What the Russians are proposing
Friday’s meeting on Syria in Vienna will include everyone but the Syrians: the US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. I’ll be surprised if the Europeans don’t edge their way in as well. The Egyptians will try too.
A Russian proposal, so far ignored by the English-language press, will be on the table for the occasion. A Syrian source has assured me it is real. I am hoping it is. With gratitude to MEI intern Bridget Gill for the translation from الشرق الأوسط here it is:
- Determining a ‘bank of targets’ shared between the nations which are conducting strikes in Syrian territory, and putting the factions that do not accept a political solution in the ‘target bank.’
- Freezing fighting forces, whether the FSA or the regime forces.
- Putting in motion a conference for dialogue that includes the Syrian regime, the domestic and external opposition, and the FSA. This is a dialogue which must produce:
- A general amnesty
- Release of all prisoners
- Parliamentary elections
- Presidential elections
- Formation of a national unity government in which all parties are represented.
- Conducting constitutional amendments that transfers several of the president’s mandatory powers to the government as an assembly (along the lines of the Lebanese model).
- The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, personally promises that the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad will not stand as a candidate in these elections, but this does not prevent the candidacy of those close to him or other figures in the regime in these elections.
- The creation of a framework to integrate the brigades of the FSA with the regime army after the integration of the Syrian militias supporting the regime into the army.
- Russia assures that the amnesty will include all opposition figures domestically and abroad, even those who have picked up arms, and in exchange the opposition [must] commit not to pursue al-Assad and regime figures legally in the future, whether they choose to remain in Syria or to leave it.
- Breaking the siege in all besieged areas on the part of the regime, in exchange for [the opposition] lifting the siege on the regime’s besieged areas, and the opposition’s cessation of acts of aggression and nations’ freezing their arming of these parties.
- Russia preserves its military bases inside Syria, on the strength of a resolution from the Security Council.
- Russia has stipulated that some of the articles of the agreement be kept secret, among them the issue of al-Assad’s participation in the elections, out of fear of his losing control of the army and other armed forces.
I see lots of things wrong with this proposition, but it is certainly not one that should be dismissed out of hand. Assuming it is real, the Russians are essentially saying that they want out of their current bad bet on Bashar al Assad while preserving their military bases and influence in Syria. They don’t much care about the rest, though we can expect them to back someone in the elections who promises to do what Moscow wants.
The devil is of course in the other details. It wouldn’t be easy to get Moscow and Washington to agree on a target list. How would it be decided who accepts a political solution? Freezing areas of control would be difficult, as they are uncertain and often changing. Quid pro quo ending of sieges has been tried many times and hasn’t worked well so far. Amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not possible in the 21st century. Who conducts parliamentary and presidential elections? How is the transitional national unity government formed? How is this proposition related to ongoing United Nations-sponsored talks?
Too many people have seen the Russian intervention in Syria as a sign of Moscow’s strength. To the contrary: it was undertaken to prevent the Assad regime from losing vital territory in Latakia. Moscow is spending more than it can afford in blood and treasure on helping the Iranians preserve Assad’s hold on power. This proposal, while unacceptable in many respects, is a clear indication that the Russians are looking for a way out. While bargaining hard for improvements in this still unacceptable proposition, Washington will have to decide whether to give it to them.
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Declining is the right answer
The Middle East is one of the few foreign policy areas other than climate change and trade that will get many electrons during the upcoming election year. Discord will dominate the discourse: President Obama is insufficiently resolute, he needs to stand up more against {you fill in the blank}, we should or should not intervene {here} or {there}. We should support our allies {more} or {less}, we {should} or {should not} condition aid on human rights concerns, and we should {defeat}, {deter} or {contain} one terrorist group or another.
You wouldn’t know that there is wide area of agreement among Americans and their political leaders on what US goals in the Middle East should be. Here they are, more or less in order of their salience to national security:
- Nuclear non-proliferation: no (more) nuclear weapons states in the greater Middle East (which stretches more or less from Mauritania to Pakistan).
- Free flow of energy: oil and gas should flow unimpeded from the Middle East to world markets.
- Counterterrorism: extremist groups in the region should not be able to mount a mass casualty attack against the United States or Europe.
- Support for allies: America’s regional allies should wield the means necessary to confront internal and external adversaries successfully.
- Spreading democratic values: all other things being equal (which they aren’t on most days), Washington prefers to deal with inclusive governments that reflect the will of their people.
If there is agreement on these goals, why so much dissonance on the Middle East?
It comes from two things: different priorities accorded to these generally agreed goals, and differences over the means to achieve them.
Priorities are important. The Obama Administration arguably has prioritized nuclear non-proliferation over support for allies, reaching an agreement with Iran that if implemented fully would prevent it from getting nuclear weapons for a decade or more but giving it relief from sanctions that strengthens Tehran’s position in the region and enables it to confront American allies. Washington would prefer a democratic government in Egypt, but has prioritized support for President Sisi and his fight against what he defines as terrorism. Some argue Washington’s focus on anti-American terrorism is leading us to over-emphasize security cooperation and under-emphasize political reform.
So too are the means to achieve these goals. President Obama has preferred killing terrorists with drones to risking American lives in efforts to build up states in the region capable of confronting the terrorist threat with law enforcement means. He has also followed a long American tradition of keeping oil flowing through Hormuz principally through military means rather than encouraging oil producers to build pipelines to carry oil around the strait. Some still think threatening the use of force is necessary to ensure compliance with the Iran nuclear deal.
So yes, there is discord, but the discord is about priorities and means, not about goals. Basically, all American politicians are singing the same lyrics, even when they strike up different tunes or use an orchestra instead of a rock band.
The bigger question is whether these goals in the Middle East are increasing or declining in importance. Let’s look at the goals one by one.
With the Iran nuclear deal, we have at least postponed the major non-proliferation issue in the Middle East. There are still others: will Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey now be tempted to at least match Iran in nuclear technology? Will Pakistan deploy battlefield nuclear weapons as a deterrent against India? Will Israel’s nuclear weapons generate increasing concern in the region? But on the whole I think we can say the issues are less urgent and less compelling, now that the Iran question is settled for a decade or more.
The US is now far less dependent on Middle East oil than it has been for decades, but energy experts will quickly counter that oil prices are determined in a global market, so a serious supply disruption would be felt economically in the US even if we imported no oil at all. Still, with prices around $50/barrel and Iran soon to regain and eventually expand its export position, there is little to worry about for the moment. The people who should worry most are in China, Japan and elsewhere in Asia, which is increasingly dependent on Middle East oil and gas exports. They should bear the burden of protecting energy flows.
Little can be said about the terrorist threat. An attack can always sneak through. 9/11 was less a probability than a “black swan”–a rare and unpredictable deviation from the norm. Ever since, the number of Americans killed by international terrorists has been less than the number killed by (non-Muslim) domestic ones (even if we don’t always call them terrorists). With Al Qaeda Central much diminished and the Islamic State preoccupied with taking and defending territory in Syria and Iraq, not to mention heightening of counterterrorist defenses worldwide, it is harder to plan and execute a major terrorist plot than it was 15 years ago.
Support for allies is arguably more important in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal, but the means we have chosen to achieve it are such that it involves little in-depth engagement with the Middle East. We ship truly gargantuan quantities of advanced armaments to the Gulf and Israel. We have also supported, despite a lot of doubts, the Saudi war against the Houthis in Yemen. The main purpose of our support for allies is to reduce the need for direct American engagement, not increase it.
Apart from guys like me and my friends in the thinktank community who make a living (or not) thinking and writing about the Middle East, there is little support left in the US for spreading democratic values in the region. The positive results of the Arab uprisings are so paltry–a fragile transition in Tunisia and some reforms in Morocco and Jordan–that most Americans (and certainly the presidential candidates) wouldn’t want to waste much taxpayer money or electoral breath on what they regard as a quixotic pursuit.
So declining is the right answer, even without considering the rising threats to the US from China in the Pacific and from Russia in Europe. Those of us who still worry about the Middle East need to figure out more economical and effective ways to achieve the goals that Americans agree on. More about that in future posts.
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Montenegro will survive the challenge
- It was clear that the protests were violent. I am not sure if this was an attempt to topple the government by force, but I believe that this could not happen in Montenegro.
- To assume power in a democratic system, it is important to obtain more votes, and I am not sure how such violent protests could contribute in gaining more votes, or even uniting opposition. People can love or hate Djukanovic, but the fact of the matter is that he is in power thanks to a democratic system and it will be very difficult to take over the power from him through street demonstrations. In democratic systems this is done through elections.
- Moscow will try to create an impression that there are intensifying efforts against Djukanovic, but in reality it is all about resisting Montenegrin membership in NATO. For Moscow Djukanovic is insignificant, what is important is NATO membership. NATO enlargement, even when it comes to small Montenegro, is a defeat for Putin, and they will try to avoid that kind of defeat.
- As long as the security forces refrain from using excessive force, and as long as it is clear that Montenegro has a considerably stronger group that supports its membership, I believe that NATO will recognize what is behind this. These protests might in fact solidify support for the Montenegrin bid among NATO member states.
*Sinisa tells me I was wrong when I said yesterday Vijesti published the interview. He informs that it was Montenegrin Radio and Television (RTCG).
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Peace picks October 26-30
- 20th Anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords Series – The Balkan Wars of the 1990s: Reflection and Reconciliation | Monday, October 26th | 10:00-12:00 | Johns Hopkins, SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This event is hosted by SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR), which is a non-profit research center that engages opinion leaders on contemporary challenges facing Europe and North America. The goal of the Center is to strengthen and reorient transatlantic relations to the dynamics of a globalizing world. Panelists: Thomas J. Miller, Former U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Robert E. Hunter, Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO; and Robert M. Beecroft, Former OSCE Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moderator: Sasha Toperich, CTR SAIS Senior Fellow and Director, Mediterranean Basin Initiative.
- Putin’s Crimea Gamble: Russia, Ukraine, and the New Cold War | Monday, October 26th | 10:30-12:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since the time of Catherine the Great, Crimea has been a global tinderbox. Most recently, the world was stunned when the forces of Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded and seized Crimea in March 2014. In the months since, Putin’s actions in Crimea, eastern Ukraine and, more recently, in Syria have provoked a sharp deterioration in East-West relations. Basic questions have been raised about Putin’s provocative policies, his motivations, and the future of U.S.-Russian relations—and whether the world has now entered a new Cold War.On October 26, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host Nonresident Senior Fellow Marvin Kalb for the launch of his new book, Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War (Brookings Institution Press, 2015). In Imperial Gamble, Kalb examines Putin’s actions in Ukraine, the impact on East-West relations, and how the future of the post-Cold War world hangs on the controversial decisions of one reckless autocrat, Vladimir Putin. Joining the discussion are Thomas Friedman, The New York Times columnist, and Nina Khrushcheva, professor of international relations at The New School. Brookings President Strobe Talbott will provide introductory remarks, and Martin Indyk, Brookings executive vice president, will moderate the discussion.
- A Global or Regional Future for Central Asia? | Tuesday, October 27th | 9:00-10:30 | CSIS | RSVP: rep@csis.org | The United States, China and Russia have developed competing visions for Central Asia. The U.S. and China both use the imagery of the Silk Road to describe their visions, but thus far dialogue between the two countries remains modest in scope and pace. At the same time, Russian-Chinese collaboration on Central Asia is growing quickly. What may be the future development of U.S.-Russia-China relationship in Central Asia? And why is Central Asia important for international security more broadly? Featuring: Ivan Safranchuk, Deputy Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy (Moscow); with Jeffrey Mankoff, Acting Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS, as discussant. The conversation will be moderated by Olga Oliker, Director and Senior Adviser, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS.
- Indonesia in the changing world: A conversation with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia | Tuesday, October 27th | 11:00-12:00 | Brookings | For more info: events@brookings.edu | On October 27, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host President Joko Widodo of Indonesia for a discussion on the role of Indonesia in the changing world, focusing on economic opportunities and reforms, geopolitics, ASEAN, and international commitments. Brookings President Strobe Talbott will provide introductions and Congressman Brad Sherman of California will deliver opening remarks. Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies Richard Bush will moderate the discussion and conclude with his closing remarks. President Widodo took office in October 2014, defeating his opponent through an unprecedented, volunteer-based campaign that called for government reforms. Previously, he served as the governor of Jakarta (2012-2014) and as the mayor of Surakarta (2005-2012).
- Captured News Media: The Case of Turkey | Tuesday, October 27th | 12:00-2:00 | Center for International Media Assistance | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Media capture –the systemic governance problem where political leaders and media owners work together in a symbiotic but mutually corrupting relationship – is a growing concern for media development around the world. It is becoming the dominant model of organization in a growing number of media markets, raising worrisome questions. Looking at the media market in Turkey as a case study, how does media capture affect journalists on the ground? What are the implications of media capture on Turkey’s upcoming elections? Join the Center for International Media Assistance at the National Endowment for Democracy in launching its latest report, “Captured News Media: The Case of Turkey” with an expert panel discussion featuring report author Andrew Finkel, Gönül Tol, Amberin Zaman, and Richard Kraemer.
- Global Security: What Does Gender Have to Do With It? | Tuesday, October 27th | 2:00-5:30 | US Institute for Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The imperative for women to participate fully in decisions about peace and security won unprecedented recognition 15 years ago with the U.N. Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1325 calling for members to craft national plans to accomplish that objective. Now, the new U.N. Strategic Development Goals declare women’s equality as a precondition to resolving many of the world’s national and regional crises. Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the five Nordic Embassies on Oct. 27 for a discussion with Nordic representatives that have helped pave the way on the connections between gender and security.Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden are ranked as the top five countries in the 2014 World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index ratings. The discussion at USIP will explore the Nordic countries’ approach to gender equality and to global security more broadly. This event will celebrate the 15th anniversary of the landmark UNSC Resolution 1325 and the underlying principle that gender equality is at the core of peace and security. Speakers include: Mr. Geir H. Haarde, Ambassador of Iceland to the United States and Former President of the Nordic Council; Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, Former Minister of Defense of Finland and Independent Expert of the High Level Advisory Group for the Global Review on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325; Ambassador Dag Nylander, Norwegian Special Envoy to Colombia; Captain Anna Björsson, Gender Advisor at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters; Brigadier Flemming Kent Vesterby Agerskov, Chief at the Regional Command South and former Director of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat; and Ms. Carla Koppell, Chief Strategy Officer at U.S. Agency for International Development. Ambassador Donald Steinberg, President and CEO of World Learning, will moderate. Join the conversation on Twitter with #1325at15. A reception sponsored by the Nordic Embassies will follow the event from 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm.
- Democratizing Under Fire: Can Tunisia Show the Way? | Wednesday, October 28th | 10:00-11:30 | US Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As Tunisia struggles to build a stable democracy from its 2011 Arab Spring revolution, it must overcome terrorist attacks, high unemployment, a refugee crisis and the threat of social turmoil. The stakes are region-wide, as Tunisia remains the only one of five Arab Spring countries to be treading a non-violent, democratic path. A critical figure in Tunisia’s evolution—Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Islamist movement Nahda—visits USIP, together with the Center for the Study of Islamic Democracy, on October 28 to discuss how his country can consolidate its progress.Tunisia’s success or failure in building a peaceful democracy is central to U.S. and international interests in a stable North Africa, Middle East and Arab world—an importance recognized this month by the award of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to key mediators in the country’s political struggle. After two attacks by militant gunmen killed scores of people and crimped the country’s vital tourist economy this year, the government imposed a state of emergency—a step that raised fears among many Tunisians about a return to the country’s decades of authoritarian, police-enforced rule.Disillusion among young Tunisians has made the country one of the biggest recruiting grounds for violent militant groups such as ISIS. As Tunisian youth circulate to battlefields in the Middle East—and as this nation of 11 million people hosts one million or more refugees from the civil war in neighboring Libya—how can Tunisia manage its borders, improve its security, prevent violence, and also strengthen democratic politics?In discussing these questions, Sheikh Ghannouchi is a vital voice. His movement, Nahda, led the first post-revolution government, which wrote the country’s new, more democratic, constitution. It is now a coalition partner in the secularist government led by President Beji Caid Essebsi. Sheikh Ghannouchi will deliver remarks on the challenges facing his homeland and its region. He then will join Ambassador William Taylor and author Robin Wright in a discussion that will include questions from the audience. Join the question on Twitter with #USIPTunisia.
- Minorities in the Syrian War and Implications for U.S. Policy | Wednesday, October 28th | 12:30-1:45 | Johns Hopkins SAIS – Rome Building | RSVP: raman2@jhu.edu | The Middle East Studies program hosts Faysal Itani, Resident Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, to speak on this subject.
- Implications for Afghanistan: The Taliban Seizure of Kunduz | Wednesday, October 28th | 2:30-4:30 | US Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Taliban’s two-week seizure of Kunduz in September revealed weaknesses in Afghanistan’s security forces and unforeseen Taliban capabilities. It has generated deep concerns about stability, security, the future of the peace process, and underappreciated humanitarian issues. On October 28, USIP will convene experts to analyze Kunduz and its fallout, including President Obama’s decision to extend the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan beyond 2016. The fall of the northern city of Kunduz to the Taliban ignited serious concerns about the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces to maintain stability in their country. While Afghan forces recaptured Kunduz with international support, Taliban forces continue to pressure other northern cities while carrying out operations elsewhere.The government in Kabul and its backers are re-evaluating how security is provided. President Obama announced a reversal of his decision to remove all U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2016, saying that 5,500 would remain. While that decision had been under long discussion, it seems that Kunduz forced the issue. Meanwhile, pro-government factional leaders are urging Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to rearm local militias against the Taliban. Many analysts say predatory actions by existing militias were part of the problem in Kunduz. Since the takeover, reports of human rights abuses and humanitarian problems are emerging from Kunduz, and the Afghan government and international community seem ill-prepared to deal with the humanitarian crisis.Finally, the fall of Kunduz was a blow to Afghanistan’s “national unity” government, which so far has given the impression of being more focused on internal rivalries than on its core responsibilities. How did divisions within the government contribute to the fall of Kunduz? And might the city’s ordeal prompt better internal coordination?Please join USIP on Wednesday October 28 for a discussion among experts on these questions and what they may mean for stability in Afghanistan. Speakers include: Belquis Ahmadi, Senior Program Officer Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace; Deedee Derksen, King’s College London, Author, The Politics of Disarmament and Rearmament in Afghanistan; Ali Jalali, Distinguished Professor, National Defense University, Former Interior Minister of Afghanistan; and Christopher D. Kolenda, Former Senior Advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of Defense. Scott Smith, Director for Afghanistan & Central Asia at USIP, will moderate.
- What is Next for Human Rights in Iran? | Thursday, October 29th | 2:00-3:30 | Freedom House | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Hassan Rouhani’s presidency has coincided with a deterioration of human rights. At least 800 individuals have been executed in 2015 – the highest number in 25 years. Over a thousand prisoners of conscience remain in Iranian jails, including American citizens, and many after serving their terms. Iran also has blocked efforts by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate abuses inside the country.Please join us for a discussion of the state of human rights in Iran today, and how the United States, the United Nations, and the international community should respond. Speakers include: Ahmed Shaheed, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran; Daniel Calingaert, Executive Vice President, Freedom House; and Mehrangiz Kar, Award-winning human rights lawyer and author. Carol Morello, Washington Post correspondent, will moderate.
- New Challenges to the Laws of War: A Discussion with Ambassador Valentin Zellweger | Friday, October 30th | 9:00-10:30 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | New technologies have altered the way nations conduct armed conflict. Advanced cyber techniques and autonomous weapons systems are two salient examples, and nations can wield these tools to great effect. As these technologies proliferate, international bodies need to consider how existing legal frameworks keep pace with on-the-ground realities.
Join Ambassador Valentin Zellweger, Director General for International Law and Legal Advisor at the Swiss Foreign Ministry and a group of leading experts for a discussion on how the challenges posed by modern technology can be addressed within the existing laws of armed conflict (LOAC) framework. Ambassador Zellweger will particularly draw from past experiences, such as the regulation of private military and security companies in the Montreux process, in order to illustrate ways to address new challenges in LOAC. Other panelists include: Colonel Gary Brown, Professor of Cyber Security, Marine Corps University; Catherine Lotrionte, Director of the Institute for Law, Science and Global Security, Georgetown University; and David Simon, Counsel, Sidley Austin, LLP. Light refreshments will be served at 10:30 AM following the panel.
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Countering the ISIS narrative
The Brookings Institution hosted “Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks” Wednesday afternoon. Former ambassador and vice president of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Alberto Fernandez, presented his major findings and policy recommendations from his research into ISIS’s propaganda operations. Richard LeBaron, non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, provided comments, while Brookings’ Will McCants, who has recently published The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, moderated.
Fernandez examined how ISIS propaganda developed, the reasons for its appeal, and efforts being made to counter its narrative. He observed that the crisis in Syria gave ISIS a window through which it could become more global and creative in its propaganda efforts, which had previously been inward-looking and somewhat amateurish. Syria historically and culturally holds much significance for Arab Muslims, and the city which holds apocalyptic significance, Dabiq, falls within its boundaries. ISIS’s English-language magazine is called Dabiq, after al-Zarqawi focused on it in one of his speeches.
Syria is also the first social media war, or tweeted war, according to Fernandez. So 2013 became a turning point for ISIS propaganda, as it also then began expanding into English.
ISIS’s appeal is based on four things: emergency, agency, authenticity, and victory. In Fernandez’s view, all propaganda stems from a political reality. To be successful, it must remain connected to that reality. ISIS exploits the sense Muslims have of being besieged and slaughtered everywhere. It provides the aggrieved with the opportunity, the invitation, to do something about this. Its character – grim, austere, brimming with zealotry and brutal violence – underscores its claimed authenticity. Finally, it is able to show that it gets results: it wins battles, takes cities, and expands its territorial control.
Efforts to counter ISIS need to be as comprehensive as ISIS’s approach. Fernandez has five recommendations:
- Recognize that ISIS is a political problem with a media dimension: the phenomenon is not reducible to social media, but is a real war.
- Counter volume with volume: efforts need a comprehensive network, including the information and experience of Syrians on the ground.
- Content needs to be multifaceted: different focuses and styles should be used, rather than attempting to find a single silver bullet that alone will undermine ISIS.
- Efforts must account for the personal dimension of radicalization and seek to replicate the tight personal relationships ISIS creates.
- There is value in better policing of space online.
LeBaron by and large agreed with Fernandez, while also highlighting that many counter-propaganda efforts don’t provide any alternate options for people who may be susceptible to ISIS’s message. LeBaron believes that “We are the counter-narrative,” that is, Western liberal capitalism and democracy, the way people live in a Western country like the US.
This may be true for young Muslims who have little familiarity with the West and grew up under autocratic regimes and weak economies. But it hardly seems a likely counter-narrative to the hundreds of young people, Muslims or converts, who were born and raised in Western countries and are nevertheless attracted to ISIS or similar ideologies. Any counter message, like any explanation, must account for the numerous different factors contributing to ISIS’s appeal.
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Yes, Mr. Obama, there is a Syrian opposition
The Middle East Institute, which graciously calls me one of its scholars, published this piece yesterday:
President Barack Obama has notoriously disparaged the moderate opposition as “farmers or dentists or maybe some radio reporters who didn’t have a lot of experience fighting.” The key question about the Syrian opposition is not whether it can fight — in fact many of its cadres are former Syrian army soldiers — but whether it can govern.
Based on a recent visit to Gaziantep — where the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and many Syrian civil society organizations are headquartered — I believe the Syrian opposition could govern effectively in a part of Syria, if it were adequately protected from ground, artillery and air assault. Syrian opposition fighters would need to provide security on the ground, while the anti-ISIS Coalition would protect any designated area from regime airstrikes and barrel bombs.
There are three possible areas in Syria where a protected and liberated zone might be established: in the south along the Jordanian border and the “green line” that separates the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights from Syria; near Raqqa in eastern Syria; and/or in northern Syria along the Turkish border.
What reasons are there to believe the opposition could govern one or more of these areas?
First, Syrians in many opposition-controlled areas have already established forms of governance, including more than 400 local administrative councils, plus nine at the provincial level. The councils provide forums for dialogue and deliver public services, such as emergency and humanitarian relief, electricity, water and sanitation to millions of people. Some collect taxes and fees. Some have even established police forces and courts. Deraa governorate in the south boasts 76 local councils. Aleppo governorate in the north has some of the most active and well-structured.
What the local councils lack is adequate funding and strong connections to the SIG, which is trying to standardize electoral processes and other procedures. According to its Minister of Local Administration, the SIG needs $42 million to pay their salaries and $300 million to fund their priority efforts per year. Funding the local councils through the SIG would enhance its stature and legitimacy, giving it traction within Syria that it currently lacks.
Second, Western funding over the last four years has generated a wide array of externally-based but Syrian-staffed nongovernmental organizations. Some of these are elite organizations, run by well-educated Syrians who may lack the grassroots support the local administrative councils enjoy. However, others are managing to sponsor intercommunal dialogues, negotiating the release of kidnap victims, organizing women to prevent rape, discovering ways of enhancing livelihoods, providing first responders and ensuring respect for human rights.
Third, the local administrative councils and nongovernmental organizations are receiving significant support from Western donors and meeting tough requirements for accountability and transparency. The Assistance Coordination Unit, a quasi-nongovernmental organization established before the SIG, handled $200 million in Western assistance in 2014 and passed a tough international audit with flying colors. The Coalition-sponsored Syrian Recovery Trust Fund is finding useful ways to spend its $90 million in mostly Western contributions, often through the local councils.
Fourth, the SIG has begun to provide important services. The education ministry has administered high school examinations in opposition-controlled areas of Syria and among refugees for several years. It runs schools staffed by 25,000 volunteer teachers. The SIG health ministry has conducted a successful polio vaccination campaign. In November, the SIG will open a Free Syrian University with a faculty of about 160 professors and upwards of 4,000 students.
No one can prove they can govern effectively until trying to do it. But we have ample indications that the Syrian opposition, despite its many weaknesses, could at least begin to govern inside Syria if liberated areas can be protected from attack.
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