Proactive would be better
Tehran is justifying its barrage of more than 300 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles fired at Israel last weekend as “proportional” to the provocation. That provocation was an Israeli attack on an Iranian consular facility in Damascus that killed high-ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Israel is justifying its 6-month attack on Gaza that has killed more than 30,000 Palestinians as proportional to its military objective. That is to destroy Hamas. Proportionality is obviously in the eye of the beholder
It shouldn’t be so
This is a serious limitation of the international regime. It sets up norms like proportionality but then leaves compliance to interested belligerents. Some Israelis will no doubt argue that proportionality requires a further response to the Iranian attack with more than 300 flying weapons. Assuming the Israelis are technically better and luckier in their targeting than the Iranians, an Israeli attack with even fewer could kill a lot of Iranians. Then the Iranians would want to kill just as many Israelis. The escalation ladder has no obvious limit.
The international system needs a better way of dealing with proportionality. It should not be left to belligerents to decide. Nor should a decision on proportionality come during court proceedings likely many years after the military action. We need norms, along with a way of convening a discussion of how to apply them to particular circumstances during a crisis.
It’s not only proportionality
Proportionality is today’s issue, but there are many others when it comes to military action and mass violence more generally. The UN has defined aggression, but like proportionality “aggression” may also be in the eye of the beholder. The Russian attack on Ukraine is aggression from President Zelensky’s perspective, but not from President Putin’s.
“Genocide” is likewise well-defined, but application of that definition to particular cases arouses a good deal of debate.
Ditto “responsibility to protect,” a UN General Assembly-endorsed doctrine. It requires states to protect their own civilian populations or risk international intervention that the Security Council authorizes.
The lawyerly approach to such issues is to rely on case law. Decisions in particular cases become precedents for future cases. But that process leaves a great deal of uncertainty and delay. What we need is a much more timely, even anticipatory process.
Proactive would be better
That is not impossible. The legal profession could provide mechanisms that provide guidelines and press belligerents to follow them even during a conflict. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is trying something of this sort with the Gaza conflict. It has responded with unusual speed to the South African complaint against Israel for violation of the genocide convention.
A less formal process might also work. The ICJ of necessity requires elaborate judicial proceedings. The Elders, a group of former world leaders already engaged on conflict issues, could become less reactive and more proactive. The UN’s International Law Commission could likewise take on this responsibility. The legal profession could also constitute an international nongovernmental group to advise on conflict issues before the shooting starts. Proactive would be better.
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The wider war has arrived, when will peace?
Iran yesterday retaliated against Israel for its bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which killed high ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The barrage of hundreds of drones and missiles was ineffective, due to Israeli, American, British, and Jordanian air defenses. The Iranians made no secret of what they intended to do and presumably are hoping it will not trigger another round.
Multiple vectors
But it is still reasonable to conclude that the wider Middle East war many have feared has already begun. Israel continues its attack on Gaza. Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel are exchanging shots across the border. Israel is frequently targeting Iranian assets in Syria. Yemen’s Houthis are targeting shipping and warships in the Red Sea. Iraq’s Iranian-sponsored “Popular Mobilization Forces” have been targeting American military bases. Israeli settlers have been chasing Palestinians from their homes on the West Bank.
Of course the pace and lethality of this wider war could heighten. So far, its most deadly axis by far has been Israel/Hamas. Hamas has killed about 1500 Israelis and the Israelis have killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, in retaliation for the mass murder, kidnapping, and mayhem of October 7. Elsewhere the wider war is more than symbolic, but still far less fatal.
Worsening prospects
Once such things start, the natural tendency is towards escalation. Certainly things have gotten worse in the past six months. They are likely to get worse still. The murder of an Israeli teenager on the West Bank last week sparked heightened settler violence against Palestinians there. Hizbollah could do a lot more damage if it unleashes its missiles. So could the Israelis if they decide to push into southern Lebanon. Iran still has lots of drones and missiles it could use in a second attack.
The next round will be Israel’s choice. It could choose to write off yesterday’s attack as ineffective and unworthy of response. Or it could decide to reassert deterrence with a direct attack on Iran or on Iranian assets in the region. I suspect the decision will be based primarily on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s domestic political calculations. He faces growing demands for his resignation. Any pause in the fighting could provide the time to bring him down. He is still hoping for enough of a victory in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran to enable him to remain in power.
That seems unlikely in Gaza. Israel has done significant harm to Hamas there but is still far from the total defeat Netanyahu has set as its war goal. Israel has been hitting Hizbollah in Lebanon without much reaction. That could be a likelier prospect. He may think a devastating blow against Iran would enable him to avoid the inevitable for a while longer. Why anyone in his war cabinet would go along with that is unclear to me, but so far they have generally supported his wartime decisions.
Can diplomacy work?
The still wider and more deadly war in prospect is not in the US interest. Nor do the Europeans want it. Karim Sadjadpour on MSNBC last night pointed out that the Chinese would likewise prefer stability in the Middle East to lower and steady oil prices. The Russians by contrast benefit from de-stabilization and the consequent distraction from the Ukraine war as well as the bump up in oil prices. But even acting together it is unclear that the Americans, Europeans, and Chinese could exert sufficient influence on Israel or Iran to de-escalate.
Both countries have leaders whose political mandates won’t last much longer. Iran’s Supreme Leader is almost 85 years old and ill. Netanyahu is suffering a catastrophic decline in popularity as well as serious corruption charges. Both are claiming not to want to escalate. But neither sees an enticing option other than escalation. Both want victory over the other as a political legacy. The wider war has arrived, but until there is decisively new leadership in both Tehran and Jerusalem peace is unlikely.
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A good lesson in diplomacy
Ten days with family in Rome have emboldened me to tell the tale of the Embassy’s Giambologna Venus:
She is the single most valuable piece in the State Department’s worldwide art collection. The story of her travels dates to my time as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge’ d’affaires ad interim 1990-93. She is now back at Embassy Rome, where I visited her week before last, courtesy of Ambassador Jack Markell.
All cooperation
Paul Richard told her backstory in the Washington Post 30 years ago. The Venus dates from 1583 and ended up in the State Department collection shortly after World War II. That was when the US government bought–I was told with post-war currency it printed itself–Palazzo Margherita, the imposing 19th century building on the via Veneto that still serves as the US embassy. The Venus was among the few art objects the hard-up dowager queen of the assassinated King Umberto I had not sold. Many of the rest are today in the Museums of the Villa Borghese and Palazzo Altemps.
The Venus stood for decades in a niche in the Ambassador’s grand staircase leading from the main, piano nobile (second floor in US numbering) to the courtyard. But sometime in late 1992 or early 1993 the State Department Under Secretary of State for Management called to say I should cooperate with the National Gallery of Art, which wanted to borrow the Venus for display in Washington. They would pay for her cleaning and restoration. The National Gallery had also arranged to display her at the Pitti Palace in Florence before she took up a couple of months residence on Constitution Avenue.
This all sounded fine to me. When National Gallery Director Caaarter Brown called, I was all cooperation.
Things fall apart
In the succeeding months, the cleaning and restoration went well. I enjoyed visiting the restorers, who worked in a cordoned off corner of the embassy courtyard. But other things started to come apart.
For reasons never explained to me, the Pitti Palace canceled its display of the Venus. This concerned me. I knew there would be a public controversy if she went to Washington without public display in Italy, where she had not been seen for more than 350 years. So I took advantage of my wife’s connection to the Director of the Capitoline Museums. She quickly arranged to display the Venus in the Sala degli Orazi e Curiazi. Its frescoes date, like the Venus, to the late 16th century.
While she was there, I awoke to news that terrorists had exploded a bomb in a parking lot outside this very Sala. I imagined the Venus in pieces, along with my diplomatic career. But she and I were both intact. The bomb had only broken a few windows.
Still more trouble
Then things got dicier. A rumor reached me–again through my art historian/museum curator wife–that the National Gallery was not planning to return the Venus to Embassy Rome. It belonged, the curators there thought, to the American people, which meant the National Gallery. Why should she hide in the niche above the Ambassador’s staircase?
This presented a classic diplomatic quandary. I had instructions to do something–cooperate with the National Gallery. But that could lead to a result I didn’t want–the loss of the most valuable piece in the State Department’s collection. How was I to do as instructed without sacrificing my employer’s interests? I could have passed the issue back to the State Department. But what if State decided to give away the Venus? My Ambassador wasn’t going to like that.
The National Gallery’s interests were also at risk, whether they knew it or not. The Italians had refused for many years to loan art to New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art. The Met would not return an ancient Greek “krater” stolen from a Sicilian archeological dig. I could barely get an Italian to accept a lunch invitation to meet the President of the Met during those years.
Trust but verify
For the Venus, the Italians were the answer. I rang up the Director General for Cultural Affairs at the Foreign Ministry to discuss her export to the US. He assured me there would be no problem. The committee charged with considering such exports would approve this one quickly without question. “We trust you” he said.
I had to tell him twice that he might trust me, but I still needed a formal bilateral agreement pledging the return of the Venus to Rome. He got the message the second time around. So we exchanged Notes Verbales committing the US Government to return the Giambologna Venus to Italy.
Codas
Off she went to the National Gallery, where about 185,000 people saw her. They held a big, flashy opening but forgot to invite anyone from Embassy Rome. Having just transferred to DC, I rang up Rusty Powell, who had replaced Caaarter Brown as Director. I suggested he could repair this faux pas by giving me and my wife a personal tour of the Venus on display. He graciously did that, accompanying us to see her before opening hours.
Then a few years later I met a National Gallery curator at a friend’s house. She had been involved in the Venus loan and confirmed that the National Gallery had not intended to return it to Embassy Rome. I was pleased to recount how I had prevented that maneuver.
It really is a good lesson in diplomacy: anticipate trouble, try to prevent it, and get lucky.
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Equality is for everyone
This week I joined dozens of colleagues in signing this letter to President Biden about Gaza. I suppose some would say it reflects the herd mentality of the Washington foreign policy establishment. I prefer to think it reflects a judicious appraisal of a bad situation likely to worsen if Israel continues its large-scale assault at Rafah.
That said, let me offer a speculation or two.
Elite Arab attitudes have changed
Arab sympathies are predominantly with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. That has not and will not change. But it is all the more striking that consultations between the US and key Arab states have continued despite Israeli abuses in Gaza and the West Bank. It seems to me clear that Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and others want to be seen as supporting the Palestinians but welcome the damage the Israelis are doing to Hamas. They may doubt the feasibility of completely destroying Hamas’ military capabilities. But there is no talk of an oil boycott or other escalation.
To the contrary, the Saudis have made it clear they want to pursue normalization with Israel once conditions permit. Discussion of that option is continuing even during the Gaza war. It is now half a dozen years since I met Israelis carrying lots of electronics in the Riyadh business class lounge. They were likely helping with internal security in the Kingdom. The Saudis also want a defense agreement and civilian nuclear cooperation with the US. That’s what “normalization” is really about.
Nor are the Arab states expressing any sympathy for wiping Israel off the map. That may still be a day dream in the Arab street, but only Iran, Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis–the axis of resistance–are really backing “from the river to the sea.” I have no doubt but that some of them are serious. But it isn’t happening. Iran is in economic crisis and political ennui, Hizbollah is trying not to get into all-out war with Israel, and Hamas is hiding underground. Only the Houthis are flexing their capabilities, which are however limited for now in their reach and impact to shipping in the Red Sea.
The Israelis are doing from the river to the sea
The Israeli settlers on the West Bank, who object to Arabs saying “from the river to the sea,” are doing it. They are on a killing and displacement spree, taking advantage of the Netanyahu government’s tolerance for violence against Palestinians. The displacement so far is not massive. Things could get a lot worse. Certainly that is the settlers’ intention. They get ample support from more Orthodox Jewish communities in the US, but their really important political backing extends as well to some American Christian evangelicals.
The Biden Administration has begun to react. It has started to sanction Israeli settlers who perpetrate violence on the West Bank against Palestinians. But the Administration needs to do much more, focusing on the political leadership that condones such abuse as well as the American Jewish and Christian networks that support and finance it. Terrorism is terrorism. Blocking American financing for violent settlers should be a priority.
American Jewish attitudes are changing too
The settlers claim religious justification for their claims to what they call “Judea and Samaria.” But liberal American Jews couldn’t care less about that. And most American Jews are more liberal, if I can use that term to encompass nonpracticing as well as Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative Jews. They have generally supported the idea of a Jewish homeland. But one that is more secular than religious and treats its Arab citizens as equals and Arab neighbors with respect. You’ll find some of the people who signed the above letter in this category.
Let me speak though only for myself. I want to see an end to warfare between Jews and Arabs. That will only be possible with mutual respect for Palestinian and Jewish rights, whether in one state or two. I still think two is more feasible than one. But admittedly two become more difficult with the extension of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. That is one of many reasons they should be stopped and rolled back.
Also critical is treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel, as many of what we used to call Israeli Arabs today prefer to be called. They constitute more than 20% of the country’s population. Equality for them is vital to Israel’s claim to be a democratic state and a free society. But you don’t have to look far to find ample evidence that the reality is far from the ideal. Separate but equal never worked in the US. It won’t work in Israel either. It is high time for Israeli practice to rise to the level of Jewish ideals. Human dignityt and therefore equality is for everyone.
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Double down on success, not failure
The US Ambassador in Belgrade has vaunted cooperation with the Serbian Army even as the President of Serbia makes clear his intention to invade Kosovo at a time of his choosing. How can both be true?
No big puzzle
It’s really not hard to figure this out. Serbia cooperates with US and NATO exercises for two reasons. First, they provide good training, which the Russians are unable to equal. The performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine has improved, but its losses are simply colossal. No one would want to emulate them. Second, NATO exercises provide excellent opportunities to gather intelligence. That will serve well in any Serbian military action against NATO-led forces in Kosovo. Belgrade no doubt also feeds that intelligence back to Moscow.
Only marginally harder to understand is the reference to the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as the KLA (or Kosovo Liberation Army). The KLA was demobilized after the 1999 war. The KSF that exists today is the creation of US and British training and equipping several generations of organization and personnel removed from the KLA. The US Ambassador in Belgrade knows that perfectly well. His reference to the KLA is intended to signal that he agrees with the Serbian government that the KSF is illegitimate.
Toadying hasn’t worked
This toadying to Vucic has become the default behavior in Belgrade. The question is why it is tolerated in Washington. I suppose there are reasons. But they are unlikely to be good ones. No amount of lickspittle will change Belgrade’s decision to align with Russia. Vucic has made clear that he intends to try to take back a piece of Kosovo whenever he gets an opportunity. Any agreement in Ukraine to surrender territory to Russia will provide that opportunity.
Washington needs to reconsider its long effort to court Vucic. That effort has failed. It has also encouraged his irredentist ambitions, not only in Kosovo but also in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “Serbian world” he aims for is strictly analogous to the “Russian world” President Putin is trying to create in Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and most ambitiously Ukraine. The West should be countering Russian and Serbian ethnoterritorial ambitions, not encouraging them. Instead, Washington is doubling down on a policy that has failed to produce anything more than minor results.
A better policy would not be hard to find
A re-evaluation is long overdue. The current Trumpian affection for ethnonationalism and irredentism is inconsistent with the liberal democratic pretensions of the Biden Administration. Tony Blinken, bless is hard-traveling body and no doubt preoccupied mind, needs to say to State Department Assistant Secretary Jim O’Brien: we have failed to get Vucic on side. Let’s try tough love.
That would mean reading him the riot act on many things. First would be prioritizing justice, preferably in Kosovo, for the organizers and perpetrators of the September 24 terrorist incident that Belgrade sponsored inside Kosovo. Second would be ensuring that Pristina gets the support it requires not only for membership in the Council of Europe and relief from outdated and counterproductive EU “consequences” but also for opening of negotiations on NATO membership. Third would be readiness to denounce any cheating in preparation for the upcoming rerun of Belgrade elections.
I could go on, but you get the point. US policy needs to return to favoring its friends in the Balkans and countering its enemies. That should not be too hard to do. Double down on success, not failure.
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C+ is not a good grade
C+ is what I would give as a grade for implementation of the year-old “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia.” Koha asked for an interview on this subject but then did not call at the appointed time. So I wrote this piece instead. It’s a B or B+ for Pristina and a C for Belgrade.
Let’s break it down article by article:
Good neighborly relations:
Certainly not in general, but there has been some limited progress on mutual recognition of their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. Pristina was never the problem. Belgrade has moved on this. B or B+ I guess.
Respect for the UN Charter:
Serbia fails (that’s an F) miserably on respect for “the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity.” Kosovo gets a B+, marked down due to continued shortcomings in protection of human rights and non-discrimination. Things are improving in those departments, but problems remain.
Peaceful settlement of disputes:
Serbia fails (F) on settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refraining from the threat or use of force. Belgrade sponsored the September 24 attempted uprising intended to create a pretext for the use of force, which it threatened by mobilizing its forces on Kosovo’s borders. Belgrade had also already kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory and organized a mob that attacked NATO-led peacekeepers. Kosovo has no real option for use of force, but nevertheless gets an A for the police handling of the September 24 incident.
International representation:
Serbia (D) continues to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Kosovo (A) has not to my knowledge objected to Serbia’s membership in them.
EU path:
Serbia (D) is no longer in transition to democracy and does not align with EU foreign policy, especially but not only on Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo (B+) is moving in the right direction on democracy and does respect EU foreign policy.
Dialogue process:
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina is much engaged, the former because it objects to the basic premises and the latter because it has gotten little benefit. C+ for both.
Treatment of the Serbian community in Kosovo:
Kosovo has conceded little on “self-management” but is resolving one important issue concerning Serbian Orthodox Church property at Decan/i. Pristina has muddied the waters on financial support from Belgrade by insisting on use of the euro but there is really no bar to direct communication for the Serbian community with the Kosovo government. B for Pristina, but no better than a C+ for Belgrade, which insists on violating Kosovo law in transferring finances opaquely and in dinars.
EU and others’ support package:
I really don’t know. Has it been created? Is anything happening on this front?
Joint Committee on implementation:
Is this just the Dialogue writ small, or has such a thing been created?
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