It’s about Iran as well as the Palestinians
Israel is now conducting a different war in Lebanon than the one it has conducted in Gaza. As Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib (@afalkhatib) has noted, “Gaza is a war of revenge, not precision.” So far, the war in Lebanon has been far more precise and targeted, though of course it has also killed hundreds of innocent civilians.
The “precision” war
This is likely to continue. The Israelis know most Sunnis, Christians, and Druze in Lebanon do not trust Shia Hezbollah. There is no point in hitting them. Support for President Assad’s war against the (mainly Sunni) Syrian opposition and involvement in Lebanon’s corrupt sectarian politics have blotted Hezbollah’s copybook. Leveling communities that don’t like Hezbollah would make no sense.
Hezbollah opposes the existence of Israel, but it has done little for the approximately 200,000 Palestinians who live in Lebanon. The Israelis are letting it be known that they are contemplating a ground invasion, but that is likely to be unrewarding. The Israel Defense Force will prefer to continue to destroy Hezbollah large rocket and missile inventory from the air. Any ground incursion is likely to be limited to the south.
The Arab openness
The Jordanian Foreign Minister yesterday made the Arab and Muslim position clear:
This is not new for the Jordanians, who protect Israel’s security every day, in return for Israeli help with internal security. But “all of us are willing to right now guarantee the security of Israel” is a bold formula, even with the traditional conditions that follow. He was apparently speaking after a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, whose 57 members include the non-Arab Muslim states.
There is more Muslim and Arab acceptance today of Israel’s existence than at any other time since 1948. But Israel isn’t paying any attention. Why not?
Two reasons
The first reason is the one Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi cites. Netanyahu wants to prevent the formation of a Palestinian state. He has devoted the last 30 years to that cause. He is not going to give it up now.
Just as important: for him, the fight with Hamas and Hezbollah is about Iran, not only Palestine. The IDF is well on its way to destroying Tehran’s best deterrent, which was Lebanese Hezbollah’s stock of rockets and missiles. Tehran’s Syrian deterrent is already in tatters. Hamas isn’t destroyed but will need time to recover. So Netanyahu is clearing the way for an Israeli attack on Iran, focused on its nuclear facilities. I find it hard to understand how Iran would use a nuclear weapon against a place as small as Israel without killing a lot of Muslims. But Israeli prime ministers have been willing to do some frightening things to prevent neighbors from getting nukes.
The consequences
With its deterrent gone and at risk of losing its nuclear assets, Tehran will likely amp up its nuclear program. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will no doubt see production of nuclear weapons as a necessary deterrent against an Israeli attack. An Iranian sprint for nuclear weapons will ignite Turkiye and Saudi Arabia rivalry. That would make four nuclear or near nuclear powers in the Middle East, with many complicated relations among them. It is hard to see how that will serve Israeli or American interests.
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Not only wider, but higher
Israel yesterday bombed Hezbollah headquarters in Dahiyeh, south of Beirut’s center, and killed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Israelis are celebrating:
So are anti-Assad Syrians in Idlib:
Decapitation ups the ante
This Israeli move signals that Prime Minister Netanyahu wants not only to widen the war from Gaza to Lebanon but also wants to up the ante. The assassination of an enemy leader forecloses negotiations and makes it harder to manage the conflict. Israel’s successful cell phone/walkie-talkie attack less than two weeks ago had already infuriated and discombobulated Hezbollah’s militants. The loss of its leader of more than three decades will cause further confusion and distrust in their ranks.
The impact of decapitation on insurgencies is a subject of debate. There is evidence that decapitation can shorten anti-terrorist campaigns, increase the odds of insurgent defeat, and decrease conflict intensity. Others think decapitation has greater chances of success in countering insurgency “when conducted by local forces against a centralized opponent in conjunction with larger counterinsurgency operations.” Those conditions were not fulfilled in yesterday’s raid. Local forces did not conduct it, Hezbollah is a networked opponent, and there was no “larger” counterinsurgency operation.
That said, Hezbollah will need time to regroup. The Israelis likely also killed some of Nasrallah’s lieutenants. A leadership strike of this sort requires inside intelligence. Somehow Israel knew where the Hezbollah leaders were at a specific time. Hezbollah depends a great deal on personal trust among its adherents. The choice of a new leader and the search for a culprit will disrupt that network for some time to come. That may not prevent retaliation in the form of rocket attacks, but those have been militarily ineffective.
Mixed reaction in Lebanon and the Arab world
Lebanese will have a mixed reaction: horror at the civilian lives lost in buildings in the capital, but also some Schadenfreude. Hezbollah has lost its heroic mettle for many Lebanese, both because it went to war against the Syrian opposition and because it is now part of a corrupt, self-perpetuating elite in Lebanon that has delivered little in recent years to its citizens. Even before the Beirut port explosion in 2020, the Lebanese economy’s wheels were coming off. The Lebanese pound has lost well over 90% of its value. Most of the population is impoverished, frustrated, and desperate.
The
The Arab world will likewise have a mixed reaction. Most Arab elites are allergic to Islamist movements like Hamas and Hezbollah. Before today’s event, they were protesting mistreatment of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank but doing little about it and nothing to defend Hamas and Hezbollah, which are Iranian allies. However, most Arab streets are sympathetic to the Palestinians and want the Gaza war to end (as do most Israelis). That was Hezbollah’s declared aim. It was rocketing Israel since October 8 of last year, it said, to get Israel to end the Gaza war.
It will be interesting to see now whether the Arab street gets agitated enough to change the Arab world’s relative quiescence (relative, that is, to its past military attacks on Israel). The Syrian exception (see video above) is due to Hezbollah’s fighting the opposition on behalf of President Assad.
The West won’t cry crocodile tears but needs to worry
The West won’t mourn Nasrallah, but many in Europe and the US will worry that his death will incentivize a major Hezbollah retaliation. While its rockets have so far caused little strategic damage in Israel, the Israelis would likely respond with further escalation. That will heighten the hostilities. Neither the US nor Europe wants a the wider war heightened.
The West will also need to worry about Hezbollah operations beyond Israel. Hezbollah has terrorist cells in many countries, including the US, which presumably supplied the large bombs that leveled Hezbollah headquarters. US embassies and government offices in Washington could become targets.
Iran is in a bind
Tehran has been trying to avoid war with Israel, which has demonstrated it could bomb Iran’s nuclear sites. Now two of its key allies have suffered a great deal of damage. Israel has not destroyed Hamas, but Iran needs to be concerned how long it will take for Hamas to regain its former military strength. Now Israel has decapitated Lebanese Hezbollah, killed other leaders, and injured thousands of its militants in addition to destroying a significant percentage of the rockets and missiles Iran has supplied.
Asking Tehran to continue to show restraint may be asking too much. Advocates of Iran’s nuclear program in Tehran will be emboldened. They will argue that Israel is looking for war with Iran and that only acquiring nuclear weapons will prevent an Israeli attack. That in turn could create incentives for Turkey and Saudi Arabia to get nukes. Their leaders have both said they will match Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The Middle East with four nuclear weapons states will not be a safe place.
There is another way out. Tehran could tell Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River, as required by the UN Security Council, and end the rocket attacks. This would enable Israelis to return to their homes along the border with Lebanon. It would also give the US leverage in pressing Israel for a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange in Gaza. The war there would be unlikely to end entirely, as Netanyahu needs the war to continue until he can declare unequivocal victory. But relative calm could allow far more humanitarian aid and early reconstruction assistance to flow.
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Israel has chosen the wider war
Israeli warplanes are today striking more than a thousand targets in Lebanon. This ratcheting up of the conflict comes after Lebanese Hizbollah had launched hundreds of rockets in recent days against Israeli targets, including near Haifa and settlements in the West Bank.
There is always something the enemy did yesterday to justify what you are doing today. Israel is driving the escalation to pre-empt what it expects would be a major Hizbollah missile attack in response to the cell phone and pager explosions that last week killed and maimed thousands of its militants. Lebanese view the warnings to civilians as an effort to get them to flee.
The prospects are grim
Hizbollah has ample reason to try to duck the escalation. It is losing a lot of rockets to Israeli attacks. The President of Iran, Hizbollah’s sponsor, has indicated a willingness to de-escalate. Many non-Hizbollah Lebanese–while resenting Hizbollah–are not pleased with suffering the brunt of the Israeli attacks.* The air attacks have killed about 500 today alone. Many thousands of civilians are fleeing. But there is no sign that Hizbollah is willing to comply with Israeli demands that it move away from the border to north of the Litani River or stop the rocket attacks.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have reportedly not yet deployed sufficient ground forces for an invasion. The 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon did not go well. Israel will try to avoid a repeat. Its stated objective is to enable Israelis who have had to evacuate from near the northern border to return to their homes. A ground invasion would not serve that objective well, but it is still a possibility.
The regional situation
Israel is now at war with Hamas in Gaza, with the Houthis in Yemen, with Hizbollah in Lebanon, and with Syria, which actively supports Hizbollah. Military experts would not have advised opening a multi-front war.
But this serves Prime Minister Netanyahu’s political interests. So long as the country is at war, he can avoid an election. He is hoping that military success will erase resentment of his many defects and enable him to stay in power. Israelis have not forgotten the October 7 intelligence failure, his corrupt practices, or his extremist coalition partners. But so far postponement has worked, even if it is hard to see how it can work forever.
That said, the Arab countries of the region and Turkey object strongly to what Israel has done in Gaza. They will also protest what they are doing in Lebanon. The sympathies of the Arab and Turkish streets remain with the Palestinians. But the governing elites are happy to see Hamas and Hizbollah get their comeuppance. Both are Islamist movements, albeit one Sunna and the other Shia, that serve Iranian interests and are not welcome in most states in the region.
Implications for the US
The wider war means no negotiated end to the war in Gaza before the US election. This is fine with Netanyahu, who supports Trump’s re-election despite President Biden’s full-throated support for Israel.
Trump hasn’t been outspoken on the Middle East. That is because he would lose Arab American votes in Michigan and Wisconsin if he said he wants Israel to win and win quickly and big. But that is precisely what his Netanyahu-aligned advisors and supporters want. He would avoid the handwringing about civilian casualties Biden has evinced or the appreciation for Palestinian rights that Vice President Kamala Harris has voiced.
American restraint on Israel isn’t happening before the November 5 election. Netanyahu knows that. Expect him to use the next six weeks to continue to do as much damage as he can to Hamas and Hizbollah, no matter the harm to Arab civilians.
*Apologies: this sentence did not say what I meant in the original posting.
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This is pandering, not diplomacy
The US and Europe have now teamed up to applaud the mining of lithium–needed mainly for electric vehicle batteries–in Serbia. The enthusiasm is over the top. German Chancellor Scholz was in Belgrade for the July signing of a Serbia/EU “strategic partnership” on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains, and electric vehicles. The US has likewise signed an agreement on US-Serbia strategic cooperation in the field of energy in Serbia.
Brussels and Washington intend these agreements to encourage commercial exploitation of Serbia’s lithium deposits, under a contract with the British-Australian firm, Rio Tinto. Institutional investors (that is mutual funds, banks, pension and hedge funds) control 58% of Rio Tinto. The single biggest shareholder (11% Google AI tells me) is the Aluminum Corporation of China.
Not quite right
That is the first hint that something is not right. Washington and Brussels do not usually support British or Australian firms, or firms whose single largest shareholder is Chinese. But both the EU and US appear to have decided that Serbia’s lithium deposits are a top priority for electric car batteries.
But are they? Here is one picture of known lithium resources around the world:
Serbia’s lithium deposits amount to 1.3% of the global total. The resources are distributed widely around the world, most in the Western Hemisphere. Lithium is a commodity traded in a worldwide market, like oil. Serbia’s production has no great significance in this global picture.
Nor is the future market for lithium a sure thing. Other technologies are in the research and development pipeline. Five or ten years from now lithium is unlikely to be the only economically viable technology.
Why then?
Why then are European and American officials tripping over themselves to encourage the development of the Serbian lithium deposits? Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kasanof has even suggested the lithium project could block the rise of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans. Meanwhile,
Here is a hint of what is really going on: US Ambassador Chris Hill told a debate in Belgrade on political options for the Western Balkans that many of the people protesting against plans to mine lithium in western Serbia support Russia.
Those protests are the most serious opposition movement still extant in Serbia today. Red-baiting (if we can still label Moscow as “red”) the demonstrators aims to undermine their impact. That is not the usual US position on environmental concerns. But the Rio Tinto project is a top priority for President Vucic. We can only imagine why. He has no doubt told the local diplomats that he will greatly appreciate their help in squelching the protests.
Let me be clear: I have no objection in principle to economic cooperation with Serbia, or to environmentally and financially sound production of lithium in Serbia or elsewhere. But I do object to European and American officials trying to squelch environmental and financial concerns to please an increasingly autocratic president.
Appeasement is the policy
The diplomatic pandering is part of a broader effort to appease Serbia, provide it with economic goodies, and convince it to turn westward. Let’s skip whether redbaiting legitimate environmental criticism reflects Western ideals. The bigger issue is whether this approach has any chance of working.
It is notable that in neither the European nor in the American agreements cited above does Serbia undertake to conduct its mining in an environmentally sound or financially transparent way. The State Department made it clear the US wants financial probity. The European agreement does likewise. But Belgrade didn’t commit to it in either agreement.
Serbia has aligned itself militarily and politically with Russia and China since Vucic became President, the recent purchase of French Rafale warplanes notwithstanding. Belgrade has also undertaken repeated efforts to destabilize northern Kosovo and to undermine the independence of Montenegro as well as the territorial integrity of Bosnia. The idea that Belgrade can be convinced to embrace the West is dumb. Vucic will take EU money and American political pressure on his environmental opponents, but neither will make him give up his affection for like-minded autocrats with irredentist ambitions.
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Register now and vote when you choose!
I’ve been doing my thing with the Georgia Justice Project and VoteRidersGA for the past 10 days or so. Writing notes to people encouraging them to register and vote. Georgia, it turns out, has lots of people convicted of felonies who have either completed probation or can get off it. They can vote without paying fines or jumping through other hoops.
Of course I’ll never know what impact this will have, if any. But given the extensive efforts to limit voting, I’m willing to pitch in to encourage it. This is a non-partisan effort, even if I am a registered Democrat (who sometimes has voted Republican).
The question of course is what motivates people to limit voting. If you ask, they will tell you they want to limit voting fraud, not voting. But there is no evidence in any of the 50 states of significant voter fraud. And the “anti-fraud” efforts are concentrated in Black and other minorities areas as well as college campuses. That tells you all you need to know about the real purpose. Their efforts are counterproductive when it comes to fraud. Those challenging voter registrations are tying up election officials in mountains of paperwork, making it difficult to maintain the quality of elections in battleground states.
Nevertheless, there has been some progress in opening up the election process to encourage broader participation, partly due to the COVID-19 epidemic. The National Council of State Legislatures lists a number of states that permit “vote by mail”:
- Eight states—California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Washington and the District of Columbia—allow all elections to be conducted entirely by mail.
- Two states—Nebraska and North Dakota—permit counties to opt into conducting elections by mail.
- Nine states—Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico and Wyoming—allow specific small elections to be conducted by mail.
- Four states—Idaho, Minnesota, New Jersey and New Mexico—permit mostly-mail elections for certain small jurisdictions.
Forty-seven states offer some sort of “early” voting before Election Day.
Polls can make inaccurate projections for many reasons. But one of the more difficult factors to take into account is turnout. At this point in the campaign, that is the main objective of both the Democrats and the Republicans. Convincing the few remaining undecided voters is far more difficult and labor intensive than getting your own cadres to the polls. So register, or check your registration, and vote when you can!
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US policy reset in the Western Balkans
Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister pledging allegiance to Putin
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75021
Friday, Serbia President Vucic announced measures intended to reverse Kosovo independence. He is no longer content to refuse to recognize Kosovo but wants instead to take at least part of it. Meanwhile, the American Embassy in Belgrade continues to profess confidence that he is moving Serbia toward the West.
Jasmin Mujanovic tweeted week before last:
US policy in the Western Balkans is clear as mud. The US supports Vucic despite his pro-Russian associations, whereas it opposes Kurti despite his pro-Western positions. In Bosnia, the US opposes Vucic’s proxies, whose counterparts in Montenegro it helped depose a pro-NATO govt.
All this is true. The State Department has lost the bubble. It is time to find it again.
Long-term objectives
US objectives in the Balkans should be clear, not confused. They should apply separately to all the states of the region, while recognizing that interactions among them may affect progress. Let me offer these longer-term goals for those countries that want a good relationship with the US:
- Democratic governance based on equal rights, with reasonable guarantees for minorities;
- Secure sovereignty and territorial integrity without use or threat of force.
These goals are consistent with NATO and EU membership for any state that wants to join those institutions.
Where we stand now: Bosnia and Serbia
Things are headed in the wrong direction.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb and Croat nationalists are reversing the progress made in the first decade after the 1995 Dayton accords. “Dayton” ended the war but left the warring parties in power. For a decade thereafter, bold international intervention forced ethnic nationalists to accept reforms that pointed towards sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as equal rights.
Since 2006 however ethnic nationalists have been unraveling the prior progress. The Americans this year pushed the leading Bosniak party out of power, claiming it inimical to statebuilding. Ironically, that party supported democratic governance and territorial integrity. The main Croat and Serb opponents of Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are still waging their fight from position of power.
In Serbia, President Vucic has taken over a weak democratic regime and turned it into a de facto semi-autocracy. He holds a majority in parliament but more importantly has concentrated power in the presidency. From there, Vucic wields the police and other security forces against a weak and fragmented opposition. He has also aligned Serbia with Russia on Ukraine sanctions and bent over backwards to attract Chinese investment in sensitive areas like telecommunications and security technology. He buys off Western criticism by supplying ammunition to Ukraine, purchasing French warplanes, and selling lithium to Germany.
Where we stand now: Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia
Kosovo, where alternation in power has occurred several times, has a popular prime minister who exerts sovereign authority in Serb-majority northern Kosovo in ways that give the Americans and European qualms. They want him to consult and get permission for anything he does that might upset either the Kosovo Serbs or Belgrade. He hasn’t been willing to do that. But Prime Minister Kurti nevertheless aligns unequivocally with the West. He has no alternative.
Friends of Putin now run Montenegro, which became a NATO member in 2017. NATO-member Macedonia, to its credit, peacefully alternated political parties in power earlier this year. Some in the current majority lean towards Russia, but the Albanian partners in the coalition are more reliably Western-oriented. That however is no guarantee, so Macedonia requires careful watching.
The threat
None of these places is top priority in a world where Russia has invaded Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, and Iran and its proxies are at war with Israel. But if something goes wrong in the Balkans, it will spread rapidly to other places.
The biggest threat is Belgrade’s increasing devotion to what it terms “the Serbian world.” This is Greater Serbia, de facto if not de jure. Vucic wants to control the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. His security services pursue this goal actively and aggressively, with support from Moscow. He has been successful de facto in Montenegro. In Kosovo, many Serbs are not devoted to Vucic, who has demonstrated little concern for their welfare. But he maintains control through finance and intimidation. In Bosnia, Vucic has gradually gained more leverage on the main Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, who is sanctioned by Washington and has driven his 49% of the country into arrears with Moscow while espousing secessionist intentions.
Partition of Bosnia and Kosovo would serve Vucic’s irredentist goals. That would greatly cheer Moscow and revivify its ambitions in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, if not also Kazakhstan. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Western Balkan states stands as a counter to what Putin is seeking elsewhere. That has encouraged him to use Serbia as a proxy. Last year, Belgrade kidnapped two Kosovo policemen, rented a riot against NATO peacekeepers, and sponsored a terrorist incident in northern Kosovo. Serbia intended for that incident to give Belgrade an excuse to move its military into the north. That would have cheered Moscow and encouraged its efforts to take all of Donetsk.
The current approach isn’t working
The Biden Administration has tried to appease Serbia to prevent Belgrade from acting on its irredentist goals and to win it over to the West. It has lavished praise and money on Vucic while withholding both from Kurti and denouncing and sanctioning Dodik. This is incoherent. Vucic and Dodik are aligned with Moscow and share the goal of Greater Serbia. Kurti’s commitment to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is a main barrier against their ambitions.
Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Europe, has recognized that northern Kosovo and Dodik’s secessionist threats are the main security threats in the Balkans. But he looks to the peacekeeping forces in both places to meet them.
That has proven a temporary expedient, but the European force (EUFOR) in Bosnia is weak and deployed in ways that would prevent it from reacting in a timely way to a determined secessionist move. The NATO-led force in Kosovo is stronger and better positioned, but would it be able or willing to prevent Serbian armor from rolling in to take northern Kosovo? It is 25 years since the NATO war that liberated Kosovo from Serbian rule. It is high time Kosovo–like any other sovereign state–be able to defend its own territorial integrity.
The reset needed
Appeasement of Serbia isn’t working. Chastising Kosovo isn’t working either. Montenegro is lost for now. Bosnia and Macedonia are at risk.
Washington needs to reset its Balkans policy in more coherent directions:
- It should support Pristina’s efforts to govern in equitably in northern Kosovo and help plan the next moves in that direction.
- It should end appeasement of Serbia, publicly criticize Vucic’s irredentist and anti-democratic intentions, and end the lavishing of praise and money on Belgrade.
- The US should encourage the redeployment of EUFOR to the northeastern Bosnian town of Brcko, where it would represent a serious deterrent to secessionism.
- Washington should insist that Bosnia implement the European Court of Human Rights decisions that would end the country’s ethnic-based politics.
- Washington should lead an effort to isolate Montenegro’s russophiles from sensitive NATO information.
- It should also warn Macedonia that it will be next if the russophiles there remain in power.
Kamala Harris is as clear as she can be about Putin’s perfidy in Ukraine:
Countering Putin in the Balkans by diplomatic means would not be nearly as costly or hard. Doing so would weaken Moscow and strengthen NATO at relatively low cost. The time has come to do it.
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