Kurdistan under pressure
I enjoyed a couple of hours serving on a panel this morning with Kurdistan Regional Government Representative in Washington Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the Atlantic Council’s Nusseibeh Younes, and SAIS second year student Yael Mizrahi. Sasha Toperich of SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations and leader of its Mediterranean Basin Initiative moderated. I won’t even try to reproduce the nuanced and fine-grained presentations by Bayan, Nusseibeh and Yael, but here are the talking points I used:
1. I am, like most Americans, an admirer of Iraqi Kurdistan and what it has achieved, even if I wouldn’t say the democratic transition there is even near complete.
2. That’s not surprising: Kurdish national aspirations were frustrated in the aftermath of World War I. Even in recent decades, Kurdistan has seen oppression, war, expulsion, and chemical attacks.
3. It has taken a hundred years for a fraction of the Kurdish population—the part fortunate enough to live in Iraq—to gain some degree of self-governance.
4. Until recently, it looked to some people as if that self-governance might progress towards independence and sovereignty.
5. I had my doubts, not I hasten to add due to weakness in the Kurds case: they were treated at least as badly as Kosovo Albanians and arguably much worse.
6. But geopolitical pressure from Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors has made independence a dicey proposition. Ankara, though friendlier than ever with Erbil, does not want independence for Kurdistan. Tehran is dead set against it. Baghdad doesn’t want it either.
7. In the last year, the situation has become even more complicated.
8. Kurdistan is under pressure for three dramatic reasons:
• The fall of oil prices;
• ISIL’s successful takeover of most of Sunni Iraq;
• Its own internal political strife.
9. Let me consider these one by one.
10. Oil prices are now at less than half their level of June 2014. At $100/barrel, Kurdistan needed production of something like 500,000 barrels per day to replace its share of Iraq’s overall oil production.
11. I’m guessing, but it seems to me likely it now needs production of well over 1 million barrels per day to replace the money it expects from Baghdad.
12. Even 500,000 bpd was a stretch. A million is a much bigger stretch, even with Kirkuk production now in Kurdistan’s control.
13. Second, Kurdistan now has to defend about six hundred miles of confrontation line with the Islamic State, as well as something like two million displaced people and refugees it is hosting with international assistance.
14. That is a daunting battle front and a massive humanitarian requirement.
15. Third is the serious political strife within Kurdistan, which pits President Barzani and his PDK against Gorran and other dissenters from his desire to prolong his stay in the presidency. They want a more parliamentary and less presidential system.
16. Soldiers who are expected to fight ISIL will want to know who and what they are fighting for. There is more ambiguity and dissension about that today than there has been for many years.
17. I don’t see any of these pressures letting up soon.
18. Erbil is getting ready to return to Baghdad in an effort to restore the agreement on oil that was supposed to allow exports directly from Kurdistan in exchange for payment of what Baghdad owes Erbil.
19. Let’s hope that issue can be sorted out, but even if it is oil prices remain under $50 per barrel and are unlikely to go above $80, due to unconventional production enabled by US technology that is now spreading to other countries.
20. Oil is priced in a global market. Kurdistan now has little prospect of meeting its budgetary needs as an independent state.
21. ISIL is not going away. Even if it is forced to withdraw from Ramadi, as it has been forced to do from Tikrit and Bayji, it will be some time before Mosul is retaken. The Kurdish confrontation line with ISIL is likely to remain long for some time to come.
22. Even after ISIS is defeated, I would anticipate extremist attacks on the KRG, as have occurred in the past.
23. Nor is Kurdistan’s internal strife likely to go away. Barzani is standing his ground. So is Gorran, which has been suspended from the parliament and the coalition government. Even if things were to get patched up, the differences remain profound and the willingness to resolve them weak.
24. So Kurdistan faces some intractable problems, even without mentioning the complications that come from the war in Syria: Turkish attacks on the PKK inside Iraqi Kurdistan and the help Erbil has given to the Kurdish forces flying PYD/YPG banners, which Ankara resents.
25. So what looked like a natural slide towards independence a year or two ago now looks like a return to the 20th century: a Kurdistan hemmed in on all sides and unable to pursue the self-determination that its people unquestionably want.
26. What should the U.S. do?
27. It should certainly support the Kurds, both Syrian and Iraqi, in the fight against ISIS, so long as they are prepared to treat Arabs and other non-Kurds well.
28. It should also continue to provide generous humanitarian assistance.
29. And Washington should do what it can to help Erbil and Baghdad resolve their dispute over the distribution of oil revenue.
30. On the internal Kurdistan issues, we should want to see them resolved sooner rather than later, since later could mean disrupting the fight against ISIS.
31. But we also need to nudge our Kurdish friends in a direction that respects the rule of law and democracy.
32. No president is forever. No governing party is forever. Adherence to the constitution as well as fair and free competition for votes is what we should expect of our partners, no matter what the outcome for longstanding friends.
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Peace picks November 9-13
- War or Peace? the Gulf States and Russia’s Intervention in Syria | Monday, November 9th | 12:00-1:30 | Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The war in Syria, now in its fourth year, has killed more than a quarter of a million people, contributed to the biggest refugee crisis since World War II, and become a breeding ground for ISIL and other extremist groups that threaten not only the region but much of the rest of the world. In September, Russia began carrying out airstrikes in Syria as part of a coordinated counterattack with Iran and Hezbollah against rebel groups supported by Gulf Arab states, Turkey, and in some cases the U.S.What does Russia hope to accomplish by its intervention in Syria? How have the Arab Gulf states responded, and how is this affecting recently improved GCC-Russian relations? What role are Iran and Hezbollah playing on the ground and likely to play at the negotiating table? Is the Obama administration seriously considering a substantive expansion of American military involvement in Syria, or will it focus primarily on diplomacy? Are the Vienna talks laying the groundwork for serious negotiations and a political settlement? And how does ISIL factor into the Syrian conflict, the trajectory of its development, and its impact on the region?This AGSIW panel will look at all these questions and more arising from Russia’s intervention in Syria and the response of the Gulf Arab states. Speakers include Fahad Nazer, non-resident fellow at AGSIW; Mark Katz, professor of government and politics at George Washington University; and Bessma Momani, senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. The discussion will be moderated by Hussein Ibish, senior resident fellow at AGSIW.
- Demonizing Dissidents: How INTERPOL is being abused by Dictatorships | Monday, November 9th | 4:00-7:00 | Fair Trials & Georgetown Law’s Human Rights Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In recent years, the use of INTERPOL’s “wanted person” alerts has expanded vastly with over 120,000 now circulating across the globe. Unfortunately, as it has become easier for countries to obtain INTERPOL Red Notices, some have been used as an instrument for silencing dissent and exporting repression with devastating consequences. Join us to discuss how INTERPOL is starting to address this problem which has been undermining its reputation as the global “good guys” in the fight against crime, and hear from people whose lives have been turned upside down by Red Notices, including: Sherif Mansour, an Egyptian-American democracy and human rights activist working for the Committee to Protect Journalists; Benny Wenda, a West Papuan tribal leader who leads an international campaign for the people of West Papua; Lutfullo Shamsutdinov, a human rights activist and witness of the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan; and Patricia Poleo, an award-winning anti-corruption journalist and vocal critic of Hugo Chavez, subject to a Red Notice from Venezuela.
- Our Walls Bear Witness: Iraqi Minorities in Peril | Monday, November 9th | 6:30-8:00 | US Holocaust Memorial Museum | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join the Museum for a discussion with experts on the plight of ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq who have been targeted by the self-proclaimed Islamic State and are now displaced, not knowing when—or if—they will be able to return home. The discussion will take place on the opening night of FotoWeek DC (November 9–12), for which the Museum will project onto its exterior walls photographs from a recent trip to Iraq.Speakers include Naomi Kikoler, deputy director of the Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, who recently returned from northern Iraq; Dakhil Shammo, a Yezidi human rights activist from the region; and Knox Thames, special advisor for religious minorities in the Near East and South and Central Asia at the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom.You can submit questions for the panelists on Twitter using the hashtags #IraqCrisis and #WallsBearWitness.
- Turkey with the brakes off: What does Erdoğan’s victory mean? | Wednesday, November 11th | 5:00-7:00 | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Turkey’s ruling AKP restored its majority in parliament on Nov 1. But the election was held after President Erdogan refused to accept the June 7 election’s results, sabotaged efforts to form a coalition government, relaunched war in the country’s southeast -– and after a massive suicide bombing in Ankara.Will this election stabilize Turkey? What does this election mean for Turkey’s regional posture, and what kind of partner will it be for the U.S.?Speakers at this forum will draw from Turkey Transformed, a recently published study in which CACI scholars partnered with the Bipartisan Policy Center to investigate Turkey’s transformation under Erdogan. Speakers include: Eric S. Edelman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; Svante E. Cornell, Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute; Blaise Misztal, Director of Foreign Policy, Bipartisan Policy Center; Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress; and John Hannah, Senior Advisor, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. The discussion will be moderated by Mamuka Tsereteli, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.
- The ISIS Scorecard: Assessing the State of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy | Thursday, November 12th | 9:30-12:30 | American Foreign Policy Council | RSVP: events@afpc.org | The Honorable Newt Gingrich will give a keynote address. Speakers at this Capitol Hill conference include: Amb. Alberto Fernandez, Vice President of Middle East Media Research Institute and Former State Department Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications; Sebastian Gorka, Major General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Chair of Military Theory, Marine Corps University; Celina Realuyo, Professor of Practice, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University; and James S. Robbins, Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs, American Foreign Policy Council.
- The Transatlantic Forum on Russia | Thursday, November 12th | 8:30-2:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for the fourth joint conference of CSIS and the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding (CPRDU). Since 2012 CSIS and CPRDU have partnered to examine the impact of Polish-Russian reconciliation and its wider regional and transatlantic implications. Significant structural cracks in Europe’s security architecture – crafted at the end of the Second World War and refined by the Helsinki Final Act – have appeared since Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea and its incursions into eastern Ukraine. As a result, the principal challenge to the transatlantic community is to formulate a new foreign policy approach towards Russia. Our expert panelists will discuss the nature and scope of this new policy while considering historical relations between Russia and the West. See here for the full agenda and the featured experts.
- Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence | Thursday, November 12th | 2:00-3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In his new book, Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks examines the recent phenomenon of violent extremism by exploring the origins of violence and its relationship to religion. Rabbi Sacks challenges the assertion that religion is an intrinsic source of violence and describes how theology can be central to combating religious violence and extremism. Through analysis of biblical texts tied to the three Abrahamic faiths, Rabbi Sacks illustrates how religiously-inspired violence stems from a critical misreading of these texts. Governance Studies at Brookings will host a discussion addressing Rabbi Sacks’ book and other important issues related to the roots of religious violence. This event is part of the long-running Governing Ideas book series, which is hosted by William A. Galston. E.J. Dionne, Jr. will also join the discussion.After the discussion, panelists will take audience questions. Books will be available for sale before and after the event.
- Migration, Asylum, and the Role of the State: Defining Borders, Redefining Boundaries | Thursday, November 12th | 4:00-5:30 | The Kluge Center at the Library of Congress | No registration necessary | Issues around immigration, migration, and asylum are pressing political, social and cultural concerns in the United States and Europe today. Three Fellows at the Kluge Center will discuss the role of the state in establishing geographic, technological and bureaucratic controls over the flow of peoples, cultures and beliefs across borders, and examine how the notions of national borders and state boundaries have evolved over the 20th and 21st century and how migrants and immigrants continue to challenge state-defined categories. Speakers include: Iván Chaar-López, researching databases, computers, and drones as instruments of border and migration control along the southern border (Digital Studies Fellow, University of Michigan); Katherine Luongo, researching witchcraft and spiritual beliefs among African asylum-seekers in Europe, Canada and Australia (Kluge Fellow, Northeastern University); and Julia Young, researching early 20th century Mexican immigration to the U.S. (Kluge Fellow, Catholic University).
- The Syrian Refugee Crisis & the U.S.: What is our responsibility? | Thursday, November 12th | 7:00-9:00 | Institute for Policy Studies | No registration necessary | Three experts on the Syrian crisis will address the issues faced by refugees, the need for ending the war to end the refugee crisis, the role of the U.S. in creating and its obligations for solving this crisis, and what the U.S. should do to assist and welcome Syrian refugees—and prevent similar crises in the future.Speakers include Pam Bailey, human rights activist and journalist; Phyllis Bennis, IPS fellow and author of numerous books and articles on U.S. policy in the Middle East; and Rafif Jouejati, Syrian activist and director of FREE-Syria. The forum will be moderated by Andy Shallal, activist and owner of Busboys and Poets. The event will be held at Busboys and Poets.
- The Search for Stability and Opportunity: The Middle East in 2016 | Friday, November 13th | 9:00-5:00 | The Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute will host its 69th Annual Conference at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The event will bring together prominent Middle Eastern and American experts and foreign policy practitioners to delve into the many questions and challenges that face the region during this period of unprecedented change. Experts from across the region and the U.S. will examine Middle Eastern states’ pursuit of security out of the current disorder, the policy imperatives that will confront the next U.S. president, strategies for empowerment, inclusion, and equity in Arab societies, and the trends and channels in which youth are challenging the societal and political order. See here for the full agenda and featured experts.
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Defending your right to say it
Friends in Serbia have informed me of the latest blowup there over press freedom. The Adria Media Group, which owns both Newsweek Serbia and the daily tabloid Kurir, has been publishing results of its corruption investigations, in particular in the Belgrade city government.
The response has been ferocious on the part of pro-government media, including publication of the home address of the head of Adria, along with the provocative “if Mr. Rodic survives, Serbia cannot.”
Aleksandar Rodic, whom I don’t know, responded in turn with an open letter that reads in part (check the original Serbian if in doubt):
I want to tell the truth facing the whole Serbian public: the media in Serbia are not free and, moreover, political pressure on media is being done on a daily basis….I myself took an active part in beautifying the ugly social reality in Serbia along with 80% other Serbian media owners….
…All of you already know that it is an open secret that media are “requested” by political decision-makers for some content not to go public or, in clear contrast to that, for some other content to be “fabricated.” That kind of media propaganda goes a long way here in Serbia.It is sad that this kind of media practice turned into unprecedented self-censorship that is closely related to government pressure dominating the Serbian media. Journalistic autonomy is threatened, since they are not willing or allowed anymore to offer critical investigation of a politics-related topic. One doesn’t know which journalist is under political pressure or blackmailed within entities such as editorial staffs.
…People are not stupid but they are resigned and that’s why they give up. They give up on this country and they give up on us. Nevertheless, we need to remain the “voice of the people” no matter what, taking our responsibility for the future of our country.
The pressures I have been suffering were always taking the form of economic weakening of my company while, at the same time, I was threatened to be put on trial for fabricated deeds with no evidence in terms of criminal responsibility.
I openly declare that I consciously agreed to do whatever I’ve been told to do, including censorship that, consequently, led to self-censorship. I do admit that censorship in Serbia is in its full swing.
Distinguished colleagues, prominent media owners, editors-in-chief, media personnel, you are aware that there is both censorship and self-censorship operational in Serbia. We all agreed to be put under pressure we suffer now and even those who consider themselves to be out of media mainstream are not fully censorship-free and autonomous.
All editors-in-chief and journalists are totally aware of what the truth is.Today, when I am put under direct pressure from politicians I stand in front of our profession saying: “Enough is enough!” This time I won’t let myself be threatened or blackmailed, no matter the cost. I appeal to all that you do our profession credit. Serbian citizens deserve to always hear the truth, including the truth pronounced by media professionals.
.
…I can – and I do – understand that everyone has someone they would like to protect, something they find so dear to them, and taking a risk is always hard and painful thing to do. However, this system of political ruling – sustained by threats and blackmailing – is substantially inhuman and no one deserves such treatment….….Dear fellow colleagues working in all Serbian media, I kindly encourage you to get rid of all kinds of fear because this is the only way for us to be journalists in the proper sense of the word. Where ignorance and fear stop is exactly where truth begins.
I confess to sympathy with Rodic, but I am in no position to defend him personally or what his publications have alleged. I just don’t know whether the corruption charges are true or false–that should be decided in court, if there is sufficient evidence to indict anyone.
I do however want to speak up for press freedom, which is still not well-established anywhere in the Balkans. Editors and journalists tell me often that they are subjected to direct and indirect pressure from government authorities, who wield the power of withholding advertising from their antagonists. In the still small economies of the Balkans, that is a serious threat. So too is incitement of violence against journalists and editors, which is all too frequent.
What many Balkans countries still lack are government authorities prepared to speak out to defend press freedom, even if they may disagree with the allegations the press publishes. They instead blame these blowups on unprofessional journalism or claim that their political opponents are behind the allegations. It would be refreshing to hear prime ministers respond by saying the allegations will be thoroughly investigated and accountability pursued wherever it may lead.
That is what demonstrators in Romania were demanding when they brought down their government this week. I suspect it is also what Serbian citizens want. It is what most Americans expect both at home and in friendly democracies abroad. I am saddened when our politicians substitute criticism of the media for honest responses to the questions they raise, as the Republican presidential candidates have recently been doing. Europeans are no less exigent about press freedom. If Serbia wants membership in the European Union, it needs to abide by the most famous thing Voltaire never said:
I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.
Or at least by this, which he did say:
The supposed right of intolerance is absurd and barbaric. It is the right of the tiger; nay, it is far worse, for tigers do but tear in order to have food, while we rend each other for paragraphs.
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The nine lives of Erdoğan
The day after the Turkish parliamentary elections last Sunday, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel to discuss the results, ‘Turkey’s Snap Elections: Resuscitation or Relapse?’ The panel featured Ömer Taşpınar, professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and nonresident fellow at Brookings; Kadir Üstün, executive director of the SETA foundation; Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute; and former congressman Robert Wexler, currently president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. Kemal Kirişci, director of Brookings’ Turkey Project, moderated the discussion.
The election results proved a surprise to most observers, with the AKP winning nearly 50% of the vote after they had been expected to gain perhaps 43-44%. As Kirişci established, they took back about 4.5 million votes in 5 months, including 2-2.5 million from nationalist party MHP and 1 million from the ‘Kurdish’ party, HDP. This places the AKP in a position of strength similar to that of 2011.
Taşpınar highlighted the disappointment that followed the June elections upset, including the failure to negotiate and build a coalition. It had been thought that disappointed voters for the MHP would migrate to the other nationalist party, CHP, but instead they switched to the AKP. Taşpınar stated that the surge in AKP voters from all parties stemmed from Erdoğan’s strategy of ‘controlled chaos,’ demonstrating that failure to vote for the AKP would mean instability, violence, and economic decline.
Üstün agreed that the electorate decided only the AKP, out of all available options, could deliver on the central concerns of Turkish voters today: security, stability, and economic development. No other party presented a positive platform, only setting themselves up as anti-Erdoğan. The HDP in particular, as a Kurdish party, had promised to the people to become an all-Turkey party, but failed after June to distinguish itself from the PKK insurgency, especially after the ceasefire ended and conflict resumed.
Tol discussed the Kurdish dynamic of the elections: after Kobani, observers had assumed the Kurdish vote had deserted Erdoğan and the AKP. However, it is now clear that the current security situation, AKP’s local electoral strategies in Kurdish areas, and conservative Kurds’ disappointment in the HDP resulted in a resurgence of Kurdish votes for the AKP. The standing conflict with the PKK, Tol observed, hurts local Kurdish civilians the most. Nevertheless, these elections are still a win for the HDP, as they attained the 10% threshold for participation in parliament.
Wexler opined that Erdoğan had the chance, during the Gezi protests in 2013, to exhibit become a transformational leader for Turkey, but he failed. Now, Wexler believes that he has a second chance, but Erdoğan must improve his relationships with Israel and other US allies in the region before the US can offer more support.
Taşpınar sees the elections as free but not fair, since media expression is increasingly restricted and opposition voices curtailed. Indeed, just two days before the election several opposition newspapers’ offices were raided. However, Wexler disagreed outright that access to information through free media had any effect on voters’ opinions, stating that voters simply had come to the conclusion that the AKP was the best party to deliver on their central interest, security. Üstün saw a more general ‘sea change’ in public opinion, but he also disagreed that the media played a large role in the election and did not support Taşpınar’s view that censorship today is comparable to the situation under previous military dictatorships.
The unexpected election result refocuses attention on consolidation of AKP rule, with potential for a renewed push for a referendum to create a stronger executive power under a presidential regime, as Taşpınar sees it. Reconciliation with the PKK is crucial to the stability of the country, but Tol does not believe the AKP is interested in giving up the fight yet. Until that happens, it is also unlikely there will be new developments in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria especially.
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Unwise
Its Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU signed, Kosovo is currently campaigning to join UNESCO. This would enable its educational and cultural institutions to benefit from international privileges reserved in practice to UNESCO members. The General Conference, which convened Monday in Paris, is expected to vote on the issue this month, perhaps as early as Monday.
That at first glance is about as far as you can get from a war and peace issue. But unfortunately it matters, mainly because Serbia is trying to block Kosovo’s move with an intense diplomatic countercampaign. Belgrade sees international organization membership for Kosovo as a back door to recognition of its sovereignty.
That’s silly. Recognized by 111 states, Kosovo is already a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as other “country” clubs. That is surely more testimony to its sovereignty than membership in UNESCO, which comes with obligations as well as privileges. Someone in the Serbian Foreign Ministry must get a point for every blocked Kosovo effort to enter an international organization.
UNESCO membership for Kosovo is particularly appropriate. The country has elaborate obligations to protect Serbian religious and cultural property under the Ahtisaari plan that paved the way for Kosovo independence. Belgrade rightly expects Pristina to fulfill those obligations. Its leadership is committed to doing so. Since declaring independence in 2008, it has substantially done so. But extremism is gaining in Kosovo, as it is throughout the Balkans. Denying Kosovo membership in UNESCO would strengthen more radical political forces there and increase potential threats to Serbs and Serb cultural and religious property.
The authorities in Pristina will have to be ready to meet those threats effectively, but even better protection would come from improved relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the local communities in which Serbian churches and monasteries are located. Albanians and Serbs of good will should be trying to ensure proactively that the local population appreciates this commitment and that the local authorities and police give high priority to ensuring its fulfillment.
The Serbian Orthodox Church has taken a position against Kosovo membership in UNESCO, enunciated here in reasonable terms by Father Sava, for whom I have a lot of respect:
This I don’t buy. A sovereign Kosovo can’t be put in the position of taking every issue Belgrade suggests to “the dialogue” the EU has sponsored. That is explicitly aimed at normalizing bilateral relations. Multilateral acceptance of Kosovo needs to proceed in the normal fashion, decided in accordance with each international organization’s normal procedures.
Kosovo is still struggling to gain full international recognition, which is an issue the more nationalist forces use against its current government. Failure to get into UNESCO will encourage this bad habit. There is nothing that could set that cause back more dramatically than a repeat of the disgraceful pogrom of March 2004, in which Albanians strove to drive Serbs out of Kosovo and destroyed churches and other Serb monuments. Most Kosovo Albanians understand and appreciate this now. But there will always be a fringe that wants revenge against Serbs for the injustice and crimes done to Albanians in the past. It is up to Kosovo’s citizens and police to prevent them from acting in ways that most Kosovars would disapprove.
But it is up to Belgrade to appreciate that denying Kosovo membership in an organization devoted to culture, education and science undermines the responsibility and accountability the Pristina authorities and the majority of moderate Kosovo citizens need to accept as their own. UNESCO membership does nothing to hurt Belgrade. Opposing it is unwise and should stop.
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Aleppo under fire
While talk of a ‘safe zone’ in northern Syria along the Turkish border was fairly commonplace toward the end of the summer, the current state of the conflict has changed considerably, due especially to Russian air strikes. The proposed safe zone would have fallen within Aleppo governorate, to the north and east of Aleppo city, and it is around Aleppo city that much renewed conflict is currently being waged.
Opposition groups and civilians have experienced the most significant setbacks in the past month and a half, in military and in humanitarian terms. Tens of thousands of civilians have fled westward, and the latest clashes in the southern countryside have more fleeing to Aleppo’s southern quarters. Current UN estimates put newly displaced Syrians in Hama, Aleppo, and Idlib at 200,000.
Meanwhile, Russian airstrikes have mostly targeted opposition militias, rather than ISIS, providing the latter with an opportunity for making gains. One of the biggest blows came on October 9, when ISIS took several villages, a prison and the Infantry Academy on the northern outskirts of the city. While Ahrar al-Sham and other rebels regained some ground, there have been no significant rebel advances.
Opposition territory around the city has contracted slightly, and much of it remains contested. The narrow corridor north from the city to the Bab al-Salama border crossing, north of A’zaz, is sandwiched between the PYD-controlled canton Afrin to the west, and ISIS to the east. The Kurdish PYD, though not hostile to the opposition, is not an ally either. It has continued to consolidate its control in Afrin and its cantons east of the Euphrates, most recently announcing the full annexation of Tel Abyad to its administration.
Syria’s second-largest city, Aleppo has long been important as a commercial and industrial center, but hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants have fled, putting the estimated current population at 900,000. The city is split between regime and opposition, with security of different neighborhoods falling to whichever militia or FSA brigade is in control. All armed groups participate in one or both ‘operations rooms’ in the city: Fateh Halab and Ansar al-Sharia. These are in charge of security and offensives, but do not fully coordinate with each other (though individual militias may). Because of complaints and the need for more fighters in the current battles, the prominent coalition Levant Front has just suspended its security services.
There are tensions and open hostilities among rebel groups. In late September, clashes flared between more hard-line Islamist groups, including Jabhat al Nusra, and the PYD’s military arm, the YPG, in a traditionally Kurdish neighborhood, Sheikh Maqsoud. The conflict was over access to the opposition’s sole access-point between rebel Aleppo and the countryside, Castello Road. The Local Council and various militias accused the YPG of attempting to open a crossing into regime-controlled areas. Kurdish and Arab residents protested for or against both sides.
With the reassurance of Russian air cover, regime forces have commenced an offensive in the southern countryside, seeking to secure its supply route, the Aleppo-Damascus International Highway, which is close to the front with ISIS. On October 26, ISIS captured a portion between Khanasir and Ithriyya, with the regime only recapturing it yesterday. If ISIS were to wrest control of this road, regime forces in Aleppo city would lose much of their external support.
Regime forces are also advancing toward Kweiris airbase east of the city, besieged by ISIS. They have been engaging the rebels directly south of the city around the towns of Hader, El-Eis, and Tel Hadya, as well. Outcomes remain indeterminate, with back-and-forth between all sides – a tank destroyed here, a hill taken there – but it appears that the regime will continue to advance for now.
The living situation inside the city has worsened in the past eleven days: fighting in northern Hama has resulted in Aleppo’s electricity supply being cut and much of the city has been days in the dark. Lack of electricity also effects other basic services, including water and health. The Local Council of Aleppo City has been striving to repair local electrical grids to the city’s inhabitants, together with the Nusra-run General Administration for Services. Lack of electricity and daily shelling and barrel-bombs from the regime, and Russian air strikes, are the biggest challenges facing Aleppo in this moment.
The Council lacks any control of internal security and judicial systems. On November 1, the Nusra-run shari’a court executed seven men, four of them for collaborating with the regime. Nusra’s court is the most prominent, though the smaller militia Fastaqim Kama Umirt also operates a shari’a court in western Aleppo, with marginally more legal legitimacy. Both, however, apply relatively arbitrary versions of legal codes.
That said, Aleppo’s Council has achieved a lot in maintaining provision of health, water, maintenance, and education services in rebel-held neighborhoods in the past two years. Schools have this autumn moved underground, while the Council strives to continue humanitarian aid to residents and IDPs. With factories closed and destroyed infrastructure – including a large pharmaceutical plant on November 1 hit by a Russian airstrike – citizens are increasingly dependent on aid.
It is crucial, however, that civil society efforts continue and receive external support, both the Aleppo Council and various pro-democracy organizations. Strong civil society remains the best hope that cities like Aleppo will come out of this conflict with something to rebuild.
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