Early elections in Serbia
Last Friday Belgrade news agency Tanjug asked some questions. My answers were published today:
Q: There is a possibility for the early parliamentary elections to take place in Serbia early in 2016. At the national level, it is said that the reason behind holding the early elections is to once again legitimize the government’s reform policy. Which are, in your opinion, the aspects relating to holding the early elections that would be in line with the policy and interests of the EU and the US in Serbia?
A: Serbia has a constitution. So long as the procedures in that are followed, I don’t think either the EU or the US has a problem with early elections. If they in addition consolidate support for reform, that would be welcome in Brussels and Washington. But of course in a real democracy there is no guarantee that the election outcome will be what foreigners prefer. It is up to the citizens of Serbia to determine the outcome.
Q: Are there tendencies from abroad to reduce the impact of the Russian Federation on the Serbian government taking into consideration the closeness of individual political parties/partners to Russia?
A: Yes. Belgrade both historically and at present is closer to Moscow than Westerners think appropriate for a country that aspires to EU membership. Certainly Brussels and Washington would be happier if Serbia conformed its policies with EU sanctions on Russia. Many European countries have in the past maintained good relations with Russia. But Moscow’s current behavior in Ukraine and Syria makes that far more difficult than in the recent past.
Q: What kind of government Serbia needs in the light of international cooperation and assignments that need to be carried out in the course of the EU integration and addressing the Kosovo issue? Which political ideas in Serbia, aside from the ones that are promoted by the Serbian Progressive Party led by Prime Minister Vucic, are acceptable for the international community?
A: Serbia needs whatever government its leaders negotiate, based on the vote of its citizens. That’s the way parliamentary systems work. Anyone who is truly committed to democracy—including a free press and an independent judiciary—will find a warm welcome in the EU and US. They will also welcome any government committed to continuing with serious normalization of relations with Kosovo.
Q: What is in your opinion the goal of a possible government reshuffle, that is the change of the coalition partners of the Serbian Progressive Party, which according to opinion polls will certainly win a majority vote and thereby the mandate to form the government?
A: I try to stay out of other peoples’ government reshuffles. It is well-known in Serbia which parties and leaders are friendlier with Moscow and which are more aligned with Brussels and Washington. But Brussels and Washington don’t get to vote, only to continue to try to influence Belgrade’s policies in a way that makes European Union membership the outcome.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Cooperation is the solution
This week, the Center for Strategic and International Studies held an event titled Open or Closed Borders? Understanding Europe’s Challenge with guests Thomas Zwiefelhofer, Deputy Prime Minister of Liechtenstein, Catherine Wiesner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, and Shelly Pitterman, Regional Representative for the USA and the Caribbean, UNHCR. The Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic Heather A. Conley moderated.
Liechtenstein, although not a member of the European Union, is concerned with the refugee migration issue as a member of the Schengen Agreement enabling border-free travel. As minister of Home Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister Zwiefelhofer is in charge of border issues for Liechtenstein. He argued that the debate over the influx is tearing apart the EU. Solidarity is essential and the responsibility should not fall solely on countries directly affected. Over the past few months, European home affairs ministers have met to discuss and plan resettlement agendas. Ultimately, the quota of refugees for each country to host will be determined by factors like population, GDP, and unemployment to avoid future disputes on unequal hosting.
With a population of just 37,000, Liechtenstein must take special precautions. The country, with humanitarian traditions, has shown readiness to participate in resettlement. But as a small country it must be careful. Zwiefelhofer asserted that Liechtenstein reserves the right to play the sovereignty card by capping refugee totals. He also argued for higher contributions to aid, especially for the UN World Food Programme.
although the number of refugees seems overwhelming, Shelly Pitterman emphasized that it is only 1% of Europe’s population, whereas refugees in Lebanon make up 25%. Assisting Syria’s immediate neighbors needs to be a priority. The challenges in Europe are manageable. Had there have been more leadership from the beginning, the problem would have been better addressed. Engagement by all states is key. Closing borders will not stop refugees, but rather make their journey “more dramatic.”
Catherine Wiesner shared the US prospective and basic position. Saving lives and maintaining human rights is the first priority. In order to do this, it is necessary to close the gap in funding. The problem demands shared responsibility. All those capable and with the power to do so should engage. Member states of the EU have different capabilities, but overall the burden of humanitarian assistance should be manageable.
The panel considered the question of normalization of mega conflict and the highest number of displaced persons to date. Pitterman argued political solutions and long term planning must coincide with humanitarian assistance. Wiesner commented that we have adapted to the new normal by reaching out to private donors. People are more inclined to donate to natural disasters than conflict, but private donors and programs like Google Match have been assets. As for the United States, increasing the number of resettled refugees and speeding up the process is in the works.
The common theme was a cry for unity and fairly-shared responsibility. A handful of nations cannot carry the burden. What Europe is experiencing is only a symptom of much bigger and deeper issues. Cooperation is crucial to resolving both those and the humanitarian crisis.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Counterproductive
I today attended a meeting with Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Željka Cvijanović, who is in Washington talking about reducing government Bosnia’s bureaucracies and decentralizing the Bosnian state. I can agree with her general stance on those questions. But she neglected to mention in an initial brief presentation at a meeting hosted by Foreign Policy her President’s referendum proposals.
The current issue is a referendum called by the RS assembly on a vaguely worded proposition that challenges the authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s courts and of the High Representative who supervises implementation of the Dayton peace agreements reached almost 20 years ago:
Do you support the unconstitutional and unauthorized imposition of laws by the High Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the imposed laws on the Court and Prosecutor’s Office of BiH and the implementation of their decisions on the territory of Republika Srpska?
The High Representative has discussed the legal issues the referendum raises in a Special Report of the High Representative to the Secretary General of the UN on the Implementation of the GFAP in BiH. The law on the referendum has not yet been published in the Official Gazette. Instead of proceeding as usual with that, the RS President and government are using the threat of the referendum to extract concessions from the European Union, which is engaged with RS in a seemingly interminable dialogue on its justice system.
I will leave the legal issues to the lawyers. What is the diplomatic impact of what RS is doing?
What I told the Prime Minister is this: the referendum proposal is convincing a lot of people in Washington that RS is doing the wrong thing in such an objectionable fashion that it is making the unthinkable thinkable: sanctioning RS officials and even abolishing the entities, which are the heart of the Dayton agreements.
The reaction is less dramatic in the EU, which still hopes to engage the RS and the Bosnians in general in reform processes intended to soften the edges of the country’s entity structure and enable it to make faster progress towards becoming a candidate for EU accession. I wish the Europeans well in that effort, which is backed by the international financial institutions on which both entities and the state government in Bosnia depend. The EU reform plan means the Europeans are less likely to join the US in vigorous action against the referendum proposal.
That is too bad, because only when the RS sees Europe and the US closing ranks and getting ready to do something dramatic will it yield to sweet reason. That is what happened with the Brcko arbitration that reintegrated one of the most contested pieces of real estate in the country and with defense reform that unified the armies in Bosnia ten years ago. Until the Europeans and Americans decide to act together in a concerted way, we’ll see little progress.
Some will wonder why I even attended a meeting at which I was bound to hear propositions that I object to.
My general approach to life as a private citizen and professor is that I am willing to listen to any foreigner the USG allows into the country (and quite a few it won’t allow in). My willingness to listen is in no way an indication of agreement or even softness. I was absolutely clear that Dodik’s toying with the referendum and using it to extract concessions from the EU is damaging not only his reputation but the viability of the RS. Catastrophic was the term I used to describe the likely outcome.
I am saying so publicly as well so there is no doubt about my views. It is arguable that we needed to allow the RS to continue to exist at the end of the Bosnian war in order to make peace. The peace has lasted, and for that we should all be grateful. But institutions are not necessarily forever. If the RS continues on its counterprodutive path, Americans and Europeans should reach the logical conclusion.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Governing Syria 2
Last week, I suggested the Syrian opposition is in a better position to govern, at least in a part of Syria, than President Obama believes. But I also promised more on the local administrative councils, Syrian nongovernmental organizations, the assistance coordination unit and the nascent Free Syria University, all civilian activities that represent the best the Syrian opposition has to offer. Today I’ll try to fulfill that promise.
Local councils
Local councils are not unique in Syria. The Libyan revolution also spontaneously generated ad hoc municipal governing councils in 2011 and 2012. But the phenomenon seems to be unusually pervasive in Syria, with the count now about 425 according to the Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA). Most function at the local level, but some function at the city or provincial level. MOLA is trying to raise the number of provincial-level councils from 7-8 at present to 9-10 (out of 14 provinces) by the end of the year.
What do they do? The most recent and most comprehensive report is from last spring, by the Local Administrative Councils Unit (LACU), a creature of the Syrian opposition but not part of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG). A second survey by a Syrian NGO on their legitimacy is in progress. The LACU report suggests that, in addition to emergency response, the most common projects are in the areas of water, power, education, health, and hygiene (I suppose that includes waste management). But most projects are stalled, often because of lack of funding, especially for salaries. A few councils have set up a local police force. Some have set up courts. Many more local ones record marriages and property transactions, though they don’t always have access to regime records.
Where do they operate? Half of the local councils operate in liberated areas subject to bombardment. A handful operate in regime-controlled areas. About one-third operate in stable liberated areas.
How are the local councils formed? One-third were elected, sometimes in indirect elections (that is, a larger electoral assembly chooses them). Half are formed “by consensus.” They are overwhelmingly male–I was told fewer than 2% of the members are women. In rural areas the local councils may have less authority than armed groups, but in cities they hold more sway. Stories of local councils facing down armed groups there are common. The armed groups need the local councils to take care of civilian needs.
How are they funded? The international donors are dealing a great deal with the local councils, most often without coordination or reference to the Syrian Interim Government, which has no funds to provide to the local councils for projects. A few manage to collect some fees or taxes, but most rely on volunteer labor and international donor support. The local councils depend heavily for legitimacy on their ability to deliver services, and secondarily on accountability and transparency. They are a genuinely bottom-up phenomenon.
Fully funding the local councils would require about $3.5 million per month for the salaries of about 10,000 workers. Supporting them fully to provide services and build projects would cost about $300 million per year, I was told.
Nongovernmental organizations
Syrian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) tend to be elite organizations run by well-educated people with good connections to international donors (that, anyway, is what I was told by an NGOer). The NGOs emphasize the right things: service delivery, accountability and transparency. But they also sometimes compete for service delivery with the local administrative councils, which often can’t meet donor requirements for documentation, monitoring and evaluation.
NGO activities inside Syria are however vital and impressive. They negotiate ceasefires and prisoner releases, deal with kidnappers, mobilize first responders, help open schools, promote intergroup dialogue, provide medical aid in besieged areas and counter violence against women. They are trying to organize an effort to allow NGOs to participate in UN peace talks. If the idea of a northern protected zone goes ahead, NGOs will have prepared Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds to return and decide on priorities for their future.
Education
Syrians have a particular concern with education. The SIG has managed to administer high school exams in liberated areas and in the neighboring countries (among refugees) for several years. One million students attend “field” schools in liberated areas and refugee camps, taught inside Syria by 25,000 volunteer teachers in apartments and basements (most school buildings in liberated areas have been bombed). There is a computer school for disabled students in Aleppo.
But many Syrian children are not in school. High school courses are on online, but the literacy rate is down to 50-60% among young people. More educated Syrians are leaving and going to Europe. In an effort to keep more young people in Syria, the SIG is planning to open in November a “Free Syria University” in liberated areas for 4-5000 students. Ten faculties will operate with 160 professors.
The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU)
One of the big issues for international donors in dealing with Syria is whether they can rely on the money to get where it is supposed to go and have the impact it is expected to have. The ACU was set up as a quasi nongovernmental organization (quango) to meet these requirements. It gets money from international donors and invests it in projects, mainly for health, food, nutrition, housing and services.
Established in December 2012, ACU grew from $53 million in 2013 to close to $200 million in 2014. Meeting international auditing standards, it is paying teachers, civil defense workers, street cleaners. It is also buying wheat and vaccinating children. The goal is to help Syrians where they are, so that they won’t move elsewhere, which should ring a bell with Europeans.
My conclusions
I don’t want to paint too rosy a picture. It is easy to find criticism of the local councils, NGOs and quangos. None of these organizations is a sturdy and reliable pillar on which to lean. But I don’t want President Obama to continue painting too bleak an outlook either.
Syria has good people trying to meet colossal challenges with limited means. Yes, I would spend $500 million per year on these civilian activities aimed at making life more livable and the future more productive for a country that right now is costing us far more just to provide humanitarian relief. Certainly that amount would be far less wastefully spent than the Pentagon performance in trying to “equip and train” Syrians to fight ISIS. Syria’s local administrative councils, nongovernmental organizations and quangos merit not just funding but our confidence and commitment.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Reform, not revolution
On Friday, the Middle East Institute and Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted Tarek Masoud, the Sultan of Oman Associate Professor of International Relations at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, to discuss a new book he co-authored, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform. I. William Zartman, SAIS Professor Emeritus, moderated the discussion. Masoud concentrated on deriving policy implications for the US from his structural analysis of why some Arabic-speaking Muslim-majority countries experienced revolts in 2011, why some regimes were able to rebuff protests, and why the results of revolts have been dismal, with the tentative exception of Tunisia.
The talk comes at a fortuitous moment, as the Nobel Peace Prize winner was just announced on Friday as the Tunisian Quartet, which contributed vitally to achieving democratic progress and stability since the mass mobilization that sparked the so-called Arab Spring and led to the departure of Tunisia’s autocrat, President Ben Ali. But personality is the least of it. Masoud and his co-authors take the position in their book that the Arab Spring was “a drama whose script was written long before its dramatis personae took the stage.” That is, there are deeply entrenched structural causes that determined the success or failure of Arab Spring movements.
Masoud suggested five policy implications.
First is that the absence of democracy in the Arab world is overdetermined; there are several decisive reasons why there hasn’t been a wave of democratic transitions. Many people have made a (questionable) cultural argument The most persuasive in Masoud‘s view is economic underdevelopment. Development generates competing political and social forces that are vital to preventing a single hegemonic power. This is one reason for Tunisia’s relative success, evidenced by the civil society-generated Quartet.
Second, Masoud views policies directed at establishing democracy as wrongheaded. What the Arab world needs are states that are durable, no matter what the regime. The effectiveness of many Arab states, which govern by fear and patronage, is rated low by the World Bank. Masoud highlighted the recent provenance of many of them, especially Yemen, as well as Muammar Qaddafi’s strikingly libertarian attitude towards governance, which led him to dismantle many Libyan state structures and atomize society. Tunisia in 2010 had a relatively effective government in 2010.
The third implilcation was simply stated: US military intervention often collapses the state, which is not useful.
Fourth: there is no pragmatic way forward without incorporating elements from the former regimes into future governments. Otherwise, there is the risk of alienating a significant cohort, which will seek to cause the new order from which it is excluded to collapse. Tunisia was advantaged in this respect as well. Its current president was associated with the previous regime.
In Syria, Masoud thought it will be necessary to reach some sort of compromise with Bashar al-Assad if a political solution is going to be achieved. Like other hereditary regimes, his is one in which the coercive and executive apparatus is tightly intermeshed. This has caused many of the monarchies to be more stable than Egypt or Libya, where there was a separation. But once armed conflict begins, this intermeshing may ensure that Assad will not stop fighting until there is no one left to fight.
The fifth and final implication is that the US should seriously consider working with Russia and Iran in Syria. Arguably, the three have more in common in this conflict than the US does with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Saudi Arabia has made it its project to undermine many different states, through the funding and arming of radical Islamists – and it is exactly this type of radical Islamism that the US is seeking to combat on a global scale. Syria needs a strong state and a stable society, not increased weaponization and battlefields drawn on ideological lines.
Though Masoud expressed hope for the region, and a desire for justice for Syria, the study he has conducted in this book with his co-authors has been one focused on the structural constraints set in place decades ago that governed political action during the Arab Spring and continue to do so now. Exploring these constraints has led him to call for a conservative policy towards the Arab world, where the state is more likely to collapse towards a state of nature than transition to democracy. We need to build states and promote economic development in the hope of producing more lasting stability.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks, October 12-16
- JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War | Tuesday, October 13th | 2-3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the fall of 1962, President John F. Kennedy faced two great crises: the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian War. While Kennedy’s role in the missile crisis has been thoroughly examined, his critical role in the Sino-Indian War – and the crisis itself – have been largely ignored. In his new book, JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), CIA veteran and Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project Bruce Riedel details several facets of the October 1962 crisis: the invasion of Indian-held territory by well-armed and equipped Chinese troops; Prime Minister Nehru’s urgent request for direct American Air Force intervention in the war; Kennedy’s deft diplomatic success in convincing neighboring Pakistan to remain neutral during the affair; and the ultimate unilateral Chinese cease-fire that brought an end to the conflict. Riedel also analyzes the CIA’s clandestine support of the Tibetan people in their resistance to Chinese occupation, a matter that had partially precipitated the Sino-Indian War. Finally, Riedel highlights the intriguing role First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy played in her husband’s South Asian diplomacy. On October 13, the Brookings Intelligence Project will launch Riedel’s new book with a conversation about this crisis, how it played an important role in forming Asia’s current balance of power, and the resultant regional arms race that still prevails to this day. Brookings Institution Nonresident Senior Fellow Marvin Kalb will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. Following their remarks, Kalb and Riedel will take questions from the audience.
- Addressing Crisis, Supporting Recovery: The Central African Republic at a Crossroads | Tuesday, October 13th | 3-4:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The citizens of the Central African Republic (CAR) have endured political instability and episodes of extreme violence since the country’s independence in 1960. Recent clashes between sectarian militia in the country’s capital of Bangui have displaced at least 30,000 residents from their homes and prompted renewed concern about the CAR’s peace process and transition back to democratic rule. The CAR’s recovery efforts hinge on the success of immediate stabilization and peacebuilding priorities, including national elections—which were recently postponed due to the ongoing violence and overwhelming logistical challenges—as well as the need to promote long-term civic inclusion and inclusive economic growth. The Brookings Africa Growth Initiative will host a discussion on immediate efforts to stabilize the CAR and long-term strategies for the country’s economic recovery. His Excellency Ambassador Stanislas Moussa-Kembe, the CAR Ambassador to the US, will give remarks, followed by a moderated panel discussion with the experts Ambassador W. Stuart Symington, US special representative to the CAR; Sandra Melone, executive vice president at the Search for Common Ground; and Madeline Rose, senior policy advisor at Mercy Corps. After the discussion, panelists will take audience questions. Amadou Sy, Director of the Africa Growth Initiative, will moderate.
- Is U.S. Missile Defense Aimed at China? | Thursday, October 15th | 2-3:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The United States has been pressing South Korea to accept a very powerful radar that is allegedly intended for South Korea’s defense against North Korean ballistic missiles. However, North Korea is likely years away from building an intercontinental ballistic missile, and the radar is much more powerful than necessary for such a purpose. Is U.S. missile defense policy actually intended to defend against threats from China, rather than North Korea? Join us as Theodore A. Postol explains his research findings in answer to this question, joined by Tong Zhao as a discussant. Carnegie’s Toby Dalton will moderate.
- Turkey Ahead of the November Elections | Wednesday, October 14th | 10:30-11:30 | SETA Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After negotiations to form a governing coalition produced no results following the June 7 elections, Turkey will return to the polls on November 1. Heading to this snap election, Turkey confronts renewed violence in its southeast and challenges as a member of the U.S. led anti-ISIL coalition. Uncertainty remains as to whether this new round of balloting will result in an AK Party single government, or lead to a fresh round of coalition negotiations. Please join us for a panel discussion on Turkey’s current domestic and foreign policy challenges ahead of the November 1 elections. Speakers include: Andrew Bowen, Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies, Center for the National Interest; Omer Taspinar, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; and Kilic B. Kanat, Research Director, the SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.. The discussion will be moderated by Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, the SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.
- Is the Bear Back? Russian Foreign Policy and the Conflicts in Ukraine and Syria | Wednesday, October 14th | 12:30-1:45 | Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Russia-Eurasia Forum invites you to a lecture by Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff of the Center for Strategic International Studies on “Is the Bear Back? Russian Foreign Policy and the Conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.” The Russia-Eurasia Forum is moderated by Professor Bruce Parrott. Guests may bring their lunch to this brown bag series.
- Attribution and Accountability for Chemical Weapons Use in Syria | Wednesday, October 14th | 1-3 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Two years after the dismantlement of Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile, there is mounting evidence that chemicals continue to be used as weapons of war with over 30 allegations of use in Syria. In September the United Nations Security Council established a Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Please join us for a discussion on the Joint Investigative Mechanism, the international response to continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, and the effort to hold perpetrators accountable and uphold the norm against chemical weapons use. Speakers include: Wa’el Alzayat, Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Mallory Stewart, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emerging Security Challenges and Defense Policy, Bureau for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, U.S. Department of State. The discussion will be moderated by Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS.
- Human Rights in Iran after the Nuclear Deal | Wednesday, October 14th | 2-3:30 | Project on Middle East Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon, the international community has begun to focus on the implementation of the nuclear deal. During the course of negotiations, the human rights situation inside Iran failed to improve, and it remains unclear how such issues may be affected by the signing of the nuclear agreement. It also remains to be seen whether the nuclear agreement will now create any additional space for the international community to address its human rights concerns. What changes can we expect to see in Iran’s domestic politics as sanctions are relieved and attention moves beyond nuclear negotiations? What role can the international community play in addressing human rights concerns in Iran? What changes might we expect in U.S. policy toward Iran post-nuclear deal, and how—if at all—can the United States play a constructive role in helping open space for domestic activists? Join us for a conversation with: Nazila Fathi, Author, The Lonely War: One Woman’s Account of the Struggle for Modern Iran; Dokhi Fassihian, Senior Program Manager, Freedom House; and Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution. The conversation will be moderated by Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED). This event is held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Understanding Iran Beyond the Deal | Thursday, October 15th | 4-5 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After surviving a review by a bitterly divided Congress, the Iran nuclear agreement is now a done deal. And yet, with regional conflict intensifying, the question of Iran continues to loom large in the American foreign policy debate. As Iran gears up for elections in early 2016, and as world leaders – in business and in politics – flock to Tehran, understanding Iran after the deal becomes an increasingly complex and urgent task. On October 15, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a conversation with Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the Brookings Foreign Policy program, and author of the recently released book, Iran’s Political Economy since the Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Maloney will be joined by Javier Solana, a Brookings distinguished fellow and former EU high representative for the common foreign and security policy; and Vali Nasr, dean of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings. The three experts will discuss Iran today, the implications of the nuclear agreement, and more. Bruce Jones, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will give introductory remarks. After the program, we will welcome questions from the audience.
- Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Region | Friday, October 16th | 9:30-11 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The complex relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is an ongoing source of instability in the South Asia region. Only this past spring, the first round of discussions between representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership gave even skeptics some reason to hope that President Ghani’s efforts to open talks with the Taliban on peace might come to fruition. After a period of improved contacts and rhetoric, relations between the Afghan and Pakistani governments have again become strained under the burden of high profile Taliban attacks under the new leader, Mullah Mansour. A lasting substantial dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains difficult to achieve, but necessary for stability and for both countries. With the arrival of Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif in Washington later this month, the panelists will explore the challenges faced by the Pakistani leadership, the prospects for its relationship with the Afghan National Unity Government, and the implications for the US- Pakistan relationship. Join us for a conversation with Mr. Shuja Nawaz, Distinguished Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council; and Dr. Vali Nasr, Dean, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The conversation will be moderated by the Honorable James B. Cunningham, Senior Fellow and Khalilzad Chair, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
- Erased from Space and Consciousness: Israel and the Depopulated Palestinian Villages of 1948 | Friday, October 16th | 1-2 | Palestine Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A dramatic transformation took place in the landscape and demography of Israel after the 1948 war, as hundreds of Palestinian villages throughout the country were depopulated, and for the most part physically erased. How has this transformation been perceived by Israelis? Author Noga Kadman suggests some answers, based on a research that systematically explores Israeli attitudes concerning the depopulated Palestinian villages. She focuses on the most ordinary, everyday encounters of Israelis with the memory of the villages, their representations and their physical remains, exploring the naming and mapping of village sites, and the ways depopulated villages are dealt with in tourist sites and Jewish communities established on their remains. Aided by statistics, original quotes, photos and maps, she will discuss her findings, which reveal a consistent pattern of marginalization of the depopulated Palestinian villages in the Israeli discourse, in the context of the formation of collective memory and of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A light lunch will be served from 12:30.
- Understanding ISIS | Friday, October 16th | 3-4 | Center for American Progress | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, has shaken the foundations of an already fragile Middle East. The potency of the ISIS threat has galvanized one of the largest global coalitions in warfare history. More than one year into the anti-ISIS campaign, the results have been mixed, and ISIS has demonstrated surprising resilience. How do we understand ISIS as an organization, and what are its main strengths and weaknesses? Please join the Center for American Progress and the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy for a discussion with Will McCants, Director at the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and Fellow at Brookings’ Center for Middle East Policy, and Hassan Hassan, Nonresident Fellow at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, on the emergence and proliferation of ISIS. Will McCants’ recently published book The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State draws extensively on primary Arabic language sources and letters from Al Qaeda and ISIS. It is a comprehensive investigation of the group’s religious grounding, motives, strategy, and leadership. Hassan Hassan’s book ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, written with The Daily Beast’s Michael Weiss, traces the evolution of ISIS from its origins on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan through interviews with intelligence and military officials, as well as religious figures and fighters, explaining why the group will remain with us for a long time. Opening Remarks will be given by William Wechsler, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.
RSS - Posts
