Syria frays, Libya wobbles, Yemen improves
The Middle East and North Africa have become difficult to follow without a scorecard. Here is a quick update:
In Syria, the ceasefire appears to be unraveling. The rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra made gains this week in ceasefire territory. This opposition group extended their territorial holds in Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia provinces. This new offensive, though limited in extent, takes back some of the territory the Syrian regime grabbed during the Russian airstrike campaign in early 2016. Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliated group, was not a part of the ceasefire agreement, but other rebel groups, such as Jaish al-Islam, have collaborated with them. This poses a threat to the ceasefire holding and the next round of peace talks, planned for April 13.
Even though the opposition has taken back some territory, the regime still holds the upper hand at the negotiating table. The Russian-backed offensive and support allows Assad to keep his seat as the head of the regime. Russia does appear to want a peaceful solution to the crisis and proved so with the partial withdrawal of troops in Syria. The opposition says it wants a compromise, but they are not willing to compromise with their demand that Assad should be removed from power. The regime has spoken of a more inclusive government, but only with Assad as the leader. How successful this next round of peace talks will be is questionable. Neither side wants to compromise Assad’s position. His position is integral to both sides’ approach in achieving a peaceful solution.
The situation in Libya seemed to improve last week and the beginning of this week as the new unity government arrived in Tripoli. The UN-backed government faced competition from rivals in Tripoli and Tobruk. It seemed that the government in Tripoli was prepared to step down until Prime Minister Khalifa Ghweil declared otherwise. The eastern Tobruk government has not voted to formally recognize the unity government. This recognition is essential in order to “establish legitimacy.”
The new unity government will have to face the challenge of garnering support from the militias that backed the rival Tripoli government in the past. Though unity government Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj does not want to suggest that he needs this militia support, in fact it is imperative to gain the backing of these groups in order to implement real change and lessen the violence in Libya.
In Yemen, Saudi-led airstrikes on civilians continued in March. The Mastaba market incident left 120 dead on March 15. Peace talks on Yemen have been agreed upon, though, and this will hopefully lessen the impact of violence against civilians. The Houthis and President Hadi’s delegation will meet in Kuwait on April 18.
Recently President Hadi fired and appointed a new vice president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and prime minister, Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, to his government. The new vice president is a key army general. The Hadi camp thinks this move will strengthen it at the peace talks. Defrocked Vice President Khaled Bahah thinks the move will be detrimental and detract from Hadi’s legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the situation in Yemen looks more positive, as both sides have agreed on a ceasefire, implemented on April 10. The city of Taiz, home to 200,000 civilians, will be the key testing ground.
The Syrian ceasefire agreement is fraying, the new unity government in Libya is wobbling, and Yemen’s situation going into peace talks looks a bit better.
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Heresies
The Middle East Institute today published my heresies concerning America’s future in the region. Essentially I agree with President Obama that American interests in the region are declining and shifting: the nuclear deal with Iran has postponed the proliferation threat and American dependence on Middle East oil is declining. Other interests like the fight against terrorism and maintaining relations with our allies require less military presence in the region and more attention to civilian functions like state-building, diplomacy to create a regional security architecture, and continuation of democracy support to those who desire it. Military assistance to allies in no way justifies the current massive US military presence in the Middle East, which attracts more problems than it solves.
This is not as different from Ken Pollack’s recent Fight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East as might be imagined. Ken also emphasizes the important civilian dimensions of stabilizing the region, especially once the civil wars are brought to an end. But he uses the oil issue as his trump card in arguing for continued US engagement and even re-commitment to the region, as he fears breakdown of Saudi Arabia.
I am perfectly willing to concede that is a possibility, but it is one the Saudis have every incentive to prevent. How redoubling American military commitment to the Middle East would contribute is not clear to me. I am confident that any future regime in the Kingdom will want to protect itself and its oil exports. A disruption of Saudi exports, should it occur, can be met more readily by drawdown of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, coordinated with other countries through the International Energy Agency as well as with China and India. Getting those two major importers of Middle Eastern oil to hold at least 90 days of strategic stocks would do much more for stability of the oil market than the Fifth Fleet, which is ill-suited to respond in any substantial way to internal disorder in Saudi Arabia.
Should an oil supply disruption last a long time, the consequent increase in prices will bring back a lot of “non-conventional” oil and gas. The technology for producing it is spreading around the world, so it is unlikely we’ll see a rise much above $70 per barrel during the next decade or more.
The Saudis could also do some things to improve the security of their oil exports. Existing pipelines that circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz are not used to full capacity. New pipelines could be built. The Kingdom would be wise to improve treatment of its Shia minority, many of whom live in oil-producing areas.
Some think Syria demonstrates that it would be better to fight wars in the Middle East than reduce our commitments there. I’d be quick to admit that President Obama’s inattention to Syria during the peaceful phase of its revolution was a serious mistake. He should have ensured that saying Bashar al Assad needed to step down was translated into action. It was clear from early on that his staying would lead to violence, that violence would lead to sectarian polarization, and that polarization would lead to radicalization.
But I disagree with those who claim the best way of ensuring that Assad left would have been to attack his chemical weapons facilities. That option did not arise until August 2013, which was well after the rebellion turned violent. Two years earlier would have been the best time to act, most likely through diplomatic and political means rather than military ones.
The failure to do so has created an enormous mess in Syria, but it is one that does not actually affect oil production and exports much. Even the humanitarian catastrophe should concern the Europeans more than the US, because of their vulnerability to migrants.
The big challenge in the Middle East today is creation of some kind of security architecture to channel competition into peaceful arenas. While American military capacity has a role to play in shaping the environment in which that is achieved, the task is essentially a diplomatic one requiring Iran and Saudi Arabia to come to terms and seek to reduce the threats that each perceives, stemming in part from the other. That should not be impossible. We did at least that well with the Soviet Union during a period of much greater threat to the US than any today. Detente is not a four letter word.
The Middle East today needs more diplomacy, state-building and democracy. It could do with a lot less saber-rattling and killing.
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Peace Picks April 11-15
- Egypt’s Former Foreign Minister on Regional Statecraft and Domestic Reform | Tuesday, April 12th | 12:00-1:30 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Nabil Fahmy, former foreign minister of Egypt, for a discussion about Egypt’s political and socioeconomic challenges and its role in regional politics and stability. Egypt’s government is under pressure to deliver economic development, good governance, and increased security in light of growing terrorist threats. These challenges come amid growing regional tensions- from the conflict in Syria to the war in Yemen. How can the state better meet its domestic objectives and how can Egypt play an effective role in brokering greater Middle East stability?
- The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Obama Doctrine | Tuesday, April 12th | 1:00-3:30 | Middle East Policy Council | Email info@mepc.org to RSVP | Our panel will address Jeffrey Goldberg‘s essay, “The Obama Doctrine,” and how it impacts U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Please RSVP promptly for limited space. Speakers include James F. Jeffrey, Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, Alireza Nader, Senior International Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation, and Fahad Nazer, Senior Political Analyst, JTG, Inc. and Non-Resident Fellow, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. The moderator will be Richard Schmierer, Former Ambassador to Oman and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Middle East Policy Council.
- The Fourth Annual Nancy Bernkopf Tucker Memorial Lecture: The Politics of Memory in East Asia | Tuesday, April 12th | 4:00-6:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II last year brought another round of contentious memory politics in East Asia. Despite the seeming sameness of the debates, in fact the practices and norms of public memory have substantially altered since the end of the war, creating what speaker Carol Gluck calls a “global memory culture.” Changes in the law, politics, society, criteria of knowledge, and concepts of responsibility have transformed our understanding of what it means to do justice to the past. How then do these changes relate to the politics of memory in East Asia today? Carol Gluck, George Sansom Professor of History at Columbia University, will speak.
- Outlook for Security and Integration of Albania and the Western Balkans | Wednesday, April 13th | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since the collapse of the communist regime more than two decades ago, Albania has undergone significant political, economic, and social reforms. Albania became a NATO member in 2009, a European Union (EU) candidate country in 2014, and signed a declaration of strategic partnership with the United States in 2015. Given the increasingly fragmented climate among EU member states over Europe’s capacity to overcome current challenges, the EU’s enlargement agenda has lost momentum. Meanwhile, instability in the Western Balkans has been fueled by unprecedented waves of refugees, and political and economic uncertainty to the South and East. As Prime Minister, H.E. Edi Rama plays a significant role in directing the path for Albania in EU accession negotiations and regional cooperation, particularly through the Berlin Process framework of annual summits in the Western Balkans. In his visit to Washington, DC, Prime Minister Rama will address Albania’s security priorities and goals for the NATO Warsaw Summit, and provide views on Albania’s reform progress.
- Supporting Tunisia’s Imperiled Transition | Thursday, April 14th | 8:30-12:15 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Tunisia remains the Arab Awakening’s last best hope. Its political transition is as remarkable as it is fragile—imperiled by both security challenges and significant socioeconomic obstacles. Join us for a discussion of how Tunisia and its international partners can forge a new and more constructive dynamic and reverse the country’s recent troubling trajectory. This event will launch a new Carnegie report entitled Between Peril and Promise: A New Framework for Partnership With Tunisia. Panels and panelists may be found here.
- Turkey, its neighborhood, and the international order | Thursday, April 14th | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Increasingly, there are concerns about the direction of Turkey’s politics, economy, security, and foreign policy. Debate is growing about the Turkish economy’s vibrancy, and its commitment to democratic norms is being questioned. Moreover, against the backdrop of the chaos in the region, its ability to maintain peace and order is hindered. These difficulties coincide with a larger trend in which the global economy remains fragile, European integration is fracturing, and international governance seems under duress. The spill-over from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq has precipitated a refugee crisis of historic scale, testing the resolve, unity, and values of the West. Will these challenges prove pivotal in reshaping the international system? Will these trials ultimately compel the West to formulate an effective collective response? Will Turkey prove to be an asset or a liability for regional security and order? On April 14, the Turkey Project of the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings will host a discussion to assess Turkey’s strategic orientation amid the ever-changing international order. Panelists will include Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Bruce Jones, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan of the University of Maryland, and Francis Riccardone of the Atlantic Council. Cansen Başaran-Symes, president of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) will make introductory remarks. Turkey Project Director and TÜSİAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci will moderate the discussion. After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
- From ISIS to Declining Oil Prices: Qubad Talabani on the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Challenges | Thursday, April 14th | 10:00-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Opening remarks will be made by Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace. H.E. Qubad Talabani, Deputy Prime Minister, Kurdistan Regional Government, will speak. Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center, will moderate. Please join us on April 14 for a discussion with Qubad Talabani, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG). Long an island of stability in a Middle East marked by conflict, the Kurdish region of Iraq now faces a perfect storm. Its finances have been severely affected by the dramatic decline in the price of oil, its main source of revenue. The KRG also faces a constitutional crisis because President Masoud Barzani’s term has ended without the Kurdish political parties finding a definitive way forward or agreement on succession. And the KRG’s Peshmerga military force is engaged with the United States and its allies in an extended offensive to rout the self-declared Islamic State extremist group and liberate the nearby city of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest. Amidst all of this, President Barzani also has indicated that the KRG will hold a referendum in 2016 on whether the region should seek independence from Iraq.
- A New Economic Growth Strategy for Pakistan: A Conversation with Pakistani Finance Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar | Thursday, April 14th | 2:30-4:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | When Pakistan’s current government took office in June 2013, the economy was under tremendous stress. Nearly three years later, estimates suggest that the economy could achieve 4.5 percent GDP growth in fiscal year 2015-16, which would be the highest rate in eight years. Inflation and interest rates have decreased, tax revenues have grown, and the fiscal deficit has shrunk. Additionally, foreign exchange reserves have crossed $20 billion for the first time in history. Meanwhile, the government recently had a successful 10th review from the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, however, the government confronts political, security, and energy challenges that have hindered a full economic recovery. At this event, His Excellency Mohammad Ishaq Dar, Pakistan’s finance minister, will unveil a new two-year strategy to place Pakistan’s economic growth on par with that of other emerging economies in South Asia. He will also speak about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Pakistan’s current security situation.
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Unworthy
I do talking head gigs for PressTV, Tehran’s official English-language service, every few weeks, thinking it is useful for Iranians to hear now and again an American perspective on the many issues that divide us. Most of PressTV‘s American commentators are unknowns who spout a pro-Tehran, anti-American line.
Yesterday’s broadcast included Mohammad Marandi, an articulate and distinguished professor at the University of Tehran. The program is for the most part self-explanatory. I recommend watching it: .
Towards the end Professor Marandi cites an interview by Al Jazeera with retired American General Michael Flynn. This interview is virtually unknown in the US, but plays an outsized role in Iran, where it is taken as crucial evidence that Washington knowingly and intentionally supported the Islamic State in 2012 and has continued to do so. I got little chance to respond on the air, and in any event the Flynn interview, sliced and diced by Russia Today, requires more than a brief comment on TV.
Flynn was head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) July 2012-August 2014. Al Jazeera starts the interview citing this apparently archived exchange from Fox News:
Michael Flynn (archive): I’ve been at war with Islam, or a, or a component of Islam, for the last decade.
Mehdi Hasan (VO): And bonded by a common enemy, can the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran finally work out their differences?
Michael Flynn (archive): I could go on and on all day about Iran and their behaviour, you know, and their lies, flat out lies, and then their spewing of constant hatred, no matter whenever they talk.
Funny thing: I never hear Tehran cite that opening line. Nor do they cite the parts of the interview in which Flynn blames “Islam” for extremist ideology.
He goes on to say that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake, but so too was the withdrawal:
Michael Flynn: [TALKING OVER Yeah, ]I, I mean, I hate to say it’s not my job but that – my job was to ensure that the accuracy of our intelligence that was being presented was as good as it could be, and I will tell you, it goes before 2012. I mean, when we were, when we were in Iraq and we still had decisions to be made before there was a decision to pull out of Iraq in 2011. I mean, it was very clear what we were, what we were going to face.
Flynn is obviously inarticulate, so it is not very clear what he means, but I imagine he is claiming that he anticipated the rise of extremists. Then comes this:
Mehdi Hasan: – “declared or undeclared Salafist” – it’s not secret any more, it was released under FOI. The quote is: “There is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist Principality in eastern Syria and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want in order to isolate the Syrian regime.” The US saw the ISIL caliphate coming and did nothing.
Michael Flynn: Yeah, I think that what we – where we missed the point. I mean, where we totally blew it, I think, was in the very beginning. I mean, we’re talking four years now into this effort in Syria. Most people won’t even remember, it’s only been a couple of years: The Free Syrian Army, that movement. I mean, where are they today? Al-Nusra. Where are they today, and what have … how much have they changed? When you don’t get in and help somebody, they’re gonna find other means to achieve their goals. And I think right now, what we have allowed is we’ve got –
I think what Flynn is saying here is that we were slow to support the moderates and should have done more early in the game, because failure to do so allowed extremism to develop. But that is not what Tehran wants to hear, so they cite this:
Mehdi Hasan: Let me – let me just to, before we move on, just to clarify once more, you are basically saying that even in government at the time, you knew those [Salafist extremist] groups were around. You saw this analysis –
Michael Flynn: [TALKING OVER] Sure.
Mehdi Hasan: – and you were arguing against it. But who wasn’t listening?
Michael Flynn: I think the administration.
Mehdi Hasan: So the administration turned a blind eye to your analysis –
Michael Flynn: I don’t know if they turned a blind eye. I think it was a decision. I think it was a wilful[sic].
Mehdi Hasan: A wilful decision to go – support an insurgency that had Salafist, al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood?
That’s where Tehran and Moscow like to stop, but Flynn actually went on:
Michael Flynn: [INTERRUPTING] Well, a wilful decision to do what they’re doing, which, which you have to really – you have to really ask the President, what is it that he actually is doing with the, with the policy that is in place, because it is very, very confusing? I’m sitting here today, Mehdi, and I don’t, I can’t tell you exactly what that is, and I’ve been at this for a long time.
So Flynn said there was a willful decision, but he did not say it was a willful decision to support Salafists, Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. The interviewer asks that question and Flynn refuses to give an answer, saying he doesn’t understand what the Administration was doing and you’ll have to ask the President. Flynn is clearly an opponent of the Obama Administration and doing his best to suggest it is soft on terrorism, but it would have been foolish of him to suggest Washington supported it.
Of course even if Flynn had said what Tehran and Moscow allege, that would only be the view of only one retired general, one with distinctly anti-Muslim, anti-Iranian and anti-Obama views.
Let me be clear on my own view of what happened. The Islamic State of today has its origins in the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), as Professor Marandi correctly said in the PressTV program. It gained traction in Iraq, especially in 2006/7, due in part to Iran’s ally in Syria, Bashar al Assad, who allowed extremists and supplies to funnel into Iraq from Syria. But by 2010, the Americans had decimated ISI.
It was the chaos in Syria that allowed today’s Islamic State to rise from the ashes. That chaos was due to Bashar al Assad’s military crackdown on the nonviolent rebellion that started in Syria in March 2011. Tehran has supported Assad’s crackdown with oil and money, military advisers and commanders, and Hizbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops. Few of those efforts, however, have been directed against the Islamic State. That’s why Assad undertook the recent offensive to chase the Islamic State from Palmyra: in order to burnish his credentials as a fighter against extremists, credentials needed at the ongoing UN peace negotiations.
The US, by contrast, has targeted its efforts against IS, both in Syria and in Iraq. US airstrikes as well as assistance to Iraqi forces is entirely focused on IS. The US has also insisted that the rebels in Syria focus their attention on IS, notoriously to the dismay of those who would like the US to provide more support for the fight against the Assad regime. The US may have been much less discriminating in 2012, as General Flynn suggests in the interview, but it is wrong to suggest that Washington ever supported the Islamic State or Al Qaeda. Tehran should drop that line, which as I said on PressTV is unworthy.
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Inclusive governance matters
Lebanon’s Assafir newspaper asked a few questions the other day. I answered:
Q: How do you explain the continuous US delay for the Mosul battle ?
A: I would find it easier to explain the Iraqi Government’s setting of unrealistic deadlines, which it does in an effort to prevent political criticism. The Americans are not in a hurry, because they know this will be a big and difficult job fraught with risk. They want it done right.
Q: Many see that Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria are interrelated battles. Why? And what do you think?
A: These are the two centers of gravity of the Islamic State. It can’t afford to lose either one, and if it does it will retreat to the other.
Q: How do you explain that the US is leading the military effort in western Iraq, and the Russians are doing the same in the preparation in eastern Syria?
A: I’m not really sure that is correct. US and Coalition aircraft and US-backed ground forces have been very active in eastern Syria. So far as I know, Russian intervention there is limited to relatively few bombing runs. Moscow’s main effort has been against moderate rebel forces in the west.
Q: How do you see the contradictions in the US war on terrorism when it comes to Syria and Iraq?
A: In Iraq the US is backing a government it thinks sincerely committed to fighting terrorism. In Syria, Washington is backing rebels it thinks are sincerely committed to fighting terrorism. I wouldn’t describe that as a contradiction.
The biggest issue in my mind is how territories taken back from the Islamic State will be governed. I think Haider al Abadi will try to govern in an inclusive way. I doubt Bashar al Assad will.
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Getting peace to the pointy end of the spear
The Foundation Center and and the Peace and Security Funders Group this morning offer a flashy new webpage and report, “The Peace and Security Funding Index: an Analysis of Global Foundation Grantmaking.” The report, not really an “index” in my way of thinking, is the first of an annual series. It’s a brave effort to assemble in one place the who, what and where of private grants related to peace and security worldwide.
The result is a molehill: $283 million from 288 foundations spread across nearly 2000 grants to 1200 organizations. Even assuming that the survey has missed almost as much grant money as it has tallied, the total is likely under 1% of the Foundation Center’s total of $25 billion in grants in 2013. Most conflict countries are poor and many poor countries are in conflict. So this is a remarkably small amount devoted to a problem that on the face of it would appear to merit much more.
This is not for lack of US participation. The top six peace and security grant makers are American: Open Society (Soros), Carnegie Corp., National Endowment for Democracy, Ford, Buffett and MacArthur. So too are 12 of the top 15. Only Swiss, Dutch and Canadian foundations make it into that upper crust.
The bulk of the money (64%) went to a category labelled “stability” that ranges pretty far from the pointy end of the spear to include things like climate security, national security, foreign policy and diplomacy. Not that I object: I teach many of those things and appreciate that a good deal of the material I rely on comes from some of these grants. Twenty per cent of the total was spent on research and evaluation. Three-quarters of the money went to institutions in the developed world (the Global North in the report, which isn’t intended literally). One-third went to global issues. Africa was the region most focused on.
The newly minted Sustainable Development Goals include no. 16: “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” Peppered throughout the other goals are many other peace and security objectives. It seems to me private foundations might do well to ponder steering a bit more money and effort in that direction.
Of course one of the reasons they don’t is that they can’t. This may sound odd: conflict zones have become downright dangerous. That wasn’t always so true. There is an enormous difference between working for peace and security in Kosovo and Bosnia during the wars there and trying to do anything like that in Syria, Libya or Yemen today. Even Ukraine is far less permissive than the Balkans of 20 plus years ago.
An Iraqi engineer visited me today. A Muslawi who worked for more than a decade to build democratic local governance there, he is now an expatriate, chased from his hometown by the Islamic State. I imagine he is unlikely to return permanently to his country, or to encourage his soon-to-be American children to do so, whatever his current intentions may be.
So in addition to urging the private foundations to spend more overall on peace and security, I’d also like to urge them to spend more on figuring out how to get their resources closer to the conflict zones that really count today. Technology gives us capabilities to track and aggregate information gathered remotely. I am thinking of the work of Bellingcat and Caerus, as well as many others. Information is flowing very rapidly out of conflict zones. What we need to do now is turn that information into on-the-ground efforts that produce peace and security. Easier said than done, I know, but still worth saying and contemplating.
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