Good humored but determined
It’s Ferragosto 2016: that’s the Italian height of summer, when everyone who is anyone heads for the beaches and mountains.
I’m in my office in DC. I never did catch the Ferragosto bug, despite 10 years of living in Italy. I like the light traffic and slow pace this time of year. Anyone who happens to be in town is easy to see and there are lots of solid hours in which to read, write, and edit. Not to mention clear the desk.
This year Ferragosto is particularly entertaining. The Rio Olympics have provided their share of fantastic performances, especially by American swimmers and gymnasts:
The natural talent, the physique, and the will to train to gold medal standard in any sport are all rare. So it is to be expected that larger countries will have more of these people. It is also likely that rich countries will have more of the resources required to find and train the gifted. When the Star-Spangled Banner plays, we should all remember that the US is advantaged in both size and wealth.
And we should remember smaller countries that produce extraordinary performances, like Kosovar Majlinda Kelmendi’s in judo:
There are a lot of competitors on the way to a triumph like this one. Many give spectacular performances, just not sufficiently spectacular to make it all the way to Rio, or at Rio to the medals. The difference in swimming is measured in hundreds of a second. Michael Phelps won the 200 meter butterfly in 4/100s:
Most of us are never going to enjoy even a moment in our lives when we perform at gold medal level in anything, but we should get joy from the triumphs we do have the good fortune to enjoy.
We can also get a good deal of pleasure from watching a performance like Usain Bolt’s:
It’s just extraordinarily boisterous and gorgeous. It defies reasonable expectations and makes us realize how limiting expectations can be. We do best to set high goals–there is no telling how close to them we may be able to come.
That’s clearly what Ibtihaj Muhammad did in winning bronze in saber:
Good humored, but determined!
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Yemen talks need rethinking
The most recent round of peace talks between the Houthis, supporters of former president Ali Abdullah Salih, Yemen’s government in exile lead by Abd Rabbuuh Mansur Hadi, and the regional powers involved in the GCC campaign in Yemen has gone nowhere. Hadi’s government in exile has departed from Kuwait. They signed a recently proposed UN deal and left it up to the Houthis to ratify the agreement and keep the talks moving.
The Houthis have not, and will not. This should come as no surprise. The Kuwait talks in their present form cannot lead to a political solution for three reasons:
1. The assumptions and structure that underpin the talks preclude an equitable settlement. On April 17, 2015 the Security Council adopted Resolution 2216, which has served as the basis for all Yemen peace talks since then. Then UNSC president Jordan (a party to the GCC coalition that has supplied planes and arms to pro-Hadi forces) proposed the resolution. It calls for the Houthis to withdraw from all territory they have seized since 2014 and to surrender their weapons.
That’s not likely to happen anytime soon. Particularly troublesome is that unconditional Houthi surrender has become a precondition for further political negotiations, not an end goal. Once the Houthis surrender their weapons and retreat from seized territory, they lose their bargaining chips in the negotiations. The Houthis initiated the current conflict because they felt they were not being heard in the political process. They aren’t going to trust Hadi to include them in Yemen’s future without the threat of force. The UNSC resolution also reiterates the legitimacy of the Hadi government and extols the GCC Initiative that removed Salih from power, led to the National Dialogue Conference, and created a draft constitution.
Widely credited with helping to avoid civil war in Yemen after the 2011 uprising, the National Dialogue Conference failed to represent the demands of the groups that had fought for Salih’s removal. Women, young people, the Houthis, and representatives of the movement for southern independence were all marginalized. Despite an initial unanimous agreement to a federal structure for Yemen, the process fell apart when it came to deciding the precise terms. A small, unrepresentative committee Hadi hand-picked redrew Yemen’s 21 governorates into a 6 regions. Criticism was widespread: the Houthis, southerners, the salafi Rashad Union, and others questioned the new map.
This led to the Houthi take over of Sana’a in September 2014. Going back to the GCC Initiative without addressing the grievances of young activists, Southerners, and especially the Houthis will accomplish nothing. A new starting point for a more representative political process is needed.
By far the most damning aspect of UNSC 2216 is its exoneration of the Saudi-led campaign. The Resolution makes no mention of a multilateral ceasefire, even while noting the deteriorating humanitarian situation. In fact, the GCC air campaign is not mentioned at all, even though the UN assistant secretary-general for human rights, Ivan Simonovic, reported the day prior that the majority of casualties were civilians. Demanding that only the Houthis put down their weapons without asking the same of “pro-Hadi forces” will never work.
2. The Kuwait talks do not represent the forces fighting on the ground. The war in Yemen is widely portrayed as a war with two sides:
- the Houthis and forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Salih;
- Allegedly “Pro-Hadi forces,” who include southern secessionists, tribes in central Yemen who are fighting more to remove the Houthis than to reinstate Hadi, and people in the Houthi stronghold of Sa‘ada who oppose the Houthis on religious and political grounds.
A large portion of the forces fighting the Houthis share many of their grievances and also felt side-lined by the elite-dominated GCC Initiative, but oppose the Houthis’ turn to violence and effort to dominate opposition to Hadi. Many do not want to see Hadi re-installed as president, but none of them have been represented at talks in Kuwait or Geneva. While “pro-Hadi forces” are united for now by a common enemy, if the Houthis retreat Hadi will lose what little influence he commands on the ground.
3. The war has stalemated on the battlefield, but both sides still believe they can use force to extract more concessions at the negotiating table. When the Yemeni government in exile walked away from the talks the first time, the Houthis escalated their shelling of the Saudi border. There is no genuine commitment on either side to reaching a political solution for the sake of the Yemeni people.
Throughout all negotiations, Hadi has not budged an inch. He demands a full return of his government and has offered no concessions to his opponents. He sees the negotiations as a zero-sum game. Any power-sharing deal with the Houthis and other groups in Yemen would come at a cost to his monopoly. With the GCC and much of the international community behind him, Hadi has no reason to accommodate Houthi interests.
The Houthis, on the other hand, lost international legitimacy when they violently chased the Yemeni government from Sana’a. Their most recent proposal, to form a joint body to oversee a political transition to a national unity government, went nowhere. Their subsequent move to form a governing council with supporters of Ali Abdullah Salih lost them any sympathy they might have enjoyed from the international community.
Peace talks in Yemen need rethinking. The international community needs to stop seeing the GCC as an impartial arbiter when it is in fact a party to Yemen’s war. The negotiations need to include all the stakeholders, including southerners and civil society actors. Then it might be possible to begin talking about trust-building measures that could lead to partial Houthi and Salih withdrawal and disarmament as well as aid delivery to besieged Ta’iz. Without these changes, Yemen’s war will continue and its abysmal humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate.
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Who founded ISIS?
Donald Trump says it was President Obama, along with Hillary Clinton when she was Secretary of State:
This is bullshit (as is his claim to have opposed the invasion of Iraq before it occurred).
But it is well worth recalling some of the history of the Islamic State, whose origins are to be found in Al Qaeda in Iraq, founded to resist the American forces there after the 2003 invasion (though there was a precursor organization under Saddam Hussein led by the real founder of the Islamic State: Abu Musab al Zarqawi). I would not call President Bush the founder of ISIS, but it is nevertheless fair to say that without the American invasion it is difficult to picture how the group would have gained the traction it did. That said, by the time of the American withdrawal in 2011, the Islamic State in Iraq had been largely defeated.
Trump will no doubt claim that it was the American withdrawal, conducted under President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton, that enabled the ISIS revival. But that simplistic and fallacious allegation, post hoc ergo propter hoc, ignores several wrinkles:
- The agreement for the 2011 American withdrawal was negotiated and signed under President Bush, prior to President Obama taking office.
- The revival of the Islamic State in Iraq was due primarily to the exclusionary governing methods of then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, who tried to repress peaceful Sunni demonstrations with force.
- The even more repressive methods of Syrian President Bashar al Assad from 2011 on created chaotic conditions that enabled the Islamic State to expand into Syria.
If you want to distribute blame, I’d put it more or less in this order: Maliki>Assad>Bush>Obama. Obama’s culpability is for failure to do as much as he should have to limit Assad’s depredations against Syria’s population.
I don’t expect Trump to accept any of this. He is obviously thrilled with the reaction of his supporters to his blaming Obama and Clinton. That will be enough for him to continue repeating his allegations.
What he won’t mention is the vigorous effort of the current administration for the past two years to kill Islamic State cadres and deny it control over territory, relying on local forces and without the loss of more than a handful of Americans. I am among the first to criticize the Obama Administration for taking an overly militarized approach to defeating ISIS. But give credit where it is due. ISIS has lost thousands of fighters, about 50% of its territory in Iraq and more than a quarter of its territory in Syria over the past year. It has also lost ground in Libya, where its capital at Sirte has reportedly fallen. Obama’s military effort against the Islamic State is a strikingly successful one.
So too is the effort to prevent Islamic State fighters from entering the US. The recent ISIS attacks (San Bernardino, Tampa) have been ISIS-inspired rather than directed. Only a handful of immigrants have been arrested for affiliation with the Islamic State, which suggests that the screening procedures are working remarkably well.
The truth is that the Islamic State does not, as Trump claims, “honor” President Obama. But it likes Trump and his ilk a lot. His effort to exclude Muslims from the US feeds the ISIS propaganda machine, which claims Muslims will never get a fair shake in the West. Trump did not found the Islamic State any more than Obama did, but he is aiding and abetting its efforts. I trust Americans will know what to do about that at the polls.
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Hezbollah in Syria
The Washington Post piece I published July 28 on forcing Hezbollah out of the fight in Syria either diplomatically or, if that fails, militarily has gotten mixed reactions, at best. Here are some criticisms I care to reply to:
- Many retweeted the false allegation that I had advocated bombing Lebanon (even that I had advocated bombing civilians in Lebanon). The op/ed was clearly directed at Hezbollah’s presence inside Syria and advocated getting its forces to withdraw to Lebanon. At no time did I advocate bombing civilians either in Lebanon or in Syria. This false allegation was clearly intended to obscure the main point I had made: that Hezbollah is itself a terrorist group that should not be in Syria, even if you think it has an appropriate role in Lebanon.
- Quite a few interpreted my piece as pro-Israel, some explicitly referring to my being Jewish. This of course ignores the fact that Israelis might not appreciate the Hezbollah retaliation I mentioned as likely. It also helps anti-Semites to put people in predetermined boxes, making further thinking or discussion unnecessary. The fact is Hezbollah would represent more of a threat to Israel if it were not fighting against Syrians. It will emerge from Syria significantly diminished in manpower and political traction in Lebanon, though with enhanced military experience.
- Some thought my proposition would be not be consistent with international law. This is a more worthy critique. International law does permit self-defense, but it has been some time since Hezbollah killed Americans, so far as I know. There is, however, no international statute of limitations, in particular on mass murder. Is the US not entitled to respond to the murder of 241 Marines because more than 30 years have passed? The US killed Osama bin Laden more than 9 years after 9/11. How many more years before we forget about mass murder? Hezbollah has sworn enmity to the US. Are we not permitted to take them seriously and try to prevent further harm to our citizens?
- Others alleged that my proposal would spread the Syrian war. This too is worthy of consideration, but I fail to see how my proposal would necessarily make things worse. If Assad and his allies continue to make progress and in particular if opposition-held neighborhoods in Aleppo were to fall, more Syrians would flee to neighboring countries, not fewer. It is certainly arguable that some significant portion of the 7 million and more Syrians who have already become refugees are attributable to Hezbollah. How many more will Hezbollah cause to flee if it is not prevented from assaulting civilians?
- Some asked whether we shouldn’t be happy Hezbollah is fighting the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. While Hezbollah does fight jihadis associated with both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, its presence in Syria is also an important recruiting tool for Sunni extremists, who are delighted to have the civilian population Hezbollah attacks mobilized to take up arms in self-defense. Killing civilians and calling them terrorists is not a viable strategy to counter violent extremism.
Assad helped to create the Islamic State in Iraq after the 2003 American invasion, when he funneled jihadi fighters into Iraq to resist the Americans. Early in the 2011 revolution, he also released extremists from Syrian prisons, in an effort to ensure that the only choice Syrians and the international community would have was between him and the terrorists. He is close to fulfilling that prophecy. The longer the war goes on, the less space there is for non-extremists. Allowing Hezbollah to continue to fight in Syria helps not only Assad but also the most extreme elements opposing him. It also postpones any political settlement, which is what is really needed.
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Peace Picks August 8-12
- Technology: Improving Elections One Bit Or Byte At A Time? | Tuesday, August 9th | 3:15 pm -4:45 pm | Pew Charitable Trusts – Research Facility| Click HERE for more information | Election apps, online tools, electronic poll books, and more, are changing every aspect of the elections process. What role do legislators play in adopting new technology? What is the price for implementing new voting tools? And what about the human factor—how does all this impact voters and poll workers? Speakers will include David Becker of the Pew Charitable Trusts, Washington, D.C.; Matthew Mastersonof the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Maryland; and Amber McReynolds, Denver Elections Division, Colorado
- Women And The SDGs: Partner Perspectives | Tuesday, August 9th | 4:00pm -6:00pm | Woodrow Wilson Center| Click HERE to register | Please join Plan International USA and the Woodrow Wilson Center for a practical discussion on how various partners can and should work together to move the SDG needle for women and girls. The panelists will share their perspectives and the challenges they face, and discuss what the SDGs really mean for women globally. To enhance the conversation, 26 women leaders from 18 countries participating in Plan’s Global Women in Management program will also be in attendance to share their views from the field. Speakers include Tony Pipa, Chief Strategy Officer at USAID; Natalie Co, Senior Manager at Accenture Development Partnerships; Roger-Mark de Souza, Director of Population, Environmental Security, and Resilience, Woodrow Wilson Center; and Xolile Manyoni, Project Coordinator/Co-founder, Sinamandla, South Africa (Global Women in Management participant, Plan USA). The discussion will be moderated by Ann Hudock, Senior Vice President for International Programs at Plan International USA. The discussion will be from 4-5pm, with a reception to follow from 5-6pm
- Teaching The Middle East Through Art, Music, And Culture | Wednesday, August 10th | 9:00am -3:00pm | Elliott School of International Affairs| Click HERE to register | This workshop will help K-12 educators develop strategies to look beyond the dominant narratives of conflict and violence in the Middle East and instead teach students about the region through its wide array of peoples and cultures. Along with presentations from leading scholars, we will engage discussions and activities, and distribute information to help educators access resources on teaching about the Middle East. Speakers include Ted Swedenburg, Professor of Anthropology, University of Arkansas and Hisham Aidi, Lecturer, Columbia University.
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Stronger Erdogan, weaker Turkey
The July 15 Turkish coup attempt was swiftly quashed. Just as swiftly came President Erdogan’s fulfillment of his promise that those responsible “will pay a heavy price for their treason to Turkey.” Why the coup failed, who was behind it, and what is the future of US-Turkey relations were the main questions explored at the Atlantic Council event last Tuesday “Ten Days after Quelling the Coup: Where is Turkey Headed?” Moderated by Aaron Stein, Senior Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the event featued Elmira Bayrasli, Visiting Fellow at New America, and Steven Cook, ENI Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Cook offered four reasons for the coup failure. The first and most important was the divided Turkish military. The coup was a factious scheme, not a unified undertaking. Second, the plotters underestimated Erdogan’s hold on power, which he has held since 2003. Third, the Turkish military is not as strong as it seemed. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Fethullah Gulen — whom Erdogan regards as the main culprit of the coup attempt — used to be partners and worked in parallel to weaken and subordinate the military. Lastly, Turkish society appears no longer willing to accept military rule.
Bayrasli clarified that Fethullah Gulen is a US-based cleric who founded the Hizmet movement. Rooted in moderate Islam, Hizmet has attracted millions of followers and has funded hundreds of schools, think tanks, and media outlets around the world. Erdogan accuses Gulen of orchestrating the coup and has urged the US to extradite him. It is possible he was behind the coup, but it is also true that Gulen has become Erdogan’s “default scapegoat.” Until Turkey provides solid evidence, the US cannot extradite Gulen, but the claim of his involvement advances Erdogan’s effort to concentrate power.
Bayrasli noted that the AKP came to power with technocrats who delivered. Turkey has seen enormous economic growth since Erdogan came to power. But economic prosperity hasn’t been matched with political and social advancement.
Cook and Bayrasli believe that Washington and the EU are positioned as mere spectators, with little leverage over Turkey’s internal affairs. The implicit Turkish threat to send a large number of refugees in the direction of Europe means that the EU will remain mute over Erdogan’s purge. According to Cook, “Turkey has the EU over a barrel.” Turkey’s paramount importance in the fight against ISIS will silence Washington too.
With its military in chaos, with police and the ministry of interior decimated by purges, Turkey may not remain an effective partner in the fight against ISIS, either in controlling its borders with Syria or working with the US at Incirlik. Who is going to substitute thousands of judges and teachers, and tens of thousands of policemen and army personnel? The purges are weakening Turkey and are undermining its capacity for effective governance. Turkey might have the EU over a barrel, but at least Washington should not be a mere spectator.
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