The name problem is Greece’s, not Macedonia’s
Regular readers of peacefare.net will have noticed the inordinate number of comments attached to some of my posts on Macedonia (see here and here for examples. Many of the comments are presumptuous (they assume I have opinions I have not expressed) and offensive, in particular anti-Jewish. I will seek to clarify in this post a small number of the many silly issues my critics raise.
First on the personal side. I am a Jew not only because my parents, grandparents and great grandparents were Jews (I really have no idea about their predecessors), but because I choose to associate myself with that family tradition. My wife is no less Jewish because she was brought up a Christian. In fact, she is a bit more devout than I am, as many converts are.
I support a Palestinian state and full respect for the human rights of Palestinians and other non-Jews in Israel. I make no claims to territory based on Bible stories, many of which may not be literally true. The United Nations General Assembly decided the partition of Palestine in 1948 and the ensuing war confirmed it. I see no viable alternative. Nor do most Palestinians and Israelis, including Israelis who are Arab.
Genes are little relevant to my religion and personal sense of identity, though if anyone is curious some of mine do show origins in the Middle East. On the genetic origins of people in the Balkans, see this. Here is the short version: none show more relationship to the Ancients than others, except perhaps for the Vlachs.
Why do I publish the claptrap of ideologues who claim descent from ancient populations whose language, culture and gene pool have long since mixed with those of many others? Because it is so transparently claptrap. Sunlight is the best disinfectant, though I admit it doesn’t seem to have occurred to the authors of the offensive comments posted on peacefare.net that everything they write confirms one of my main points: that the “name” issue comes from Greek insecurity about Greek identity. Which means “the name” is not really Macedonia’s problem but Greece’s.
Macedonia has other problems. It needs to sort them out quickly and justly if it wants its friends to continue speaking up for it without embarrassment.
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Peace picks November 2-7
- The Iran Deal and the Future of US-Iranian Relations | Monday, November 2nd| 4-5:30 | American University | Email USFP@american.edu for more information | Join the United States Foreign Policy Program to welcome Ambassador Pickering back to SIS. He will discuss the recent Iran accord and its implications for the future of US-Iranian relations. Speakers include: Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former U.S. diplomat and founder of the Iran Project.
- Blood, Oil, and Cast: Confronting Terror Finance in Today’s Middle East | Monday, November 2nd | 10:00-11:00 | Center for American Progress | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the years since 9/11, the United States has built effective tools to disrupt funding for Al Qaeda. More than a decade later, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and similar groups that extract resources from the land and people they control challenges the existing policy framework that focuses on safeguarding the formal international financial system. Meanwhile, Iran continues to destabilize the region through direct support to proxy groups such as Hezbollah. Although key U.S. partners in the region have taken action to crack down on terror financing, others have yet to take the necessary steps to counter terrorist fundraising in their own borders. Speakers include: Juan Zarate, former Deputy National Security Adviser for Combating Terrorism, William F. Wechsler, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, and Hardin Lang, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress.
- Turkey’s snap elections: Resuscitation or relapse? | Monday, November 2nd | 3:00 – 4:30 | Brookings Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND |As Turkey prepares for highly-contested elections on November 1, concerns are growing about the country’s politics, economy, security, and foreign policy. Just a few years ago Turkey was recognized as a model of democracy and beacon of stability and economic growth in a challenging region. However, more recently, Turkey’s economy has lost its dynamism, its leaders’ commitment to democratic principles seems to be eroding, and doubts are emerging about the country’s interests and engagement in the region. Even more disturbing, as the conflicts in Syria and Iraq continue unabated and massive refugee flows spill over into Europe, violent Islamic extremism has now surfaced in Turkey. With the government and opposition trading accusations, the horrific, recent bombing attack in Ankara has further polarized an already deeply-divided and anxious country. Panelists will discuss how recent events might influence voters what the election results might portend for Turkey’s strategic orientation. Speakers include: Ömer Taşpınar, National War College and Brookings, Gönül Tol, Middle East Institute, Kadir Üstün, SETA Foundation; and Robert Wexler, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace.
- A Conversation with Tunisian Nobel Prize Laureate Hussein Abassi | Wednesday, November 4th | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | unisia has made tremendous efforts since its 2011 revolution to establish the institutions and practice of pluralistic democracy, and on October 9 the Norwegian Nobel Committee recognized Tunisia’s achievements. The committee awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four civil society groups including the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). The UGTT, led by Mr. Hussein Abassi, played a powerful leadership role in the National Dialogue and in making Tunisia a model country for the region. The Atlantic Council is pleased to invite you to a discussion with Mr. Abassi on the role of institutions in pluralistic democracies in the Middle East. Other speakers include: Ambassador Thomas Shannon, and former Slovenian President Danilo Türk.
- Syria webinar: Putin in Syria- does it change anything? | Wednesday, November 4th | 10:00-11:00 | Aegis Advisory | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On 30 September, Russia began its airstrikes in Syria ostensibly against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Aegis Advisory is offering a webinar which will provide a framework for understanding the ever more complex situation, offering a privileged understanding of the environment in country and the likely range of scenarios. Why did the Russians decide to intervene now in the Syrian conflict? Would their intervention help in “degrading and destroying” ISIL? Should we expect a breakthrough in the security and political stalemate that will result in a meaningful solution?
- Kirkuk: Iraqi Keystone and ISIS Target | Wednesday, November 4th | 12:00-1:15 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While ISIS militants control the western reaches of Kirkuk, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and local police have prevented the fall of Kirkuk city and most of the oil-rich province. Kirkuk hosts hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons who have fled ISIS aggression. With funding and support from the Baghdad government disrupted, the challenges facing Kirkuk are mounting. The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Dr. Najmaldin Karim, governor of Kirkuk province since 2011, for a discussion about the province’s precarious place at the center of the Iraq war against the Islamic State. Governor Karim will review the threat posed by ISIS and how local government is trying to deliver for Kirkuk’s Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, and Christian citizens while in the grip of a security and humanitarian crisis. Gönül Tol, director of MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies, will moderate the audience discussion with Dr. Karim following the governor’s opening remarks.
- Roundtable with the Leadership & Advocacy for Women in Africa | Thursday, November 5th | 11:00 – 12:00| Georgetown University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) Fellowship Program was founded in 1993 at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C., in order to train women’s human rights lawyers from Africa who are committed to returning home to their countries in order to advance the status of women and girls in their own countries throughout their careers.
- Afghanistan Today: Facing Challenges, Opening Opportunities | Thursday, November 5th | 5:00 – 7:00 | SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Speakers will provide in-depth knowledge of current developments, as well as prospects for the future in Afghanistan, as seen from the perspectives of the government, media, and the private sector. Speakers: TBA.
- The state of Africa’s Great Lakes region | Friday, November 6th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Great Lakes region of Africa is crucial to Africa’s general stability, yet it remains plagued by a number of ongoing security and development challenges. A broad question, among others, is how or if the United States should try to promote democracy and security in these key countries at this crucial juncture? Other concerns include how to ensure stability and continue to protect human rights. Speakers include: Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Co- Director, Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence , The Brookings Institution, Anthony Gambino, Former USAID Mission Director in Congo, Kristin McKie, Assistant Professor of African Studies & Government, St. Lawrence University, The Honorable Thomas Perriello, Special Envoy, Africa Great Lakes Region, U.S. Department of State.
- Rising Tides: a simulation of regional crisis and territorial competition in the East China Sea | Saturday, November 7th | 11:30am – 6:00 pm | George Washington University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This simulation will examine the complex maze that actors must negotiate when dealing with the tense social, political, and military dilemmas currently occurring in the East China Sea. Participants will assume the roles of influential policymakers, and must work with both state and non-state regional actors to execute comprehensive and multilateral government responses to issues ranging from great power politics, piracy, and natural resource conflicts; to state bargaining dilemmas, humanitarian assistance, and collective action problems. Participants will have the unique opportunity to grapple with serious questions of national interest through the eyes of the government of the United States and the People’s Republic of China as they are divided into teams in order to develop their respective policies and agendas. Participants will need to develop strategies in line with their team’s objectives to manage a variety of crises and react to actions from other teams.
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A small step forward, a big step backwards
Yesterday’s communique after Vienna talks is classically ambiguous. It represents a small step forward, and a big step backward. It raises as many questions as it answers.
The step forward is this: Iran is included in the 19 parties issuing the statement. It had not previously been party to multilateral talks on Syria, even though it plays a vital role in sustaining Bashar al Assad in power. Without Iranian troops, weapons, command and control as well as oil and other assistance, he would be long gone by now.
Much of what Iran has agreed to is not controversial in principle: Syria’s unity, independence, territorial integrity, the continuity of its state, human rights for its citizens and humanitarian access. However difficult to implement in practice, none of Assad’s international opponents has wanted anything else. Nor does Russia, though its concept of human rights might not coincide with ours (Saudi Arabia’s doesn’t either). There is value in getting Iran to sign on to things already agreed in the 2012 communique that until now has been the touchstone of international diplomacy on Syria. It was in fact Iran’s refusal to sign on to that communique that prevented it from attending the January 2014 Geneva 2 conference, which was the last time something resembling the “international community” met on Syria.
But there is a big piece of the 2012 communique missing from yesterday’s document: the provision for a transitional governing body with full executive powers based on mutual consent. This is a big step backwards. In its place, we got this much vaguer promise about the transition:
a political process leading to credible, inclusive, nonsectarian governance, followed by a new constitution and elections. These elections must be administered under U.N. supervision to the satisfaction of the governance [sic] and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, free and fair, with all Syrians, including the diaspora, eligible to participate.
Herein lies the devil of all details: what to do about President Assad between now and elections. The Iranians have not signed on to delegation of his authority to a transitional governing body, but only to his fate being decided in UN-supervised elections. And implicitly the Americans and their partners have backed off the demand that he give up power at the start of the transition process, settling instead for his removal at the end, if the voters so decide (or perhaps earlier if the Russians are prepared to prevent him from standing at the elections).
The Americans will argue that this is really not the case because “no credible, inclusive, nonsectarian governance” can be established with Bashar still in place. But they have certainly lost something important in the omission of reference to a transitional governing body with full executive powers established by mutual consent. That was far more explicit than the reference to “a political process.”
Were I in the Syrian opposition, I would be concerned about this step backward. But a lot still depends on whether the Russians are prepared to continue to support Assad, who is costing more in blood and treasure than Moscow can afford. The Americans believe the fight against the Islamic State in Syria can’t succeed with Assad still in place, because his brutality pushes so many Sunnis in the extremists’ direction. They need to convince Moscow that they are correct. Peeling Russia away from Assad and Iran has long been critical to prospects for peace in Syria. It still is.
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If only one person votes, is it democratic?
I tweeted yesterday, in regard to turn-out at the first round of the Egyptian parliamentary elections:
If an election is held and 22% vote, is it democratic?
Those who responded were on the “yes” side:
It is a miracle the Elections were even held! Who said they have to have fair. I bet 22% were family votes Politics
Uhhh ya? What’s the threshold for participatory politics?
shall we cancel it and repeat it and assign minimum turnout ratio?
The 2014 Midterms had only 36.4% turnout. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/11/10/voter-turnout-in-2014-was-the-lowest-since-wwii/ … Any different
yes
I assume some of those who retweeted might be implicit “no”s.
So what do I think about this? It was not a rhetorical question.
The answer on the most superficial level does have to be yes. Elections are and should be legally valid even if turnout is low. Some countries do have a threshold for minimum turnout, but in my experience that is not in elections but rather in referenda on important constitutional issues. It would be impractical to have a threshold for an ordinary election. You might end up with no one ever getting elected.
But low turnout still has implications, because elections are a way of conferring legitimacy. If only a single person turned out (which happens occasionally at the local level in the US), surely there would be doubts about the legitimacy of the person elected. Twenty-two per cent is several million more than one in Egypt. But you still have to wonder what the other 78% are thinking.
The question is not so much about the legitimacy of the individuals elected with such a low turnout, but rather about the legitimacy of the political system that manages to attract such a low turnout. That is not only true for Egypt but also for the US, where Josh Klemons is correct to point out the miserable turnout at mid-term polls held two years after the President is elected, usually with much higher turnout.
People vote with their feet. If they fail to turn up, that suggests disillusion, indifference and hostility, not enthusiasm, commitment and engagement. President Sisi certainly has widespread support in Egypt. I observed the constitutional referendum there in January 2014 and saw it with my own eyes. He may have lost some support since then–even the completion of the Suez Canal project does not seem to have roused much enthusiasm–but there are certainly a lot of people who think he is doing well and deserves a parliament that supports him.
The problem is that he has obliterated his opposition. Some but not all the Muslim Brotherhood supporters of 2011/12 have abandoned their cause. Nor have all the civil society activists who sparked the revolution in the first place. They just don’t want to vote because they see no real choices and don’t want to lend legitimacy to a regime that doesn’t offer them. In his understandable zeal to reestablish law and order, Sisi has done more to erase nonviolent dissent than to eliminate criminal violence against the state, which continues to plague the authorities, especially in northern Sinai.
An election can be “democratic” even if the context in which it takes place is autocratic. Slobodan Milosevic held elections often. He won them, often without much cheating at the polls because he had limited dissent to a narrow band of the population. In a democratic system, there has to be a real chance for alternation in power, even if the alternation seldom occurs (remember Japan under the LDK). If the political competition is limited to people and forces that have no chance of winning, or when they win simply switch to side with those already in power, that is not really a democracy.
So yes, the elections in Egypt were “democratic.” The African Union observers found they
…were conducted in a transparent and peaceful manner. The elections provided an opportunity for citizens to freely express their democratic right to vote.
I imagine the procedures at the polling places and in the counting were correct. But the context is not democratic and many Egyptians are therefore not taking advantage of the opportunity. I hope Egypt evolves in a democratic direction, with a vigorous opposition and the real possibility of alternation in power. But for that to happen, President Sisi is going to have to ease up on repression and welcome dissent.
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Iran in the tent
Tomorrow’s meeting on Syria in Vienna will include Iran, until now excluded from multilateral efforts to negotiate a political solution to the multi-sided civil war. Some see this as an innovation that gives Tehran “legitimacy” and strengthens its diplomatic hand in the region.
To the contrary: Iran needs to be at the table because there can be no diplomatic solution in Syria without its contribution. Iran is Bashar al Assad’s mainstay. Tehran provides Damascus with arms, ground troops (mainly through Hizbollah), command and control as well as economic support (largely in the form of oil). Only recently have the Russians come out out of the shadows to provide air attacks, intelligence and some ground capabilities. For the previous four and a half years, Iranian enabled Bashar al Assad to hold Damascus and western Syria as well as a link between those critical areas.
The international community tried to negotiate a political settlement without Iran. The June 2012 Geneva communique’ was the product of a UN-sponsored meeting Tehran did not attend. The Geneva 2 meeting in 2014 likewise kept the Iranians at arms’ length, because Tehran was unwilling to endorse the 2012 communique’. Excluding Iran didn’t work. Neither Geneva conference led to serious progress in ending the Syrian wars, though the communique’ remains what diplomats call an important touchstone or point of reference.
Now Washington has concurred in allowing Tehran into the tent. Foreign Minister Zarif, who led its nuclear negotiating team, will participate. This is a mixed blessing. Zarif and his boss, President Rouhani, do not control Iran’s Syria policy. Supreme Leader Khamenei does. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), not the Foreign Ministry, is the executive agency. It is hard to picture how Zarif could agree to something the IRGC does not want, in particular any plan that involves the removal of Bashar al Assad from power.
The best that can be hoped for in Vienna is a discussion that initiates a struggle over Syria policy inside Iran. The Islamic Republic has long sought a leading role in the Islamic world, not just among Shia. The war in Syria is alienating Sunnis, who are by far the majority in the Islamic world. It is also decimating Hizbollah, killing thousands of Iranian troops and costing Tehran a fortune. While Americans worry that its engagement in Syria will increase Iran’s influence in the Middle East, Iranians worry that it is weakening the Islamic Republic and aligning it with a lost cause.
Iran will be on the spot in Vienna. It has already put forth a plan to end the Syrian wars with a ceasefire, a national unity government, constitutional changes and elections. This is broadly consistent with the 2012 Geneva communique.’ The Russians have reportedly fleshed this out in somewhat more detail. Iranian failure to support the purported Russian plan would risk a serious breach in Assad’s support. But the Russian plan includes an explicit provision for Assad not to run in any new election, raising a serious risk to Iran’s longer-term interests in Syria. This would be unacceptable to the IRGC and the Supreme Leader, if not also to President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif.
So the Vienna meeting is an opportunity for American diplomacy, which is presumably why Secretary of State Kerry has doggedly pursued it and agreed to inviting Iran to the table. It would be a mistake to expect any dramatic breakthroughs. But the meeting could initiate strains between Russia and Iran as well as within Iran that might ultimately produce positive results from Washington’s perspective.
Of course the meeting will also produce strains on the other side of the equation. The Syrian opposition, which is not invited to Vienna, will fear being sold out. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who will attend, will insist that Iran and Russia abandon Assad. Failing that, they will want to continue and increase arms shipments to the rebels in Syria, shipments that have already proved effective in blocking regime advances on Idlib and Aleppo.
My sense is that at this point the US-led Coalition, despite its notoriously different objectives, has better alternatives to a negotiated solution than Russia, which has already doubled down on a bad bet and risks what President Obama terms “quagmire.” Iran may still be willing to throw good money, supplies and troops after bad, but only because it lacks a viable alternative. He who has a better alternative to a negotiated solution has leverage. The Americans need to use it, by threatening to increase further the quality and quantity of arms shipped to the Syrian opposition. They could also increase their own air engagement and begin to target Hizbollah, which is certainly as much a terrorist organization as its Sunni counterparts.
What is still missing is a way out. The Americans want one that displaces Bashar al Assad from power. The Iranians want one that keeps him in place. I’m not seeing a solution to that problem. Vienna at best will be the beginning of a process, not the end of one. At worst, it will fail and lead to further military escalation, with ever more dreadful consequences for ordinary Syrians until one side or the other “wins.”
Iran inside the tent is better than outside, but no guarantee of a negotiated solution.
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What difference do women make?
For the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, on Tuesday the US Institute of Peace collaborated with five Scandinavian embassies to host the event “Global Security: What Does Gender Have To Do With It?” The event specifically examines what lessons may be learned from Scandinavian successes in gender equality and feminist policies, and comes in the wake of a new global report that explores the continuing – and some new – challenges for gender equality and women’s rights worldwide.
After Ambassador William Taylor, Executive Vice President of the USIP, gave the welcome, His Excellency Geir Haarde, Iceland’s Ambassador to the US, highlighted Scandinavian countries’ successes, including their long history of collaborating and sharing best practices, but also warned that even they must be vigilant against backsliding. This is especially important considering the global climate for gender rights: violent extremism, gender-based violence, systematic rape as a weapon of war, women being formally excluded from peace processes, and many other continuing challenges.
The keynote speaker, Elisabeth Rehn, former Minister of Defense for Finland and instrumental in achieving UNSCR 1325, took a global outlook. Nordic countries have indeed achieved much, but 1325 in particular ‘was born in Africa, in Namibia’. Rehn therefore highlighted the locality of all advancement initiatives. There is a crucial role for the UN, of course, in formalizing and institutionalizing such initiatives, and for world leaders as well, but Rehn pointed out that women the world over – as individuals – have different needs and expectations, and so naturally they need different projects as well.
Rehn also explored one of the central themes of the event: including women in peace negotiations and processes greatly enhances the success of negotiations and the sustainability of peace agreements, and counters violent extremism. Women’s participation can produce creative peace, which pays attention to the psychological aspects of reconstruction as well as the physical, and incorporates social, health, and education issues – especially for girls.
The expert panel featured Brigadier Flemming Kent Vesterby Agerskov of Denmark, who was Director of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force in Afghanistan; Captain Anna Bjorsson, Gender Advisor at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters; Carla Koppell, Chief Strategy Officer at USAID; and Ambassador Dag Halvor Nylander, Norwegian Special Envoy to the Colombian Peace Process.
Agerskov offered insights into how incorporating women into his efforts to fight corruption and increase stability in Afghanistan heightened successes there. Like his fellows on the panel, he emphasized the need for decisive leadership on board with increasing women’s participation in all aspects of peace processes and civil society initiatives. Bjorsson stated that gender equality is a central policy of Sweden’s current government, following the principle that women and men must have the same power to shape society and their own lives. Creating a military with a gender-equal code of conduct and increased female participation makes it more effective in addressing different groups’ security concerns, as well as enhancing its reputation.
Koppell highlighted the relative successes of the USAID agenda on women’s rights in the past three years, with 50,000 women worldwide working for it in some capacity, but also stressed that this program needs to improve. For instance, they are behind on women mediators and dealing with non-state actors in countries where USAID projects are based, as well as in exploring the consequences for gender rights of new threats like climate change.
Nylander concluded with an illuminating overview on how the peace process in Colombia over the past three years has had the most success of any such process in confronting gender issues, such as sexual violence; integrating a gender perspective into all resolutions; and working with numerous women civil society activists and women’s NGOs. Importantly, though at first neither party (the Colombian government and FARC) fully acknowledged the importance of gender issues, they now are both supportive of these steps.
This panel did not have sufficient time to go into detail about local cases, but the speakers agreed on global themes and answered their initial question. UN reports and local experiences have shown that gender-inclusive settings with active participation from both men and women greatly facilitate negotiations and create enduring peace agreements. Women, like men, have roles to play at every level and at every step in the process, even in militaries. Hopefully, the next fifteen years will bring more progress.
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