The Superbowl and American foreign policy
That’s patriot Lady Gaga for those like me who wouldn’t recognize her on the subway.
While you were all enjoying the Superbowl, I was wondering what it tells us about US foreign policy. I’m late with this post, but it took me time to convince myself to publish it. Some of you will think I made a mistake.
First the obvious. American football is a sport in which bringing overwhelming force to bear is paramount. Many American politicians feel the same way about foreign policy: they want to bomb the smithereens out of anyone who threatens the United States. Finesse, so important to that other sport known as “football,” is the least of their concerns. Making the sand glow and wiping out enemies are the goals.
But of course that is a superficial view of events both on the battlefield and on the gridiron. There is a cerebral dimension to both, one that requires coordination between different players on the field, offense and defense as well as “special teams,” analogous in more than their name to the vital “special forces” that now dominate the American approach to killing terrorists. The ground and air games also require careful coordination, in both football and war, as well as a lot of intelligence on the opposition.
The parallels extend to the audience as well. Both American football and modern war are best viewed from a distance. Even the half-time show is far more interesting on TV than in the stadium, where many of the special effects appear piddling. Nor can you see all that much of the game, unless you’ve got terrific seats. TV has learned to make warfare look spectacular too. You can’t smell it or hear how loud and terrifying it is. But you can admire its precision without worrying about its accuracy.
The long-term effects of football and war bear comparison as well. Both cause real and visible harm to some of the participants, but they cause far more but less visible harm to many more. I’m amazed that people are still watching football knowing its effect on the players’ brains and life spans. Its popularity sheds new light for me on the Roman passion for gladiators. Post-traumatic stress and suicide are the analogous long-term effects of warfare. They should certainly be weighed in any future decision to go to war, though I doubt they will be. Our political leaders show little more concern for the brains of our troops than football coaches show for the brains of their players.
There is really nothing glorious about war or football. Nor are they proper entertainments. War it can be argued is sometimes necessary, or unavoidable. Football isn’t. There the already stretched analogy breaks down.
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Dire
Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is making noises about conducting a referendum soon to decide its political future. A drafting committee is working on the wording of the proposition. President Barzani and his PDK are committed to conducting the referendum this year.
Whatever the wording, Kurdistan’s largely young Kurdish population will understand it to be about independence. Ditto the large Kurdish diaspora, which referendum advocates want to enfranchise. Most of Kurdistan’s now substantial Arab population of people displaced by war will not be able to vote.
The outcome is predictable: 90% and likely more will vote yes, whatever the precise wording.
The case for Kurdistan’s independence is on the face of it compelling. Saddam Hussein’s regime mistreated its population, chasing Kurds from their homes and even out of the country. Kurds were even gassed during the 1988 Anfal campaign. Kurdistan won a large measure of autonomy in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, but the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil has been at best rocky since then. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not received all the oil revenue it is entitled to, it has had to defend its own territory from the Islamic State without help from Baghdad and it faces demands from its population, most of whom no longer speak Arabic, for complete independence. The KRG claims to be a democracy and to treat minorities well.
So why shouldn’t it happen?
The geopolitical circumstances are not favorable. While Kurdistan has vastly improved its relations with Ankara, large parts of eastern Turkey were slated at the end of World War I to become part of a Kurdish state. Turkey will not want to see independence for its southern neighbor while it represses a violent Kurdish rebellion on its own territory, for fear of the irredentist consequences. Iranians feel even more strongly on this issue: what the Kurds call “eastern Kurdistan” is inside the Islamic Republic. Iran’s population is not much more than 50% Persian. Tehran will fear the Kurds won’t be the only ones looking to get out. The Baloch have been rebelling since 2004.
Iraqi Kurds naturally look to the Americans for support. Washington was vital to their survival in the 90s, when it protected them with a no-fly zone in northern Iraq. The Kurds supported the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and happily hosted American forces. The KRG has welcomed Iraqi Christians displaced by ISIS and maintains friendly relations with the US, even welcoming American investment and admitting Americans without the visas the Baghdad government requires. My Kurdish friends ask plaintively: don’t the Americans want a new friendly ally in the Middle East? One with at least a nominal commitment to multiethnic democracy?
Washington might, but it has global concerns, which include maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, where Moscow is supporting breakaway territories in each of those countries. Independence for Kurdistan would open the proverbial Pandora’s box, strengthening Russian arguments and undermining the international consensus that has formed against independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the annexation of Crimea and the rebellion in Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the aspirations of Transnistria. China will be no less opposed to Kurdistan’s independence than the Americans, for fear of the implications for Tibet.
Even inside Iraq, there are issues. The boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan are not agreed. While the KRG seized the so-called “disputed territories” during its offensive against the Islamic State in 2014, Baghdad has not agreed that they belong within Kurdistan. The KRG is offering to conduct referenda in these territories on whether they want to join with Kurdistan, fulfilling a provision of the Iraqi constitution. But doing that while the KRG is in control is unlikely to convince Baghdad that a free choice is being made.
At current oil prices around $30/barrel, the KRG is nowhere near having the financial resources to be independent. Baghdad isn’t providing the funding it should, but independence would leave Kurdistan even worse off. It is still an oil rentier state, despite its hopes for a more diversified economy. My guess is that oil prices in the future will have a hard time going over $70-80/barrel, because above that level massive quantities of unconventionally produced oil and gas (as well as other alternatives) will come on line. The KRG needs closer to $100/barrel to meet its financial requirements with oil production even well above current levels.
Advocates of an independence referendum are claiming that it would be prelude to a re-negotiation of the relationship with Baghdad, not necessarily a one-way street to independence. Anyone who knows young Kurds will doubt that after voting for what they think of as independence they will accept some sort of confederal arrangement to stay nominally inside Iraq. An independence referendum is far more likely to be prelude to still another war, in which Arabs (both Sunni and Shia) fight Kurds to determine the borders they have failed to agree on for more than a decade.
The implications of a referendum without prior agreement, both on the legitimacy of the process and on Kurdistan’s borders, are dire.
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Assad is fulfilling his own prophecy
With Syrian government and Iranian forces encircling Aleppo aided by Russian air attacks, it behooves us to consider what happens if President Assad wins. He is close to achieving his main goal by taking control of what he regards as “useful” Syria, which includes the corridor north from Damascus at least to Aleppo and west to Lebanon and the Mediterranean.
This Assad victory would not defeat ISIS, which controls territory to the east of this corridor, or the Kurdish forces that control most of the border with Turkey. Neither ISIS nor the Kurds have clashed more than occasionally with Syrian government forces, the Iranians and Russians. The Kurds appear to have an explicit understanding with the regime, which maintains government facilities within Kurdish-controlled territory. The regime and ISIS stay out of each other’s way.
Aleppo was once the largest city in Syria, with more than 2 million inhabitants. How many remain is unclear. Tens of thousands have fled in recent days north to the Turkish border, where they are blocked from entering. Many more presumably remain in the city, some in areas that have long been regime-controlled. If the encirclement of opposition areas is successful, they face starvation, bombardment and eventual surrender. Large parts of the city are already destroyed.
Idlib, to the soutwest of Aleppo, is also under attack and at risk of being cut off from Aleppo and from Turkey.
Judging from what has occurred elsewhere, there will be little effort to rebuild, except in areas dominated by or repopulated with Alawites and Shia. Syria’s Sunnis and others who have opposed Assad will be left to fend for themselves. Neither Russia nor Iran has provided significant reconstruction aid, the bill for which will be well over $100 billion. The Europeans, Americans and Gulf have provided most of the humanitarian assistance, relying in part on the United Nations, but they will presumably be unwilling to pay for reconstruction in areas where the regime regains control.
With moderate rebel forces defeated in the north, the odds are that the extremist forces of Jabhat al Nusra (JN), an Al Qaeda affiliate, and the Islamic State (ISIS) will gain. JN cadres appear to be mainly Syrian. ISIS is not. We should expect that whatever moderate Syrian forces remain will ally with JN, which will continue to fight. ISIS relies heavily on foreign fighters and is much less likely to attract many Syrians. Kurdish and allied Arab forces have been pressing south towards Raqqa, which is the de facto “capital” of the ISIS caliphate, but taking the city would require a far bigger Arab force than appears to exist right now.
In the south, moderate forces are holding up a bit better, but they have not come under the same kind of intensive regime, Russian and Iranian assault mounted around Aleppo. ISIS has been active in a small part of the south, but so far without any big success. It remains to be seen what will happen there.
A regime takeover of Aleppo and Idlib will end any serious military prospects for the moderate non-Kurdish opposition, except in the Azaz pocket near the border with Turkey. Even there, the Kurds and regime, Iranian and Russian forces may combine to push them out and force displaced Arabs into Turkey. Assad would be glad to add to Erdogan’s woes.
Assad has long wanted the contest in Syria to be seen as a fight between his regime and the extremists. He is getting close to driving the relative moderates off the battlefield, fulfilling his own prophecy. The consequences for many Syrians, for Turkey and for the prospects for peace will be disastrous.
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Kurdistan keeps reinventing itself
On Wednesday, SAIS hosted an event entitled “Kurdistan: Re-Inventing Itself, Yet Again.” Sasha Toperich, Senior Fellow and Director, Mediterranean Basin Initiative, Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS made opening remarks. Hemin Hawrami, Director, Foreign Relations Office, Kurdistan Democratic Party gave a keynote address, which was followed by a panel discussion. Rebeen Pasha, WYLN Senior Fellow, Mediterranean Basin Initiative, introduced and moderated the panel. Panelists included Hawrami and Salam Mohammad Islam, Chief Executive Director, Rwanga Foundation.
Toperich explained that Iraqi Kurdistan has a 600 mile front with ISIS and 1.8 million refugees/IDPs. Baghdad has not provided the KRG with the funding it promised. Iraqi Kurdistan is a flag without a country and a safe harbor for minorities affected by ISIS atrocities. The different groups in Iraq should be able to chart their own destinies while being reconciled with each other. If Iraq must remain united, the Kurds must be able to take out their own loans and revive their economy. He strongly supports the KRG’s independence referendum.
Hawrami stated that Iraqi Kurdistan is an important actor in a chaotic Middle East. Many of Iraqi Kurdistan’s challenges are external. ISIS is a symptom of sectarianism in Iraq and developments in Syria. A military response to ISIS is a short-term solution. ISIS was a terrorist organization but became a terrorist state when it captured Mosul. The KRG warned Baghdad about ISIS, but Maliki didn’t listen. When ISIS attacked the KRG, they aimed to:
- Gain control of disputed areas claimed by the KRG.
- Stop the independence referendum.
ISIS is a combination of Takfirism and Ba’athism. The KRG has a three-phase counter-ISIS strategy:
- Stopping ISIS.
- Rolling back ISIS.
- Defeating ISIS.
Over 1,600 Peshmerga sacrificed their lives to accomplish the first two goals. The KRG remains threatened; there are still daily skirmishes. But defeating ISIS requires liberating Mosul; the Iraqi government isn’t yet finished with Ramadi. Liberating Mosul requires boots on the ground (Sunnis and Peshmerga). But they will need more equipment. The Peshmerga have been unpaid for four months but are still fighting.
Iraqi Kurdistan has experienced three shocks since 2014:
- Maliki cut the budget for the KRG in February 2014.
- The influx of 1.8 million refugees and IDPs.
- Low oil prices.
Until 2013, Iraqi Kurdistan was the only region in the Middle East and North Africa with double-digit economic growth. Had it been independent, its rank in the areas of openness and governance would have been comparable with Malaysia and Indonesia. Unemployment was at 6% but is now ~25%. The poverty rate has jumped from 3% to 13%. The KRG is still learning how to govern; more still needs to be done. Kurdistan wants dialogue with Baghdad (not military conflict) but doesn’t want to be part of another decade of sectarianism and bad governance. Dialogue with Baghdad has improved; they now have a joint committee with Baghdad that meets monthly.
That is why they are holding the referendum (hopefully this year), which is not for immediate independence but asks what people want for their future. It will be for all citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan, including those in the diaspora.
The Kurds have been victims since Sykes-Picot but the borders are now only on maps. The KRG hopes these borders can be redrawn through peaceful coexistence and wants to add to the number of functioning political entities in the region. The KRG has become a safe haven for Iraqi Christians, most of whom now live in Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is a villa in the jungle that must be protected.
Pasha stated that he sees both challenges and opportunities for Iraqi Kurdistan. He grew up under Saddam and couldn’t imagine a future without Saddam. If we detach ourselves from the current situation, we can focus on Kurdistan’s future potential. Investing in young people is key for Iraqi Kurdistan’s future since 2/3 of the population is under 30.
Hawrami, in response to a question, said the Kurds believe the disputed territories are Kurdish and have waited ten years for censuses and referenda in these areas. Since the Iraqi Army’s retreat, the KRG has provided security but won’t impose a military status-quo. The KRG will hold special referenda in these areas for them to decide if they want to be part of Kurdistan. The KRG will also not accept interference by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). If these areas choose to join Iraqi Kurdistan, the KRG will provide them with special status based on power-sharing and equal opportunities.
Another audience member asked about KRG-Turkey relations. Hawrami explained that Turkey and the KRG have common interests; they have strong economic ties and the KRG supports the peace process in Turkey. Out of 3,300 foreign companies working in Iraqi Kurdistan, over 1,300 are Turkish. Turkey has not publicly rejected the independence referendum and recognizes that Iraqi Kurdistan adds to the stability of the region. Iraqi Kurdistan is not a threat to its neighbors.
A third audience member asked if it has become increasingly difficult for non-Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan. Hawrami responded that 1.4 million of the KRG’s IDPs are Arabs (Sunni and Shia) and the Kurds have provided them education. Their children are learning Kurdish. Thousands of Sunnis fled Ramadi during the military operation there and weren’t accepted in Baghdad because the PMUs feared they would change the demographics. They went to Kurdistan instead; the Kurds believe in freedom of religion. Islam has begun referring to citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan as Kurdistanis rather than Kurds, since 25% of the population is now non-Kurd.
Islam spoke about how effectiveness depends on efficiency. Since 1991, when Kurdistan achieved some self-governance, it has been at best effective but could have been more efficient and could have dealt with its challenges better. Instrospection is healthy for societies and Iraqi Kurdistan is still learning. In the early 1990s, CSOs in Iraqi Kurdistan were focused on humanitarian relief. They moved in the direction of democratization and development in the late 1990s, and especially post-2003.
The Rwanga Foundation’s vision is for education for all. They provide services, build capacity and design policies. They work on entrepreneurship and encourage youth to believe in themselves; youth are not only the leaders of tomorrow but also of today. Partnerships between CSOs, the government and the private sector will be important. Rwanga also provides humanitarian assistance in Sinjar. So far, Rwanga has completed 80 projects and has helped about 1 million people.
In the panel discussion, Pasha asked what is needed to rebuild liberated areas. Hawrami argued that ensuring security is paramount. The Peshmerga can do this, but more international assistance is needed for economic reconstruction. Islam noted that Sinjar needs more services for people to return.
Asked what Iraqi Kurdistan is doing to invest in good governance, Hawrami responded that the democratic process in Kurdistan began in 1992, but democracy also requires a culture of accountability and transparency. Iraqi Kurdistan was rural until the 1960s but the Ba’athists destroyed villages and moved people to urban camps. This transformed the people from producers to consumers. To increase productivity, the KRG has encouraged investment and boosted the private sector. The Kurds have institutions for accountability but democracy is an ongoing process. Many flaws remain. Fighting ISIS has made the Peshmerga stronger and the economic crisis will make the economy stronger because Kurdistan will enact reforms.
Hawrami noted that Iraqi Kurdistan looks to increase its trade relations with Iran, but won’t take sides in the regional sectarian conflict and won’t accept Iranian intervention in the disputed areas. Islam asserted that Kurdistan is on the right track, but there have been ups and downs. Developing the mentality of democracy takes a generation.
To conclude, Hawrami stated that the US must accept that the “one Iraq” policy is a failure and that Iraq is already divided. Washington must protect Kurdistan as a stable force in the region. Islam reiterated the importance of focusing on youth.
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Peace picks February 8-12
- The Syrian refugee crisis and the United States | Monday, February 8th | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino have stoked fears among some Americans regarding the possible entry of Syrian refugees into the United States. Concerns exist that, along with refugees, members of the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations might enter the country and carry out attacks against the U.S. homeland. These fears, coupled with often vitriolic political rhetoric, have alarmed American Muslims. What is the true level of danger refugees pose? How can the United States best contribute to managing the Syrian refugee problem? Given the 2016 presidential elections, what options are politically viable? On February 8, the Center for Middle East Policy and the Governance Studies program at Brookings will host a discussion on the U.S. role in addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. The panel will include Elizabeth Ferris and William Galston of Brookings, experts on refugee resettlement and U.S. politics respectively, as well as Robert McKenzie, a new Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World visiting fellow whose research focuses on Muslim communities in the West. Daniel Byman, Senior Fellow and Research Director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the panel. Following the discussion, the panelists will take audience questions. This discussion is part of a series of Foreign Policy at Brookings events focusing on the refugee crisis and the U.S. and international community’s response.
- Cross-Straits Series: Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? | Tuesday, February 9th | 12:30-2:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Taiwan’s elections on January 16 resulted in both its new president and, for the first time, a majority of legislators being from pro-independence parties. This has raised concerns about how Beijing will react. The official China Daily stated after the election that if president-elect Tsai Ing-wen does not accept that Taiwan is part of China, she will be leading Taiwan in the direction of “conflicts and tension.” Underscoring the point, the mainland military recently conducted amphibious landing exercises along its coast opposite Taiwan. Would China actually use force against Taiwan? And under what circumstances? What are the current capabilities of China’s military? Does it have the ability to force Taiwan to unify with the mainland? This Atlantic Council event is part of the Cross-Straits Series of the Brent Scowcroft Center’s Asia Security Initiative, which examines strategic and current affairs surrounding cross-straits relations. Speakers include Roger Cliff, Atlantic Council Nonresident Senior Fellow, Tiffany Ma, Director of Political and Security Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research, and Thomas L. McNaugher, professor at Georgetown University. The moderator is Shannon Tiezzi, Managing Editor of The Diplomat.
- Inside the Iran Negotiations: A Conversation with Chief Negotiator Wendy Sherman | Tuesday, February 9th | 4:00-5:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | What was it like to be inside the room during the roller coaster saga of the historic nuclear deal with Iran? What role did personal relationships and domestic politics play in this landmark accord? What were the key moments that made success possible or could have threatened the deal? And what lessons can be learned from U.S.-Iranian negotiations? Join us for an extraordinary event as Chief U.S. Negotiator Ambassador Wendy Sherman takes us inside the room for an intimate look at the personalities, politics and negotiating dynamics that defined the nuclear agreement. Wendy Sherman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, and Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic Relations at the Wilson Center, will also speak.
- Inside the Sieges: The Scope and Implications of Besieged Syria | Wednesday, February 10th | 11:30-1:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The images of emaciated children in the besieged Syrian town of Madaya drew international attention in January 2016. Meanwhile, the opposition Syrian High Negotiations Committee’s unanswered demand for lifting of sieges, as stipulated in UN Security Council resolution 2254, threatens to derail Syria peace talks in Geneva. Key international leaders’ calls for implementation of the resolution, aimed at ending the violence, have not resulted in access to besieged areas. On February 10, 2016, please join the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East for a discussion on the scope, scale, and policy implications of the ongoing siege crisis. Mohamed Katoub will share his experiences as a dentist and medical worker from the besieged Damascus suburb of Douma. Valerie Szybala will present the findings of the newly released Siege Watch report that indicates there are well over 1 million Syrians under siege in Syria, and that the Syrian government and its allies are the main parties besieging civilian populations. Jan Jaap van Oosterzee will examine the implications of the sieges, and Faysal Itani will moderate the discussion. Dr. Mohamed Katoub is the Public Relations Director for the United Medical Office of Eastern Ghouta. Valerie Szybala is the author of several influential reports including Slow Death: Life and Death in Syrian Communities under Siege and Assad Strikes Damascus. Jan Jaap van Oosterzee has been working on Middle East programs in various capacities with PAX, an international peace organization based in the Netherlands. Faysal Itani focuses on the war in Syria and its regional impact. Ambassador Frederic Hof specializes in the conflict in Syria.
- The future of securing global cities | Wednesday, February 10th | 2:00-3:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On February 10, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will convene a panel discussion to introduce Securing Global Cities, a new project based in Foreign Policy’s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. Securing Global Cities will be co-chaired by Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and General Ray Odierno, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and JP Morgan Chase Senior Advisor. It is part of the Global Cities Initiative, a joint project of the Brookings Institution and JP Morgan Chase. The goal of the project is to help cities around the world improve the physical safety of their citizens from various forms of violence. The overarching motivation of the project is the belief that cities have much to learn from each other by analyzing systematically and sharing best practices that strengthen their roles in a globalized world, bolster their economies, and protect their communities and citizens. The project will identify different types of threats–from terrorists to narcotraffickers and other international criminal networks, gangs, insurgents, and abusive security forces–and examine the various tools that governments can deploy to address these diverse and complex problems. The tools will include reformed and strengthened police forces, justice systems, paramilitary and military institutions, intelligence capabilities, and a range of other instruments. The discussion will be moderated by Martin Indyk, executive vice president of Brookings. Following the discussion, the panelists will take audience questions. JP Morgan Chase is a donor to the Brookings Institution. Brookings recognizes the value it provides is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment. This event will be live webcast. Join the conversation on Twitter at #GlobalCities.
- Five Years In: The Legacy of the Arab Spring | Wednesday, February 10th | 2:15-5:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | During the past five years the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has seen dictators toppled, new terrorist movements seize large swaths of territory, civil wars waged, and the regional order recast. Amidst a region awash in this protracted turbulence that shows no signs of soon abating, this event will explore the lasting legacy of the Arab Spring as we approach its five-year anniversary. Please join us as we discuss the ways in which the fateful events of 2011 irreversibly changed the MENA region. This event is composed of two panels. The first panel is called The Makeup of Post-Arab Spring Politics. It will take place from 2:15 to 3:45. This panel will explore the most notable effects of the Arab Spring on political and governance issues in the MENA region. Panelists will seek to differentiate between developments that are passing phenomena and those that will have a lasting impact on the region’s political fabric. Speakers include Shadi Hamid, Senior Fellow for the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Amy Hawthorne, Deputy Director for Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy, Paul Salem, Vice President for Policy and Research at the Middle East Institute, and Robin Wright, Wilson Center-USIP Distinguished Fellow. The moderator will be Marina Ottaway, Middle East Fellow at the Wilson Center. The second panel is called Physical Destruction and Prospects for Reconstruction. It will take place from 4:00 to 5:30. This panel will analyze the physical toll incurred by five plus years of violent turmoil and will discuss the scale of damage sustained across the region and will evaluate the range of effects such damages will have on regional affairs during the years to come. Speakers include Richard Cincotta, Global Fellow at the Wilson Center and Director of the Global Political Demography Program at the Stimson Center, Marwa Daoudy, Assistant Professor in International Relations at Georgetown University, Nadim Khouri, Independent Researcher at the World Bank, and Erika Weinthal, Lee Hill Snowdon Professor of Environmental Policy and Associate Dean for International Programs at Duke University. The moderator will be Henri Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center.
- DHS: Progress in 2015, Goals for 2016—A Conversation with Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh J. Johnson | Thursday, February 11th | 10:00-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Wilson Center as Secretary Jeh C. Johnson, the fourth Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, delivers his final State of Homeland Security address, entitled “DHS: Progress in 2015, Goals for 2016.” Secretary Johnson oversees the United States’ third largest Cabinet department and leads the nation’s efforts to counter a broad range of threats, from terrorism to natural disasters. Secretary Johnson’s remarks will be followed by a question & answer session with the Center’s Director, President & CEO Jane Harman.
- HFAC Subcommittee Hearing—Jordan: A Key U.S. Partner | Thursday, February 11th | 2:00-5:00 | Rayburn House Office Building | This hearing will be held by the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. Witnesses include the Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department, Paige Alexander, Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for the Middle East at the U.S. Agency for International Development, and Fatema Z. Sumar, Regional Deputy Vice President of the Department of Compact Operations at the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
- Arab Voices on the Challenges of the New Middle East | Friday, February 12th | 9:00-10:15 | Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is pleased to host a review of its first Arab Experts Survey. The results of the survey, conducted in English and Arabic, represent the views of more than one hundred accomplished political thinkers representing almost every Arab country and answer broad questions around terrorism and extremism, civil war and foreign intervention, sectarianism, corruption, and governance. The survey is part of Carnegie’s Arab World Horizons project, an effort to examine the social, political, and economic forces shaping the Arab world. Marwan Muasher, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Perry Cammack, Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, and Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, will discuss the findings of the survey, and Joyce Karam, Washington Bureau Chief for Al-Hayat, will moderate. Join the conversation on Twitter with #ArabWorldHorizons. Registration will begin at 8:30 a.m. A light breakfast will be served. The discussion will begin promptly at 9:00 a.m.
- The Yemen Quagmire | Friday, February 12th | 12:00-1:30 | Johns Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a discussion with Amat Alsoswa, former Yemeni Cabinet Member, Leslie Campbell, NDI, Andrew Plitt, USAID, and Charles Schmitz, MEI, who will discuss the deepening complexity of the conflict, the growing humanitarian crisis, the challenges of delivering aid to a suffering population, and prospects for peace talks and an end to the fighting. Daniel Serwer, Senior Research Professor of Conflict Management at Johns Hopkins SAIS will moderate.
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Russians are resigned
On Thursday, the Wilson Center hosted Natalia Zubarevich, professor at Moscow State University and Director of the Regional Program at the Moscow-based Independent Institute for Social Policy. Zubarevich discussed how the Russian financial crisis involves all of the regions of Russia and all aspects of economic development. The Russian economy has stopped growing, due in part to sanctions and largely due to the fall of oil prices.
Zubarevich concludes that trends differ from previous crises. Regional budgets have destabilized, investment has declined, incomes and wages have declined, and industrial output has dropped. Decline stretches across all sectors, but the unemployment rate still remains low. The devaluation shock reduced incomes and wages, hurt investment, and affected the consumption and processing industries. A deepening of the Russian economic crisis is impending.
Investment has plummeted by 8 percent, declining in 51 regions. Real money incomes declined in 78 regions, with the worst effects felt in the Urals, Volga, and the Northwest. In only three regions is the construction sector growing; otherwise, a 10 percent construction decline is seen throughout Russia. The only noteworthy industrial growth is in those regions that specialize in defense, as the federal budget funds defense spending. Moscow has pushed regions to cut expenditures. Forty-one have cut education spending, which could lead to a less-skilled workforce in the future. The Urals and the Northwest regions have been affected intensely.
Cities and smaller towns have differential factors that set them apart from one another. The smaller towns’ financial crisis is a result of industrial output decline, while large cities’ economic woes come from the weakening of incomes and purchasing power. The biggest risk of the crisis in small towns is growth of unemployment. Labor migration is accelerating. Those qualified in IT sectors seek jobs abroad, so some of the most skilled workers are leaving Russia.
The unemployment rate is 5.8%. No significant changes are foreseen. Russia created a specific model of labor that could adapt to market fluctuations. The Russian government and businesses will drop people down to part-time work. This is acceptable to citizens. The workers’ mindset is that there is still paid work available, so there is no need to protest and demand immediate improvement of their situation. The shrinkage of the working age population contributes to this low unemployment rate, too. A very small generation born in the 1990s is coming to the labor market, while a very large generation born in the 1950s is leaving the market simultaneously. The labor market will be reduced by 10 to 14 percent by 2025.
The Russian middle class, which has enjoyed access to global consumer goods, will now have to adjust their lifestyles due to the financial crisis. But the working classes will not protest. There is no real trust between neighbors, so Zubarevich does not see large clusters of people rising up to protest economic conditions. People are dissatisfied, but are ultimately surviving in the current economic conditions. Russia will continue to face its economic stagnation. Full recovery is not in sight. But Russians are resigned to their circumstances.
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