Forget renegotiation, try these ideas
Rob Satloff, abandoning previous suggestions for renegotiation of the nuclear agreement with Iran, now puts forward proposals for the US to undertake without any need for Iranian agreement. He ties these to defeat of the agreement in Congress (whether by a veto-proof majority or not I can’t tell), but that is not logically necessary for their consideration. So let’s consider them, one by one:
Consequences: Rob wants punishments other than full sanctions “snapback” defined for non-capital violations, as he rightly anticipates it will be difficult to to use “the nuclear option,” if I may call it that, unless the violation is major. Specifically, he proposes
to reach understandings now with America’s European partners, the core elements of which should be made public, on the appropriate penalties to be imposed for a broad spectrum of Iranian violations.
I see no reason not to talk about this and even agree the penalties with the Europeans now, but is making the consequences public likely to increase compliance?
I wonder. Penalties defined now are likely to be less severe than what we can actually get once a violation occurs. It might be far better to wait for a incident of noncompliance and respond vigorously. I see no justification for Rob’s assumption that penalties defined later have “no value.” The first violation and reaction are the key to imposing credible consequences.
Deterrence: Rob wants penalties agreed and defined for transfer of funds from sanctions relief to Iran’s regional trouble-making. He suggests:
…these new multilateral sanctions should impose disproportionate penalties on Iran for every marginal dollar sent to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, etc.
Assuming that Rob is correct that our intelligence agencies can in fact determine unequivocally what amount represents increased assistance (which would surprise me), I again see no problem in discussing this with our friends. As he notes, levying sanctions of this sort is not ruled out because they are unrelated to the nuclear issue. We should be traying to block these transfers regardless of what happens on the nuclear deal.
Pushback: This is a related idea:
“Ramp up U.S. and allied efforts to counter Iran’s negative actions in the Middle East, including interdicting weapons supplies to Hezbollah, Assad, and the Houthis in Yemen; designating as terrorists more leaders of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq that are committing atrocities; expanding the training and arming of not only the Iraqi security forces but also the Kurdish peshmerga in the north and vetted Sunni forces in western Iraq; and working with Turkey to create a real safe haven in northern Syria where refugees can obtain humanitarian aid and vetted, non-extremist opposition fighters can be trained and equipped to fight against both ISIS and the Iran-backed Assad regime.”
Each of these propositions deserves its own consideration, but in general it seems to me vital that we push back in some of these or other ways against Iranian misbehavior in the region, lest Tehran get the idea that the nuclear agreement blesses their ambition of achieving regional hegemony.
Declaratory policy: Rob wants a Congressionally endorsed statement that the US will use military force to prevent Iran from embarking, after the 15-year restrictions in the agreement, on enrichment that could “only” lead to a nuclear weapon. For reasons I fail to fathom, he thinks to be effective this has to be done now by the president who did the deal.
Even leaving aside that problematic “only” lead to a nuclear weapon (which betrays a lack of understanding of the many ways in which uranium enriched to high levels can in theory be used), Rob is self-contradictory. First Rob says President Obama’s threat that “all options are on the table” has lost credibility. Then he says it has to be this president to say more or less the same thing, this time with Congressional backing, in order to be credible.
More importantly, Rob fails to consider the international repurcussions of having the Administration do this right now. The hardliners in Iran love reiteration of the “all options” statement, as it demonstrates their thesis that American attitudes are unchanged and Washington seeks an opportunity to strike Iran.
If Congress wants to go on record, I don’t see who could stop it. Nor do I think anyone in Tehran doubts where Congressional sentiment lies. But the Administration has a stake in seeing maximum implementation of this agreement, which is threatened on the Iranian end by hardliners who didn’t want to see it done in the first place. Strengthening opponents of the deal in Tehran is not in the US interest.
Israeli deterrence: Rob wants to transfer the Massive Ordnance Penetrator and the means to deliver it to Israel.
Here more discussion is needed. Is this without end-use controls, or with them? What means are needed to deliver it, and how many of the bombs and delivery means are we talking about? How realistic is it to imagine that Israel will have the capabilities needed to evade Iranian air defenses and deliver these 30,000-pound monsters? Who is going to pay for this stuff?
So yes, there are certainly some things we should be doing to block Iranian misbehavior in the region but I’ve got more questions than answers about some of Rob’s other propositions.
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Peace picks August 17-21
1. The Defense Economy and American Prosperity | Monday, August 17th | 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | At just over 3 percent of gross domestic product, U.S. military spending totals more than $600 billion annually. A number of recent developments and long-term trends, however-including sequestration and contractor consolidation-threaten the health of the U.S. national security industrial base. The American defense industry is being squeezed on multiple fronts, but just how important is the defense sector to the overall strength of the American economy? Do specific cities or regions have more to worry about than others should defense spending continue to decline? What impact does defense spending have on regional and national job creation and technology innovation? On August 17, the Foreign Policy and Economic Studies programs at Brookings will host a discussion of the American economy and the role that defense industry could play in the nation’s continued recovery and economic health. Panelists include Ben S. Bernanke, Brookings distinguished fellow in residence, and Mark Muro, senior fellow and policy director of the Metropolitan Policy Program. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, will also participate and moderate the session. Following discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
2. Assessing Japan-Republic of Korea Relations after Prime Minister Abe’s Anniversary Statement | Tuesday, August 18th | 10:00-11:30 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s statement commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II has the potential to either repair or further impair Tokyo’s current strained bilateral relations with Seoul. In recent months, both countries have endeavored to repair the relationship by addressing and compartmentalizing historic issues. But real progress on the nascent rapprochement initiative remains dependent on Abe’s anniversary statement and President Park Geun-hye’s response. Strained relations between two critically important allies is of grave concern to Washington since it hinders U.S. security interests in Asia and constrains effective integrated responses to the North Korean military threat. Questions remain over what role the U.S. can play in helping Japan and the Republic of Korea achieve reconciliation. Speakers include: Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS, and Associate Professor, Georgetown, Evans J.R. Revere, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings and Sheila A. Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, CFR. Host: Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Heritage.
3. Examining Arctic Opportunities and Capabilities: Does the U.S. Have the Infrastructure, Ships and Equipment Required? | Tuesday, August 18th | 1:30-3:30 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On April 24, 2015 the United States began a two-year term as Chairman of the Arctic Council. The Council is composed of eight Member States: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S. Clearly, the capabilities of these eight countries to operate in the Arctic differ quite significantly. As Arctic opportunities arise, so, too, has the interest of an increasing number of non-Arctic countries. Twelve countries have been deemed Arctic Council “Observers:” the People’s Republic of
China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Several of these “Observers” are also actively developing and advancing their potential Arctic operations capability. The United States, under its Chairmanship over the next 20 months, will have numerous policy questions worthy of examination and assessment. Can any Arctic policy be sustained without enduring U.S. capabilities? Does change in the Arctic region encourage other countries to become more actively operational in the area? While the U.S. has the capability to operate around much of the globe, does
it really have a robust ability to be a presence in the Arctic? How might the U.S. better operate side-by-side with Arctic allies? Are Arctic Council “Observer” nations already more capable of Arctic operations than the U.S.? Join us for a most timely and important discussion. Keynote speaker: Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., USCG (Ret.), Special Representative for the Arctic, U.S. Department of State. Host: James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, The Heritage Foundation. Other speakers include: H.E. Geir
Haarde, Ambassador of Iceland to the United States and former Prime Minister, Isaac Edwards, Senior Counsel for Chairman Murkowski, U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and Luke Coffey, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation. Moderator: James E. Dean, Manager, International and Diplomatic Programs, The Heritage Foundation.
4. China’s Missiles and the Implications for the United States |Wednesday, August 19th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Hudson Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While China’s ongoing island-building in the South China Sea has garnered headlines, Beijing has quietly continued a ballistic missile modernization program that increasingly threatens U.S. and allied naval vessels—and challenges existing U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense capabilities. The United States is particularly concerned about the development of the DF-21 “carrier killer” that is designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the Western Pacific. Additionally, the commander of the U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Gortney, confirmed in April that China has deployed three ballistic missile submarines capable of striking the U.S. homeland. On August 19th, Hudson Institute will host five noted experts for a discussion of China’s expanding missile arsenal and the role of that arsenal in Beijing’s broader strategic objectives. Trey Obering, Dean Cheng, Mark Schneider, and Bryan Clark will join Hudson Adjunct Fellow Rebeccah Heinrichs to analyze China’s military capabilities, national strategy, and possible U.S. responses. Speaker: Henry A. “Trey” Obering III, Executive Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton. Panelists include: Dean Cheng, Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy, and Bryan Clark, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Moderator: Rebeccah Heinrichs, Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute.
5. Seeking Security: Georgia Between Russia and ISIS | Wednesday, August 19th | 3:00 – 4:00 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As world headlines focus elsewhere, international security remains at risk in Georgia: Russian troops last month continued a creeping seizure of new Georgian territory, including part of a strategic pipeline. ISIS is recruiting fighters throughout the Caucasus for its war in Syria. Georgian Defense Minister Tinatin Khidasheli, in Washington to meet with top U.S. officials, will make her remarks at USIP August 19. She will discuss how her country is navigating regional security threats that have deepened in the 18 months since Russia attacked Ukraine.
6. US-Israeli Relations After the Iran Deal | Wednesday, August 19th | 6:30-8:30 | Located at Thomson Reuters but sponsored by PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After July’s historic nuclear deal between the P5+1 great powers and Iran, what is next for relations between the United States and Israel? Moderator: Warren Stroble, Reuters DC diplomatic editor. Panelists: Alexandria Paolozzi, Senate Legislative
Director and Issue Specialist on Israel for Concerned Women for America (CWA). She visited Israel in September 2014 on a Millennial Leaders tour. She has organized Capitol Hill panels on religious freedom in the Middle East, rallies and demonstrations in support of Israel, and has lobbied on pro-Israel policies in the United States Senate. Dr. Guy Ziv is an assistant professor at American University’s School of International Service (SIS), where he teaches courses on U.S. foreign policy, the Middle East, and international negotiations. He is the author of the Why Hawks Become Doves: Shimon Peres and Foreign Policy Change in Israel. He is founder and director of the Israel National Security Project (INSP), a repository of statements by Israeli security experts concerning the strategic imperative of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ari Ratner is a former State Department official and current PS21 board member.
7. Cyber Risk Wednesday: Hacks, Attacks, and What America Can Do about It | Wednesday, August 19th | 4:00-5:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Two months ago, the OPM discovered the biggest breach of US government data in history, described by many as the long-feared “Cyber 9/11”, exposing sensitive information on millions of Americans. While the Obama administration has refrained from publicly attributing the attack, many officials have privately pointed the finger at China. In July, hackers penetrated the Joint Chiefs of Staff email network in what has been described as the “most sophisticated” cyber breach in the history of the US military. Although the investigation is still underway, suspicion has quickly fallen on Russia. And just days ago, news broke about Chinese cyber spies having had access to the private emails of top US officials since at least 2010. In light of the unprecedented scale and scope of these recent data breaches, the Obama administration faces difficult questions: Does political cyber espionage warrant retaliation? Would retaliating effectively deter US cyber adversaries? Or would it further escalate the conflict, especially as the United States itself has been caught spying on other nation states? To answer these questions and suggest a way forward for the US government, this moderated panel discussion brings together recognized cybersecurity and espionage experts Siobhan Gorman, Director at Brunswick’s Washington, DC office; Jason Healey, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative and Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs; and Robert Knake, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow for Cyber Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
8. Taiwan’s China Tangle | Thursday, August 20th | 2:30 pm – 4:00 pm | Stimson | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Taiwan was a symbol of “Free China” during the Cold War era. Democratization and the rise of local identity after the 1990s transformed the nature of the society into an indigenous regime. Under the double pressure of globalization and the rise of China, Taiwan is searching for a new route to cope with increasing domestic and international challenges. This presentation by Stimson’s Visiting Fellow Dr. Tse-Kang Leng will discuss the impact of the “China factor” on Taiwan public opinion toward cross-Strait relations, Taiwan’s economic links with the Mainland, and Taiwan’s strategic positon in a globalizing world. Speaker: Dr. Tse-Kang Leng, Visiting Fellow, East Asia Program, Stimson Center, Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica (IPSAS), and Professor of Political Science, National Chengchi University. Moderator: Alan D. Romberg, Distinguished Fellow and Director of the East Asia Program, Stimson.
9. A New Kind of Conflict: Cyber-Security on the Korean Peninsula | Thursday, August 20th | 3:00-5:30 | SAIS- The Bernstein-Offit Building, Room 500 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | ‘A New Kind of Conflict’ is a simulation exploring a cyber-security incident between North and South Korea, with the goal of highlighting the gaps between modern capabilities and international legal frameworks designed to combat cyber-crime. Networking reception with food and drink will follow. Event starts at 3pm, check-in begins at 2:45pm. Seating is limited.
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Israel hostage to its own right wing
On Wednesday, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia hosted a talk entitled The Threat from Within: Israel’s Extremist Dilemma by Barak Mendelsohn, FPRI senior fellow and associate professor of political science at Haverford College. Mendelsohn is an Israeli expert on radical Islam, who also served in the Israeli Defense Force for five years. Alan Luxenberg moderated. Audio of the conference can be found here.
Mendelsohn explained that most of his work focuses on jihadism, but his research on how actors interpret religion led him to probe similarities between jihadism and Jewish extremism. A few years ago, he was an isolated voice but sadly now finds himself vindicated, with the two recent attacks at the Pride Parade in Jerusalem and at Duma in the West Bank.
Religious Jewish terrorism is not new in Israel. There have been several attacks and attempted attacks since the 1980s. Baruch Goldstein’s massacre of Arabs at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron in 1994 and Rabin’s assassination in 1995 are among them. Jewish terrorism cannot be separated from the settlement project of Israel’s messianic right-wing. It incubates Jewish extremism.
Every monotheistic religion can clash with the state because of the conflict between divine authority and temporal authority. But many religious people have found ways to reconcile God and the state. Religious Zionism saw the emergence of Israel as part of God’s redemptive process. Religious Zionists tolerated state action that conflicted with their preferences because the will of God was represented in the state’s authority.
Many Religious Zionists looked at the victory of 1967 as God’s plan for Israel. They were excited to return to lost Jewish lands, especially Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). The costly 1973 war led to gloom. Religious Jews began to sanctify land over other Jewish values, including the sanctity of life. If the state went against this value, the state was to be opposed.
All Israeli governments since have pandered to Jewish extremists, not just Likud governments. The messianic right built settlements without state authorization. State institutions provided aid to unauthorized settlements. Many were retroactively recognized, even when built on private Palestinian land. The IDF role in the West Bank was was to protect settlers from Palestinians, not protecting Palestinians. When members of the messianic right took illegal actions, few were prosecuted. The courts handed down mild sentences to those who were. Politicians granted amnesty.
In the 1990s, the view that a two-state solution was necessary became dominant among Israel’s political establishment. But the state was unable to act according to its strategic interests and dissociate itself from the messianic right. The state found itself tied to interests that clashed with its own. The messianic movement’s settlements built close to Palestinian cities prevented their expansion and led to increased friction and hostility. This created a self-fulfilling prophecy that made finding a solution to the conflict more difficult.
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Iran plans to dominate post-Assad Syria too
Bassam Barabandi, former Syrian diplomat, writes about developments in Zabadani, a key town on the Lebanese border:
What is happening at Zabadani is the beginning of a long process. Emboldened by the nuclear deal, Iran is trying to consolidate its power and position itself as an indispensable broker for peace. Tehran is even beginning to test the waters for a post-Assad Syria.
Assad (and by extension, Iran) has been failing militarily. Given the amount of treasure Iran has invested in Assad, that failure has more of an impact on Iranian leadership at this point than it does on Assad.
The original “train and equip” program started in Zabadani in the 1980s with Iranian training and equipping of Hizbollah. They have been a force and a player politically in Zabadani ever since.
Once the revolution began, Zabadani was hotly contested by rebels and the regime. Rebels took control of it early. For the most part, they have held the town ever since.
In 2012, Davutoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, scoffed at Assad’s threats that he would attack Turkey, when he could not even break through in Zabadani. The next day Zabadani was beleaguered by airstrikes and has been under siege ever since. Humanitarian assistance is badly needed and the Assad regime has refused to allow it through.
Hizbollah attacked Zabadani this year precisely because it has been under siege and seemed an easy target that might help the regime gain some ground in an otherwise bad fighting year. This was not the case. Fighters, mostly allied with Ahrar as-Sham, account for roughly 30% of the population of Zabadani.
Plagued by defeats throughout southern Syria, Hizbollah was also unable to deliver clear, decisive defeats to the rebels at Zabadani. These difficulties have provided lessons to the Iranian leadership, which began to transition to a new strategy. Tehran has recognized that it will not be able to achieve all of its goals through military means only.
Last week Iran began dealing directly and solely with rebels from Ahrar as-Sham, successfully negotiating a cease-fire without the Assad regime. Their objective is to negotiate outcomes that they could not secure through force.
The Assad regime is trusting Iran as its primary interlocutor in these matters. ISIS is knocking at Ahrar as-Sham’s door. Assad is all but telling the rebels that ISIS cannot get through while the regime still stands, positioning himself as an indirect protector of these areas of Syria. This has the potential to open up cross-border humanitarian assistance through UN resolution 2165.
For Iran, there are two possible outcomes:
- If the cease-fire with Ahrar as-Sham holds, Assad can be seen as opposing ISIS incursions in Zabadani as well as allowing cross-border humanitarian assistance from Lebanon on the basis of UN resolution 2165;
- If the cease-fire fails, the Iranians will be able to blame it on Assad or the rebels, whichever proves to be more advantageous.
Iran’s ultimate aim is to change the demography of Zabadani from Sunni to Shia. Their hope is that through these negotiations they can get the combatants, who they say are foreigners, out of Zabadani, thereby opening up space for new residents to come in.
The Iranians are trying a similar maneuver in Fou’ah, in northern Syria. There they are negotiating a cease-fire, attempting to get foreigners to leave. In Fou’ah there are perhaps 1000 fighters from Hizbollah, Iraq and Afghanistan. But in Zabadani, the fighters are Syrians from Zabadani. The Iranian maneuver there is destined to fail.
The fact that Iran is attempting this negotiation without Assad is a major development and a possible harbinger of Tehran’s new strategy in Syria. It is testing the waters for a post-Assad Syria, in which it envisions itself as the only way to bring peace to the country. Iran would then be in full control. The Iranian leadership feels that in the wake of the nuclear agreement they have more clout and legitimacy to take on a more prolonged, intensive political role in Syria.
Zabadani looks to be the first stages of long process whereby Iran is moving Assad aside and positioning itself as the sole power in Syria, using its Quds forces and Hizbollah as the primary military and training apparatus for Syrian forces.
PS August 15: Bassam Barabandi updates yesterday’s post on Zabadani:
Yesterday Iranian negotiators and representatives from the armed opposition force known as Ahrar Al-Sham agreed on ceasefire in the Zabadani area adjacent to the Lebanese border and four Shia villages located in northern Syria.
What’s unfortunate about the the results of this ceasefire is that the deal will entail the swapping of populations. The Sunni Arabs of Zabadani can leave to Idlib and the Shia Arabs of the four villages can go to the area under the Assad regime’s control.
Ahrar Al-Sham used the authorization from the people of Zabadani to do such a deal under the rubric “humanitarian reasons and to save life.”
It’s more complicated than simply this one issue.
It’s clear that the deal is between Iran and Turkey to share influence over Syrian territory. The regime authorized Iran to negotiate. Foreign Minister Zarif was in Damascus for this reason.
The people of Zabadani will issue a statement soon rejecting this deal. Should it be implemented, it will be the first time since the beginning of the revolution that a population swap based on sectarian lines is conducted in Syria.
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The Iran deal’s regional impact
On Monday, an all-MEI panel discussed After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics. Panelists included Robert S. Ford, senior fellow and former US Ambassador to Syria, Thomas W. Lippman, scholar, Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies, and Alex Vatanka, senior fellow. Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research moderated.
Vatanka stated that reformists, moderates, the Iranian public and most of the Iranian media are in favor of the deal. Some hardliners criticize the deal, but they’ve opened a previously taboo debate about the pros and cons of Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei has been vague, but this shouldn’t be taken as opposition; Khamenei rarely unequivocally supports anything. Those close to Khamenei are defending the deal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasn’t come out against it but they and their subsidiaries worry that the deal will hurt them financially. Rouhani needs to reassure them that they won’t lose out as foreign firms enter the market.
The Rouhani Administration is a Western-educated team with cohesive thinking on the country’s direction. Like China, they may try to open up economically and deal with political reform later. Zarif believes that Western companies must invest in Iran to render the deal more stable. Khamenei appears to accept economic reform but has made the resistance economy part of his legacy. It is unclear what he wants from the deal. Is he looking to prevent the possibility of war, eliminate sanctions, or make new friends? If many reformists lose their seats in the next Majlis elections, it means that Khamenei is unwilling to let a reform agenda go farther. If the Majlis accepts the deal and Congress rejects it, Iran can portray themselves as the good guys.
There are contradictions regarding Iran’s regional relations. The deputy foreign minister recently stated that Iran wanted to talk with the Saudis about Yemen and Bahrain, but then an ayatollah at a Friday sermon put Saudi Arabia, Israel and ISIS in the same category. If the reformists reconcile too much with the Saudis, the hardliners will brand them as pro-Saudi agents.
Lippman said that despite US declarations of an unshakeable commitment to the Gulf, Gulf Arabs were publicly skeptical until recently. Now the GCC countries publicly (if not privately) believe the US commitment. Beginning at Camp David, they decided that the Iran deal was done and that they weren’t going to do “a full Bibi.” They will work with the US and each other to confront regional problems.
The Saudis won’t race to a bomb; they care about self-preservation, which includes full integration into the world economy. The Saudis can’t afford to become nuclear outlaws.
Tol stated that understanding Turkish fear of the Kurds is key to grasping Turkish politics. It also plays a role in Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis Iran. Turkey shares the West’s objectives regarding Iran’s nuclear program but has promoted engagement rather than isolation, voting against UN sanctions in 2010. Iran is a large market for Turkish goods and the two countries have close energy ties. However, Turkey worries that a nuclear Iran could change the regional balance of power. All political parties in Turkey welcomed the deal and the sanctions relief.
Turkey has three main concerns about Iran:
- Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq and opposes Turkey in Syria.
- Closer ties between Washington and Tehran could come at Turkey’s expense, focusing too much attention on the fight against ISIS and undermining Turkey’s anti-Assad efforts;
- Iran’s support for the PKK and PYD.
Ford asserted that the problems in Iraq and Syria don’t revolve around the US and Iran but around local grievances. The pressures against the Iraqi state are increasing. Low oil prices are contributing to the Kurdish drive for independence. Progress on Sunni-Shia reconciliation is lacking. Iran is partially responsible because of its ties to militias that are considered terrorist organizations by the US. Iran is unlikely to give up these allies, whose political leaders are ruthless and capable. It is unclear if the US and Iran can work together in Iraq. ISIS can recruit as long as the conflict between the Sunnis and the militias continues. If Iran cedes control of the militias to President Abadi, that could help.
Assad is losing and the opposition is advancing on the Alawite homeland. There are diplomatic visits between Syria, Russia, and Iran; Syria’s foreign minister recently visited Tehran and likely
also Oman, which serves as an intermediary with the Saudis. There are also reports that Iran is about to put forward a peace plan with a unity government, constitutional amendments to protect minorities, and future internationally supervised elections. Ford thinks this won’t succeed because the Turks haven’t signed on and their closeness with the armed opposition gives them a veto.
The Russians and Iranians are urging the US to stop pushing against Assad and start working with him, but Assad is about to lose his supply lines. There were recent anti-Assad protests in Alawite-majority Latakia province. Assad doesn’t have the capacity to take on ISIS if it can’t hold the Damascus suburbs. The Iranians have to recognize that Assad is losing but they will almost certainly use at least a small portion of the money from sanctions relief to shore-up Hezbollah and Assad. This will cause a short-term increase in violence.
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Jeb, the anti-Trump
Jeb Bush’s foreign policy speech at the Reagan Library yesterday merits careful attention. In a campaign for the Republican nomination dominated so far by Donald Trump’s verbal antics, this speech ranks as the most serious effort yet to challenge Barack Obama’s approach to threats from the Islamic State and Iran.
I won’t quarrel much with the Governor’s analysis of the current situation. Yes, the Islamic State in particular and Islamic extremism in general are more of a threat today than they were in 2009, even if American civilian deaths from terrorist acts since 9/11 have been minimal. Iran is a bad actor likely to cause more problems in the Middle East once sanctions are lifted. The situation in Syria, which Iran has exacerbated with support to Bashar al Assad and Hizbollah, is catastrophic and needs a more effective approach.
But Bush confuses cause and effect in ways that make his policy prescriptions screwy. It is apparent that the mainly military approach both the Bush and Obama administrations have taken to fighting Islamic extremism in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen has made the situation worse, not better. Yet in Iraq Jeb suggests we only need to do more and better on the military front in order to fix the situation. I don’t see any reason to believe that will work well. Nor is his hand-waving confidence about Iraqis “coming through for their country” convincing.
The Iraq war is the basis for much of what Bush thinks Obama has gotten wrong. In Bush’s narrative, the “surge” was a military success that Obama squandered by withdrawing American troops. Only by showing more military resolve region-wide can the US reverse that mistake.
But that is a false account of what actually happened. Obama withdrew American troops from Iraq on a schedule negotiated and agreed by the George W. Bush Administration. Republicans neglect that fact, because it disrupts their portrayal of the Obama Administration as weak, vacillating and prone to ignore the importance of military power. When challenged, they claim that George W. thought the agreement would be renegotiated. Obama tried that and failed, not because he was weak, vacillating and prone to ignore the importance of military power but because political sentiment in both the US and Iraq leaned heavily against a continuing US military presence.
If anyone is to be blamed for the rise of the Islamic State’s takeover of Sunni portions of Iraq, it is Nouri al Maliki, who was hand-picked as prime minister by the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration compounded that error when it backed Maliki for a second term even though his party had lost its plurality in parliament. Maliki thereafter proved himself an aggressive Shia sectarian who alienated both Sunni and Kurds, thereby weakening the Iraqi state and setting the stage for the ISIS takeover. It is vital always to remember that the problems in Iraq and generally in the region are at their heart political, not military.
But that narrative is too complicated for Jeb Bush. He prefers a simpler one that echoes his older brother’s worldview:
What we are facing in ISIS and its ideology is, to borrow a phrase, the focus of evil in the modern world.
I can think of a lot of other foci of evil in the modern world, and I’d have thought that “axis of evil” was a Manichean phrase no one would want to echo, given its association with the catastrophic mistake of invading Iraq and the less catastrophic but still serious mistake by George W. of failing even to try to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran before it had installed almost 20,000 centrifuges and enriched enough uranium to make a nuclear weapon.
On that subject, Jeb takes up the prevailing Republican unequivocal opposition to the nuclear deal. He offers no idea what his alternative is. He promises to undo the alleged damage Obama has done if elected, but of course withdrawal from the deal at this point would also have consequences he fails to consider: either Iran will race for nuclear weapons or the Europeans, Russians and Chinese will implement the deal and lift sanctions. The US then ends up either 1) having no alternative to war (without any allies except Israel), 2) watching its European allies make common cause with Moscow and Beijing against American efforts to unilaterally enforce sanctions. This is no formula for restoring American leadership, which is what Jeb says he wants to do.
Only on Syria does Bush offer any substantial suggestions worth examination: protected zones in parts of Syria and a no-fly zone over the whole country. Assad, not just ISIS, would be his target. Those are propositions President Obama has resisted because they take the US down the slippery slope towards greater involvement in the chaos that the multi-sided Syrian civil war their has generated. But his refusal to get involved hasn’t improved the situation or made it easier to solve. We shouldn’t have to wait for a new president to correct course on Syria.
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