The good news from Tikrit
I have been curious about the situation in Tikrit, liberated from the Islamic State nine months ago. This morning’s NPR report is the best I’ve seen/heard on the subject. Sounds like a solid B grade to me, which under the circumstances is pretty good. And the first year isn’t over yet. Whatever grievances persist, returns and startup of construction are excellent signs. It is post-liberation conditions that will decide the eventual outcome of the fight against the Islamic State, not merely military prowess.
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Worsening
On Wednesday, Human Rights First hosted ‘How to Navigate Egypt’s Enduring Human Rights Crisis: Blueprint for U.S. Government Policy.’ Neil Hicks, Director of Human Rights Promotion at Human Rights First, moderated. Panelists included Brian Dooley, Director of the Human Rights Defenders Program at Human Rights First, Amy Hawthorne, Deputy Director for Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy, and Nancy Okail, Executive Director at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.
Dooley explained how difficult it is for human rights activists to operate in Egypt. He gave specific examples on human rights violations in the past few weeks. Arrests have spiked. Anyone related to activists, or who has the potential to become an activist, is suspicious to the Egyptian government. The crackdown on the media worsens, and Egypt now has the second highest rate of journalist imprisonment.
Focusing on the deterioration of human rights since the Arab Spring, Okail said the Egyptian government’s response has always been quick, cosmetic fixes, rather than long-term solutions. The government is addressing symptoms, rather than causes, leading to no real positive impact in the long run. The unrest in Egypt happens because of the problems that were not properly addressed. These problems existed prior to the Arab Spring, which did not cause them
Okail also said the current regime uses control instead of power: control happens in the absence of power, and violence occurs as a result. When a leader has real power, s/he does not have to force constituents to act accordingly. Using intelligence agencies, heightening security, implementing force, and controlling the media are all approaches the current government employs in order to maintain its authority.
Hawthorne said the scale of violence by the state is troubling and tears at the social fabric. Today’s rate of disappearances did not happen under Mubarak, who targeted Islamist groups. This government targets anyone viewed as a threat to security and stability. Over 5,000 apartments were searched near Tahrir Square. Why is the government cracking down so hard on potential activists? Hawthorne suggested people within the regime are worried about what dissent will do to stability. President Sisi bears most of the responsibility for what is happening, even if he does not have complete control over the whole government.
Addressing the American role, Hawthorne said US influence in Egypt is at a low point, limiting Washington’s credibility, political capital and ability to affect change. Relationships with the Egyptian government are difficult. Relationships with human rights activists is are complicated. The root of the challenging relationships is the distrust of the US. The United States does not embrace Sisi, but still gives aid to Egypt. Hawthorne recommended that the US should investigate where its aid ends up, but this is difficult to do, as the Egyptian government is not transparent.
The U.S. should focus on four things moving forward:
- Listening to Egyptian partners. What these people prioritize, the US should also prioritize. These priorities may change, and the US should observe why they change.
- Paying attention to human rights defenders and civil society organizations. They are trying to hold the Egyptian government accountable for human rights abuses.
- Consistency when speaking on Egyptian human rights issues. Inconsistency breeds to skepticism.
- Honestly assessing government officials. A normal relationship should not be maintained as long as human rights violations are occurring.
Overall, the human rights situation in Egypt seems to be worsening. Verbal condemnation of human rights abuses simply is not enough. Perhaps taking away a significant amount of aid would be a way to put real pressure on the Egyptian government to change its approach towards journalists and activists.
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The confessional/ethnic temptation
Henri Barkey writes in The American Interest:
The U.S. government [should commit] itself to the creation of a confederal democratic Syria that is divided along confessional and ethnic lines. In its most elementary form, the new Syria would be divided along three main areas, Alawi/Christian, Sunni, and Kurdish, with Damascus remaining as the capital although temporarily run by a UN administration.
How simple! How neat! How symmetrical!
How homicidal.
I’d be the first to admit that something like this confessional/ethnic cantonalization is emerging from the chaos of Syria’s civil war. The Kurds have established several cantons of what they are calling “Rojava” along the Turkish border. Alawites, Shiites and Christians are retreating from central Syria to the west. The Islamic State dominates a good part of the east, though there is no single “Sunni” area but rather a patchwork of them. Ultimately some sort of equilibrium may emerge organically that resembles what us conflict management nerds call a mutually hurting stalemate, one of the key conditions for a negotiated outcome.
But that is a different proposition from US advocacy of confessional and ethnic cantonalization, which implies someone in Washington or New York drawing lines. That would lead quickly to ethnic cleansing, because each group would seek to establish unquestioned dominance over its own territory. There is no single concentration of Sunnis. Creating one can be done, but only by force. What will happen to Alawites and Christians who have managed to survive in Sunni areas through the war, but now find themselves on the wrong side of some line drawn in Washington? What will happen to the Sunnis who inhabit western areas of Syria, none of whose provinces were majority Alawite before the war? Those who don’t “belong” will be chased out, forced across the lines into what someone in Washington or New York has designated as their homeland.
If you don’t like Sykes-Picot, you are sure not to like Henri’s proposition.
The only group in Syria that would jump at it is the Islamic State. It would get recognition of its dominance in parts of eastern Syria. That alone should give any American pause. It should also have made the editors of a publication called The American Interest hesitate.
Worst off would be Damascus, where Henri proposes the UN govern, temporarily. But Damascus is as mixed as all of Syria, with significant populations of Sunnis, Shia, Alawites, Kurds and Christians. Ethnic cleansing there would take particularly brutal and unforgiving forms as each of those groups tries to protect itself from others and dominate the capital. Where would UN capability to prevent that from happening come from? Who is going to deploy peacekeeping forces quickly and effectively to back up a UN administration?
Consider also the regional impact. The Kurdish PKK would get official recognition of its safe haven in Syria, from which it could continue to attack Turkey. Ankara won’t go along with that. Islamic State ambitions to control Anbar and Ninewa provinces in Iraq would get a big boost. Baghdad wouldn’t accept that. Some in Beirut would be tempted to think about a “greater” Lebanon, incorporating turf from Syria. The Jordanian border, on both sides of which there are the same tribes, would be at risk.
The United States already has a perfectly good vision for the future of Syria: an inclusive, pluralistic polity that settles its issues peacefully within well-established institutions. That’s not what is lacking. It is the political will and resources to make it happen that are missing.
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Indonesia has a plan
On Monday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hosted its annual Fullerton Forum in Singapore. The keynote address was delivered by Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs and a retired general in the anti-terror squad of the Indonesian special forces. Pandjaitan was introduced by both Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia and by Ng Eng Hen, the Defense Minister of Singapore.
Pandjaitan stated that the goal of terror groups is always to destabilize countries and demoralize their populations. ISIS has not succeeded in doing this so far in Indonesia because the Indonesian government is clear that it does not negotiate with terrorists and will respond immediately to any attacks. ISIS recruitment is a global problem; the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS doubled between 2014 and 2015. Brookings estimates there are 46,000 Twitter accounts that support ISIS. In Indonesia, even some middle-class people have joined ISIS, including a policeman who died in Syria.
Indonesia is a huge country with many poorly-educated people; ISIS’s propaganda concerning the caliphate is powerful among lower-class people. Syria and Iraq are included in Islamic “end times” prophecies, and ISIS convinces people to fight the West and all countries that lack Sharia. ISIS wants to see the caliphate expand to Southeast Asia. Its fighters are hard to deal with because they have what Pandjaitan refers to as a “one-way ticket”: they are prepared to die.
In the January 14 attacks in Jakarta, Indonesian security forces responded rapidly, eliminating the terrorists in less than 12 minutes. They killed four terrorists, and using one of their cell phones, were able to track down and arrest others. This sets an example for terrorists. The attackers were previously linked with Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda. Even though ISIS and AQ are fighting each other in Syria, their affiliates are capable of cooperation; Indonesia believes the local ISIS and AQ leaders have merged their work.
Terrorists in Indonesia operate in cells to maintain secrecy; cells do not have contact with other cells, making it difficult for the police to crack down on networks. So far, the authorities have had success in mapping terror networks, but Pandjaitan cannot promise that Indonesia is immune from attacks. Terror groups also communicate their final decisions to stage attacks via couriers, which are hard to intercept.
Fighting terror effectively involves three components:
- A soft approach.
- International intelligence cooperation.
- A hard approach.
The soft approach to fighting terror is Indonesia’s strategy of first resort. This includes counter-radicalization and deradicalization campaigns that are holistic in nature and will partially be conducted using the media. They are working with Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah to spread the message, including on television, that ISIS is not Islam and Islam is not ISIS. Indonesia has freedom of religion, so people have the freedom to follow sharia law.
The government is also campaigning against religious intolerance. Indonesia is the largest archipelago country in the world, which makes it difficult to manage. The government is working on categorizing terrorists as ideologues, militants and sympathizers. Ideologues will be imprisoned separately to help stop radicalization in prisons. The government is also cracking down on social media content supporting terror, including videos that provide instructions on how to build bombs.
The ASEAN countries already have a platform for intelligence sharing regarding threats, attacks, and terror financing. Intelligence cooperation in the region is already very good.
The hard approach is a secondary approach, but is one that Indonesia is prepared to use. Indonesia has prepared its special forces to conduct operations anytime and anywhere within the country. If terrorists take hostages, the special forces will free them immediately. The Indonesian government is also altering counterterrorism legislation so that the authorities will be able to detain those suspected of plotting terror attacks for 7-30 days. Those found to have no terror links will be released. New legislation also allows the government to revoke the citizenship of Indonesians who join groups of foreign fighters.
Another key to stopping terror in Indonesia is economic improvement. Economic growth has stopped slowing. The economy grew by about 5.5% this year. Consumer confidence and confidence in the government have increased. The government has been trying to distribute economic growth more evenly between Indonesia’s regions and improve the country’s infrastructure. There has historically been a large gap between the haves and the have-nots. Many terrorists come from poor backgrounds. This year, Indonesia will spend $70 billion or 36% of the national budget on outlying regions. Funding for villages has increased from $2 billion to $4.5 billion in 2016. This will give each village around $100,000 to spend, which will help reduce rural poverty and boost economic growth. Poverty reduction is crucial. Indonesia has 230 million Muslims. If 2% live in extreme poverty and are brainwashed by ISIS, one can imagine how many will become terrorists and stage domestic and regional attacks.
An audience member asked Pandjaitan about links that had been discovered between the terrorists in the recent Jakarta attacks and terrorists from Mindanao in the Philippines. Pandjaitan stated that radicals in Mindanao are supporting radicals in Indonesia, including through the smuggling of weapons and explosives. Indonesian authorities are working to crack down on weapons smuggling.
Another audience member asked about Indonesia’s position regarding China’s actions in the South China Sea. Because of Indonesia’s territory in the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has declared that its Special Economic Zone extends into the South China Sea. There were reports that Indonesia was considering pursuing international arbitration against China. Pandjaitan replied that China acknowledges the Natuna Islands are part of Indonesia, so China and Indonesia are not in conflict regarding this matter. However, Indonesia views the South China Sea as an important area for global shipping. Indonesia does not wish to see power projection in this area and views freedom of navigation as very important.
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Coexistence on the border of war
My colleagues at the International Repubican Institutehad me do a facilitation training workshop in December with some of their staff and collaborators, focused on growing frictions between Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts. This brief description of the workshop on “Promoting Coexistence Between Syrian Refugees and Jordanians” was published originally on the IRI website.
With more than 630,000 registered Syrian refugees out of a population of 6.5 million, Jordan faces inevitable tensions between its own citizens and the people it has sheltered from the civil war tearing apart its northern neighbor.
Most of the Syrian refugees live in cities near the border, not in camps. Populations of Jordanian towns have doubled and even tripled. Syrians and Jordanians compete for housing, jobs, water, electricity, waste disposal, health and education in a country whose economic performance has been middling at best. Local governments and the services they provide are overwhelmed. For the Syrians, a seemingly temporary emergency is turning into a long-term nightmare.
Jordanians and IRI staff concerned about this situation and its longer term risks met recently in Amman to consider possible solutions. Their energetic brainstorming session identified six goals that, if realized, would significantly reduce the risks involved and promote coexistence between Syrian refugees and Jordanians:
- Improve community-level conflict management
- Build local governance capacity
- Increase awareness of legal rights and responsibilities
- Promote social and economic integration
- Expand economic opportunity
- Enlarge donor assistance and make it more effective
Little is being done along these lines yet. Few Jordanians and Syrians are prepared to manage local conflicts. Local governments have limited resources and little interest in meeting the needs of Syrians, who Jordanians sometimes view as privileged by international donors. Rights are ignored and responsibilities neglected. The Syrian and Jordanian communities are largely segregated from each other and enjoy little communication or mutual exchange. Economic opportunities are limited for both communities in a country that has a high fixed exchange rate with the dollar and little appetite for economic reform. Donors are neither transparent nor accountable from the local community perspective.
A far more intense focus on these issues is required. Training in conflict management of key people in both communities, perhaps to work in tandem, would provide a quick response capability as well as a longer-term capacity to reduce tensions. Overwhelmed local governments need help, including from local civil society organizations, in analyzing and responding to needs. More integration in win/win economic enterprises and social services would reduce tensions. Donor transparency and accountability would give both Jordanians and Syrians confidence that they are being treated fairly.
This dialogue among Jordanians was just the start of a much broader process of consultation. Syrian refugees should meet to brainstorm their own goals, which are likely to be different from those the Jordanians outlined. Then they will together need to look for ways in which both groups can cooperate to turn their difficult challenges into opportunities. Syrians may be in Jordan for a long time, like the Palestinians and Iraqis who preceded them. Both countries can ultimately gain from the talents and enterprise Syrians have to offer.
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Hangups: why and who
The Syria peace talks did not begin as projected in Geneva today, though they are likely to convene before the end of this week. Secretary of State Kerry is doing his damndest to make it happen. What are the hang ups? Is he wise to press so hard?
There are two big hangups: why talk and with whom. Or in diplomatese: the agenda and the shape of the table.
Why is the bigger issue. The Syrian opposition, backed by Washington, wants to talk about transition of power away from Bashar al Asad to a “governing body with full executive powers.” That 2012 formula has been repeated ad infinitum since, either explicitly or implicitly (by reference to the June 2012 United Nations communique in which it first appeared). The regime has made it clear it will not negotiate about transition in Geneva. Nor did it last time the UN tried for a political solution, two years ago. Bashar al Asad’s delegation will stick with an anti-terrorist pitch, backed by the Russians and Iranians. The military gains the regime has made against its opponents since Russia’s intervention in the fall mean it is feeling little pressure to yield.
While the Russians never tire of saying that they are not wedded to Bashar al Assad, everything they do suggests the opposite. There is good reason for this. Moscow has no hope of a welcome in Syria by a serious successor to the regime, so the Russians are sticking with what they’ve got.
Iran even more so. Tehran has risked Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias it supports and Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria, certainly losing thousands. Though Syrians in my experience are little inclined to sectarianism, the approximately three-quarters of the population that is at least nominally Sunni is not going to easily forget what Iran and its proxies have done to prop up a dictator. Nor will the Alawites and Shia who have backed the regime want to find out what the majority population is inclined to do in retaliation. So having Iran at the table, entirely justified by its role in the conflict, is no easy formula for a solution.
In addition, there are other “who” problems. The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, often cited as a serious obstacle, is not such a big problem this time around. With Saudi sponsorship, the main opposition forces other than al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State have chosen a High Negotiation Commission (HNC), headed by former regime Prime Minister Hijab, and a negotiating team. The main body of the opposition is, in fact, remarkably unified this time around, at least for the moment.
The problem is that there are forces claiming to be opposition that lie outside the HNC, which does not recognize them as such. They come in two flavors: Kurdish and so-called “internal” opposition, both heavily favored by Moscow.
The Kurds who count are affiliated with the Kurdish PYD militia who are fighting in northern Syria against the Islamic State with US support. Washington doesn’t want them excluded from the talks, even if they are affiliated with the Kurdish militia waging a rebellion inside Turkey. Moscow agrees, not least to give Turkey grief.
Moscow also backs elements of the “internal” opposition who aren’t regarded by the opposition forces represented in the HNC as real opposition. Russia is trying to force internal opposition figures into the HNC delegation, likely in exchange for allowing some of what Moscow regards as extremist groups also to join. From Moscow’s point of view, the more unmanageable and fractious the HNC presence in Geneva, the better. The last thing Moscow wants is for the Syrians to choose their own delegation, which would be heavily anti-Russian.
The HNC seems determined to reject Kurdish participation in its delegation, not least because the Kurds often clash with opposition brigades represented there and collaborate with the regime in territories the Kurds largely control. But of course that may mean separate Kurdish representation, which in some ways is precisely what the mostly Arab HNC should not want to see. Separate Kurdish representation in the talks could well favor Kurdish ambitions for a separate federal unit within Syria, like the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. The Syrian Kurds are calling theirs “Rojava.”
With all these complications, is Secretary Kerry wise to insist?
Richard Gowan argues that there are reasons to proceed, despite the odds: possible progress on humanitarian issues, keeping a peace process alive because it may eventually lead somewhere, and most of all the need Washington and Moscow are feeling to limit their recent competition and try for some cooperation in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal. Even a failure, in this view, has the virtue of trying.
My own inclination is towards skepticism, not least because failure at this point will likely mean another tw0-year hiatus. Secretary Kerry is a far greater risk-taker than most of his predecessors. He tried with Israel and Palestine far beyond the point at which others would have given up. The result is an impasse that may last a long time. He pressed forward with Iran on nuclear issues to good effect. Will his Syria effort look more like the former or the latter? More likely the former, with catastrophic consequences for millions of Syrians.
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