Equality is for everyone
This week I joined dozens of colleagues in signing this letter to President Biden about Gaza. I suppose some would say it reflects the herd mentality of the Washington foreign policy establishment. I prefer to think it reflects a judicious appraisal of a bad situation likely to worsen if Israel continues its large-scale assault at Rafah.
That said, let me offer a speculation or two.
Elite Arab attitudes have changed
Arab sympathies are predominantly with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. That has not and will not change. But it is all the more striking that consultations between the US and key Arab states have continued despite Israeli abuses in Gaza and the West Bank. It seems to me clear that Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and others want to be seen as supporting the Palestinians but welcome the damage the Israelis are doing to Hamas. They may doubt the feasibility of completely destroying Hamas’ military capabilities. But there is no talk of an oil boycott or other escalation.
To the contrary, the Saudis have made it clear they want to pursue normalization with Israel once conditions permit. Discussion of that option is continuing even during the Gaza war. It is now half a dozen years since I met Israelis carrying lots of electronics in the Riyadh business class lounge. They were likely helping with internal security in the Kingdom. The Saudis also want a defense agreement and civilian nuclear cooperation with the US. That’s what “normalization” is really about.
Nor are the Arab states expressing any sympathy for wiping Israel off the map. That may still be a day dream in the Arab street, but only Iran, Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis–the axis of resistance–are really backing “from the river to the sea.” I have no doubt but that some of them are serious. But it isn’t happening. Iran is in economic crisis and political ennui, Hizbollah is trying not to get into all-out war with Israel, and Hamas is hiding underground. Only the Houthis are flexing their capabilities, which are however limited for now in their reach and impact to shipping in the Red Sea.
The Israelis are doing from the river to the sea
The Israeli settlers on the West Bank, who object to Arabs saying “from the river to the sea,” are doing it. They are on a killing and displacement spree, taking advantage of the Netanyahu government’s tolerance for violence against Palestinians. The displacement so far is not massive. Things could get a lot worse. Certainly that is the settlers’ intention. They get ample support from more Orthodox Jewish communities in the US, but their really important political backing extends as well to some American Christian evangelicals.
The Biden Administration has begun to react. It has started to sanction Israeli settlers who perpetrate violence on the West Bank against Palestinians. But the Administration needs to do much more, focusing on the political leadership that condones such abuse as well as the American Jewish and Christian networks that support and finance it. Terrorism is terrorism. Blocking American financing for violent settlers should be a priority.
American Jewish attitudes are changing too
The settlers claim religious justification for their claims to what they call “Judea and Samaria.” But liberal American Jews couldn’t care less about that. And most American Jews are more liberal, if I can use that term to encompass nonpracticing as well as Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative Jews. They have generally supported the idea of a Jewish homeland. But one that is more secular than religious and treats its Arab citizens as equals and Arab neighbors with respect. You’ll find some of the people who signed the above letter in this category.
Let me speak though only for myself. I want to see an end to warfare between Jews and Arabs. That will only be possible with mutual respect for Palestinian and Jewish rights, whether in one state or two. I still think two is more feasible than one. But admittedly two become more difficult with the extension of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. That is one of many reasons they should be stopped and rolled back.
Also critical is treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel, as many of what we used to call Israeli Arabs today prefer to be called. They constitute more than 20% of the country’s population. Equality for them is vital to Israel’s claim to be a democratic state and a free society. But you don’t have to look far to find ample evidence that the reality is far from the ideal. Separate but equal never worked in the US. It won’t work in Israel either. It is high time for Israeli practice to rise to the level of Jewish ideals. Human dignityt and therefore equality is for everyone.
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Double down on success, not failure
The US Ambassador in Belgrade has vaunted cooperation with the Serbian Army even as the President of Serbia makes clear his intention to invade Kosovo at a time of his choosing. How can both be true?
No big puzzle
It’s really not hard to figure this out. Serbia cooperates with US and NATO exercises for two reasons. First, they provide good training, which the Russians are unable to equal. The performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine has improved, but its losses are simply colossal. No one would want to emulate them. Second, NATO exercises provide excellent opportunities to gather intelligence. That will serve well in any Serbian military action against NATO-led forces in Kosovo. Belgrade no doubt also feeds that intelligence back to Moscow.
Only marginally harder to understand is the reference to the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as the KLA (or Kosovo Liberation Army). The KLA was demobilized after the 1999 war. The KSF that exists today is the creation of US and British training and equipping several generations of organization and personnel removed from the KLA. The US Ambassador in Belgrade knows that perfectly well. His reference to the KLA is intended to signal that he agrees with the Serbian government that the KSF is illegitimate.
Toadying hasn’t worked
This toadying to Vucic has become the default behavior in Belgrade. The question is why it is tolerated in Washington. I suppose there are reasons. But they are unlikely to be good ones. No amount of lickspittle will change Belgrade’s decision to align with Russia. Vucic has made clear that he intends to try to take back a piece of Kosovo whenever he gets an opportunity. Any agreement in Ukraine to surrender territory to Russia will provide that opportunity.
Washington needs to reconsider its long effort to court Vucic. That effort has failed. It has also encouraged his irredentist ambitions, not only in Kosovo but also in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “Serbian world” he aims for is strictly analogous to the “Russian world” President Putin is trying to create in Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and most ambitiously Ukraine. The West should be countering Russian and Serbian ethnoterritorial ambitions, not encouraging them. Instead, Washington is doubling down on a policy that has failed to produce anything more than minor results.
A better policy would not be hard to find
A re-evaluation is long overdue. The current Trumpian affection for ethnonationalism and irredentism is inconsistent with the liberal democratic pretensions of the Biden Administration. Tony Blinken, bless is hard-traveling body and no doubt preoccupied mind, needs to say to State Department Assistant Secretary Jim O’Brien: we have failed to get Vucic on side. Let’s try tough love.
That would mean reading him the riot act on many things. First would be prioritizing justice, preferably in Kosovo, for the organizers and perpetrators of the September 24 terrorist incident that Belgrade sponsored inside Kosovo. Second would be ensuring that Pristina gets the support it requires not only for membership in the Council of Europe and relief from outdated and counterproductive EU “consequences” but also for opening of negotiations on NATO membership. Third would be readiness to denounce any cheating in preparation for the upcoming rerun of Belgrade elections.
I could go on, but you get the point. US policy needs to return to favoring its friends in the Balkans and countering its enemies. That should not be too hard to do. Double down on success, not failure.
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C+ is not a good grade
C+ is what I would give as a grade for implementation of the year-old “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia.” Koha asked for an interview on this subject but then did not call at the appointed time. So I wrote this piece instead. It’s a B or B+ for Pristina and a C for Belgrade.
Let’s break it down article by article:
Good neighborly relations:
Certainly not in general, but there has been some limited progress on mutual recognition of their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. Pristina was never the problem. Belgrade has moved on this. B or B+ I guess.
Respect for the UN Charter:
Serbia fails (that’s an F) miserably on respect for “the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity.” Kosovo gets a B+, marked down due to continued shortcomings in protection of human rights and non-discrimination. Things are improving in those departments, but problems remain.
Peaceful settlement of disputes:
Serbia fails (F) on settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refraining from the threat or use of force. Belgrade sponsored the September 24 attempted uprising intended to create a pretext for the use of force, which it threatened by mobilizing its forces on Kosovo’s borders. Belgrade had also already kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory and organized a mob that attacked NATO-led peacekeepers. Kosovo has no real option for use of force, but nevertheless gets an A for the police handling of the September 24 incident.
International representation:
Serbia (D) continues to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Kosovo (A) has not to my knowledge objected to Serbia’s membership in them.
EU path:
Serbia (D) is no longer in transition to democracy and does not align with EU foreign policy, especially but not only on Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo (B+) is moving in the right direction on democracy and does respect EU foreign policy.
Dialogue process:
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina is much engaged, the former because it objects to the basic premises and the latter because it has gotten little benefit. C+ for both.
Treatment of the Serbian community in Kosovo:
Kosovo has conceded little on “self-management” but is resolving one important issue concerning Serbian Orthodox Church property at Decan/i. Pristina has muddied the waters on financial support from Belgrade by insisting on use of the euro but there is really no bar to direct communication for the Serbian community with the Kosovo government. B for Pristina, but no better than a C+ for Belgrade, which insists on violating Kosovo law in transferring finances opaquely and in dinars.
EU and others’ support package:
I really don’t know. Has it been created? Is anything happening on this front?
Joint Committee on implementation:
Is this just the Dialogue writ small, or has such a thing been created?
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A new book is a joy. Hackers are not.
Some of you will have noticed my hiatus in posting lately. It has two imminent causes. I’ve been proofing my new book. And Gmail has blocked my account, due to hacking efforts Google attributes to a foreign government. Regular readers will know the likely culprits. I hardly need mention my other (welcome) obligations. I am reading three doctoral dissertations, I recently trained some Syrians in consensus-building, and I appear almost daily on Al Jazeera Arabic or Al Hurra.
The new book is entitled Strengthening International Regimes: the Case of Radiation Protection. I submitted the manuscript December 31. Palgrave MacMillan will publish it in April. That is very fast for an academic book. I am grateful to everyone involved: the German owner Springer, the British imprint, the New York-based editor, and the copy editing and production crew, which I think works in India. Globalization is not defunct yet.
I regret the $120 price. I don’t expect you to buy it. But please do ask your local or university library to get it.
It took a lifetime
The book is the product of most of my lifetime. I initially wrote about the history of radiation protection for my Princeton doctoral dissertation with Tom Kuhn. That was in the 1970s, but my dissertation only got to 1934. The international regime that protects all of us from ionizing radiation was then still a pre-teen.
I’ve now completed the history more or less to the present, in good time for the 100th anniversary of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in 2028. What was once an exercise in history of science is now also an exercise in the creation and dissemination of normative regimes. I am fortunate that my own career followed the same trajectory. It gave me tools with which to trace a fascinating history across two disciplines. That is a rare treat.
The crux of the matter
The keystone of the regime for radiation protection is an epistemic community of global experts. They used specialized knowledge to protect both the enterprises using radiation as well as human health and the environment. They have been remarkably successful. The entire world respects the norms they set, even though they lack legal authority. That lack of legal authority has made the norms more resilient, not less.
Their success can teach us something about what makes a regime strong. I argue in the book that the lessons learned may be applicable to other technologies and knowledge-rich subjects that entail both risks and benefits. Balancing them cooperatively rather than in an adversarial process has distinct advantages. The lessons learned may have applications to less knowledge-rich enterprises as well. I explore the possibilities beyond ionizing radiation in the final chapter.
More anon
I’ll have more to say about the book in coming months and will hope to meet some of you in public discussions of mine and related work. If you have suggestions of institutions that might be interested in hosting a discussion, please let me know. I am already trying to arrange something at SAIS and some of the other international affairs institutions with which I am affiliated.
In the meanwhile, I will welcome thoughts on how to liberate my Gmail from the block Google has imposed on it. You can reach me, until the hackers get to it, at dserwer1@jh.edu My Googlevoice number 202 681 7021 is also blocked. Those of you who have it should please use my other number.
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When Jews and Arabs agree and disagree
The horrors of the October 7 attack and the Gaza war are all too present. But it is notable that at least some Arabs and Jews are reacting in similar, if not identical ways. At least I find that true in the US and hope it is true more widely.
Atrocity is atrocity
Most of the Jews and Arabs I come into contact with find both the Hamas attack and the Israeli reaction atrocious. Both are prepared to acknowledge the context for the Hamas attack. It came in the midst of escalating Jewish settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as right-wing Jewish challenges to the status quo on the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount. But that in no way justified an indiscriminate attack on civilians inside Israel.
The same is true in the other direction. Most Arabs and Jews understand Israel had to respond. Nor do they think it wrong to seek justice for the Hamas perpetrators and release of the hostages taken to Gaza. But the indiscriminate and disproportionate assault on the civilian population there is still entirely unjustified and counterproductive. States today have obligations when they undertake military action that should not be ignored. Yes, it is true that the United States and its allies during World War II conducted indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing of Germany and Japan, including use of the atomic bomb. But international norms have changed. Even then, protection of civilians was required, not optional. Today it is de rigueur. Atrocity is atrocity.
What could Hamas and Israel have done?
Both Hamas and Israel should have focused their targeting on military targets. That would have meant for Hamas only attacking military bases, not the nearby music festival or kibbutzim, many of which are in fact sympathetic with the Palestinian desire for a state. For Israel it would have meant targeting individuals and groups clearly associated with Hamas and other armed factions in Gaza. That would have precluded the razing of more than 50% of the buildings in the Gaza Strip.
That both warring parties violated the rules of war will have long-term consequences. Israelis will have a lot harder time putting the October 7 attack behind them. Many are seeking revenge, not justice. Some Palestinians will likewise seek revenge. Gaza will be far more difficult to rebuild. Both will be rallying to the more extreme factions of their respective politics, making agreement harder than it might otherwise have been. If you kill people indiscriminately because of their identity, you can expect that identity to strengthen, not weaken.
What is to be done now?
The Americans and others have made no secret of their intensifying effort to reach agreement on a multi-week pause in the fighting to allow exchange of prisoners/hostages. That would certainly be a good thing. But if the exchange is less than complete, the fighting is likely to restart if the same people remain in power.
Prime Minister Netanyahu is determined to continue the war for as long as possible. He knows that a prolonged pause will open the possibility his government will fall and a less radical one take its place. Hamas may likewise fear a prolonged pause will bring its status into question as well. There have already been demonstrations in Gaza against Hamas. A pause will make the consequences of what it brought on starker.
It would make a big difference if Jews and Arabs inside Israel could get together to dump Netanyahu as well as Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. He is almost as unpopular as Netanyahu. That would open the door to an Israeli government committed to getting the hostages released, Gaza rebuilt, and a common destiny mapped. It would also enable a reformed and more capable PA.
It is clear enough that neither Jews nor Arabs are going to leave Palestine/Israel to the others. The Jews complain when Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea.” But Palestinians are correct to perceive that the settlers are trying to do it, not just talk about it. Neither will succeed in its maximal ambitions. They are going to have to share the land. There is no reason they can’t do that. It will require wisdom, not slogans.
Why won’t Biden change American policy?
Where Arabs and Jews in America disagree is on US policy. Arabs are sorely disappointed in the President Biden’s unconditional support for Israel and say they won’t vote for him again. Jews like me point out that he has shifted towards support for a fighting pause, exchange of hostages/prisoners, and support for a two-state solution, even though he hasn’t diminished his support for Israel’s right to defend itself or conditioned aid on Israeli behavior.
Much of the Administration and many Jews seem ready to go further, including Tony Blinken. The Secretary of State has said that the Jewish settlements on the West Bank are not consistent with international law. That is a big step in American politics, though the Administration has done nothing to reinforce the statement with actions.
Arab Americans are saying they won’t vote for Biden again. A significant number indicated their displeasure yesterday in the Michigan democratic primary by voting “uncommitted.” That was a smart move. It demonstrated political weight.
But it would be foolish for Arabs and Muslims in Michigan and elsewhere to carry through on the threat and not vote for Biden in November. His likely challenger, Donald Trump, would be far less likely to speak up for Palestinian rights than Biden is. Trump has always wanted increased Jewish support but never got it. Christian evangelicals, however, are vital to the Republican base today. Most of them don’t want to hear anything about the Palestinians. Trump has said little or nothing about Gaza so far. But when he does, Palestinians won’t want to hear it. Voting for Biden may be distasteful to Arab and Muslim Americans, but staying home or voting for Trump should be unthinkable.
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Gaza questions are easier than answers
The New York Times has already described how Netanyahu’s plan for postwar Gaza clashes with everyone else’s thinking. Netanyahu wants a full-fledged re-occupation of Gaza, complete with puppet Palestinian government there. He is already clearing a buffer zone inside the Gaza fence and wants to control the Egyptian/Gaza border as well. He imagines that UNRWA can be abolished. Israeli-selected local officials would manage an Israeli-imposed deradicalization process.
What is this really all about?
This is nothing but a formula to continue the Gaza conflict indefinitely. Netanyahu figures that as long as the war lasts he can delay his political downfall. So he is defying President Biden’s pitch for Palestinian Authority revitalization and takeover of Gaza, which would also be a difficult maneuver. Netanyahu has also repeatedly and forcefully ruled out a Palestinian state, which the US supports in principle. Israel and the US are not aligned, diplomats would say, except on Israel’s right of self-defense.
Inside Israel, Netanyahu’s policies are finding a good deal of support, even if he is still wildly unpopular. A lot of right-wing Israelis appear to be looking for revenge, not peace. While Gazans are suffering the horrors of indiscriminate and grossly disproportional attacks, Israel’s soldiers are celebrating the destruction of homes and mosques. Things will only get worse if the Israelis send ground forces into Rafah, where much of the Gaza population has taken refuge from attacks further north.
What is the alternative?
The diplomatic world is struggling to produce an alternative. That would apparently entail a longish pause in most of the fighting to permit a series of hostage exchanges. It is not a bad idea, but there are obvious limits. Hamas will not surrender all of the hostages, because once it does it fears Israel will restart the full-scaled assault on its cadres. But Israel won’t want to surrender all of its prisoners either, so perhaps there is a middle ground with some common interest. Hamas will be finding some of the hostages burdensome and Netanyahu is under political pressure to get some back.
If a pause and additional prisoner exchange does prove feasible, the Americans, Qataris, and Egyptians will want to use the occasion to try for a negotiated end to the war. That too is not a bad idea, but it is hard to see how they could get Netanyahu or Hamas to agree to it. It would either entail Israeli acceptance of a continued presence of Hamas in Gaza or Hamas agreeing to surrender. The former isn’t going to happen with Netanyahu and his rightwing allies in power. The latter isn’t going to happen without a more thorough military defeat than Hamas has suffered so far.
What if Netanyahu were no longer in power?
If Netanyahu and his coalition were to fall from power, other alternatives might emerge. A new Israeli government less committed to Jewish supremacy might conclude that the Netanyahu plan for postwar Gaza is nonsense. It might better understand that the war is creating chaotic conditions in Gaza that will be difficult to manage, never mind repair. Ever more radical groups could emerge and take over from Hamas. Or localized gangs and protection rackets could exploit the situation to establish drug and other smuggling operations.
Israel’s minimal goal in this war should include being at least as secure as it was before October 7. That will require local and international security forces, competent Palestinian governance, international humanitarian relief, Gulf economic assistance, and other inputs to stability that are already difficult to imagine. Continuing the war at this point is predictably counterproductive because it will make them more difficult, not easier.
But ending the war will require the Israelis to summon the political will and courage to get rid of Netanyahu sooner rather than later. That should now be President Biden’s top priority. Getting rid of the prime obstacle to peace is not optional. Continuing to cater to Netanyahu will only bring more grief to Israelis, Palestinians, and ultimately Biden himself.
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