War is complicated
I’m not often an enthusiast for videos, but this one seems to me to do a good job on the complicated relations of Iran and the US in the Iraq context. It is important to keep in mind, however, that in Syria the US and Iran come out more definitively on different sides (Iran with Bashar al Assad and the US at least nominally against), even though they both seek to defeat the Islamic State.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
It all depends
People were asking me what I think almost before the ink was dry on the five pages agreed yesterday between Belgrade and Pristina on the general principles/main elements of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. The answer is: it all depends.
It depends on your frame of reference:
- If you want to know whether it is consistent with the Ahtisaari plan and previous agreements between Pristina and Belgrade, that is one frame of reference. It looks to me as if it is.
- If you want to know whether the general principles will ensure the Association/Community is formed consistent with Kosovo law, that is another frame of reference. It looks to me as if it will be.
- If you want to know whether it is consistent with practices in other situations where a minority in one country looks to a neighboring “mother” country for support, that is still another frame of reference. I think you likely can find precedents elsewhere.
- If you want to know whether allowing Belgrade to assist in providing education, healthcare and urban planning to Serbs in Kosovo is wise, that is another frame of reference. It at least might lower burdens on the government in Pristina that it would find difficult to carry.
But if you ask me whether it looks like a good idea that Kosovars will have no reason to regret, I confess to doubts. Those doubts originate with the Ahtisaari plan, not with this latest iteration of its most dubious provisions. Kosovo’s negotiators have done well to make it clear the Association/Community will be formed in accordance with Kosovo’s constitution and laws, verified by its constitutional court. It is also clear the Association/Community is supposed mainly to exercise overview and provide services only consistent with Kosovo law. On paper it looks like an ethnically defined version of the Democratic Governors Association (DGA) in the United States. How can I object to that?
I can, because it is ethnically–not politically or geographically–defined and could become the kernel of separate Serb governing structures in Kosovo. That of course is the fear: a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered that country dysfunctional. It is bringing up the rear in the regatta for European Union membership in the Balkans.
Unfortunately, Ahtisaari left the door open for that to happen in Kosovo too, specifically in article 9.1 of Annex III of his proposal:
Based upon the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, municipalities shall be entitled to cooperate and form partnerships with other Kosovo municipalities to carry out functions of mutual interest, in accordance with the law.9.1.1: Municipal responsibilities in the areas of their own and enhanced competencies may be exercised through municipal partnerships, with the exception of the exercise of fundamental municipal authorities, such as election of municipal organs and appointment of municipal officials, municipal budgeting, and the adoption of regulatory acts enforceable, on citizens in general;
9.1.2 Municipal partnerships may take all actions necessary to implement and exercise their functional cooperation through, inter alia, the establishment of a decision making body comprised of representatives appointed by the assemblies of the participating municipalities, the hiring and dismissal of administrative and advisory personnel, and decisions on funding and other operational needs of the partnership…
This notion of “partnerships” to carry out municipal functions might be perfectly sensible and workable in a normal European context. We’ve got some analogies in the US, like the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. But with due respect to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, it could be a nightmare in the Balkans.
Some colleagues have said there is not so much to worry about, because the divergent interests between large and small municipalities, and between those north and south of Ibar, will limit what the Community/Association is able to do. That could be correct, provided the municipalities are driven by their own interests.
But if Belgrade cracks the whip and insists that the Serb municipalities obey its lead–which the flow of its resources may be able to ensure–that argument could be moot. Combined with the disciplined clout of Serb members of the Kosovo parliament, the Community/Association could become a real hindrance to Kosovo’s further institutional development. It will almost certainly become a source of contention within the Albanian community, parts of which will see perfidy even if there isn’t any.
Might Belgrade recognize that a functional Kosovo state is in its interests and a dysfunctional one is not? After all, a weak or collapsed state in Kosovo could create real problems on Serbia’s southern border. I think that is true, but I wouldn’t want to bet on Serbian democracy to come to that conclusion easily. It has been a long time since Belgrade cared much about governance of the Albanians in Kosovo. America isn’t the only democracy that tries all the bad options before doing the right thing.
Do I think the other things agreed yesterday outweigh the risks associated with the Community/Association? No, I don’t. I wouldn’t surrender my kingdom these days for either a horse or an international dialing code, though I might trade a dialing code for allowing a Serbian telecomm provider to operate.
But really the Pristina government had no choice: it was obligated to implement the Ahtisaari plan. Too bad that plan wasn’t better articulated on this issue.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks August 24-28
1. Promoting Nuclear Safety Cooperation in Northeast Asia | Tuesday, August 25th | 12:00-1:30 | East-West Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | China, Japan, and South Korea all have deep experience with nuclear energy and large commercial nuclear power sectors, and the use of nuclear power is expected to continue to expand, mostly driven by growth in China. There have been calls over the years to increase regional nuclear safety cooperation, and the need for such cooperation has been highlighted by the Fukushima accident in Japan, the fake parts’ certificates scandal in South Korea, and rapid reactor construction in China. The most recent proposal for strengthening regional nuclear safety cooperation came in South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). NAPCI envisions addressing “soft” issues, including nuclear safety, in order to build deeper regional cooperation on “hard” security issues, similar to the integration process in Europe, and Park has specifically cited the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) as a model for Northeast Asia. Yet, is EURATOM an appropriate model for Northeast Asia? Can NAPCI’s call for regional nuclear safety cooperation actually be realized, and what would effective cooperation look like? Strong, enduring commitment to nuclear safety cooperation by all regional actors will be necessary for NAPCI or any other initiative to succeed. This seminar will examine the current state of nuclear safety cooperation in Northeast Asia and offer a view to the future. Speaker: Dr. James E. Platte, Non-Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow, Pacific Forum, CSIS.
2. Peace, Conflict, and the Scale of the Climate Risk Landscape | Tuesday, August 25th | 1:15-2:45 | Webinar Sponsored by the Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Climate risks have the potential to affect every natural and social system, to harm populations, disrupt economic systems, and contribute directly or indirectly to conflicts within and across jurisdictional borders. The Global Climate Security webinar series convenes global thought leaders to seek pathways to improve responses to destabilizing climate risks. The opening webinar will examine the security implications of climate risk and will provide a context for the subsequent place-based and sector-based webinars. This session will address climate risk and security on all fronts from the risk assessment perspective (impacts on governance, economic vitality, national, regional and international security) to potential solutions (risk management, policy, and technical). Participants will hear from experts from the national intelligence and climate impact communities who will address the scale of the risks. The first webinar will set up the remaining webinars, which in turn will address how to respond in four sectors (national & subnational, industry, defense and global policy) based on risk assessment and responses commensurate with the risk. The intent is to examine steps to bridge the risk – policy analysis gap. Speakers include: Joshua Busby, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin Marc Levy, Deputy Director, Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Earth Institute, Columbia University, Mathew J. Burrows, Director, Strategic Foresight Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, and Nadya T. Bliss, Director, Global Security Initiative, Arizona State University.
3. Iran: What Next After the Nuclear Deal? | Tuesday, August 25th | 6:30-8:30 | Located at OpenGov Hub and sponsored by PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After last month’s Iran nuclear deal, what next for the Islamic Republic? Will the easing of sanctions bring it more into the diplomatic and international mainstream? Or will the new economic growth create a more assertive Iran that further antagonizes the rest of the region? What will the domestic consequences be of Tehran’s new openness to the outside world? And what, if anything, will happen to the nuclear program? Panelists include: Ariane Tabatabai, Visiting Assistant Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, Reza Akbari, Senior Program Officer, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, and Sam Cutler, Policy Advisor, Ferrari & Associates, P.C. Moderator: Negar Razavi, PhD candidate, University of Pennsylvania and Global Fellow, PS21.
4. International Youth Month Breakfast Briefing: “Young Democracy: Engagement as a Deterrent to Radicalization” | Wednesday, August 26th | 9:30 – 11:00 | Located at the Rayburn House Office Building and hosted by IFES | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join IFES for a breakfast briefing on how involving young people in constructive democratic processes can serve as a potential deterrent to radicalization. This panel will discuss engagement both before and after the age of enfranchisement, with a special emphasis on the political participation of young women and girls. Discussants will offer examples of programmatic work from multiple regions and countries, including Bangladesh, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Libya, Nepal, Syria and Yemen. This event will be co-hosted by the office of Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (TX-18). Speakers include: Matthew Cohen, Program Officer, Africa, IFES, Jessica Huber, Senior Gender Specialist, IFES, Juliette Schmidt, Deputy Regional Director, Asia and the Pacific, IFES, and Ambar Zobairi, Deputy Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa. Moderated by Augusta Featherston, Youth Adviser, IFES.
5. The Economic Impact of Lifting Sanctions on Iran | Thursday, August 27th | 10:00-11:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A new World Bank report assesses that the removal of economic sanctions against Iran could significantly boost economic growth in Iran—including $15 billion in annual oil revenue—while potentially reducing global oil prices as much as 14 percent in the short run, depending on OPEC’s response, and opening up a significant market for exports. Drawing from the report’s systematic and comprehensive analysis, Shantayanan Devarajan will discuss the economic and geopolitical implications of Iran’s potential reentry into the global economy. Carnegie’s Uri Dadush will discuss the economic consequences and Karim Sadjadpour will moderate. Speakers include: Shantayanan Devarajan, chief economist, MENA region, World Bank and Uri Dadush, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment. Moderator, Karim Sadjadpour, senior associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment.
PC: Eddie Grove
6. The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic | Thursday, August 27th | 10:00 – 11:30 | CSIS | REGISTRATION CLOSED- WATCH ONLINE | Please join us for the release and discussion of a new CSIS Europe Program report, The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic, which examines Russia’s economic, energy, and security strategies and aspirations in the Arctic, and the evolution of the Kremlin’s Arctic policies over the past decade. On the eve of President Obama’s and Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Anchorage, Alaska where they will convene Arctic and non-Arctic leaders to discuss climate impact and resilience, and global leadership in the Arctic, it is a timely moment to better understand the
largest and most dynamic Arctic actor and to assess whether the Arctic will remain a cooperative region or succumb to geopolitical tensions. Report author Heather A. Conley and project consultant Dr. Marlène Laruelle will examine the significant changes in Russia’s Arctic policies and rhetoric – particularly since President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012 – and offer their insights on Russia’s military posturing in the region, as well as how to develop new collaborative thinking to preserve and protect international Arctic cooperation. New York Times correspondent Steven Lee Myers, who has written about and traveled frequently to the Russian Arctic, will offer his reflections on the report and assess whether the
development of a 21st century “ice curtain” is realistic. The panelists will also preview the upcoming August 31st meeting in Alaska and assess the impact of the potential attendance of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. Speakers include: Dr. Marlène Laruelle, Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University and Steven Lee Myers, Correspondent, The New York Times. Introduced and moderated by Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic, CSIS Europe Program.
7. A Normal Nuclear Pakistan | Thursday, August 27th | 12:30-2:00 | Stimson | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A commercial pathway for Pakistan to join the mainstream in the global nuclear order is highly unlikely. Pakistan’s leaders must therefore consider nuclear weapon-related initiatives that could facilitate mainstreaming, while also strengthening nonproliferation norms, bolstering global disarmament hopes, and setting the bar higher for new entrants into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This presentation will discuss a new report by the Stimson Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,” co-written by Toby Dalton (Co-Founder and Senior Associate, Stimson) and Michael Krepon (Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). The report takes a hard look at Pakistan’s nuclear weapon-related programs and its ambitions to be viewed as a normal state possessing advanced nuclear technologies.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
დავითი and Голиаф (David and Goliath)
On Wednesday, USIP hosted a talk by the Defense Minister of Georgia, Tinatin Khidasheli, entitled Seeking Security: Georgia Between Russia and ISIS. William B. Taylor, Executive Vice President, USIP, moderated. Khidasheli made a forceful argument that NATO membership or at least a path to NATO membership for Georgia would help deter Russia and maintain NATO credibility.
In his introductory remarks, Taylor noted that Georgia is a strong US ally that has demonstrated its military and diplomatic capabilities. Georgia is committed to integration with the West and NATO.
Khidasheli said Georgia proves success for a former Soviet Socialist Republic is possible without Russia in charge. This is why Russia fights everything they do. Putin is trying to recover from the weakness of the Yeltsin era. He won’t let any country in Russia’s immediate neighborhood have a say without Russia’s permission.
The European Neighborhood’s Eastern Partnership started with six countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, at the 2015 Riga Summit, only Georgia was fully present. This was disappointing.
Khidasheli cited two motives for her trip to DC:
- To strengthen Georgia’s partnership with the US and achieve more tangible results and military cooperation.
- To seek advice on Georgia’s path to NATO membership.
NATO needs Georgia more than Georgia needs NATO, she said, in order to maintain its mission and credibility. The Alliance has been talking for years about its commitment to partners and its open-door policy. It must prove it is still a courageous organization. Some argue that expanding NATO will force Russia to act, but after NATO made it clear in 2008 that it wasn’t expanding, Russia invaded South Ossetia. By 2009, the West viewed Russia as a partner again, but Russia’s actions in Ukraine made it clear that is not true.
As soon as the Riga summit ended in disappointment, Russia started actions in Georgia. There are daily Russian movements on the artificial border with South Ossetia. The Russians sometimes advance up to a kilometer or two. Georgia won’t be provoked and won’t allow war on its territory. The checkpoints that Russia has marked are now just .5 km from Georgia’s main East-West highway. Is Russia targeting it or trying to distract Georgia?
NATO will hold its Warsaw Summit in July 2016. Georgia will hold parliamentary elections in October 2016. A bad outcome at Warsaw won’t make Khidasheli’s voters fall in love with Russia, but it could decrease their turnout, leading to a more pro-Russian parliament. The situation in Ukraine is adding to doubts about Georgia’s integration into NATO and the EU. There are two possible outcomes of the Warsaw summit:
- NATO allows Russia a veto over new members, rejects expansion and cedes additional areas to Russian dominance.
- NATO pursues enlargement, sending a clear message to Russia that partners matter as much as members.
NATO brings peace. It is the only reason the Baltics are currently safe. The current situation won’t deter Russia. The world hasn’t been able to stop the war in Ukraine.
The dominant argument from the Kremlin now favors a strong Russia. Putin has no trouble presenting the West as the enemy. But sanctions alone against Russia won’t help and will play into Putin’s “evil West” narrative. The West needs to understand that Russia is a country where people ate rats and cats in World War 2 and still won. Western notions of hardship and happiness aren’t relevant there.
Khidasheli recognizes that a realistic outcome of the Warsaw Summit won’t be NATO membership but an intermediate step towards membership. Georgia wants a statement that it is on a membership track.
While Georgia recently acquired an air defense system from France, Khidasheli did not specify how Tbilisi plans to deter Moscow or draw red lines. Georgia will make decisions about whether to shoot down a Russian plane violating Georgian airspace based on the threat level. With respect to Russia’s creeping annexation policies, Khidasheli reiterated that Georgia won’t be provoked. Georgia will not make a decision regarding countering Russia without its partners.
Russia is trying to use soft power to influence Georgia through NGOs and the media. There are political parties that openly align with Russia, including a former parliamentary speaker.
Khidasheli also spoke briefly about the problem of ISIS recruitment in Georgia, especially in the Pankisi Gorge. This poses a great danger. Georgia has failed to pay enough attention to the problems in this region. More integration, education and targeted employment programs are needed to decrease the feelings of isolation and abandonment among locals. The government must also examine other areas of Georgia where the demographics suggest future problems and address those issues now.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Pushback
The big downside of the Iran nuclear deal is what the Iranians get: somewhere between $50 and $100 billion in unfrozen assets once sanctions are lifted. While I support the deal because it delays any Iranian attempt to get nuclear weapons by at least 10-15 years (and maybe forever), I also recognize that some portion of the unfrozen assets and the increased revenue from future oil and eventually gas sales will be used for activities that destabilize the Middle East and potentially areas beyond. The notion that it will all go to improving the lot of ordinary Iranians is bozotic.
The Obama Administration has hesitated during the negotiations to push back hard against Iranian support for Hizbollah in Syria and Lebanon, the Houthi rebellion in Yemen and arming of Shia militants in Bahrain. Iran views these efforts, which are under the control of the Supreme Leader (SL) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as protecting its homeland from Sunni extremists and possible Israeli attack. The Administration’s logic seems to be that pushing back harder might have weakened Rouhani’s standing within the Islamic Republic and made conclusion of a deal on the nuclear program, which is also under SL/IRGC control, impossible.
So what about now? There is still an argument to be made: push back against Iran’s regional troublemaking could stiffen the Iranian reaction and make implementation of the deal more difficult. But that argument is inconsistent with the Administration’s own claim that the deal concerns the nuclear file, as Middle Easterners call it, and nothing else. We are paying for this deal with lifting sanctions. We shouldn’t have to pay for it by tolerating Iranian subversion using money derived from lifting sanctions.
Rob Satloff last week offered a handy checklist of options to pushback against Iranian subversion in the region:
Ramp up U.S. and allied efforts to counter Iran’s negative actions in the Middle East, including interdicting weapons supplies to Hezbollah, Assad, and the Houthis in Yemen; designating as terrorists more leaders of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq that are committing atrocities; expanding the training and arming of not only the Iraqi security forces but also the Kurdish peshmerga in the north and vetted Sunni forces in western Iraq; and working with Turkey to create a real safe haven in northern Syria where refugees can obtain humanitarian aid and vetted, non-extremist opposition fighters can be trained and equipped to fight against both ISIS and the Iran-backed Assad regime.
All of these seem to me meritorious, but I imagine the Administration might argue that most are already in train. Certainly there have been efforts to interdict weapons going to the Houthis and Assad; I imagine also to Hizbollah, whose missile supplies the Israelis have repeatedly attacked. Training of the Kurds and Sunnis in Iraq started some time ago. Both clandestine and public programs have been training and equipping non-extremist opposition fighters in Syria, though the numbers and outcomes so far have been ridiculously low. Certainly more and better can and should be done.
The only really new idea here–new in the sense that the Administration hasn’t yet signed on to it, but it has been around for years–is the “safe” haven in northern Syria. I certainly don’t understand what the Turks and Americans might have agreed to already and plan to talk with colleagues in the Pentagon next week about that. But let’s imagine that they have agreed on the basic idea, which would deprive the regime of any pretense of sovereignty in a border area of the country and begin to offer an opposition alternative. What is required to make it viable?
There are five basic requirements to be considered:
- Security
- Governance
- Rule of law
- Economic activity
- Social services, including humanitarian aid
Without any one of these, Syrians won’t go to a safe haven and the effort will fail, like many others before it. The conditions created don’t have to be perfect, but they need to be better than what people can find in Syria outside the safe haven. That might appear a low bar, but really is isn’t: there are regime-controlled areas in Syria that have suffered relatively little, in which even its opponents seek haven. And the refugees camps in Turkey are not the worst on earth.
In a future post, I’ll consider how to meet these requirements, which are far from trivial, especially under the conditions prevailing at the moment in northern Syria.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Tehran calling
Unlike many colleagues around Washington, I have decided to talk with and answer questions from Iranian media willing to publish them. I think it important for Americans to try to be understood in Iran. Certainly Tehran is making big efforts to be understood in the US. While I find some of what the Iranian media broadcast objectionable and even odious, most of the questions they ask me are straight up, like these from Hamid Bayati, published this morning in the Tehran Times:
Q: As you know Iran and Russia begin new initiative to bring peace to Syria, so how do you evaluate these efforts?
A: There really is nothing to evaluate yet. The Iranian four-point proposal, which has been public for some time, requires a good deal more detail before it can be evaluated. The key question is how the transition will be handled. No political solution will work that keeps Bashar al Assad in power, because the Syrian opposition will continue fighting.
Q: Some experts believe that after nuclear deal reach between Iran and world powers, Western countries especially the US begin to cooperate with Iran in regional issues such as Syria, and a new era begins in Middle East. Do you agree with this view?
A: Not really, even if I would like to see it happen. Iran with the nuclear agreement will have substantial resources. The question is how it will use those resources. Hardliners in Tehran will presumably argue for more support to Iran’s allies in the region: Bashar al Assad and Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, Houthi forces in Yemen and Hamas. The US and Europe will not welcome moves of that sort. There will be enormous pressure on the US administration to push back, especially against Hizbollah.
Q: Turkey launches airstrikes against ISIL and PKK positions in Syria and Iraq, are these acts helpful to peace process in Middle East or not?
A: The Americans think more Turkish help against ISIL is vital. The US and Turkey have different opinions about the Kurds in Syria, though at this point PKK attacks inside Turkey are making that irrelevant.
Q: How do you evaluate the US-led Coalition against ISIS after one year of its creation? Does this Coalition reach its goals?
A: The Coalition has not reached its goals, but it has blocked ISIS advances and has rolled them back in some areas (Tikrit, Kobane, Tal Abayd). Without a better formula for who will govern in ISIL-controlled territory, I don’t see how the Coalition can “win.”
Q: As you know US congress is reviewing the Iran nuclear deal and it is possible US lawmakers will kill this deal. If this event happen what will we have after that?
A: It is possible but not likely that US lawmakers would kill the deal, but in order to do so they would need a 2/3 majority in both houses of Congress. That will be difficult to get. If they do kill the deal, Iran and the P4+1 will have some important decisions to make. Do they abandon the deal completely, or do they implement it without the US? If the deal is abandoned, what will Iran do?
Q: In an interview aired Sunday on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS,” Obama said the United States’ role in global politics could be affected by the deal, how do you explain this sentence?
A: Defeat of the deal would separate the US from its allies and undermine confidence in American leadership in many countries. It would be like the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations almost 100 years ago, a move that isolated and weakened the US.
Q: If US congress kills the deal, is it possible United States and EU continue a different strategy toward Iran? I mean is it possible they have different relations with Iran and EU that don’t follow US policy?
A: It is possible, though the US might try to apply “secondary” sanctions by barring European companies from doing business with the US if they do business with Iran. That would create big problems with America’s closest allies.
Q: It seems European countries have been more eager than US to revive their relations with Iran, how do you explain this view?
A: Europe needs Iranian oil and gas much more than the US does. Our companies are far less interested in doing business with Iran than some European countries. Geography is destiny I’m afraid.
As I failed to respond adequately to his question about the PKK, Hamid sent more, which were not published with the rest of the interview:
A: What do you think about Turkey military attacks on PKK positions? Some experts said these attacks are because the AK party lost in elections. Some experts said Turkey attacks the PKK because Turks don’t want Kurds to be strong, what do you think about it?
Q: The PKK made the mistake of ending the ceasefire with the Turkish government, which reacted forcefully. Some think this was the result of a split among the Kurds between those who did well in recent elections and the military component, which feared irrelevance.
It might have been better for the Turks to escalate more slowly; some think Erdogan may be seeking to regain some of the popular support he has lost recently by vigorously responding to every Kurdish provocation. But the PKK is a terrorist organization that attacks the Turkish state and can’t expect safe haven in Iraq or Syria. Iranian support for the PKK is a big concern for Turkey.
The complication of course is that the most effective Syrian fighters against ISIL include Kurds affiliated with the PKK. The Americans prioritize the fight against ISIL, which is an international threat. The Turks prioritize the fight against the PKK, which is a domestic threat. Iran does likewise when it faces a domestic threat of the PKK variety. The US and Turkey will work out their differences in dealing with the Kurds. I’m less sure that Iran and the US, or Iran and Turkey, will do likewise, though it would be desirable.
RSS - Posts
