The Kosovo Serbs need a hug
Kosovo is a young country, born from repression of Albanian peaceful protest and subsequent/consequent armed rebellion against Serbia. American-led NATO intervention made its travails shorter and less deadly than those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has also made Kosovo perhaps the most pro-American, pro-EU country on earth.
But it is suffering a period of estrangement from both the US and EU. I first met its current prime minister, Albin Kurti, when he was a university student. He was working with Adem Demaci, who did not advocate Kosovo independence but rather a Balkan confederation. That would have included Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. Albin in the past has advocated union with Albania. Day dreams of the past.
Today Albin is a vigorous advocate of Kosovo independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. I would even describe him as a “sovereigntist,” meaning that he prioritizes Kosovo behaving like a sovereign state, despite its lack of universal recognition and UN membership. He often seems unconcerned with the consequences.
What Albin wants
Many Kosovo Serbs still regard themselves as citizens of Serbia and do not want to acknowledge the Kosovo state, especially those who live in its northern municipalities. Those four are contiguous with Serbia and have Serb majorities. Albin insists the Kosovo Serbs use Kosovo license plates and pay their Kosovo electricity bills. He contests Serbia’s still dominant institutions in the north, the presence of Serb security forces there, the organized crime networks that Belgrade exploits, and Belgrade’s control there of education and health services.
He also wants to see transparency and accountability for the resources that flow from Belgrade to Serb majority municipalities throughout Kosovo. That is one reason the Central Bank is saying it will enforce the law requiring transactions in Kosovo in the legal currency (the euro). The police have confiscated cash and records of Serbian government shipments to Serbs in Kosovo.
Frictions
All this puts Albin at odds not only with many Kosovo Serbs but also with the Europeans and Americans. They worry about keeping Belgrade on side and stability in Kosovo. That means preferring the ad hoc arrangements that have allowed Serbs there, especially in the north, to live as if they are in Serbia. Albin’s inclination to act without consulting Brussels and Washington aggravates the situation. The Americans and Europeans aren’t used to a Kosovo leader who acts as if his country really is sovereign. They may or may not doubt the wisdom of insisting on euros for transactions, but in any event they want to be consulted and discuss the issues before implementation.
That may sound reasonable. But from Albin’s perspective, it is just as much an infringement on Kosovo sovereignty as the transactions in euros. A sovereigntist won’t want to comply, especially if his unilateralism garners popular support. That it does in Kosovo, which is far more democratic than Serbia has ever been. American diplomats can be certain that if they displace Albin again, as they did during the Trump Administration, that he will be back after the next elections with an even stronger mandate.
Winning hearts and minds
All this argues for a much better understanding of why the Kosovo Serbs are important to Kosovo and what can be done to win over those who are still resisting. Modern statehood in a democracy depends on popular support. The American constitution’s first three words say it well: “we the people.” There are not a lot of Serbs left in Kosovo–perhaps less than 6% of the population, as Kurti claims. But they are a key factor in Kosovo statehood.
They and their church and culture are a distinct characteristic of Kosovo that distinguishes it from Albania. Their attachment to Belgrade is a clear threat to Kosovo security. The Serbs have an outsized impact on Kosovo’s sovereignty and potentially its territorial integrity. Without their loyalty, Kosovo statehood will always be under threat.
Winning them over sounds like an impossible task, but it is not. The euro is a far better currency than the Serbian dinar, even if the latter is pegged to the former. Any reasonable person would much rather be using and receiving a currency managed from Brussels and accepted throughout the EU.
The Belgrade-inspired mass resignation of Serb judges, prosecutors, and administrative staff from their jobs and continuing boycott has seriously damaged the judicial system in northern Kosovo, to the detriment of the Serbs and others who live there. The Belgrade-instigated boycott of municipal elections in April 2023 was likewise damaging to Serbs, not Albanians.
Serbia’s security officials and organized crime gangs Belgrade directs impose indignities on Serbs in the north every day. Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force face intimidation and violence, not just targeted against themselves but also of their families.
Making peace
Much of the Serb population south of the Ibar River has made its peace with Pristina. They don’t love it. But many tolerate it and some are coming to appreciate at least its largesse if not its sovereignty.
Protection of the Serb church and private property is particularly important. Most of the important religious sites are in the south. The refusal so far of the Pristina authorities to implement a 2016 decision on the Decan/i monastery property has damaged their credibility in the Serb community. A unilateral decision to proceed would give Pristina an important patch of moral high ground to stand on.
But Kurti needs to go further. His government should work as closely as possible with the northern communities to win their acceptance and eventual loyalty. He has good cards to play. The Kosvo Serbs need a hug. Give it to them.
Serbia is the problem, Serbs the solution
Where did they get this nice photo in my living room?
I did this interview for Arlinda Rrmoku of Pristina outlet Sinjali yesterday:
Dialogue
1. What progress has been made towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in recent years?
A: Very little. Acceptance of documents and license plates. Payment of electricity bills. Good things that should have happened long ago.
2. What are the main obstacles hindering the normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The main obstacle is Serbia’s resistance. But Kosovo has also failed to do all it could to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, which is a vital part of normalization.
3. How do you assess the role of the European Union in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The EU has failed to use its leverage with Serbia. It has used leverage with Kosovo, but inappropriately and without results.
Politics are an obstacle
4. What impact could the recent political changes in Kosovo and Serbia have on the normalization process?
A: Not much. In Serbia, Vucic remains very much in charge. In Kosovo Kurti and Osmani remain in charge.
Washington has been too
5. How do you see the role of the United States in promoting stability and peace in the Western Balkans, particularly regarding Kosovo-Serbia relations?
A: Washington has done poorly in recent years. It was a serious mistake to prioritize the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which in my view can only come with recognition.
6. What steps should be taken to address the remaining issues in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, such as the status of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo?
A: Pristina should be taking unilateral action to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, as indicated above. This will require much greater effort to meet their needs, allow Serbia’s legitimate subsidies to flow, and protect their property, in particular at the monastery in Decan/Decani.
As is Russia
7. How do you view the involvement of other regional actors, such as Russia and Turkey, in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process?
A: They don’t really play directly, but Russia is supporting Vucic’s illiberalism at home and irredentism with his neighbors. Turkey I see as a relatively minor player, though it occasionally will weigh in.
8. What are the potential implications of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on the broader stability of the Western Balkans?
Security is at risk
A: The dialogue as conducted in recent years has not been a factor for stability. Its difficulties have echoed in the region.
9. How can economic cooperation and integration initiatives contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I believe it can: having populations and companies that prosper could lessen hostilities and open new possibilities. But Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo makes this difficult.
10. How do you assess the security situation in the Western Balkans, particularly in light of recent developments?
A: It’s shaky, due mainly to Serbian malfeasance.
11. What are the main security challenges facing the region and how can they be addressed?
A: Serbia and Russia are the main security challenges in the region.
12. How do you see the role of NATO and other international organizations in ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans?
A: NATO is the guarantor in Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as well as the backup guarantor to the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That makes it pretty important to the region. The EU has the primary role in Bosnia.
13. What impact could unresolved disputes and ethnic tensions have on the security situation in the region?
A: I don’t worry about a big war or a long one, but localized instability and ethnic cleansing is a serious threat in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
Borders need improvement
14. How do you assess the effectiveness of border management and security cooperation among Western Balkan countries?
A: More would be better. Trade delays at the borders are too long, migration and trafficking too easy, and the border between Serbia and Kosovo too porous.
15. What role can the European Union play in promoting security sector reform and institution-building in the Western Balkans?
A: You’ll have to ask the EU, but my understanding is that the EU does a great deal on border management.
16. How do you see the potential for increased cooperation between Western Balkan countries and neighboring EU member states in addressing common security challenges?
A: I’d like to see more, especially between Croatia and Bosnia as well as Bulgaria and Macedonia, but political issues make that sometimes problematic.
Reciprocal reassurance is key
17. What are your recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to promote peace, stability, and reconciliation in the Western Balkans, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Kosovo needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb population, Serbia needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Albanian population, and the two countries need to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. When they do those things, peace, stability and reconciliation will be far easier than today.
Stevenson’s army, February 11
– Opposition wins in Pakistan.
– Senate resumes voting today on foreign aid package
– WSJ reports Hamas tunnels beneath UNRWA HQ
– Egypt threatens end of Camp David accords
– WaPo has background on Abraham Accords
– Venezuela builds troops on Guyana border
– Trump questions NATO treaty, encourages Putin
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My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, February 9
– Zelensky fired his top general. Eliot Cohen seems sympathetic to Zelensky
– Senate may miss Super Bowl for foreign aid fight
– Russia spreads disinformation in Africa
– Russia messages US civil war
– Biden stresses international law from aid recipients
– Army cancels helicopter program
– Europeans tell how to Trump-proof Europe
– Treasury sanctions some Ecuadorans
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Time to turn the policy around
There is no exaggeration in what Albin is saying. President Vucic financed, supported, and orchestrated the terrorist attack of September 24. The Kosovo police the EU wanted (and continues to want) withdrawn from northern Kosovo responded professionally, killed three of the perpetrators, and prevented worse from happening. Washington and Brussels know this but won’t say it. They prefer to allow Vucic to get off scot-free.
They are likewise allowing him to avoid responsibility for the unfair national and fraudulent Belgrade elections of December 27. The European Parliament has called for a commission to investigate. But so far the European Commission, the Council, and most of the Member States are keeping their mouths shut about an election that wouldn’t pass muster in any EU country. It didn’t come close to the relatively free and fair elections in recent years in Kosovo, including two that installed Kurti in office.
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil
Why this “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” approach to someone who is taking an EU candidate country into ever closer alignment with Russia and China? Many tell me the ammunition Serbia supplies to Ukraine is a factor. But Belgrade surely ships as much ordnance or other military supplies to Moscow as it does to Kyiv. It is unlikely Vucic would cut off Kyiv out of spite for Western criticism. Inat only goes so far when it is a question of profits for your arms manufacturer friends.
Support for “stability” is another possible explanation. But Vucic has no viable opposition, either on the liberal democratic side of Serbian politics or the ethnic nationalist side. Serbia’s problem is a lack of political competition, not an excess of it. He is the destabilizing force both in his country’s politics and in its relations with its neighbors.
The internationals are part of the problem
Lack of international political horsepower is another explanation. EU negotiator Miroslav Lajcak is exhausted and at the end of his rope. The dialogue he has led for more than three and a half years has played out. Belgrade has repeatedly and loudly renounced supposed “legally binding” agreements reached there. Yesterday he refused to sign them at the Security Council. Without real progress on de facto if not de jure recognition, Pristina refuses to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities that Lajcak and American negotiator Gabe Escobar unwisely made their top priority.
Many hope things will improve with Assistant Secretary of State O’Brien in charge. He has been appropriately blunt with the Bosnians. But it is not clear whether he is prepared to dial up the heat on Vucic about the Serbian elections, the dialogue with Pristina, Belgrade’s September 24 terrorist attack, or the kidnapping of three policemen on Kosovo territory. Jim recognizes the difficulty of any political settlement and tries to steer his efforts in the economic direction, hoping to flank the recognition issue.
So who cares?
None of this is a big problem, at least as seen from Washington or Brussels. But it isn’t a big problem until it is. Vucic is increasingly serious in his efforts to destabilize the neighboring countries with irredentist and self-victimizing claims on behalf of their Serb populations. The Russians will be pushing him in that direction, to echo and amplify their own claims in Ukraine. The atmosphere in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo is increasingly tense. It would not take much effort to provoke instability even in all three, then justify the movement of Serbian tanks to protect the local Serb population from false rumors of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Even without revanchist moves into his neighbors, Vucic can exploit the Serbian domestic scene to promote violence. His security forces have been arresting and beating dissenters who dare to apologize for Serb atrocities in the 1990s. They have even lain flowers on the grave of a young girl killed by Serb security forces in Kosovo. The repression intimidates the Serbian opposition and ensures it will not retreat from hard-line Serbian nationalism on Kosovo. It is admittedly inclined not to do so anyway, but Vucic wants to make sure no one gets any fancy ideas about acknowledging the malfeasance of the Milosevic era. As Information Minister then, he was a mainstay of that regime.
What is to be done?
The right approach to this situation is to recognize failure and turn the policy around. I thought when he first came to power Vucic might be the guy to take Serbia in a democratic direction. He has chosen not to be. He instead decided not to befriend the West but rather to ally with the East. He dishes out just enough goodies to Washington and Brussels to keep them from calling his bluff. It doesn’t take much.
It is time to call him out, loudly and clearly. The US should insist on the transfer of the September 24 perpetrators to Kosovo for trial. As the European Parliament has proposed, the EU should stop its ample financing of Serbian efforts to prepare for accession until new elections are held, at least in Belgrade. The dialogue should be refocused on the economic issues O’Brien prefers. The EU and US should call out high-level corruption in Belgrade. The EU should lift the “consequences” it levied on Kosovo and acknowledge Pristina’s anti-corruption efforts. That would be a Balkans policy worthy of President Biden’s claims to supporting democracy.
Stevenson’s army, February 8
– From Netanyahu
– From Senate GOP
– From House GOP
– From Cong. McCaul on Derek Chollet
– Ukraine worries, says NYT
– WaPo sees troop shortage in Ukraine
– Politico tells where money would go
– CBO says deficit is shrinking
– NYT updates us on Ecuador
– Ian Bremmer says Chancellor Scholz is “toast”
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).