House of Kurds
On Wednesday, the Middle East Institute hosted a talk by Hemin Hawrani, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Leadership Council and the head of its foreign relations office, entitled Dynamics in Iraqi Kurdistan. Randa Slim (director of the Track II Dialogues initiative at The Middle East Institute and an adjunct research fellow at the New America Foundation) moderated. Hawrani gave a comprehensive presentation about the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)’s role in the fight against ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan’s prospects for independence, and internal KRG politics.
Hawrani asserted that the war against ISIS will be lengthy because ISIS is the symptom of the problem, not the problem itself. The KRG has a three- phase strategy to counter ISIS:
1. Stop ISIS- this has been accomplished on the ISIS-KRG front.
2. Roll back ISIS- this has been largely accomplished on the ISIS-KRG front, as the Peshmerga have liberated 20,000 km2 from ISIS control.
3. Defeat and destroy ISIS- Still a long way off. Over 1,200 Peshmerga have died in this fight. ISIS continues to gain ground on other fronts. ISIS has managed to almost fully replenish its killed fighters with new recruits.
Hawrani stated that the KRG is a reliable partner in the fight against ISIS, but they need more assistance because ISIS outguns them. The fighting is different that the Peshmerga has encountered in the past because the majority of casualties are from IEDs and suicide bombers. The Peshmerga need more armored personnel carriers, tanks, and high power rifles. They only have 40 MRAPs but need approximately 400 to deploy their forces. They also need transport aircraft, as well as advisory support to modernize their forces. The KRG needs direct arms shipments to avoid delays in Baghdad as well as more help supporting 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Baghdad, Hawrani said, is doing little to help. Iraq is broken and cannot go back to the pre-2014 situation. The KRG supported Abadi to be Prime Minister for all Iraqis and concluded an agreement with him to receive a portion of Iraq’s budget in exchange for oil from Kirkuk. Baghdad has not kept its side of the agreement, or its promises to Sunni Arabs. Baghdad claims it lacks cash, but it has money for the Shi’ite PMUs. Baghdad must either commit to helping the KRG or not interfere with the KRG.
Hawrani stated that the independence for Iraqi Kurdistan is a process and that it will happen. The KRG plans to hold an independence referendum for all citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurds and others) in the next couple of years. The options posed by the referendum will include:
1. A fully independent Iraqi Kurdistan.
2. An independent Iraqi Kurdistan in a confederation with Iraq.
3. The status quo.
The Kurds will discuss independence with Baghdad before any other capitals because they want to pursue this amicably. The KRG seeks to reassure Ankara and Tehran that their desire for independence is not a threat. The KRG does not have a pan-Kurdish agenda and seeks a peaceful, internal solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey and Iran.
The KRG has done its part to be part of a pluralistic Iraq, but the Iraqi state has failed and Kurds no longer want to be part of an uncertain future. Even a fully independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not fully break with Iraq because there would still be economic and defense ties. There might also be a shared currency and shared oil resources. An independent Iraqi Kurdistan would add to the number of functioning states in the region. A referendum will also be held in Kirkuk and other disputed areas to determine if they want to join Iraqi Kurdistan. Hawrani stated that the capture of Kirkuk and other areas is not territorial expansion because the Iraqi Army abandoned these areas.
With regard to internal KRG politics, Hawrani said that the KDP (his and President Barzani’s party ) is on the same page as its rival, the PUK, with regard to ISIS. The KDP has proposed three solutions to the dispute regarding the duration of Barzani’s presidency:
1. Barzani could serve for four more years and hold an independence referendum during this period.
2. Barzani could serve until the end of the current parliament’s term in 2017, at which point there will be elections for both the presidency and parliament.
3. The government could resign and call for early elections.
Hawrani also spoke about KRG policy vis-a-vis the Syrian Kurds (PYD). The KRG does not wish to interfere in Syrian Kurdish affairs or copy and paste Iraqi Kurdistan’s experience onto Syria. Its main stipulation is that Syria’s Kurds act in a unified fashion. The KRG and PYD had agreed that there would be a unified force of all Syrian Kurds and a unified political administration. The PYD has not abided by these terms.
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Srebrenica and its implications
I participated in a panel Wednesday at Voice of America on Bosnia: Twenty Years After Srebrenica with Ambassadors Stephen Rapp and Kurt Volker as well as Tanya Domi. The video of the event is on the VoA website (it is too big to upload to peacefare.net).
The unwelcome news of Russia’s veto of a UN Security Council resolution marking the anniversary arrived just before we started. Angela Merkel at the time was in Belgrade, so Tanjug had some questions about her visit there and the blocked UNSC resolution:
Q: In short, what is your analysis of the results of the visit, and in your opinion, what was the most important message?
A: The visit went well. Merkel’s explicit message was praise for Serbia’s fiscal restraint. I imagine that has more to do with the Greek crisis than with anything else. I don’t imagine Merkel was pleased with the Russian veto of the Srbrenica resolution, but I don’t know what she said to Nikolic and Vucic about that.
Q: Also, how do you comment the fact that UNSC didn’t adopt British resolution on Srebenica because of Russian veto, as a consequence of disagreement on the text of resolution?
A: The disagreement appears to have been focused on use of the word “genocide,” which is a characterization both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice have both used with regard to Srbrenica. The view from Washington is that that word characterizes a well-established fact. Russian and Serbian denial of that fact makes Prime Minister Vucic’s attendance at the Srebrenica commemoration less important than it otherwise might have been.
Q: What is your opinion on prime minister Vucic`s visit to Potocari? What will that step mean for the region?
A: As indicated above, I don’t think it will be seen as significant in the region, because of the Security Council veto. Only if he were to say something explicit condemning the genocide will there be much impact. That isn’t likely, but it would certainly be welcome here and in Brussels.
Srebrenica of course has broad implications far beyond the Balkans for international community and American policy, as Derek Chollet points out. But I disagree with Derek on a number of issues, as I pointed out to a correspondent this morning:
1. On Iraq, I think Derk’s argument is specious: the only viable justification for intervention in 2003 was weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Saddam was not doing much more harm to his population then than he had been doing for a long time (or that many other dictators have done since). Without WMD, the intervention was just a monumental mistake.
2. In Libya, Derek fails to mention that the Libyans did not want our help after Qaddafi was gone, because they thought (with some good reason) that they could handle it themselves. They did pretty well until late 2012 but then ran off the rails.
3. In Syria, lots of people saw the need for early diplomatic efforts to remove Assad, which among other things might have prevented the transformation of a peaceful rebellion into a violent one. Derek and Phil Gordon should be ashamed of their failure to get the President to act on his conviction that Assad had to go.
4. Rwanda and Srebrenica do inform such decisions, but I doubt there was much we could have done militarily in either case to prevent what happened. In Srebrenica, we tried to convince Izetbegovic to move the Muslims out of the enclave, which was obviously vulnerable. That is now being criticized as a proposal to assist ethnic cleansing. But military intervention on the scale required was out of the question at the time. In Rwanda, military intervention against whom? Individual machete wielding Hutus?
Bottom line: Our military strength has made our diplomatic capabilities atrophy. We should get back to using military strength to frame issues, which it seems to me the Administration has been pretty good about with Iran (the military option being so unattractive they hardly had a choice). But the solutions are often diplomatic rather than military.
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Two unexpected wars
On Tuesday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a talk entitled Two Unforeseen Wars: A Military Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine and the Campaign against ISIS with Brigadier Ben Barry, the Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at the IISS.
Barry discussed the conflicts separately but drew some parallels between them on the level of military strategy.
Both the conflict in Ukraine and the war against ISIS came as a shock to the US. The conflict in Ukraine began with a Russian campaign in Crimea led by elite units and complemented by propaganda. The Russians made good use of special forces, electronic warfare and deniability. In Crimea, both sides sought not to use lethal force. The ability of the Russian military to restrain its use of lethal force shows that it is better trained than when it fought in Afghanistan or Chechnya. The Russian military has a cadre of strategic planners and an aptitude for deception.
According to Barry, the insurgency of pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine has exploited grievances against the Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of investment in recent years. They have made little effort to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign against the separatists. Last summer, they had some success in pushing the separatists back, but were stopped by Russian intervention, including professionally applied indirect fire. Both the separatists’ own artillery, as well as the Russian artillery that intervened, are skilled. The Ukrainian Air Force has been stymied by the separatists’ air defenses. The separatists have also made effective use of SIGINT and drone intelligence to call in strikes. Russia has improved its military readiness, as the conflict in Ukraine attests.
With regard to the fight against ISIS, according to Barry, Maliki’s 2010 election victory was followed by his attempt to consolidate power by marginalizing Sunni and Kurdish politicians. Meanwhile, the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq fought Assad in Syria and renamed themselves ISIS. They rebuilt their networks in Iraq among discontented Sunni tribes and used sophisticated propaganda to gain volunteers and donations. They then launched their assault on Fallujah, followed by their capture of Mosul. In Mosul, the majority of 3 or 4 Iraqi divisions disintegrated in the face of ISIS’s onslaught. The Iraqi army had suffered from Maliki’s attempt to assert direct control over it and replace capable commanders with politically loyal ones.
ISIS has used both insurgency tactics and conventional forces. The high water mark of ISIS offensives in Iraq came in the fall of 2014. After this point, ISIS still counterattacked at vulnerable spots and conducted offensives in Syria simultaneously. ISIS is now on the strategic defensive in Iraq, but this has been an active defense. To take Ramadi, ISIS used diversionary attacks to distract the Iraqi forces. They may have also conducted the attack under the cover of a sandstorm to stymie coalition airstrikes.
Barry described the sequence of an ISIS attack:
1. Indirect fire.
2. En masse suicide bombings.
3. Captured armored bulldozers are used to breach Iraqi army berms.
4. Close assault including cameramen to document the carnage and subsequent executions.
The fall of Ramadi played into ISIS’s narrative of defending the borders of the Caliphate and mounting counterattacks. These facts on the ground inspire recruits and cause other groups to declare allegiance to ISIS.
According to Barry, ISIS has two main vulnerabilities:
1. In a successful, sustained offensive against it, ISIS would have to move a large numbers of fighters, unmasking them and rendering them vulnerable to attack.
ISIS could, however, move large numbers of civilians at the same time to complicate an attack.
2. If the Sunni tribes in Iraq turn on ISIS, this would be a significant blow.
At first glance, these two conflicts have little in common but Barry drew a few parallels between them:
1. Both conflicts show the importance today of winning the information war. Military operations will increasingly be used for their propaganda effects.
2. The Russian separatists and ISIS leverage superior military leadership against the Ukrainian government and the Iraqi military, respectively.
3. Without airpower, the anti-ISIS coalition would be far worse-off than it is. In Ukraine, we can see how the Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of airpower.
4. Artillery is key in both conflicts. Indirect fire is normally the cause of the majority of casualties in war, and this is likely true in both Iraq and Ukraine. Western militaries have reduced their use of indirect fire, but Russia and China still have extensive indirect fire capabilities.
5. Both conflicts demonstrate the need for the US and NATO to assess which of their allies are vulnerable to hybrid warfare.
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Yes, a nuclear deal means trouble
I am a proponent of a good nuclear deal with Iran. But I have taken some time this week to appreciate Israel’s perspective. Here is what I have understood and how I react.
The Israelis are concerned with the geostrategic impact of a deal with Iran that will accept and thereby legitimize its enrichment program. Other countries in the region that have in the past been constrained from pursuing enrichment will now proceed, in particular Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Whereas Turkey may be a more or less consolidated democracy, it is unpredictable who might come to power in the Kingdom or Egypt and what they might do with nuclear technology.
At the same time, Iran’s pernicious proxies in the region–until now deterred by Israel’s military capabilities–will be emboldened and enriched with resources once multilateral sanctions are lifted. Iran doesn’t much care about US sanctions. The ideology of the regime requires that the US remain an enemy. It will be sufficient for Europe, Russia and China to begin doing business with Tehran to put lots of money in its pockets. Any help the US gets from Iran and its proxies in fighting the Islamic State will be short-lived.
Everyone in the region, not just Israel, will feel less secure. An arms race will ensue. The buying spree will put advanced weapons into the hands of regimes that are not stable or reliable. No one knows where they will end up.
American reassurances are dubious. One hundred per cent access to Iranian facilities is impossible. No country has ever provided it. Iran won’t either. Nor can sanctions “snap back.” Neither the Russians nor the Chinese will agree to a mechanism that they are unable to block.
In my view, these preoccupations all have their validity. The trouble is the outcomes feared are likely whether there is an agreement or not. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are already under no legal restraint from enriching uranium whenever they please. Multilateral sanctions are unlikely to survive much longer, due to Chinese and European hunger for oil and gas as well as their interest in exporting to Iran. Arms have been pouring into the Gulf countries as well as Egypt and Jordan for years. There is already no lack of advanced equipment in hands that may or may not be reliable.
On top of all that, no agreement means no inspections and no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program. That is worse than the ample access to Iran’s nuclear program, and serious constraints, that an agreement will have to provide.
It is hard not to see the Israeli preoccupations as nostalgia for a region that they dominated for decades. Iran was marginalized, the Arabs were under America’s thumb, and Israel could do, and did, as it liked.
But that is not the eternal order in the Middle East. There is no way to keep Iran in its diminished position, much as we might like to try. Nor are the Arabs inclined to remain under American control. The prospect of a nuclear deal is ironically inclining them more than ever before to make common cause with Israel against Iran, whatever the Americans think. Just think what would happen if the Israelis were to settle with the Palestinians!
The bottom line: Israel wanted Iran to be forced to give up enrichment and will be satisfied with nothing less. But that was unlikely at best and impossible at worst.
Provided the verification mechanisms in any nuclear deal reached in the next few days are robust, including accounting for past military dimensions, all of us will need to learn to live with a still non-nuclear-armed Iran that is less constrained and more flush with cash than in the recent past. We’ll also need to be prepared to deter and counter its troublemaking, at least until someone who doesn’t see America as an enemy governs in Tehran.
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Coalition as the Syrian Kurds’ air force
My friends at peopledemandchange.org have put together the data to show it (and I’ve made a few minor editorial changes):
The international coalition members conducting airstrikes in Syria include the United States, Bahrain, Canada, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. According to information provided by the Pentagon in daily briefing a total of 1077 airstrikes were conducted in Syria in the first six months of 2015. More than half of the airstrikes targeted the ISIS targets in the area around Kobani.
The attacks were conducted as part of Operation Inherent Resolve which has as its mission “to eliminate the ISIL terrorist group and the threat they pose to Iraq, Syria, the region, and the wider international community.” In September 2014 the campaign of airstrikes started with the US taking out multiple Khorassan Unit targets in the wider Aleppo area, a place where al-Qa’ida had been operating a series of safe houses since 2003. The airstrikes conducted by the coalition in 2015 did not target the Syrian army, Jabhat al-Nusra or the Khorassan unit.
This analysis is based on the daily Department of Defense statements about the airstrikes:
In total 924 airstrikes where in support of the Kurdish YPG militia in Northern Syria. Around Kobani 603 airstrikes took place and in Hasakah 284. In June 2015, 37 strikes took place near the border town Tel Abyad, where the YPG started an offensive, with support of the FSA, to push back ISIS in their main province Raqqah. Also in June the Coalition air forces bombed 35 targets near Raqqah, the same amount of air raids as the five months before.
Most of the targets are ISIS assets like tanks, armored vehicles, AAA guns and ISIS tactical units. Other targets include ISIS fighting position and headquarters.
Deir Ez-Zur
As most of the targets are in direct support of defending or supporting YPG forces, there is a real difference with airstrikes by Coalition forces in the eastern province of Deir Ez-Zur. In the first six months of 2015 the province of Deir ez-Zur, including the border town Abu Kamal, got 57 coalition airstrikes. Most of the airstrikes took place in the months of January (17 airstrikes) and June, with 18 airstrikes. The airstrikes in the Deir ez-Zur province are different from other areas where the air strikes are directly linked to ongoing fighting. More than half of the airstrikes in Deir ez-Zur are linked to economic infrastructure. The Coalition targeted oil collection points, well heads, a refinery, oil pumps and pipelines and storage and staging facilities.
To specify the 57 airstrikes even more in-depth:
In total 31 of the 57 airstrikes in Deir Ez-Zur were economic targets, including 26 attacks on oil collection points, two wellheads, one on oil pumps, one refinery and one storage facility. The second group of targets was tactical in nature and included ten tactical ISIS units, two ISIS checkpoints and one fighting position.
The third group of targets, ten in total, were ISIS vehicles, including armored vehicles, a tank, an excavator, a piece of artillery and a MRLS system. Finally the last group of targets were ISIS buildings including two bunkers.
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Peace picks July 6-10
1. A Conversation with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian| Monday, July 6th | 4:00 | German Marshall Fund | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) invites you to a conversation with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian. The focus of the discussion will center on France’s defense priorities, as well as the future of U.S.-French cooperation in meeting the spectrum of challenges currently facing Europe and the United States. Jean-Yves Le Drian is the French minister of defense. He was appointed in 2012, serving in this position through two governments. Le Drian has overseen French intervention in Mali in
2013, France’s Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, a counter terrorism mission conducted in partnership with Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger, and operation Chammal in support of the Iraqi forces again Daesh. As minister of defense, Le Drian also directed the publication of the French White Book on Defense and National Security in 2-13. Prior to this, Le Drian was the president of the Brittany Regional Council from 2004 to 2012. Until 2007, Le Drian was deputy of Morbihan to the National Assembly, having first been elected in 1978. In this position, he sat on the National Defense Committee. Previously, Le Drian held the position of mayor of Lorient from 1981-1998, during which time he also served as France’s secretary of state of the sea.
2. EnCourage Pt. II: Voices From the Middle East| Tuesday, July 7th | 9:00 | Johns Hopkins SAIS – Nitze Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After a successful EnCourage conference in Jerusalem this year, New Story Leadership (NSL) returns to Washington with our 2015 Team of five Israeli and five Palestinian students aged 20 – 32 to host EnCourage Pt. II: Voices from the Middle East in partnership with the Johns Hopkins University Conflict Management Program. This second EnCourage conference comes at time when the conversation about Israel and Palestine has been
dominated by hopelessness. In the face of stalemate, NSL has reached out to young activists in Israel and Palestine to tell stories of courage and hope for the Middle East. The conference will include keynote speeches by four NSL Team members, a panel discussion, and a question-and-answer session between the Team, academic panel, and the audience. Keynote speakers include: Abeer Shehadeh, University of Haifa, Israel, Shay Ater, Tel Aviv University, Israel, Mohammad Al-Hroub, Al Quds University, Palestine, and Yaara Elazari, Integrated Program for the Hebrew University and the Jerusalem Academy for Music and Dance, Israel. Panelists include: Professor Marc Gopin, James H. Laue Professor of Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, and the Director of the Center on Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, George Mason University, Professor Stef Woods, American Studies Program, American University, Dr. Manana Gnolidze-Swanson, George Mason University, and Dr. Boaz Atzili, Director of the SIS Doctoral Program, American University. Additional panelists TBA!
3. The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security| Tuesday, July 7th | 12:00-1:30 | Atlantic Council| REGISTER TO ATTEND | Securing the Middle East after an Iran nuclear deal is the region and the world’s next big challenge. The United States and its allies have engaged in tireless diplomacy with Iran over the past few years to produce an agreement that would limit Tehran’s nuclear program for the next decade and a half. But the hard work does not stop here, and in fact, it may have just begun. To protect the deal and take full advantage of its potential benefits – which include the drastic reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons proliferating in the region – the United States needs a comprehensive strategy for regional security in the Middle East. After all, the ultimate prize and broader objective is and has always been to secure and stabilize the region, and a nuclear deal with Iran – as strategically significant as it is – is only one piece of the Middle East security puzzle. Please join the Atlantic Council for a launch of a report by Brent Scowcroft Center Senior Fellow for Middle East Security Bilal Saab entitled The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security and a debate on the future role of the United States in the Middle East following a nuclear deal with Iran. Additional speakers include: Barry Posen, Director, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Richard Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations. Moderated by: Barbara Starr, Pentagon Correspondent CNN
4. Two Unforeseen Wars: A Military Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine and the Campaign against ISIS | Tuesday, July 7th | 2:00-3:00 | International Institute for Strategic Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The unexpected Russian occupation of Crimea, the subsequent insurgency in eastern Ukraine and the rapid conquest of much of northern and western Iraq by ISIS were all strategic shocks. But there is now enough reporting on the conflicts to allow a preliminary analysis of their military contours, including the similarities and differences between the two wars. Brigadier Ben Barry will present the military dynamics of both the Ukrainian conflict and the ISIS insurgency, while examining the emerging military lessons of the conflicts and the military challenges that the pose for the US, NATO and their allies. Speakers include: Ben Barry, Senior Fellow for Land Warfare, IISS and Samuel Charap, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, IISS.
5. The Iran Negotiations: Is this Really the End Game? |Wednesday, July 8th | 11:00-12:15 | Wilson Center |REGISTER TO ATTEND | Despite the uncertainties, the United States and Iran seem to be in the final stages of what promises to be a comprehensive accord on the nuclear issue. Join us as analysts and observers of Iran, Middle Eastern politics, and U.S. foreign policy assess the state of the current negotiations, the implications of an accord and the consequences for the region without one. Speakers include: Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic Relations and Director, International Security Studies, Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar; Historian, analyst, negotiator, and former advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 1978-2003, Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center, Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Danielle Pletka, Senior Vice President for Foreign Policy Studies, AEI and former Senate Committee on Foreign Relations senior professional staff member, Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar; Journalist and Author/Editor of eight books, most recently editor of “The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are.”
6. Hearing: Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran | Thursday, July 9th | 10:00-1:00 | Rayburn House Office Building | Chairman Royce on the hearing: “As we anticipate a congressional review of the Administration’s possible nuclear agreement with Iran, we’ll be looking to see how the Administration has done on Congress’ red lines. Did we get anywhere, anytime inspections? Full Iranian transparency regarding its past nuclear activities? No large-scale, immediate sanctions relief; but guaranteed, workable sanctions snap-backs? Meaningful restraints on Iran’s nuclear program that last decades? This hearing will be the first in a series the Committee will hold should the Administration strike what might be one of the most significant agreements in decades. As I have said, no deal is far better than a bad deal.” Witnesses include: The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, Foreign Policy Project Advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center, (Former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control & Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State), Michael Doran, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Michael Makovsky, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer, JINSA Germunder Center Iran Task Force.
7. Middle East Energy: Beyond an Iran Nuclear Deal |Thursday, July 9th | 10:30-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Iran hopes that the pending nuclear framework agreement will lead to much needed foreign investment in its oil and gas sector. Insofar as eased sanctions permit, billions of dollars will be needed to reverse production declines and re-establish production growth. How realistic are Iran’s aspirations to attract such investment, and what increased production and exports can be reasonably expected over the near to medium term? In turn, what will be the impact
of increased Iranian exports on its neighbors, notably Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and their desire to secure a larger share of the global market? How will the Saudis and other Gulf monarchies react to Iranian moves? What are the implications of changes in Saudi national and energy leadership and of Kurdish moves to produce and export separately from Baghdad? What is the effect of these regional changes on the global energy balance? Energy experts will explore these issues in this eighth event in the Wilson Center’s Regional and Global Energy Series. Speakers include: David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies LLC, David Gordon, Senior Advisor, Eurasia Group, Julia Nanay, Principal, Energy Ventures LLC, Jean-Francois Seznec, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council. Moderator: Jan H. Kalicki, Wilson Center Public Policy Fellow and Energy Lead.
8. The Iran Deal and its Consequences | Thursday, July 9th | 2:00-3:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) are expected to reach a ground-breaking comprehensive nuclear agreement by the end of June or shortly thereafter. The panelists will analyze the agreement in terms of its impact on nonproliferation, regional dynamics, US-Iran relations, and trade and investment in Iran. They will also discuss the potential obstacles to implementation both in Iran and in the United States. Panelists include: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, Kenneth Katzman, Middle East Specialist, Congressional Research Service, Clifford Kupchan, Chairman, Eurasia Group, John Limbert, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, US Naval Academy. Moderated by: Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
9. Washington D.C. Launch: Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance | Thursday, July 9th | 2:00-3:30 | Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the face of growing mass violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber attacks, the world needs a new kind of leadership, combined with new tools, networks, and institutions. The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, in collaboration with the One Earth Future Foundation and UN Foundation, invite you to the Washington, D.C. launch of Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance, the new report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance. The report offers a vision for just security, to ensure that neither justice nor security imperatives are neglected by critical international policy debates in 2015 and beyond. It further presents a bold, yet practical action plan for innovating global governance, and ways to mobilize diverse actors to advance reform to better respond to 21st century threats, challenges, and opportunities. Co-chair of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance Madeleine K. Albright and Commissioner Jane Holl Lute will discuss the report.
10. A View from the Frontlines of Islamist Insurgency: Perspectives on Terrorism in the Middle East and South Asia | Friday, July 10th | 12:00-1:30 | Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | What do ISIS’s rise in Iraq and Syria and Iran’s new-found power and growing sphere of influence in the region portend for the broader Middle East? What is being done to counter Islamist
extremist forces in the region and what is the current state of play? How do the current regional dynamics impact the threat from al-Qaeda, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Join us at The Heritage Foundation as a panel of experts discuss the evolving regional dynamics and trends pertaining to the threat of Islamist extremism and share with us various perspectives on the struggle against the threat. Speakers include: Sara Carter, Senior Reporter, American Media Institute, Sebastian Gorka, Ph.D., Major General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Chair of Military Theory, Marine Corps University, and Katherine Zimmerman, Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute.
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