Why a negotiated Gaza peace isn’t happening
Israel has been backing away from the Gaza peace plan the Americans say it proposed. After indicating it welcomed the proposal, Hamas is asking for major changes. Here are the good reasons why a negotiated peace in Gaza is not possible right now:
- No mutually hurting stalemate.
- No mutually enticing way out.
- No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents.
Any of these factors might change. But for now all the usual pre-conditions for a successful negotiation are missing.
No mutually hurting stalemate
Neither Hamas nor Israel is hurting enough to prefer negotiations over continued fighting. Military leader Yahya Sinwar thinks civilian casualties help Hamas. He is prepared to continue fighting, as he believes he has the Israelis where he wants them. Israeli officials are letting everyone know the war might last until the end of this year. Prime Minister Netanyahu figures that will postpone an Israeli election that might bring down his government. He imagines an election only after he can claim credit for a complete Israeli victory.
There isn’t even a stalemate. The Israelis are continuing their offensive into Rafah. Hamas is resorting to guerilla tactics in several parts of Gaza. The military situation is still dynamic. It is far from the kind of stasis that would convince belligerents think they can gain more from talking than fighting.
No mutually enticing way out
Even if there were a mutually hurting stalemate, it is hard to imagine a mutually enticing way out that could convince the belligerents to try to negotiate a deal. Israel wants to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas might give up the governing role, but it cannot give up its military capability without surrendering completely. Hamas wants to destroy Israel. No one in Jerusalem will agree to that.
Hamas and Israel did live side by side since 2007, albeit with repeated attacks and small wars (compared to the current one). But going back to that from the current situation seems impossible. Hamas isn’t going to trust Israel to leave it alone. Israel isn’t going to trust Hamas to leave the Jewish state alone.
No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents
The only way to square that circle is with outside military and police forces committed to keeping the peace. Tens of thousands would be required. The 4000 police would need to be Arabic-speaking. The 32,000 soldiers would need to be well-equipped and trained. These would need to operate in coordination with 7500 local troops and 4500 local police. Where do you get those in Gaza? Wouldn’t any you find there likely be Hamas-affiliated, one way or the other? The Palestinian Authority has fewer than 10,000 police in the West Bank. What percentage of those could be moved to Gaza?
These are among the issues Tony Blinken is criss-crossing the Middle East to discuss. The Gulfies will likely be willing to write checks, but will the Saudis, Qataris, or Emiratis be putting thousands of their police and soldiers into Gaza? The Egyptians won’t want to either. They controlled Gaza until 1967 and were glad to give it up. They don’t want to re-acquire it.
Scholarship demonstrates that belligerents won’t want to negotiate a settlement that spells doom to themselves. Both Israel and Hamas have reason to fear a settlement without a heavy enforcement presence would do just that.
Wishing Tony Blinken well
I do hope Tony Blinken succeeds, despite the odds. But the circumstances suggest he won’t. The Hamas/Israel war seems destined to continue without a negotiated settlement, until there is a mutually hurting stalemate, a mutually enticing way out, and security for whatever remains of the belligerents. Nothing less will allow a successful negotiation.
Victory by one side or the other is still a possibility. But not one likely to happen soon.
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Mealy-mouthed won’t work, riot act will
Yesterday Nevena Bogdanović of RFE/RL asked for my comments on the “Declaration On The Protection Of National And Political Rights And The Common Future Of The Serbian People.” I find the full text in English at https://twitter.com/NationalIndNews/status/1799467259133317379). Her deadline was too tight for my schedule. So I am recording here my reactions not only to the Declaration but also to the contrasting responses of the American embassies in Sarajevo and Belgrade.
The Declaration is what it says it is
The Declaration is the product of an effort to institutionalize pan-Serb institutions in an Assembly (to meet every two years) and a National Council of the Serbian People. The Assembly includes representatives of the widespread Serb diaspora. But the Council is constituted of officials from the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade) and the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska (headquartered in Banja Luka). The purpose of their cooperation is spelled out:
The Pan-Serbian Assembly recommends that the institutions of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska act unitedly and in coordination and make efforts to stop the assimilation of Serbs in the countries of the region, as well as around the world.
https://twitter.com/NationalIndNews/status/1799467259133317379
The Assembly also recognizes the Serbian Orthodox Church as a pillar of “national, cultural, and spiritual identity.” It supports Serbia in efforts to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, declaring Kosovo and Metohija “inalienable.”
The Assembly also wants reversion in Bosnia to the Dayton peace agreements as signed. That means without the many decisions the High Representative, the Sarajevo parliament, and the entity assemblies have made since 1995. The Declaration explicitly challenges the appointment of the current High Representative.
Greater Serbia by another name
I could go on, but essentially this document is a manifesto for the Serbian World, or Greater Serbia. The references to the broader Serb diaspora are a thin veil. Most Serbs who live in Australia are already “assimilated.” They vote in elections there, serve in its armed forces and other Australian institutions, and describe themselves as Australian, even while preserving their identity as Serbs.
The real purpose of this declaration is to prevent Serbs in the neighboring countries (Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo) from professing and acting on loyalty to the countries in which they live. That is a prerequisite for any future union, which is the ultimate Serb aim. The good news is that someone thinks the Serbs might be loyal to the countries in which they live.
The embassy statements, one right and one wrong
US Embassy Sarajevo got it right:
…the conclusions adopted at the All-Serb Assembly as they relate to the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are rooted in legal disinformation and riddled with errors. They do not constitute a defense of the Dayton Peace Agreement, as the authors claim, but are a deliberate attack on that agreement and the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is dangerous.
https://x.com/USEmbassySJJ/status/1800222971526623266
US Embassy Belgrade got it wrong. I am told this is what the Ambassador said in response to a question about the Declaration:
The focus of everyone who cares about Serbia and its future should remain on creating a peaceful and prosperous future for the entire Western Balkans, increasing regional cooperation with EU integration as the final goal. Serbia has a constructive role to play in that process and we welcome the many examples of its leaders pledging to do so.
While this is true, you wouldn’t know that Serbia is already “rapidly veering off course” for EU accession.
I haven’t found a comment from US Embassy Pristina. It correctly retweeted Sarajevo’s denunciation.
Squeeze Republika Srpska
Which is the real American position? At present, both are. Washington is trying to appease Vucic and burn Milorad Dodik, the secessionist President of Republika Srpska. This effort to distinguish between them has not worked. Nor will it, since their objective is the same: Greater Serbia, de facto if not de jure.
Embassy Sarajevo has consistently said the right things about Dodik, whom the US has sanctioned. But it has not really done anything more about him. Washington should be squeezing Republika Srpska’s finances as tight as it can. And getting the EU and UK to do likewise. My compliments if they are doing that quietly.
Read Belgrade the riot act
The Americans are appeasing Serbia these days because they want Belgrade to continue exporting ammunition to Ukraine. But Serbia is also exporting electronic components to Russia that are needed to manufacture weapons. Belgrade deserves little credit for doing what it should want to do, especially if it continues doing what it knows it should not do.
Some Americans also believe mollifying Vucic will work better than criticizing him. I know of no basis for this belief. It is inconsistent with his own past behavior as well as that of his mentor, Slobodan Milosevic. I had hoped when he first came to power that Vucic would become a real democrat. But he dashed those hopes long ago.
The Americans should read Vucic the riot act, that is warn him loudly and publicly. Washington should oppose European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) funding for Serbia unless he decides to end irredentist claims to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The Americans should also lobby hard against European Investment Bank (EIB) and EU Growth Plan funding unless that condition is fulfilled.
Save some money and dignity
The Balkans are far down on America’s list of priorities these days. Saving some tens of millions there should be welcome. Cutting funding to those who oppose American and European objectives in the region should be easy. Benefits of Western institutions should go to those who merit them. It is embarrassing that they are going to people who don’t.
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What’s missing from the Gaza peace plan
The Israeli proposal for “General Principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and restoring a sustainable calm” in Gaza seems stalled, despite President Biden’s concerted efforts. What are its prospects?
Security, security, security
In real estate, it’s all about location, location, location. In post-war stabilization and reconstruction, it’s all about security, security, security.
The first security concern is that of the belligerents. They won’t agree to an end to the fighting if they think their own security will be at greater risk. This is especially true in the current case, as Israel has vowed to eliminate Hamas and Hamas’ strategic goal is the elimination of Israel. If Israel is responsible for security in Gaza after the ceasefire, Hamas has good reason to fear the Israel Defense Force will continue to target it, especially its leaders.
The second security concern focuses on civilians. The international community should not be interested in a ceasefire that fails to improve conditions for non-Hamas affiliated Gazans. They need not only to be housed and fed but also protected from gangs and chaos. That requires some sort of police force and rudimentary justice system. Without them, civilians have no recourse when a guy with a gun steals their food, water, shelter, and property.
The third security concern is the region. If war ends in Gaza only to start up between Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel, the Middle East will have gained little. The broader war the region has long feared is already brewing. Iran’s allies and proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have all been attacking Israel. The missile and drone tit for tat between Iran and Israel in April suggested what a broader war might entail.
The gaping hole in the draft agreement
The peace plan lacks provisions for the first two categories of security. It details the time lines for hostage/prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of Israeli forces, humanitarian relief, return of Gazans to the north, and other requirements. But it refers only vaguely to Egypt, Qatar, and the US as “guarantors” of the agreement. That means little if it doesn’t include provision of security, or at least a leadership role in doing so.
But it is hard to see what those three countries can realistically do about security. Whoever does that will need to speak Arabic. The US has individuals but no military or police units who speak Arabic. Qatar’s army has fewer than 12,000 soldiers. It is hard to picture Doha providing more than 10% to a peacekeeping presence in Gaza. It is much more likely to write the necessary checks. Egypt has many more soldiers, but Cairo does not want to deploy troops in Gaza, for fear of ending up in charge there, as it was until 1967.
Using Jim Dobbins’ numbers for a heavy peace enforcement operation, Gaza would require something like 32,000 troops and 4000 police, in addition to 7500 local troops and 5500 local police. As the available local forces in Gaza would be mostly Hamas-affiliated, which Israel will not allow, the international presence will have to be beefed up accordingly.
I just don’t see how to fill that gaping hole. Are the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis going to deploy large parts of their armies to Gaza?
The other security requirement
The third security requirement is the regional one. This need not be in the plan, but it has to be real. The US has worked hard to prevent the wider regional war, but Israel and some of Iran’s friends seem increasingly eager for one. Israel wants to move Hizbollah back from its border so that tens of thousands of civilians can return to their homes in the north. The Houthis want to demonstrate their importance in the region and gain additional aid from Iran.
The Iranians will elect a new president June 28. The Supreme Leader will retain control of foreign and security policy. But that election will likely provide some indication of the direction Tehran wants to take in the future. If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its way, which seems likely, the regional situation could deteriorate quickly.
Prove me wrong
I’ll be glad to be wrong. I hope this peace plan succeeds. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
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Belgrade needs to do its part
Besnik Velija of Pristina’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I responded yesterday:
Q: As an analyst with long experience and who has followed the politics of the Balkans for so long, what does the fact that Prime Minister Albin Kurti refused to move forward with the Association Draft even though it cost him the loss of membership in the Council of Europe. And what does it mean for the relationship of trustworthiness between the parties, given that the internationals were not even convinced by two letters with promises and demanded substantial and tangible steps for the Association?
A: The Prime Minister’s relationships with the Europeans and Americans is lacking confidence and effectiveness. That said, I think it is a colossal mistake for the Americans and Europeans to insist on creation of the Association of Serbian-Majority Municipalities, which is Belgrade’s top priority in the dialogue, without any benefits for Pristina. All concerned should reread the 2013 Brussels agreement, which required not only the Association but also Belgrade recognition of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory, participation of Serbs in Kosovo’s institutions, and non-interference in Kosovo’s path toward the European Union. Belgrade has fulfilled none of those requirements.
Q: How do you see everything that happened around the Lajcak Draft for the Association? Do you think that Kosovo will ever implement that Draft, considering that Kurti was able to fail the membership in the Council of Europe and not send that Draft to the Constitutional Court?
A: I don’t see how the Association can move forward without at least de facto if not de jure recognition of Kosovo by Serbia.
Q: How did you see Foreign Minister Gervalla’s offer in the last few hours? She first said that Kosovo is writing a Draft inspired by the FES draft, then at the conference she said that there is nothing concrete and that it is only in the proposal phase. Does such an approach show frivolity on the Kosovo side and how do you comment on the fact that there was no coordination with the President of Kosovo for such a proposal?
A: I’ll leave the coordination issue up to those involved. I do think Kosovo should prepare a draft that it would find acceptable, provided Belgrade fulfills its obligations under the 2013 Brussels agreement.
Q: Now that the CoE application is gone, what do you think that the EU and US can do in order to convince Kosovo to move forward with ASM implementation?
A: They can convince Belgrade to do its part.
Q: If there will be no steps toward ASMM, Do you think that there could be space for a return of the land-swap idea if former US president Donald Trump will be back in office in WH?
A: I have no doubt the land swap idea will arise again if Trump is re-elected, whether or not there are steps toward ASMM.
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One key to Gaza’s future is inside Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu refuses to define an end-state for Gaza, beyond Israeli control of security there. But it is becoming clear what he intends. Along with his extreme-right coalition partners, Netanyahu wants to reproduce something like the West Bank in Gaza. The Palestinians would be limited to relatively small enclaves. Israeli security forces, possibly with support from Jewish settlements, would control corridors that separate them. The first of those already exists. Israel would control all movement in and out of the Strip, including from Egypt and the Mediterranean.
Occupation is occupation
In the West Bank, the Palestinians control security and civil administration only in Area A, which represents 18% of the territory. That control is often merely nominal. Nothing like it will be allowed in Netanyahu’s concept for Gaza. At best, the model for Gaza is Area B, where Israel controls security and the Palestinians nominally control civil administration. That represents 22% of the West Bank. But the reality will more than likely be close to Area C, where Israel controls both security and civil administration. Area C makes up 59% of the West Bank.
This is a formula for occupation but without the protection the 4th Geneva Convention affords. Israel claims the Convention does not apply because Palestine was not a state or legitimately part of one before Israel occupied it. Whatever the legalities, the fact is that Israel has not respected the Convention in the West Bank or Gaza in the past and cannot be expected to do so in the future. But occupation is occupation, even if you claim the Convention does not apply.
What could prevent it?
Netanyahu’s intentions are not however the only factor in determining what is going to happen. America, Europe, Arab states, Iran and its allies, and the rest of the world all have some influence. So too do the Palestinians.
US concurrence in this formula is possible if Donald Trump is re-elected. President Biden’s constituency would object vehemently. But Biden has demonstrated little capacity to influence the Israelis, even when he has had the will. Would he really cut off arms supplies to get a better deal for the Palestinians in Gaza? The Europeans have been mostly supportive of Israel so far. They aren’t likely reverse course. Even if they did, their influence is negligible.
Arab states will be under greater popular pressure not to accept Netanyahu’s ambitions. But they have not been willing during the war to levy any serious pressure on Israel. The fact is they are mostly glad to see Hamas battered. They are also interested in normalization with a state that will help them maintain internal security and improve their economic and technological prospects. The popular pressure has proven manageable. Why say or do anything that might make it less so?
Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen will speak up loudly against Israeli occupation and lob occasional missiles and drones at the Jewish state. But they have not been effective during the war and are unlikely to improve their performance afterwards. China and Russia will also shout denunciations of Israeli behavior, but they too have not been very effective in the past.
The rest of the world doesn’t like Israel’s occupation of the West Bank or Gaza, but what can they do about it?
Opposition has to come from within Israel
Within Israel, the main preoccupation so far among Netanyahu’s opponents has been the hostages. Israelis want them back. Netanyahu says military pressure will achieve that. A plurality of Israelis prefer a deal with Hamas. That implicitly would leave Hamas intact, even if weakened.
This situation is changing. Within the last week, Israeli officials, including the Defense Minister, have let it be known they are unhappy with not having a plan for how the war will end. They do not want the responsibility for a permanent occupation. Now Benny Gantz, by default Netanyahu’s key political rival, has demanded the Prime Minister enunciate a post-war plan by June 8.
Israelis would do well to contemplate what the failure to produce one could mean. Gaza may already be ungovernable. Chaos next door is never a good strategy. Burning down your neighbor’s house is a dangerous thing to do. Repression forever is no better. Like any agglomeration of more than 2 million people, Gaza reconstruction will need water, shelter, food, health, education, and security. That will require a major international effort. It is well past time to have begun thinking about it and organizing for it.
The odds of success for such a reconstruction effort are not high. But the outcome, even if only partly successful, would be a lot better than chaos or re-imposed occupation.
Resistance will continue
Whatever the Israelis decide–chaos, repression, or reconstruction–Palestinian resistance will continue until the Palestinian state becomes a reality. Jews should understand that better than they do, and better than those who have not suffered oppression, dispossession, and displacement. The question is whether the Palestinians will choose a more moderate path than the mass murder the Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades led them on, or an even more radical one.
There are signs of discontent with Hamas in Gaza. Encouraging the emergence of a more moderate resistance should be an Israeli priority. Israelis should be supporting aid into Gaza, not ransacking it. The International Criminal Court, whose prosecutor is seeking warrants for the arrest of Netanyahu and the Defense Minister as well as three top Hamas leaders, is doing so because of abuse of the civilian population of Gaza:
That gives Israelis an opportunity to reverse the decisions that have deprived Palestinians of the physical necessities of life. Israel can’t erase the past. But it can reverse counterproductive policies.
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What to do about the Association
The inevitable question today for those who think about the Balkans is what to do about the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. Belgrade wants it formed by statute inside Kosovo. The Americans and Europeans are insisting on it. The Kosovo authorities are resisting it. What should be done?
The original agreement
Pristina agreed to the Association in 2013, in what was termed the “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.” This unsigned agreement envisaged the Association having “full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning.” The central authorities could also delegate to it additional competences. There was a further agreement concluded in 1915, but the Kosovo Constitutional Court voided much of that agreement.
The 2013 agreement includes quid pro quo‘s for Kosovo. It provides for the integration of Serbs into the Kosovo Police and judicial institutions, as well as application of the Kosovo legal framework in all the Serb municipalities. It also provided “that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path.”
This was a two-way deal, not a one-way concession. Vuk Draskovic, Serbia’s former foreign minister, reminded me of this during a visit to Washington last year.
Its failure
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina has fulfilled its part of the bargain. Albin Kurti, now Kosovo prime minister, opposed formation of the Association while in opposition. In power, he has continued to resist its implementation. Serbian President Vucic, who served as Deputy Prime Minister at the time of the original agreement, has continued to insist on it.
Moreover, talk in Belgrade about creating a “Serbian world” that includes the Serb populations of neighboring countries has raised suspicions. People in Kosovo worry that Serbia is trying to create with the Association a separate, autonomous area outside Pristina’s authority. Those suspicions gained credence when a Belgrade-backed proposal for the Association did just that. A similar Serb association in Bosnia led to war in the 1990s.
In the meanwhile, Belgrade has failed to fulfill its part of the deal. It has never given up trying to block Kosovo progress towards the EU. This includes its recent efforts to bar Kosovo accession to the Council of Europe. Serbs have withdrawn from Kosovo institutions in the four northern municipalities. Serbia also sponsored a boycott of elections there, kidnapped three Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, organized a rent-a-riot that injured NATO peacekeepers, and plotted a terrorist attack last September intended to provide an excuse for a Serbian military incursion. Each of these efforts was a challenge to the legal framework that Belgrade had agreed would be applied throughout Kosovo.
Diplomatic malpractice
There is nothing new about failed agreements between Kosovo and Serbia. Many of the more technical agreements from before 2013 achieved only partial or belated implementation. But for reasons only the diplomats involved can explain, in this case the Americans and Europeans promised Belgrade implementation of the Association without any quid pro quo for Kosovo.
In an op/ed the Americans promised the Association won’t be allowed to become a new level of governance. But they have not been willing to commit to that in a formal government agreement. The Europeans have levied “consequences” (i.e. sanctions) on Kosovo for failing to establish the Association. They have also at the last minute delayed consideration of Kosovo’s application to join the Council of Europe. The Europeans imposed this new condition even though Kosovo had met a long-standing requirement to acknowledge a Serb monastery’s property rights.
This is diplomatic malpractice. I suppose the intense pressure will make Kosovo cough up a proposed statute for the Association. But it makes no sense to condition accession to the Council of Europe on its implementation. Membership in that otherwise obscure institution would give Serbs in Kosovo access to the European Court of Human Rights. That provides a serious forum for resolution of ethnic minority complaints. Serbia, the US, and the EU should welcome Kosovo interest in joining it.
Give to get
In addition to pressuring Kosovo, the US and EU should remind Serbia of its obligations under the 2013 agreement. Serbs should reenter the Kosovo institutions and participate in elections. Belgrade should end its campaign against Kosovo membership in European institutions. Serbia should deliver its rioters and terrorists to Kosovo for trial, as evidence that Belgrade accepts the Kosovo legal framework. I have no doubt but that Pristina would view the Association differently if Belgrade fulfilled all these conditions.
Serbia should give in order to get. That is what they 2013 agreement on the Association requires.
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