Iranian parliamentary “elections”
February 21 marked the 11th Iranian parliamentary election. The Wilson Center hosted an event After Parliamentary Elections: Iran’s Political Future on February 26 with a panel of scholars to interpret the aftermath . Robin Wright, a USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow served as the moderator, with panel participation from Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, Ariane Tabatabai, Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, and Kenneth Katzman, Specialist on Middle East Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.
Wright stated the facts that led it to be considered the “most rigged Iranian election in history”:
- 90 sitting members of parliament were disqualified for reelection,
- only 19 reformists won seats (down from 121 in the 2016 elections),
- conservatives and hardliners won 221 of the 290 seats, comprising 76% of parliament, compared to 29% in 2016.
- voter turnout was poor due to dissatisfaction with the government about the downing of the Ukrainian plane and the public health threat of coronavirus.
Significance of this Parliament
Vaez cautioned against interpreting these election results as unprecedented. In 2004, the Guardian Council used similar tactics to disqualify 80 members of the parliament and paved the road to Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005. Tabatabai noted that the hardline win comes at a time of lower voter turnout, illustrating the widening gap between the population and the regime.
Vaez speculates that the push for a government-selected parliament is due to the Supreme Leader’s desire to conduct structural reforms. It would be more challenging to introduce constitutional reforms with a parliament ideologically opposed.
Katzman emphasized that the regime is by no means on its back feet. Is continuing its aggressive, confident stance. He pointed to the steps officials took to fix the election as an example of their resounding confidence. He pointed to Lebanon and Iraq as examples where political protests have resulted in resignations and government concessions. This has not occurred in Iran despite popular dissatisfaction with the leadership.
Militarization of Politics
Tabatabai and Vaez both noted that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) made monumental gains in this election. The next speaker of the parliament could be a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Tabatabai thinks the Guards aim centralize and reassert power. Katzman noted the increased ability for the IRGC to influence and project power in the region with more parliamentary support.
Vaez noted that Parliament, Majles, does not play a monumental role in foreign policy , but it can impeach members of the cabinet and withhold approval, leading to a lame duck presidency.
Presidential Elections : Impact of US Election on Iran
Vaez suggests that the election of a hardline president in 2021 depends mainly on two factors,
- The new elected Parliament’s performance and
- the 2020 elections in the United States.
If there is a US president whom the Iranian government believes it can negotiate with, Vaez doubts that Iran will elect someone like Ahmadinejad. The panelists emphasized the close knit nature of these two elections and the monumental global impacts they will have.
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Big trouble
No one should minimize the health impact of COVID-19, the corona virus originating in Wuhan, China. It is spreading rapidly and will likely make a lot of people sick. The death rate is high–over 2%. It hits older people especially hard and kills younger people much less. President Trump’s effort to portray the virus as not so bad is deplorable.
That said, the impact is likely to depend on how the world reacts as much as on the virus itself. This is obviously true for public health measures: getting sick people isolated and treated correctly will surely lower the risks both to others and to them. The virus has already tested the Chinese and Iranian public health systems. While the initial Chinese reaction in Wuhan was inexcusably slow, WHO is praising China’s vigorous response since. In Iran, the response appears to have been much less effective. In both countries, the publics are unconvinced of their respective governments’ veracity. Health epidemics are going to prove a tough test for governments unused to telling the truth.
That applies to the US as well. President Trump has wisely delegated responsibility to Vice President Pence, whose credibility is far higher than his own. But Pence did not do well as Governor of Indiana in responding to HIV. Nor will he be free to do and say what he wants. His primary responsibilities will be to prevent the American experts Trump boasts about from saying anything to contradict the President and to take the rap if the virus spreads widely in the US. He can’t be fired, but he can be denied renomination.
There is also a risk of overreacting. In retrospect, it is clear that Washington and most of the rest of the world overreacted to 9/11, not only by grounding all aircraft immediately thereafter for longer than necessary but also by launching two wars that each have killed about as many Americans as the initial attacks, plus many thousands of Iraqis and Afghans. In the aftermath of dramatic events, officials want to err on the side of caution–there is no reward for taking additional risks. The World Bank has already cancelled a big conference in DC for next week, despite the absence of COVID-19 here. I suppose the reasoning was that people would be coming from abroad, but remote participation might well have reduced if not eliminated the risk they would have posed.
President Obama handled the Ebola outbreak well: he reacted quickly and did what was needed to keep it in Africa and deal with it there. It is already too late for containment in the current outbreak. The initial Chinese delay eliminated that possibility, and in any event Trump had already dismantled the White House apparatus set up for early reaction. Now we need to try to isolate those infected and ensure that we don’t overreact in ways that cause unjustifiable harm.
The damage to the stock market is already gigantic, though not necessarily irreversible: US markets have declined more than 10%. Only time will tell if that reflects weakening economic fundamentals, caused by disruption of supply chains as well as dampening demand, or is an overreaction. Certainly it illustrates that the United States has a great deal to lose from Chinese economic failure. Maybe a good deal more to lose than from Chinese success, which is vital to American industry and agriculture.
The virus is also having a political impact. Whatever WHO thinks, Chinese are complaining bitterly about their government’s response, and Iranians won’t be far behind. There is nothing wrong with that: citizens should expect their governments to protect public health and criticize them when they fail. But neither Iran nor China permits a serious challenge to their autocratic regimes. Excessive rigidity there could spawn dissent and even cause collapse.
The United States does allow a political alternative to come to power. That is potentially the silver lining. Kakistocracy is only tolerable if it doesn’t appear to matter. If the corona virus makes it clear that we can ill afford incompetence and mendacity, the Trump Administration could be in big trouble.
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Stevenson’s army, February 26
– WSJ notes the return and buildup of US forces in Saudi Arabia.
– Some anti-JCPOA Senators are discussing a new deal with Iran.
– NYT explains why US & India failed to reach a trade deal this week.
– Australia warns of foreign spy threat.
– Graham Allison says US should prune some of its alliances.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Consensus is hard
Following elections in September and October, Tunisia is having difficulty forming a government. Presiding is a populist president without a political party who has in the past proposed radically overhauling the entire system, abolishing political parties, and creating a form of direct democracy.
On February 19, the Middle East Institute hosted a panel discussion on “The State of Tunisia’s Democratic Transition and the Power and Perils of Consensus Politics.” The discussion featured four speakers:
Daniel Brumberg, director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University and a senior non-resident fellow at POMED,
Sharan Grewal, an assistant professor of government at the College of William & Mary,
Mohamed-Dhia Hammami, a scholar at Wesleyan University in the College of Social Studies and Government, and
Sabina Henneberg, a postdoctoral fellow in the African Studies Program at SAIS.
William Lawrence, a visiting professor of political science and international affairs at American University, moderated
Current context
Hammami attributed the difficulty of forming a government to the fragmented parliament and the president, whose lack of party affiliation contributed to the disarray. President Said designated Elyes Fakhfakh as the new prime minister because of Ennahda’s inability to gain enough votes to form a new government. Fakhfakh excluded Heart of Tunisia from his coalition because of Nabil Karoui’s corruption cases, scandals, and lobbying with the Israelis. Ennahda withdrew its support from Fakhfakh to call for a government of national unity. A new parliamentary election would be risky. President Said thus invited UGTT, which is a labor union with political legitimacy, to act as a mediator between Fakhfakh’s government and opposing parties.
Consensus politics
Brumberg indicated that social, ideological, political, and geographical divisions in the society show Tunisia’s divisions. Identity politics reflect concern of exclusion, make a majoritarian system difficult. For a diverse group to achieve consensus, parties have to postpone difficult issues, such as economic reforms, the need for a supreme court, and security reforms. Brumberg believes that there’s no alternative to deal with Tunisia’s pluralistic structure other than reaching a consensus. If Tunisians were to move beyond the consensus, to deal with the issues that have been postponed and approach a majoritarian system, it could be troubling for the entire state.
Grewal added that consensus politics was important from 2011 to 2014 during the establishment of the constitution. The transition to democracy should be done only once rules are set. The national unity government in 2015 continued the transition, thus postponing divisive issues. The parties thereby escaped blame for failed policies and avoided bringing back the polarization that plagued 2012-13.
Henneberg attributed the 2012-13 polarization to Ennahda’s inexperience, insecure domestic context, and the rise of opposition to the Egyptian Islamist government. She agreed that Tunisia required an inclusive consensus to write a successful constitution. This resulted in the establishment of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet to overcome the polarization.
Ennahda’s concerns
Hammami argued that Ennahda is in favor of sustaining consensus politics, which helps it to survive. Ennahda’s support for including Heart of Tunisia in the parliament was due to the lack of consensus to pass political, security, and economic reforms. Grewal noted that Ennahda also has concerns about Fakhfakh, who might repolarize politics.
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Stevenson’s army, February 25
– State Dept struggles to expand diversity.
– Bipartisan group struggles to restore Congressional powers in national security.
– Just Security reports new data base on war powers issues.
-New Army training team in Africa.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Idlib in crisis
The United Nations reported over 900,000 newly displaced Syrians in northwestern Syria since December 2019. This number is currently increasing due to the violence in Idlib. This tragic reality served as the foundation of the Middle East Institute’s event on February 21, 2020, titled The Crisis In Syria’s Idlib. The discussion was moderated by Alexander Marquardt, Senior National Correspondent at CNN, with participation from Charles Lister, Senior Fellow and Director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremist Program at the Middle East Institute, Elizabeth Tsurkov, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Doctoral student at Princeton University, and Zaher Sahloul, President and Founder at MedGlobal.
“Unprecedented” Situation: Idlib
The panelists accentuated the “unprecedented” nature of the current situation in Idlib. Unlike Syrians in other “de-escalation” zones, the residents of Idlib have nowhere to go. The Turkish border is closed. The 2.8 million people in Idlib are trapped, fearing for their lives. Tsurkov underlined that there is a genuine fear among the population in Idlib that they are all going to die. Lister believes there are close to 2 million people on the border, IDP camps have been entirely full for months, and people are forced to sleep outside in freezing fields.
Sahloul provided a more historical overview of the conflict in Syria, reemphasizing that the humanitarian crisis has been ongoing for over nine years. Assad’s tactics focus on attacking civilian infrastructure; this is an attack against humanity, as schools, markets, and hospitals are constantly being bombed and destroyed. The majority of people are not being killed by bombs, but by chronic disease and lack of available doctors and treatment facilities.
Tsurkov added that the people in Idlib do not want to stay and wait for the regime to capture them as they fear being placed in regime prisons, which essentially serve as “extermination sites.” She notes that even people who are employed by the Syrian government are afraid of remaining under regime control because they have seen what happens too often: execution.
The International community’s failure to respond
Lister in dismay noted that the UN is unable to act. A French proposed statement to declare Idlib a crisis could not pass in the Security Council due to a Russian veto. Assad has recaptured around 35-40% of northwestern Syria in under a year. The key regime objective has been achieved: to control the north/south M5 highway. The next objective, control of the east/west M4 highway has not yet been accomplished.
The panelists emphasized that Erdogan is feeling huge political pressure not to allow any refugees over the border. Turkey has lost 18 observation posts in Idlib, but Turkish-controlled forces did fire at Russian jets. Turkey has established an end of February deadline for the regime to withdraw from Idlib. The panelists doubted this aspiration will be achieved.
Sahloul emphasized that the UNHCR office warned nongovernmental organizations in Syria last year of an additional million displaced people predicted in the next year. Therefore, Sahloul argues, the UN should not be surprised. He cited the lack of UN observers in Idlib and the failure of the UN Secretary General to visit Idlib as evidence of UN disinterest.
What could/should happen?
Tsurkov believes that if the Russian and regime warplanes that conduct horrific bombing and displacement of civilians were threatened and risked being shot down, the bombing would stop. Therefore the US and international community should raise the stakes for Russia and Assad by not only intervening when chemical weapons are used, but also when civilians are bombed.
All the panelists suggested that Turkey should not stand alone in this crisis. While Turkey has made many deplorable policy decisions in Syria, Ankara is also currently the only force trying to stop the regime. Lister said that Turkey has no choice but to gradually escalate its force presence and strength in the region. Turkey has to find a way to force a stalemate or ceasefire.
The only alternative to regime or Turkish control of Idlib is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose ancestry includes Al Qaeda. In response to this alternative, Tsurkov professes that local support for HTS is limited and dwindling, due to its recent military losses, but Gaza-fication of Idlib (control by an extremist group) would be better than millions fleeing and mass slaughter.
She believes the only plausible alternative is Turkish-controlled Idlib. Sahloul emphasized that HTS would not be able to govern; it was tolerated only because of the stability it brought. Lister noted that HTS has been officially reaching out to conduct interviews with the international community so that its image can be more aligned with stability and governance than with terrorism. Or at least can be viewed as better than the alternative.
The panelists conclude that the the international community should be providing funds and urging the parties to achieve a ceasefire as a way of stabilizing the situation. Lister urges the US, at a minimum, to utilize diplomacy and put pressure on Russia.
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