Afghanistan: from bad to worse
Tuesday the United States Institute of Peace hosted a panel entitled Can Afghanistan Stabilize as US Forces Plan their Exit? Panelists included 
William Byrd (USIP Senior Expert in Residence), Ali Jalali (Former Minister of the Interior of Afghanistan and USIP Senior Expert in Residence), Scott Smith (Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, USIP), Moeed Yusuf (Director, South Asia Programs, USIP). The panel was moderated by Andrew Wilder (Vice President, USIP Center for South and Central Asia). A link to a full video of the conference can be found here.
Overview
Wilder presented an overview of the situation in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have had more casualties this year alone than the US military has had over the entire course of the conflict in Afghanistan. There is pessimism in Kabul over the political deadlock, there is very little economic activity (ironically in part because some investors are scared away by President Ghani’s anti-corruption agenda), and President Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan has been unpopular domestically.
Security
Jalali discussed Afghanistan’s poor security environment. The end of the Coalition combat mission meant an end to international air and intelligence support in this typical fighting season. The Taliban may be willing to negotiate, but want to improve their bargaining power through gains on the ground.
The ANSF struggle with a low force to space ratio in its attempt to defend vast territories. The troops are spread thinly to maintain a presence in all parts of the country occupying small, remote, vulnerable outposts. The Taliban attack these outposts, causing heavy casualties, and then disperse. Suicide attacks in cities have also increased, demonstrating to citizens that the government is incapable of providing security.
The ANSF lack intelligence capacity. In the past, they were able to foil 70% of planned attacks, but now they foil a mere 30%. Instead of manning remote, strategically insignificant posts, the ANSF should focus on intelligence-gathering to take the fight to the Taliban through ambushes.
Politics
Smith discussed Afghanistan’s political impasse. The government is in a state of institutionalized crisis, as disagreements continue between the supporters of President Ghani and Chief Executive (CEO) Abdullah. The agreement between the two parties gives both sides an equitable share of power, but does not contain mechanisms for dispute resolution if one side oversteps its authority. The result is disputes about how to resolve disputes.
Those who try to serve as mediators between the parties become distrusted by both sides. Ghani has tried to build a competent government but has not appointed anyone with previous ministerial experience. Abdullah is losing some supporters because he cannot provide patronage appointments to all his benefactors.
Meanwhile, an opposition is forming that includes former president Karzai and is hoping this government will collapse so that it can step into its shoes. The risk is that the Taliban will step in instead.
Economics
Byrd discussed Afghanistan’s economic woes. Afghanistan’s economy has traditionally been based on subsistence agriculture and herding. The Coalition’s military campaign brought investment, but this is drying up in the wake of the withdrawal, causing a decline in growth. Growth is not yet negative only because recent harvests have been good.
There is little business investment, capital flight, and high unemployment. Human capital indicators, such as literacy, are poor. There is a dire fiscal crisis, though revenue has improved somewhat in the first four months of this year. The Afghan private sector needs more confidence. Byrd argued that high tariffs on imports of cash crops like apples and almonds, combined with innovative export subsidies, could be beneficial.
Foreign policy and negotiations
Yousef spoke about Ghani’s attempt to reconcile with Pakistan. Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan made sense because he has no other options. The state has gotten weaker and the Taliban stronger. Pakistan has been reluctant to go after the Taliban’s safe havens militarily and has been concerned about Afghan-Indian ties. Ghani has been less warm towards India, hoping that Pakistan can bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.
So far, this has not happened. If negotiations do occur, they should focus on what is needed to achieve a ceasefire. Yousef argued they should not become mired in human rights issues, which can be addressed later.
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Asia will move ahead no matter what
With continued conflict in the Middle East and Europe, the US “pivot to Asia” has taken a back seat in the past few months. On Wednesday, the Center for Strategic and International Studies reignited a discussion on US interests in Asia with Singapore’s Foreign Minister and Minister of Law, K. Shanmugam. The event was hosted by Ernest Z. Bower, Senior Adviser and Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at CSIS, and moderated by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, who spent much of his diplomatic career in East Asia.
Shanmugam emphasized the importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would set new terms for trade and business investment among the US and 11 other Pacific Rim nations—a group with an annual gross domestic product of almost $28 trillion that represents 40% of global GDP and one-third of world trade. On June 12, the US House of Representatives rejected a bill that would have provided assistance to workers displaced by global trade, hindering completion of the TPP this year.
The TPP, Shanmugam thinks, offers a mutually beneficial deal by allowing Asia to benefit from US dominance in the energy and IT sectors and granting the US economic leverage over close to half the world’s GDP. But the region will not wait for America. In today’s global economy, China has arisen as a significant player with the ability to set up alternative multilateral institutions to which other countries will happily subscribe. This does not mean the Southeast Asian countries will choose the “Chinese side.” Indeed, the region wants the US to partake in its prosperity, as it did after WWII. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in today’s multipolar world, the U.S. cannot control the outcomes—even if it is the single most important power.
Another pressing regional issue is the South China conflict. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines all have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over oil and gas reserves in the sea. Little progress has been made in resolving these conflicts. Shanmugam believes it is unrealistic to expect any understanding on the issue of sovereignty. No claimant will be willing to give up its claims. A more feasible outcome is a Code of Conduct that regulates the behavior of the claimants. The US can play a role by encouraging the process of reaching agreement on such a Code of Conduct.
Shanmugam also elaborated on the slim possibility of developing an ASEAN economic community. Unlike member states in the European Union, there are huge disparities in the GDP of Asian countries. Singapore’s GDP per capita is $60,000 while that of some other countries is as little as $3000. Furthermore, Asian states don’t share cultural, religious and historical experiences that allow for integration. Islam dominates in Indonesia, Buddhism in Thailand and even Communism is a religion in some places.
What is doable is easier movement of goods and services across the Asian states. The creation of manufacturing hubs, heavy investment in infrastructure, reduction and equalization of tariffs across borders and simpler rules and regulations can contribute to making the ASEAN community an economic powerhouse. The US needs to decide whether it wants to be a part of the resulting prosperity. Either way, ASEAN countries will forge ahead to build a brighter future.
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Libya agonistes
The Council on Foreign Relations yesterday issued an update of my 2011 Contingency Planning Memorandum on post-Qaddafi violence in Libya. Overdue, it is necessarily gloomy. Libya has suffered mightily since the revolution, which has degenerated into an internecine squabble with deadly consequences.
UN efforts to negotiate a solution, which faced a deadline yesterday (the start of Ramadan) seem unlikely to succeed. Some think the UN is too beholden to the Tripoli-based government; others that it too supportive of its Tobruk rivals. No one sees a likelihood the various militias will come to terms any time soon.
Even if an agreement were to miraculously appear, implementation would be an enormous problem. In yesterday’s update, I suggested the US had to be ready to train and equip as many as 8000 Libyans, which was the intention a couple of years ago when we embarked on (and later abandoned) preparation of a General Purpose Force. But the total required to ensure a safe and secure environment in a country the size of Libya is more like 50-75,000. The European Union and Arab League should bear most of that burden. It is likely to be a long time before we see that happen.
Here are the first couple of paras of my update. You’ll have to visit CFR’s website for the rest:
The potential chaos highlighted by a 2011 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Contingency Planning Memorandum, “Post-Qaddafi Instability in Libya,” has come to fruition. Libya today is in the midst of a civil war—one as confusing as it is ferocious. Atrocities against civilians are mounting. The collapse of the Libyan state and the country’s division is possible. This could threaten Libya’s remaining oil and gas production and spark new waves of migration to Europe and neighboring countries in North Africa.
Libya’s transitional road map fell apart in 2012, as the elected parliament and several subsequent governments failed to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate revolutionary brigades that had fought against the Qaddafi regime. As a result, the brigades aligned with political factions and began to fight each other, killing thousands of Libyans, internally displacing about 400,000 people, and creating a refugee population of one to two million abroad.
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From inside northern Syria
I get lots of email, little of it more interesting than this timely update on the sitution in and near Tal Abyad on the Turkish border in northern Syria, which was liberated from ISIS two days ago. This comes from Bassam Barabandi and Sasha Ghosh-Siminoff of People Demand Change, who have good on-the-ground sources in Syria (I’ve made some minor edits for clarity and readability):
Tensions over Raqqah
The Kurdish and Arab tribal heads from both sides along with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) commanders are meeting today to continue discussing the status of Raqqah. The major dispute surrounds PYD’s claim that Northern Raqqah is part of “Rojave” or the Kurdish autonomous zone that they have claimed in Syria, and whether that means that their forces have the right to control this area militarily. Also it has implications for the areas future such as whether YPG will attempt to change the demography of the area to solidify Raqqah as a land-bridge between Kobani and Hasakah.
More and more tribal fighters from Raqqah have come to join under Abo Essa’s command and will continue to do so, especially if they think their lands will be taken by the Kurds.
Refugees from Raqqah (and especially Tal Abyad) who are in Akcakale [Turkey] have gathered into an informal militia of several hundred armed men in response to the YPG’s announcement that they considered Raqqah part of their autonomous zone. The situation there is very tense. Many of these armed refugees are crossing the border today back into Tal Abyad to support Abo Essa and show the YPG they will not give up their land without a fight. The Turkish Government thus far has not interfered in Akcakale regarding this tense situation. Some Raqqah community leaders went to Akcakale last night and asked everyone to calm down and not to make a violent confrontation in Turkey with either Kurdish refugees or the YPG. Kurdish civil society activists also made calls to Kurdish refugees and youth in Akcakale and pleaded with them sternly to stay out of the streets and not to make a fight with any of the youth from Raqqah.
Ahmad Haj Salah, the first president of the Raqqah local council was beaten by three youth when he was in Akcakale, but his injuries were not serious and he returned to Gaziantep.
Refugees crossing into Turkey not expelled
More civilians crossed into Akcakale, Turkey after the Turkish Government opened the border crossing today at 10am (Turkish time).
Some citizen journalists (Arab) have traveled to Akcakale to interview the Arab refugees fleeing Kobani and Raqqah. So far the responses have been that people are fleeing because they did not want to be caught between YPG and ISIS battles and that they needed food and water and preferred to come to Turkey until the fighting was over and it was clear who is in control of the ground. When asked about the issue of whether YPG had forced them to leave, until now the response was that they left voluntarily and were not forced to leave.
YPG commander had requested some villages in the Tal Abyad suburbs be evacuated by the civilians until the fighting was over. In these villages, civilians complied and left, but this same commander announced that all civilians who were requested to leave can return without fear and no harm will come to them. Some civilians have begun return and the YPG has worked to help a local bakery in the area open back up so the civilians can receive food.
Military situation still fluid
Ayn Essa has been liberated and the surrounding suburbs as well.
Western front is still moving south towards the Tal Abyad-Raqqah highway to cut the road just south-east of Ayn Essa.
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Peace for sale
Monday the Wilson Center hosted Calculating the Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, which was a presentation of a RAND Corporation study. Here is a link to the study. Ambassador Charles Ries (Vice President, International, RAND Corporation) and C. Ross Anthony (Senior Economist, RAND Corporation and Director, RAND Israeli-Palestinian Initiative) explained the methodology and key findings of the study. Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen (Director, Arab-Israeli Programs U.S. Institute of Peace) and Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives, the Wilson Center) provided their assessments of the significance and potential impact of the study.
The study examined the economic impact of five different trajectories for the conflict over a ten-year period:
- A two-state solution based on the Clinton parameters.
- A unilateral Israeli withdrawal from much of the West Bank coordinated with the Palestinians and the international community.
- An uncoordinated unilateral Israeli withdrawal from part of the West Bank.
- Nonviolent Palestinian resistance, through the internationalization of the conflict and nonviolent demonstrations.
- A violent Palestinian uprising.
The study compared each of these trajectories to the status quo, in which current trends continue for the next 10 years, and considered the impact of each scenario on direct costs to both parties, as well as on missed economic opportunities because of the perpetuation of the conflict. The study did not model a one-state solution because of the uncertainty regarding the character of such a state.
A two-state solution would provide the greatest economic benefit to both sides. Conversely, a violent Palestinian uprising would be most harmful to both sides. Neither unilateral withdrawal scenario would have a significant economic impact on either side. Nonviolent Palestinian resistance would harm both sides economically, though not as much as a violent uprising.
A two-state solution would provide a greater benefit to Israel in absolute terms, but a greater proportional benefit to the Palestinians. Israel’s GDP would be $23 billion larger in 10 years over what it would have been if present trends continued. The GDP of the West Bank and Gaza would be $9.7 billion larger in 10 years over what it would have been if present trends continued. This translates to a 5% increase in Israel’s GDP but a nearly 50% increase in the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza. The study assumed that Israel’s security costs would not change in a two state solution, but that a decrease in uncertainty, an increase in trade with the Arab world and the Palestinians, an influx of Palestinian labor into Israel, and increased tourism would boost the economy. On the Palestinian side, increased tourism, freedom of movement, Palestinian labor in Israel, and trade are among the factors that would boost the economy.
By contrast, a violent uprising would pose heavy costs on Israel through an increase in instability, increased security costs as well as decreased trade, Palestinian labor in Israel, and tourism. Palestinians would suffer from decreased Palestinian labor in Israel, destruction of property, greater restrictions on movement, more prisoners in Israel, more barriers to trade and the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Israel’s GDP would be reduced by 10% relative to the baseline scenario and the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza would be reduced by approximately 45% relative to the baseline scenario.
The study’s authors did not recommend a path forward for Israelis and Palestinians and noted that the various intangible factors (conflicting national narratives, lack of leadership, lack of urgency, etc.) that have led to the current impasse in the conflict fall outside the purview of this study.
Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen noted that this study presents the conflict as opportunity-based rather than rights-based, and allows groups advocating for a solution to the conflict to use data to support their case. Nonetheless, the impasse in the peace process is likely to persist because of mutual distrust. The recent election of a right wing, nationalist government in Israeli reinforces the Palestinian perception that the Israelis have not been negotiating in good faith. Operation Protective Edge reinforced the Israeli view that no Palestinian leader can guarantee an end to Palestinian land claims inside pre-1967 Israel.
Aaron David Miller noted that if it were possible to buy a solution to the conflict through economic inducements, this would have happened already. The issues of security, competing narratives, broken trust, and psychological trauma must be addressed before the two parties can look rationally at the opportunity costs. In addition, the leadership, urgency, and effective third-party mediator required to solve the conflict are missing. The good news is that the study got a lot of publicity and interest. The bad news is that nobody knows what to do about it.
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Droning on at home and abroad
On Thursday, June 11, the Project for the 21st Century hosted The Future of Drones with panelists Erik Lin-Greenberg, former US Air Force Officer and PhD candidate at Columbia University, and Lisa Ellman, Counsel for McKenna Long and Aldridge LLP and member of the firm’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Practice Group and Public Policy and Regulatory Affairs practice. The event was moderated by Ryan Hagemann, Civil Liberties Policy Analyst at the Niskanen Center and adjunct fellow at TechFreedom, specializing in robotics and automation.
Lin-Greenberg clarified the commonly misunderstood concept of drones. These aircraft are otherwise known as remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) whose pilot undergoes the same training as a pilot flying a manned aircraft. Often, large military aircrews operate a drone, as opposed to one person operating it. Furthermore, drone operations fall under two broad categories—Title 10 missions for military use and Title 50 missions for covert action (not necessarily flown by the military crew).
The use of drones today, however, is moving in a completely uncharted direction. Ellman explained there is a growing field of commercial drone operations in which companies use drones for deliveries, crop dusting, providing internet service and taking aerial photos of properties for sale. Currently, the commercial use of drones is illegal in the US. The only way one can circumvent the law is through special permission from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). However, drones for recreational purposes are legal, i.e. the law permits a hobbyist to fly drones in an open air space.
Other countries are ahead of the US in the commercial use of drones, including pizza delivery in England and crop dusting in Japan. The data on the safety of commercial drones is however still scant, which makes policy formulation difficult. The US has the most complex airspace in the world. Other countries have a lot more free airspace. The FAA must regulate “as if drones might fall from the sky” because its objective is to prevent accidents.
The potential commercial and widespread use of drones also introduces questions on privacy. Companies often want to use drones but don’t want others’ drones to spy on them. The critics’ response to this argument is that other technology, such as satellites and helicopters, can already do what commercial drones will do. This begs the question of whether the US must formulate drone-specific rules or can utilize existing general privacy rules.
Lin-Greenberg noted that drones still do not have the payload of manned aircraft. Nevertheless, drones’ tactical effectiveness in minimizing collateral damage could mean that RPA use will continue to increase. The State Department has also relaxed rules on RPA exports, which will limit the clientele that buys Russian and Chinese drones and will allow the US to leverage more influence on foreign buyers, she suggested.
The future of drones remains uncertain, but in order to sustain progress, it is imperative policymakers maintain pace with technology . Industries should begin moving towards commercial drone use, while safety and privacy issues continue to inform the policymaking process.
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