For now, Netanyahu is succeeding
Israel’s air force is destroying Syria’s navy, weapons manufacturing sites, chemical and other weapons depots. It is undertaking hundreds of sorties per day. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) has also seized control of the UN buffer zone on the Golan Heights. That was created in a 1974 agreement.
Location, location, location
None of this should be surprising. Syria for the moment can’t defend itself. Its longtime enemy is trying to weaken it further. Among many other advantages, Israel now occupies the peak of Mount Hermon. That has unimpeded electronic visibility over a good part of Syria, including the capital, and Lebanon. This is valuable real estate.
The Israelis can do this because the Syrian Arab Army has disintegrated and the Russians are not preventing it. While Assad was in power, Israel raided Syrian sites, but only with a wink and a nod from Moscow. Now it is unclear whether Moscow has no objection or is simply unwilling or unable to object. Syrian and Russian air defenses have not reacted to the Israeli attacks.
The American position
Former President Trump formally proclaimed in 2019 that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights as “part of Israel.” The Biden administration upheld that policy with a 2021 tweet. It is hard to picture Trump in a second term reversing it. He has signaled, not least with appointment of an evangelical Christian as ambassador, that he will back Israel. Even more than Biden did.
That does not necessarily mean the United States will want Israel to hold on to the UN buffer zone. But Netanyahu will no doubt press Trump hard on that issue. In the past, Trump has given the Israeli Prime Minister pretty much everything he has asked.
The new Syrian government has its hands full
Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has named Mohammed al Bashir as interim prime minister until March 1. He was the head of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). That is the government HTS empowered for several years in the territory it controlled in the northwest province of Idlib. Al Bashir and SSG officials have met with President Assad’s outgoing officials to arrange the transfer of responsibilities. This is far more orderly than one might have anticipated. Let’s hope it can continue that way. Syria’s economy and population need relief. Those are for now top priorities.
But no Syrian leader will fail eventually to claim all of the Golan Heights. Some HTS fighters have declared their next objective is Jerusalem. Their leader’s nom de guerre is Abu Mohammed al Jolani (more or less father of Mohammed of Golan). Least of all one whose parents came from there. Al Jolani’s father was an Arab nationalist and supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Al Jolani himself says the second intifada radicalized him. Netanyahu will no doubt be hearing from him in due course.
But al Jolani has his hands full for the moment. Turkish-backed forces are attacking US-backed Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Al Jolani wants the Kurds to support the new regime. Turkiye President Erdogan, an important HTS backer, wants them pushed away from the Turkish border and east of the Eurphrates. That’s east of Manbij on the map below. The Turkish/Kurdish conflict could explode and weaken the unified effort HTS has tried to construct.
The broader picture
Syria would be weak in the present situation even if the Israelis weren’t contributing to its travail. But Netanyahu’s policy is to burn down his neighbors’ houses. He has done it in Gaza, Lebanon, and now Syria. He would no doubt like to do the same in Yemen. Jordan is already a client state, as the monarchy owes its continued existence to Israeli security cooperation. Egypt is likewise neutralized, even if uncomfortable with Israel’s behavior in Gaza. Netanyahu’s aim is a regionally hegemonic Greater Israel. He wants full control over the West Bank and Gaza and cowed enemies in Lebanon and Syria. For now, he is succeeding.
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The fight for justice in a post-Assad Syria
Colleagues at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) have posted this statement welcoming the fall of the Assad regime and looking ahead to a just outcome:
Thirteen years ago, SJAC began preparing for the day after the fall of the Assad government, with the steadfast belief that Syrians would someday have an opportunity to pursue meaningful justice and accountability for the crimes committed against them and to build a state that respects the rights of all Syrians.
Over the past decade, our team in Syria and across the diaspora have collected over two million pieces of documentation of the conflict, conducted extensive investigations of international crimes, and laid the groundwork for comprehensive missing persons investigations. Now, at the start of the first week of a post-Assad Syria, our work has just begun.
In the coming weeks, SJAC’s team will be focused on collecting and preserving at-risk documentation from previously inaccessible, government-controlled areas while ensuring that Syrians have access to clear, impartial sources of information on the immediate justice challenges that will arise in the coming days. As the situation on the ground stabilizes, our team looks forward to working alongside Syrians from across the country to begin to design a meaningful transitional justice process.
While SJAC has long supported Syrian-led justice, the dream of a stable and peaceful Syria can only be achieved with the support of the international community. Over the past decade, as the conflict stalled, many states have withdrawn support for human rights and humanitarian efforts in Syria, while simultaneously disengaging in the peace process. Now, with the dream of a stable and peaceful Syrian at hand, we ask that the international community re-engage in Syria, both through robust funding for reconstruction and justice processes, as well as through political engagement.
As the political makeup of a post-Assad Syria evolves, the international community should reconsider sanctions and reassess Hayat Tahrir Al Sham’s designation as a terrorist organization. In a time of uncertainty, we also ask that host countries continue to provide safe asylum to Syrians around the globe. Syrians themselves will be best placed to assess when it is safe to return.
The future may be uncertain, but the SJAC team is excited to have the opportunity to work for justice and accountability in a post-Assad Syria.
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Winners and losers from Assad’s fall
The success of Syrians in deposing Bashar al Assad poses the question of who wins and who loses. Inside Syria, Hayat Tahrir al Sham is the big winner for now. It led the breakout from Idlib and inspired the many risings elsewhere in Syria.
There are lots of other countries that stand to win or lose something in the transition. Let’s assume Syria remains reasonably stable and its government basically inclusive and not vindictive, which appears to be HTS’ intention. We can try to guess the pluses and minuses for the rest of the world.
Turkiye is the big winner
In the region, Turkiye is the big winner. President Erdogan had been ready to negotiate with Assad, who refused to engage. Erdogan lost patience and backed a military outcome. He unleashed both Turkish proxies and HTS, which could not have armed and equipped itself adequately without Ankara’s cooperation. He does not control HTS 100%, especially now that it is in Damascus. But he will have a good deal of influence over its behavior. Let’s hope he uses it in the democratic and less religious direction. That however is the opposite of what he has been doing at home.
Erdogan has two primary goals in Syria. First is achieving enough stability there to allow many of the three million Syrian refugees in Turkiye to return. Returns will take time, but there is already a spontaneous flow back into Syria. The second is keeping the Syrian Kurds associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) away from Turkiye’s border with Syria. Erdogan would also like its Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) dissolved. Or at least as far from power as possible.
Refugee returns look like a good bet. Disempowering the Kurds in eastern and northern Syria does not. They are well-established and cooperate closely with US forces in that area. Future President Trump will want to withdraw the Americans. But the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces will remain essential to fighting the Islamic State (IS). HTS, IS, and the PKK all carry the “terrorist” label in the US and Europe. But HTS and IS are rivals. HTS will want the Kurds to continue to fight IS. They will also be vital, at least temporarily, to preventing Iran from re-establishing a land route through Syria to Lebanon.
Israel wins and loses
The Israeli government would have preferred to see the Assad devil it knew stay in power. But his fall means the Iranians and their proxies will no longer be stationed along the northeastern border of Israel. The Israelis have already moved their troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone inside Syria. They didn’t want some known or unknown force filling that vacuum. That advance might give them a stronger position in future negotiations with Damascus, whenever those occur.
But Israelis have to be worried that a jihadist group led the overthrow of Assad. Ahmed al Sharaa, the birth name of HTS’s Abu Mohammed al Jolani, was born in Riyadh to Syrian parents. They were displaced from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The second Palestinian intifada motivated his conversion to jihad. It is hard to picture someone with that background more pliable than the impacable Assad on border and Palestinian issues. Jolani himself appears to have said little about Gaza or the Lebanon war. But some of his followers are clear about where they want to go next:
Lebanon and Jordan
Lebanon and Jordan, two key neighbors of Syria, can hope to be winners from the change of regime . Both will want to see Syrian refugees return home, as they were a strain on their economies. They will also stand to gain from reconstruction and eventually a more prosperous Syria.
Assad had been financing his government and his cronies with proceeds from the export of the stimulant Captagon. Decent people in both Beirut and Amman will welcome relief from that flood of poison into and through their societies. Some of their corrupted politicians may regret it.
Lebanon will have to reabsorb Hezbollah fighters who supported Assad. They will be a defeated and unhappy lot. But the Lebanese Army and state stand to gain from any weakening and demoralization of Hezbollah. Anyone serious in Beirut should see the current situation as an opportunity to strengthen both.
Iran and Russia are the biggest losers
Apart from Assad, Tehran and Moscow are the biggest losers. They backed Assad with people, force, money, and diplomacy. They are now thoroughly discredited.
Iran has already evacuated its personnel from Syria. Tehran has lost not only its best ally but also its land route to Lebanon.
Russia still has its bases. Almost any future Syrian government will have a hard time seeing what it gains from the Russian air force presence. Moscow’s air force brutalized Syrian civilians for almost 10 years. The air bases will no longer have utility even to Moscow. Moscow will prioritize keeping the naval base at Tartus, which is important for its Mediterranean operations.
The Gulf gains, Iraq loses
Gulf diplomacy was trying to normalize relations with Assad in the past year or two. But few Gulfies will mourn his regime, provided stability is maintained. Qatar may be more pleased than Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi. The Saudis and Emiratis are less tolerant of political Islam. Nor do they like to see regimes fall. Qatar is more comfortable with political change, including of the Islamist variety.
Iraq’s Shia-dominated government loses a companion in Damascus. It won’t welcome a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus. But Baghdad, like the Gulf, is unlikely to mourn the fall of Assad. He did his damnedest to make life difficult for Iraqis after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
The United States and Europe gain but will need to ante up
The US and Europe have long viewed Assad as a regrettable but necessary evil. They hesitated to bring him down for fear of what might come next. Now they need to step up and fund Syria’s recovery, mainly through the IMF and the World Bank. They will want Gulf money invested as well. The best way to get that is for them to ante up matching funds.
That is also the best way for them to gain leverage over the political settlement. If they want an inclusive outcome, they’ll need to be ready to pay for it. Hesitation could open the door to malicious influence.
Let the Syrians decide
That said, the details of the political settlement should be left to the Syrians. They will need to write a new constitution and eventually hold elections. The extensive constitutional discussions the UN has hosted for a decade may offer some enlightenment on what Syrians want. Just as important in my view is how the new powers that be handle property issues. Only if property rights are clearly established and protected can Syria’s economy revive. But who rightfully owns what and what to do about destroyed property are complicated and difficult issues.
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Will Syria stay together or fragment?
One of the threats to Syria now that Assad has fallen is fragmentation. In my experience, all Syrians say they want to preserve the country and its borders. But the conflicts among them and with neighboring countries can foil that goal and lead to partition.
The pieces of the puzzle
Syria’s population is mixed. Ninety per cent of its population is Arab. The rest is mainly Kurdish and Turkmen. More than 70% of Syrians are Sunni Muslim. But there are also various denominations of Christians as well as Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, Shiites and others. Damascus was thoroughly mixed. Several concentrations of Kurds were found along the northern border with Turkey, along with Turkmen and Arabs. The Alawite “homeland” was in the western, Mediterranean provinces of Tartous and Latakis. But they were a plurality and not a majority there. More Sunnis have sought refuge there, as under Bashar al Assad, an Alawite, those provinces were relatively safe.
The war is superimposing on this hodge-podge an additional dimension: military control of territory. Hayat Tahrir al Sham, the leader of the uprising, will control much of Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. Turkey and its surrogates will control most of the northern border. They are trying to push Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) east of the Euphrates, an area the SDF already dominates. Other opposition forces will be in charge of the south and the Jordanian border. The Druze have long maintained their insular community in Suwayda. It is unclear who will dominate Damascus. The southerners are arriving there first, but it is hard to picture HTS settling for second fiddle there.
There are no clear pre-existing regional lines along which Syria might fragment, except for the provincial boundaries. But those do not generally correspond to ethnic or religious divisions. The pieces of the puzzle do not fit together. They overlap and melt into each other.
The divisive forces
That would be a good reason to avoid fragmentation. Homogenization of ethnic groups on specific territory would require an enormous amount of ethnic “cleansing.” Ordinary Syrians don’t want that. But there will be forces at work that might make it happen.
The Turkmen/Kurdish conflict has already removed a lot of Kurds from Afrin in the northwest and border areas farther east. Ankara backs the Turkmen and wants to prevent Kurdish access to Türkiye. This is because the Syrian Kurds have supported Kurdish rebels inside Türkiye. The Kurds have built their own governing institutions in eastern Syria. They might seek independence if they get an unsatisfactory political outcome at the end of the war.
The Alawites of Tartous and Latakia are dreading revenge from the rest of Syria for mistreatment under the Assad dictatorship. They could try to set up their own statelet, perhaps even attaching it to Lebanon. They could also try to chase the Sunni Arab population out, while importing as many Alawites as possible from Damascus. Many there served the Assad regime and will want out.
The unifying forces
Syria’s neighbors won’t want a breakup. Türkiye has the most clout because of its presence in Syria and support for HTS. Ankara will oppose even autonomy for the Kurds. Jordan and Iraq have less clout, but they won’t want fragmentation either. Nor will Russia and Iran, which supported Assad and are big losers due to his fall. Ditto Israel and the United States, which would fear radicalization of any rump Syria if its Kurds or Alawites secede. Israel doesn’t want a jihadist entity on its northern border.
HTS and other opposition forces will also resist fragmentation. They want to govern all of Syria, not a part of it. HTS has moderated its attitude toward non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslims. It has also tried to minimize revenge and has emphasized continuity of the Syrian state. But HTS is an authoritarian movement, not a democratic one. It remains to be seen how it will behave in practice.
The obvious solutions
The obvious solution is decentralization. Devolving authority to provincial and municipal institutions offers minorities opportunities to govern themselves, or strongly influence how they are governed. The Alawites and Kurds might be satisfied with decentralization, provided they also get reasonable representation at the national level. The Kurds already have their own institutions. Some non-Kurdish opposition areas in Syria have used local councils for governance since the 2011 uprising against Assad.
There are also power-sharing arrangements that can assuage minority concerns at the national level and lower levels. Quotas in parliament, reserved positions in the state hierarchy, and qualified majority voting in parliament or local councils. I’m not an enthusiast for these, as they often entrench ethnic warlords, but sometimes they prove necessary.
Syrians may invent mechanisms I haven’t considered. In any event it is they who should decide. The country will need a new constitution, then in due course elections. The existing road map for Syria’s political process is UN Security Council resolution 2254, which Assad stymied. HTS and the rest of the opposition can revive it and gain international support by doing so.
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He talks the talk, will he walk the walk?
Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al Sham, is on a roll. His forces are leading a breakout from Idlib province that has now taken two major cities, Aleppo and Hama. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) forces of Bashar al Assad have retreated from both. HTS and its allies are now on the outskirts of Homs. Kurdish forces have evicted the SAA from Deir ez-Zur and environs. Other opposition forces are in the process of liberating Daraa and Suwayda south of Damascus. Once Homs falls, Damascus and the western provinces of Latakia and Tartous will be at risk. Assad is unlikely to stick around to see how they fare.
That’s the good news
Aaron Zelin, a leading expert on HTS, writes of al-Jolani’s governance in northwest Syria:
There’s nothing liberal about the polity he’s built in Idlib. They may have built institutions, but it’s still authoritarian. And he’s literally a leader above the law because technically he has no official position in the Salvation Government.
HTS is a descendant of the Islamic State of Iraq a as well as Al Qaeda. But Al-Jolani has tried for years to project a more moderate image internationally. And in recent days he has voiced and shown respect for Syria’s enormous diversity, which includes Christians of various sorts, Kurds, Shiites, Alawites and others. But there is no guarantee that he will continue in that vein once Assad is gone. Nor is political pluralism something he has practiced while governing in Idlib. Citizens there are not entirely free to criticize.
Uncertainty
Al-Jolani’s preferences are not the only uncertainty looming over Syria. Its economy is devastated. Its social fabric is in tatters. The Assad regime has been depending on income from drug trafficking. Russia and Iran (as well as its Lebanese Hezbollah allies and Shiite proxies) have been vital to the regime’s survival. Ukraine has weakened the former and Israel has battered the other. Even if they wanted to, they might not be capable of propping up Assad. Moscow has removed its warships from their base in Syria. Iran is evacuating its people.
Turkiye has been vital to HTS success. But Ankara’s primary interest in Syria is not liberating it from Assad. The Turks want the more than two million refugees it hosts to return south and Kurdish forces to keep away from its border. Turkiye may not support HTS’s desire to go all the way to Damascus.
The Americans and Gulfies are looking on in amazement. It is not clear whether they will support an HTS-led government, but there may be no better option. They don’t want Syria to break up. HTS might be the only thing capable of holding it together.
Israel will not welcome a jihadist state on its northern border. It might try to prop up Assad or an unworthy successor.
It could still go bad
HTS has had a relatively easy time of it. SAA resistance could stiffen. Infighting among rebel groups could lead to splits. The Kurds in particular will resent the Turkish proxies, who are chasing Kurdish forces and some civilians east of the Euphrates.
The Islamic State could take advantage of the chaos in Syria to re-emerge from its hiding places in the central desert.
HTS or other “opposition” atrocities against civilians could turn the population and the internationals against the liberators. After winning, HTS could return to its extremist roots. Or it could decide to take up the Palestinian cause and align with Hamas, turning off aid from the US and EU. Even without that, the internationals might fail to provide the assistance a liberated Syria will require.
Celebrate now, but prepare for later
Syrians are of course correct to celebrate now. HTS is liberating people who have been unjustly imprisoned for a decade and more. But they should also keep a keen eye on their liberators. Trading one autocrat for another, even a less pernicious one, would not be a worthy outcome.
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Make Kosovo and Bosnia Greater!
Biden Administration policy in the Balkans has been a failure. Kosovo and Serbia have continued their dialogue but with only minor results. The political normalization the US and EU aimed for is further off than in 2020. Bosnia’s constitutional arrangement is inconsistent with the European Union membership the country nominally seeks. The Serb and Croat nationalists who have vetoes over its politics prefer a state well-fed with EU funds but unable to enforce the rule of law.
Appeasement hasn’t worked
Mistaken policy is the root of these failures. Biden’s State Department chose to appease Belgrade, the biggest country in the Western Balkans by both population and area. Officials who like to repeat those factoids hoped Serbia would choose alignment with the West. They thought that would pull Bosnia in the right direction.
Appeasement hasn’t worked. Belgrade instead has pocketed Biden’s support and aligned Serbia with Russia and China. While selling ammunition to Ukraine and buying French warplanes, Belgrade has been re-arming mainly with Chinese and Russian equipment and supplying Russia with electronic components. Serbia, which has an official policy of military neutrality, has refused to align with EU sanctions on Russia.
Belgrade has also adopted irredentist goals. It seeks to establish a “Serbian world,” analogous to Moscow’s “Russian world.” That would unify the Serb populations of neighboring countries in a single de facto if not de jure political space. Montenegro has already joined up, the result of elections in which Belgrade and Moscow weighed in heavily. Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, its Serb-dominated 49%, is dependent on Russia and increasingly part of the Serbian world. Belgrade aims to incorporate the Serbs of northern Kosovo as well.
Creeping authoritarianism is the result
To compensate for its lean toward Serbia, the State Department also chose to mollify Albania, the second largest country in the Western Balkans. State Department officials hoped that would pull Kosovo in a more malleable direction.
Albania is a NATO member and has remained loyal to the Alliance. But its Prime Minister is a political rival of Kosovo’s Prime Minister. Their political competition has prevented any positive impact of Washington’s coddling of the former and antagonism toward the latter. But American favor towards Albania’s Prime Minister has enabled him to establish a de facto monopoly on power. He has fragmented and disempowered the opposition. Corruption is rampant.
Something similar has also occurred in Serbia, whose President has obliterated the opposition. The US and EU rarely speak out against corruption or abuse of power in Serbia. The security forces regularly beat and brutalize protesters. Brussels and Washington nevertheless consistently advocate for Belgrade’s priorities. They have bent over backwards to support lithium mining in Serbia that the Serbian environmental movement opposes. This despite the existence of bigger lithium deposits in both North and South America.
The right policy direction
The approach of the first Trump Administration to the Balkans favored partition of Kosovo, which would have also resulted in partition of Bosnia. That would have rewarded Serbia and Russia. The effort failed. The new American administration should not repeat that mistake.
It should also recognize the failures of the Biden Administration. That should not be hard. They are glaring: too much support for Belgrade and Tirana, too little attention to corruption and rule of law. And too little support for the sovereignty of Bosnia and Kosovo.
A realistic assessment of geopolitics in the Balkans should guide a change in policy. Serbia and Montenegro have aligned with Russia. They willingly help Moscow destabilize the rest of the Balkans. Serbia and Montenegro are also major recipients of Chinese financing. Kosovo and Albania remain pro-American and prepared to resist both Russian and Chinese malfeasance.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is split. The Dayton peace treaty gave it a constitution that enables Republika Srpska and its Croat nationalist leadership to align with Russia while the Bosniak and its relatively weak non-nationalist Croat leadership remains staunchly anti-Russian.
The right policy direction for the Trump Administration is towards helping America’s friends and undermining its adversaries.
Pristina and Sarajevo are frontline states in the geopolitical rivalry with Russia and China. But Kosovo and Bosnia are both still weak states. They need to consolidate their state sovereignty. Washington and Brussels should help with that. They merit military, intelligence, financial, and political support.
The Americans and Europeans should tone down support for Belgrade and Tirana. They should no longer ignore corruption in Albania and Serbia. Brussels and Washington should publicly criticize infringement on human rights and democratic norms. They should cut back financing.
This won’t be easy
It sounds easy enough, but there is a complication. During the past four years, Belgrade has assiduously courted former President Trump, his family, and his supporters. Jared Kushner is investing Saudi money in Serbian real estate development. If personal connections prevail, there is little hope for a good change of US policy in the Balkans.
But both Secretary of State-designate Rubio and National Security Advisor-designate Kellogg are not part of this real estate cabal, so far as I know. They should be amenable to the argument that America should be good to its friends. Rubio has supported Kosovo in the past. Kellogg won’t want instability in the Balkans while the US tries to settle the Ukraine war. Partition of Bosnia or Kosovo would reward Russian aggression.
Trump himself might like the notion of shoring up sovereignty of America’s friends in the Balkans. Neither Bosnia nor Kosovo has ever been “great.” But making them greater is still a worthy cause.
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