Russians are resigned
On Thursday, the Wilson Center hosted Natalia Zubarevich, professor at Moscow State University and Director of the Regional Program at the Moscow-based Independent Institute for Social Policy. Zubarevich discussed how the Russian financial crisis involves all of the regions of Russia and all aspects of economic development. The Russian economy has stopped growing, due in part to sanctions and largely due to the fall of oil prices.
Zubarevich concludes that trends differ from previous crises. Regional budgets have destabilized, investment has declined, incomes and wages have declined, and industrial output has dropped. Decline stretches across all sectors, but the unemployment rate still remains low. The devaluation shock reduced incomes and wages, hurt investment, and affected the consumption and processing industries. A deepening of the Russian economic crisis is impending.
Investment has plummeted by 8 percent, declining in 51 regions. Real money incomes declined in 78 regions, with the worst effects felt in the Urals, Volga, and the Northwest. In only three regions is the construction sector growing; otherwise, a 10 percent construction decline is seen throughout Russia. The only noteworthy industrial growth is in those regions that specialize in defense, as the federal budget funds defense spending. Moscow has pushed regions to cut expenditures. Forty-one have cut education spending, which could lead to a less-skilled workforce in the future. The Urals and the Northwest regions have been affected intensely.
Cities and smaller towns have differential factors that set them apart from one another. The smaller towns’ financial crisis is a result of industrial output decline, while large cities’ economic woes come from the weakening of incomes and purchasing power. The biggest risk of the crisis in small towns is growth of unemployment. Labor migration is accelerating. Those qualified in IT sectors seek jobs abroad, so some of the most skilled workers are leaving Russia.
The unemployment rate is 5.8%. No significant changes are foreseen. Russia created a specific model of labor that could adapt to market fluctuations. The Russian government and businesses will drop people down to part-time work. This is acceptable to citizens. The workers’ mindset is that there is still paid work available, so there is no need to protest and demand immediate improvement of their situation. The shrinkage of the working age population contributes to this low unemployment rate, too. A very small generation born in the 1990s is coming to the labor market, while a very large generation born in the 1950s is leaving the market simultaneously. The labor market will be reduced by 10 to 14 percent by 2025.
The Russian middle class, which has enjoyed access to global consumer goods, will now have to adjust their lifestyles due to the financial crisis. But the working classes will not protest. There is no real trust between neighbors, so Zubarevich does not see large clusters of people rising up to protest economic conditions. People are dissatisfied, but are ultimately surviving in the current economic conditions. Russia will continue to face its economic stagnation. Full recovery is not in sight. But Russians are resigned to their circumstances.
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Iranian aspirations
On Wednesday, the Wilson Center hosted ‘Iranian Public Opinion on Foreign Affairs on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections.’ Ebrahim Mohseni, Senior Analyst at the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research, presented poll findings conducted in August 2015 and January 2016. William Miller, Senior Scholar at the Wilson Center, Paul Pillar, Researcher in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and Robin Wright, Wilson Center-USIP Distinguished Fellow, added remarks following Mohseni’s presentation. Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, moderated.
Parliamentary elections in Iran take place in about a month. The survey is representative of a broad population, taking opinions from all across Iran. A high voter turnout is expected, with nearly 67 percent of the population anticipated to vote. Mohseni described the government’s strengths and weaknesses. Security and improving Iran’s relations with European countries are where citizens believe the government is doing a fine job. People are divided on whether the economy is improving. Citizens believe the government has not made sufficient progress at all when it comes to reducing unemployment. Mohseni believes the next parliament should try to focus on unemployment and economic problems, as there is big dissatisfaction throughout Iran on these issues. Providing solutions to these problems will promote stability.
Around 76 percent of the surveyed population supported it the Iran-US nuclear deal in August, but that number has since declined due to possible new US sanctions. Iranians are disappointed that all santions are not being lifted. Only 34 percent think that the US will live up to its end of the deal, and only 38 percent believe US-Iran relations will improve.
Almost two-thirds of the population thinks Iran should send military personnel to Syria. Fighting ISIS, protecting Shiite religious sites, preventing terrorists from nearing Iran’s borders, and protecting Syrian civilians were listed as reasons. Many also believe that helping out with the Syria situation will spread Iran’s regional influence while decreasing Saudi Arabia’s influence. Iran is split down the middle when it comes to potentially collaborating with the US against ISIS because people believe the US is not sincere in its efforts. They believe the US wants to increase its own influence in the Middle East, protect Israel, topple Assad, and decrease Iran’s standing in the region.
Wright explained that though Iran is still a revolutionary state, the passions of the revolutionary period are no longer relevant. Iran is now more practical. Iranian attitudes are very normal as the economy is the most important issue to citizens. She is interested in seeing a poll after the first round of elections.
Pillar agreed with Wright’s point, saying the Iranians really are similar to Americans when it comes to concerns about the economy. How Iran sees the US is how the US sees Iran: suspicions exist on both sides on whether promises will be upheld, though Iranians have more well-founded suspicions on the nuclear deal. Iranians’ expectations of the economic benefits are too high and the time frame in which they hope to see them realized infeasible.
Miller believes Iran’s civil society is both fairly open and revolutionary in attitude, which demonstrates the stability of the regime. These surveys provide assistance to US policymakers and add crucial data necessary to evaluate how Iranians perceive the US and its actions.
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What to do when peace talks stall
The Syria peace talks stalled even faster than I might have predicted, though I wasn’t sanguine about their success. The reason for the suspension is all too clear: the Syrian army is making headway in north Latakia, around Aleppo and elsewhere, with vigorous support from Russian air strikes as well as Hizbollah ground forces and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps “advisors” (more like commanders). President Assad and his allies see no reason to halt the offensive. The Syrian opposition, which had asked at the talks for an end to air strikes and opening up of humanitarian access, sees no reason to talk while its people are getting slaughtered. Those of us who said this conflict was not “ripe” for peace talks, which includes almost everyone knowledgeable about the situation, were right.
That is little comfort. Nor does it mean the UN was wrong to try.
It is the UN’s role in today’s world order to take on cases no one else wants touch. That’s how it ended up with Libya, Yemen and Syria. The Americans and Europeans left Libya to its own devices, which sufficed for a while but then proved unequal to the state-building challenge. Now there is an agreement of sorts, but no implementation. The Houthis and Saudis wrecked a four-year peace process in Yemen, based on a Gulf Cooperation Council agreement and UN mediation, with military action. A recent effort to reinitiate talks has been postponed until at least late this month. Syria has already seen two failed UN efforts to end the war–Geneva I and II they are called–to no avail. Geneva III looks likely to fail too. Let’s hope they don’t catch up with the Superbowl numbering.
These stalled peace processes are bad for Libyans, Yemenis and Syrians, but they don’t have much say in the matter. Civilians are today the most frequent victims of war, as the contestants are so often vying for power within a state rather than trying to defeat the regular military forces of another state. Moving civilians, or persuading them to accept your rule, is therefore the objective, not an unintended consequence. It is far less perilous to guys with guns (yes most of them are guys, though not always all) to go after unarmed civilians, or even armed insurgents, than to contest another state’s armed forces.
The only real beneficiaries of continued fighting in Libya, Yemen and Syria are likely to be the extremist forces affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. They thrive on disorder–areas that have witnessed chaos are more likely to accept their draconian rule–and the extremists often fill the vacuum as states concentrate their efforts against less extreme insurgents. The one thing we can be pretty sure of from the experience of fighting extremists since 9/11 is that attacking them from the air without establishing order on the ground thereafter ensures that we will have to roll Sisyphus’ rock up the hill once again. And with each iteration the extremists get bolder, smarter and more lethal.
We are all too clearly losing the war against violent extremism. We should be thinking hard about whether the means we are using are appropriate to the task. Washington’s purpose should be to eliminate safe havens for extremists who might strike Americans. Drones have dinstinct advantages. They keep their operators safe while killing bad guys, but they can’t reestablish governance on territory from which extremists have been driven. Only legitimate state authorities can do that. It is time to refocus our attention on where they are going to come from.
Stalled talks are an opportunity. The warring parties in Libya, Yemen and Syria as well as their international supporters should be thinking hard about how these countries will be governed once the killing has stopped. Both the fighting and the peacemaking are worthless without an answer to that question.
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The US, Europe and Iran
Umid Niayesh from Azerbaijan’s Trend news agency asked some good questions today regarding Iran-West ties in post-sanctions period. I answered.
Q: What do you think about the doctrine of “the West minus the United States,” which is followed by conservatives in Iran, in particular by Khamenei? Can it be a successful approach?
A: As the US is maintaining more sanctions (not imposed because of the nuclear issue), it is natural that the EU will move ahead faster. The EU also has a much stronger interest in Iranian energy resources.
Q: May the EU gradually replace China and Russia in Iran’s market in short term following removal of sanctions?
A: China is a major customer for Iran’s energy resources and a major supplier as well. Russia is far less important. There are many areas in which Iranians will prefer EU technology and investment over Russian competitors.
Q: May developing Iran-EU ties also lead to improving political ties? Can it also help to Iran-US ties?
A: The US will handle its own political ties with Iran. It is hesitant because of Iranian subversion in the Gulf states, human rights abuses and threats against Israel. The EU appears less reluctant.
Q: Iranian officials repeatedly say that Iran is open for economic ties with US, including presence of US businessmen and investors. What are the actual obstacles to this issue?
A: There are three big obstacles: continuing US sanctions levied for other than nuclear reasons, lack of diplomatic ties between the US and Iran, and American distrust of the Iranian courts and political system. You would have to be a brave investor to run that gauntlet.
Q: May West sacrifice its principles such as human rights for economic interests in ties with Iran?
A: I doubt the US will. The EU will be less exigent.
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The Butcher’s Trail
I was unable to attend Julian Borger’s book presentation today in DC, but here is my appreciation of his recently published account of the search for and trial of Balkans war criminals:
Who knew the search for war criminals could be so entertaining? Julian Borger, now the Guardian diplomatic editor who reported from the Balkans during the 1990s, has a sharp eye for relevant detail and an ironic sense of its role in the story of how war criminals were tracked and captured in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia after the Dayton peace accords were signed in 1995.
His Butcher’s Trail is enlivened with a menagerie of well-drawn and memorable characters: the “Serb Adolf” (that’s what he called himself), an evangelical American general trying to redeem the loss of Marines in Somalia, a former mayor so anxious for status that he drives into Croatia to keep an appointment with the senior UN official plotting his capture, the American-trained Polish special forces who in their first operation ever snatch him, the planned use of a gorilla costume to distract Radovan Karadzic’s guards on a winding mountain road at night and his frumpy wife’s successful effort to evade massive and concerted American efforts–coordinated in part by David Petraeus–to track her to her husband.
This would all make for an interesting, if sometimes excessively John Irving, novel. It makes for captivating non-fiction.
I was involved as a State Department officer in some of the earlier and notably unsuccessful efforts to capture war criminals in Bosnia. The generals commanding the hunt thought the protection of their troops far more important. A deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander told me point blank in the summer of 1997 that President Clinton wasn’t interested in capturing war criminals. The general and his boss–Wes Clark–got me withdrawn from the effort in order to block reports to the State Department about what they were doing, or more likely what they were not doing.
Later the hunt for war criminals–PIFWCs in milspeak (Persons Indicted for War Crimes)–became far more serious, though the Americans lagged the British and Dutch in the effort. Trying to minimize risk, Washington often deployed far too many people and too much apparatus, without however knowing much about the environment and terrain in which they had to operate. Borger tells the story of their bumbling well. Nor does he spare the French, late-comers to the competition to capture PIFWCs, whose keystone cops even ended up facing off with each other in the hotel room of one of Radovan Karadzic’s mistresses. But Borger also gives some credit: the Americans at least learned and applied their lessons later in the hunt for Al Qaeda and other terrorist operatives.
While Borger’s focus is on the hunt, he never looses perspective on the reasons for it. He colors in the stark words of criminal indictments with vivid eye-witness descriptions of rape, ethnic cleansing, torture and cold-blooded murder. And he fits these crimes into the main political programs they served: primarily the Croatian and Serbian efforts to carve up Bosnia.
By dying in 1999, Croatian President Tudjman escaped accountability for his concerted efforts to force Bosnia’s Muslims away from his borders and annex territory where the Bosnian Croats were in the majority. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic wasn’t so lucky. Defeated at the polls in 2000, he was shipped to The Hague in 2001 for trial at the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a precursor of the International Criminal Court. Borger’s account of how and why the Serbian government took on that responsibility is compelling, as is his description of how Serbian security forces continued to provide protection for Karadzic and Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic.
Borger is keen to make a sharp distinction between the judicial bungling of the Tribunal–whose trials are lengthy and unedifying, with highly variable and sometimes reversible outcomes–and the critical role of its chief prosecutors (especially Louise Arbour and Carla del Ponte) and their small intelligence units in tracking down war criminals and pressuring Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia into handing them over, often with leverage provided by the European Union and the United States. His point is well argued, but it is unlikely to save the Tribunal from those who think it should have done far more far faster to hold its indictees accountable.
It would be hard for any court–even a well-established one–to proceed expeditiously and still provide due process to the butchers Borger describes so well. ICTY has proven unequal to those demanding criteria. But it has still set an important precedent of holding at least some people accountable for the horrors they perpetrate. And, as Borger is right to emphasize, it removed homicidal leaders from countries in which they would have otherwise played spoiler roles. That is, he rightly emphasizes, the Tribunal’s major contribution.
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You decide
Shpend Limoni of Pristina daily Gazeta Express asked some questions today. I answered:
Q: The political stalemate in Kosovo is continuing for months. The opposition parties and the government are still in the opposing positions regarding the demarcation process with Montenegro and Brussels Agreement on the Association of Serb Municipalities. Do you think that early general elections are a solution for this crisis?
A: Whether to hold early elections is a choice Kosovars need to make, not foreigners. That is what parliament is for.
On the merits of the two issues, I’m surprised either one has aroused so much passion and have my doubts that early elections will lead to their easy resolution.
Q: Mr. Thaçi is insisting on becoming President of Kosovo as a fulfilment of the governing coalition agreement. Yesterday he met with State Secretary John Kerry which is seen as a decisive moment for his candidacy. Do you think that Thaçi has US support in his intentions to become next President of Kosovo?
A: You will have to ask US government officials about official US government support. Generally Washington tries to stay out of choices of this sort in countries with democratic systems. We really do believe in government of the people, by the people and for the people. I realize that in Kosovo that principle may have been violated in the past, but I don’t really see any good reasons for violating it now.
Q: Considering the large international support for Mrs. Jahjaga do you think that she has a chance for a second mandate as President of Kosovo?
A: I think President Jahjaga has done a great job of representing Kosovo both to the international community and in her domestic capacity. But to get a second mandate she needs to find the support required in parliament.
Q: Do you believe that the Special Court somehow could affect the election of the President and the overall situation that is Kosovo is facing right now?
A: I imagine that the cases the Special Court might consider will be a factor in the minds of at least some of the parliamentarians who elect the President and who need to find a way out of the current situation. But it is impossible to predict now precisely who will be indicted and for what. That will attenuate somewhat the impact of what the court might do.
My main point throughout this interview, and in many others, is that people in the Balkans need to start taking responsibility for their own decisions. The unipolar, imperial moment is over. Washington has a lot of other things to worry about. Friends and allies who want to make a serious contribution will be taking care of their own business, not leaning on Washington to make decisions for them.
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