mass murder the Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades led them on, or an even more radical one.
There are signs of discontent with Hamas in Gaza. Encouraging the emergence of a more moderate resistance should be an Israeli priority. Israelis should be supporting aid into Gaza, not ransacking it. The International Criminal Court, whose prosecutor is seeking warrants for the arrest of Netanyahu and the Defense Minister as well as three top Hamas leaders, is doing so because of abuse of the civilian population of Gaza:
That gives Israelis an opportunity to reverse the decisions that have deprived Palestinians of the physical necessities of life. Israel can’t erase the past. But it can reverse counterproductive policies.
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What to do about the Association
The inevitable question today for those who think about the Balkans is what to do about the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. Belgrade wants it formed by statute inside Kosovo. The Americans and Europeans are insisting on it. The Kosovo authorities are resisting it. What should be done?
The original agreement
Pristina agreed to the Association in 2013, in what was termed the “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.” This unsigned agreement envisaged the Association having “full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning.” The central authorities could also delegate to it additional competences. There was a further agreement concluded in 1915, but the Kosovo Constitutional Court voided much of that agreement.
The 2013 agreement includes quid pro quo‘s for Kosovo. It provides for the integration of Serbs into the Kosovo Police and judicial institutions, as well as application of the Kosovo legal framework in all the Serb municipalities. It also provided “that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path.”
This was a two-way deal, not a one-way concession. Vuk Draskovic, Serbia’s former foreign minister, reminded me of this during a visit to Washington last year.
Its failure
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina has fulfilled its part of the bargain. Albin Kurti, now Kosovo prime minister, opposed formation of the Association while in opposition. In power, he has continued to resist its implementation. Serbian President Vucic, who served as Deputy Prime Minister at the time of the original agreement, has continued to insist on it.
Moreover, talk in Belgrade about creating a “Serbian world” that includes the Serb populations of neighboring countries has raised suspicions. People in Kosovo worry that Serbia is trying to create with the Association a separate, autonomous area outside Pristina’s authority. Those suspicions gained credence when a Belgrade-backed proposal for the Association did just that. A similar Serb association in Bosnia led to war in the 1990s.
In the meanwhile, Belgrade has failed to fulfill its part of the deal. It has never given up trying to block Kosovo progress towards the EU. This includes its recent efforts to bar Kosovo accession to the Council of Europe. Serbs have withdrawn from Kosovo institutions in the four northern municipalities. Serbia also sponsored a boycott of elections there, kidnapped three Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, organized a rent-a-riot that injured NATO peacekeepers, and plotted a terrorist attack last September intended to provide an excuse for a Serbian military incursion. Each of these efforts was a challenge to the legal framework that Belgrade had agreed would be applied throughout Kosovo.
Diplomatic malpractice
There is nothing new about failed agreements between Kosovo and Serbia. Many of the more technical agreements from before 2013 achieved only partial or belated implementation. But for reasons only the diplomats involved can explain, in this case the Americans and Europeans promised Belgrade implementation of the Association without any quid pro quo for Kosovo.
In an op/ed the Americans promised the Association won’t be allowed to become a new level of governance. But they have not been willing to commit to that in a formal government agreement. The Europeans have levied “consequences” (i.e. sanctions) on Kosovo for failing to establish the Association. They have also at the last minute delayed consideration of Kosovo’s application to join the Council of Europe. The Europeans imposed this new condition even though Kosovo had met a long-standing requirement to acknowledge a Serb monastery’s property rights.
This is diplomatic malpractice. I suppose the intense pressure will make Kosovo cough up a proposed statute for the Association. But it makes no sense to condition accession to the Council of Europe on its implementation. Membership in that otherwise obscure institution would give Serbs in Kosovo access to the European Court of Human Rights. That provides a serious forum for resolution of ethnic minority complaints. Serbia, the US, and the EU should welcome Kosovo interest in joining it.
Give to get
In addition to pressuring Kosovo, the US and EU should remind Serbia of its obligations under the 2013 agreement. Serbs should reenter the Kosovo institutions and participate in elections. Belgrade should end its campaign against Kosovo membership in European institutions. Serbia should deliver its rioters and terrorists to Kosovo for trial, as evidence that Belgrade accepts the Kosovo legal framework. I have no doubt but that Pristina would view the Association differently if Belgrade fulfilled all these conditions.
Serbia should give in order to get. That is what they 2013 agreement on the Association requires.
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Could the message be any clearer?
I spoke this morning at Hudson Institute-US/Europe Alliance event on Foreshocks in the Black Sea and Western Balkans: Repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine War. I drew on this post:
All too often those who follow the Balkans view Moscow and Beijing as manipulating President Vucic. That is not the whole story. He “has agency” in the awkward syntax of political science. Vucic has decided to align his increasingly autocratic regime with Russia and China, as well as with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Hungary. He likes their “might makes right” style, which gives him some hope of recovering Kosovo or part of it. He would no doubt befriend Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, if Pristina hadn’t beaten him to it by establishing its embassy in Jerusalem.
The many reasons why
Ethnonationalist, autocratic preference comes naturally to Vucic, who learned his politics at Slobodan Milosevic’s knee. But he had a choice when he became Prime Minister in 2014. He could have adopted a truly pro-Western approach. He has long talked pro-EU. If deed had followed words, Serbia would today have a consolidated democracy well on its way to accession. Instead, it has drifted towards authoritarian rule. Freedom House ranks it generously as “partly free.” Its ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) “has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations.”
Vucic has not only presided over Serbia’s democratic decline. He has encouraged it. Many Balkan watchers complain about “stabilitocracy.” They mean by that the alleged Western preference for incumbent rulers because they provide stability, despite democratic shortcomings. But that ignores the fates of Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski, Montenegrin President Djukanovic, and Kosovo President Thaci. Vucic fears lack of Western commitment to stability. He worries, I hope rightly, that the day he faces defeat in an election or indictment in an international court no one in Europe or the US will trouble themselves with him.
There are no doubt ample economic reasons for Vucic’s autocratic drift as well. China is not beneficent, but its mining, rail, and tire projects and investments leave ample room for hiring well-connected locals and skimming off a percentage to support Vucic-connected oligarchs and politicians. Moscow deals are even less transparent. Both the Chinese and the Russians are all too willing to help as well with internal security cooperation that might go a yard further than the Americans or Europeans would countenance, including extensive electronic surveillance.
Vucic is serious about the Serbian world
But in the end the biggest factor in Vucic’s Eastern leanings is his admiration for those who take what they want, without offering any excuses. Vucic wants to govern all the Serbs of the Balkans, de facto if not de jure. His minions call that ambition the “Serbian world.” In Milosevic’s era it was known as Greater Serbia. Vucic is achieving his objective de facto in Republika Srpska and in Montenegro with minimal violence. That won’t be possible in Kosovo. Any violent move there would throw the Balkans back into chaos and ethnonationalist slaughter.
Belgrade’s new government includes the strongest Serbian world advocate, Deputy Prime Minister Vulin. He claims to have organized the terrorist incident in northern Kosovo last year. It was intended to provide an excuse for Serbian military intervention.
The new Prime Minister was Defense Minister last year when a rent-a-crowd injured dozens of NATO peacekeepers and when Serbia kidnapped police from the territory of Kosovo. He denies genocide in Bosnia and vaunts his ambition to get Montenegro “closer” to Serbia. He shows no sign of accepting as valid the two agreements negotiated last year on normalization with Kosovo. His predecessor disowned them. The new Foreign Minister, the former Ambassador in Washington, can talk for an hour or so with an EU diplomat without mentioning them.
Vucic himself has made it clear he is biding his time until geopolitical circumstances allow him to grab at least northern Kosovo.
This is where the Chinese, who want to do likewise with Taiwan, and the Russians, who have already annexed something like 18% of Ukraine, are most useful. They help Vucic keep alive the hope that some day he can seize what he wants.
So where will the fate of the Balkans be decided?
We should take Vucic’s ambition seriously. Washington and Brussels need to extinguish it. It will be difficult to do that until Biden wins in November and Ukraine evicts Russia. It will be impossible if Trump or the Russians win. Washington, Donbas, and Crimea will decide the fate of the Balkans.
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Farewell to failure
State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar and EU Special Representative Lajcak, both with mandates for the Western Balkans during the past three years, are saying their farewells in Washington this week. These are two experienced diplomats who know the Balkans well. They have collaborated without much friction. The biggest visible issue has been American support for “Open Balkans,” a scheme for facilitating trade. The Europeans rightly viewed it as unnecessary and duplicative of their own efforts in what is known as “the Berlin process.”
But Lajcak and Escobar failed to produce the political normalization between Kosovo and Serbia that they made their top priority.
What went wrong?
Escobar and Lajcak started badly and ended worse. They promised Belgrade that they would prioritize the creation of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo. They ended without significant progress on that mistaken priority.
Pristina had committed to the Association in a 2013 Brussels agreement. But Escobar and Lajcak neglected to get Belgrade to deliver the quid pro quo. In addition to the Association, the Brussels agreement acknowledges the validity of the Kosovo constitution and justice system in its entire territory, commits the Serbs to participating in Pristina’s governing institutions, and pledges that Kosovo and Serbia will advance to the EU without interfering with each other.
Belgrade has reneged on all those commitments. It has maintained de facto governance over the Serb population in the Serb-majority communities of northern Kosovo. It organized the boycott of municipal elections there. Belgrade also withdrew Serb officials from the police and courts. And Serbia has done everything possible to hinder Kosovo entry into the Council of Europe.
Belgrade then went on the offensive
Frustrated with the failure of the EU and US to deliver the Association, Serbia last year decided to make things worse. It kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, rented a mob to attack NATO peacekeepers inside Kosovo, and organized a terrorist attack that was supposed to provide the excuse for a Serbian military intervention.
By the end of last year, Serbian President Vucic was expressing hope for changed geopolitical conditions, including Trump’s reelection, that would enable Serbia to retake part or all of Kosovo. The newly inaugurated Serbian government includes vocal supporters of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the leading advocate of the “Serbian world,” a euphemism for Greater Serbia.
Policy needs a reset
Clearly, Western policy towards Serbia is not working. Washington and Brussels aren’t doing much better with Kosovo. Pristina has refused to move on the Association, despite costly European “consequences” and vituperative US denunciations. Only if Belgrade implements the other provisions of the 2013 Brussels agreement will Pristina respond in kind. Vucic is in no mood to do that.
Success requires a reset. The more political dialogue the 2013 agreement initiated has demonstrably failed for more than a decade. The more technical dialogue that preceded it was far more successful. It focused on issues that could produce demonstrable benefits to the citizens of both countries. Despite spotty implementation, the results were substantial. Even today, Pristina and Belgrade have done better with practical issues like license plates and identity documents than political normalization.
That is the right direction for the future. Political normalization for now is a bridge too far. Serbia won’t be interested in surrendering its sovereignty claims in Kosovo until the war in Ukraine ends Russian annexations there. Kosovo won’t be interested in forming the Association until it is confident that Serbia accepts its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But both Belgrade and Pristina can welcome smoothing movement through their mutual borders and enabling more licit trade and commerce.
Pristina has rightly begun to insist on use of its official currency, the Euro, in transactions within Kosovo. But that is creating problems for the Serb communities, which receive subsidies from Belgrade in Serbian dinars. This is the kind of practical issue the EU and US should focus on. Belgrade and Pristina need to agree on transparency for Serbia’s subsidies to the Serb communities inside Kosovo, which would help resolve the currency issue. That is the practical direction in which prospects for success lie.
Farewell to failure requires getting the priorities right.
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The Gaza war will likely continue
That’s precisely what Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is doing. The Israel Defense Forces have seized the Rafah Crossing into Gaza. The attack is proceeding. Netanyahu hopes thereby to accomplish the complete victory over Hamas that has so far eluded him. Only that would have any chance of keeping him in power.
Netanyahu claims Hamas or Qatar made last-minute changes in the ceasefire agreement. Whatever they may be (or not be), it is hard to imagine that they justify an attack on a place where more than a million civilians are crammed together. This attack will be remembered for creating an even greater humanitarian catastrophe than the more than six months of war on Gaza have generated so far.
A test for Biden
President Biden has firmly opposed the attack on Rafah without a clear plan for protecting civilians. That is nowhere in sight. The Israelis are encouraging civilians to evacuate some areas, as they have previously, but the attacks are not limited to those. And there are few places left for civilians to go.
The question now is how Biden, who has supported Israel’s objective of eliminating Hamas’ military capabilities, will react. Axios has reported that the US has put a hold on some shipments of ammunition for Israel. But it is unclear how vital these are and how long the hold will last.
More important than a shipment or two of ammunition is the overall posture of the US towards Israel. In recent years, it has become “Israel right or wrong.” Netanyahu has taken advantage of that attitude not only in Gaza but also on the West Bank, where he has unleashed racist settlers to attack Palestinians. Arabs chant “from the river to the sea.” Netanyahu and his allies are doing it. They are also making Gaza uninhabitable.
Biden cannot continue to pose as a champion of democracy worldwide if he allows Israel to continue its disproportionate killing of civilians in Gaza. But stopping Netanyahu at this point will require a dramatic reversal of US policy.
The problem is domestic politics
That will be difficult. Biden faces some domestic pressure to rein in Israel. Many liberal Jews, as well as Arab and Muslim Americans, oppose continuation of the war. The campus protesters represent only the most visible part of that electorate. But the far more numerous evangelical Christians still favor “Israel right or wrong.” Most of them will vote Republican anyway, despite Donald Trump’s obvious disdain for religion and morality. But the center of gravity of American politics still favors Israel. Shifting toward more conditionality will not help Biden in November.
The opposite is true in much of the rest of the world. While much of Europe is still backing Israel, many in Africa and Asia view Israel as a colonial power and therefore support the Palestinians. America could benefit internationally from shifting policy away from “right or wrong,” as Eisenhower did when he got Israel, Britain, and France to back off the Suez Canal in 1956. But foreigners don’t get to vote in US elections.
Biden isn’t likely to pass the test
I would not bet on Biden forcing Israel to back down in Rafah. He is more likely to try to get Netanyahu to make the attack shorter and less violent. But Netanyahu is looking for a real victory–the modern equivalent of Yahya Sinwar’s head on a pole–and won’t settle for less. The Gaza war isn’t over and may continue for a long time still.
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