Tighten your seat belts
Yesterday’s unprecedented framework for a nuclear accord with Iran sets back the clock in two different ways: it would put Iran a year away from accumulating the fissionable material needed for a nuclear weapon (as opposed to the current two-three months) and it would maintain tight constraints for at least 10 years (and in some areas 15), in addition to permanent verification procedures. In return, Iran would get still unspecified sanctions relief, presumably timed to implementation of the nuclear parts of the agreement.
What does this mean for US/Iran relations, the region and the rest of the world?
It puts the US and Iran on course for intense interactions for a decade or more to come. This is a sharp break with the sporadic and often hostile relations they have endured for more than 30 years. Negotiation of the final details and implementation of the nuclear agreement will not necessarily be a friendly affair. There is lots of room for frictions and misunderstandings to develop over one or another aspect of Iran’s far-flung nuclear program. But we are going to need a dedicated group of nuclear and Iran savvy diplomats to ensure that all the t’s are crossed and the i’s dotted. It would clearly be best if these people were located in Iran or nearby, which raises the question of reopening an American diplomatic facility in Tehran. A bridge too far for the moment, but something to keep in mind.
Iran’s regional behavior will ensure that future relations with Washington are not entirely friendly. Tehran vaunt strong influence over four Arab capitals today: Damascus, Sanaa, Baghdad and Beirut, in addition to Gaza. This influence has been acquired by force of arms, mainly through aggressive action by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies.
The IRGC and other Iranian security agencies do what they think they can get away with to subvert the Sunni Arab monarchies in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Iranian threats against Israel continue unabated. While claiming to be non-sectarian in outlook and providing support to Hamas (a Sunni Arab organization), Tehran has done a good deal to polarize the Middle East between Sunni and Shia, in particular by supporting Shia militias in Iraq, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the nominally Shia Alawite leadership in Syria.
At the same time, Iran is a serial human rights violator at home, where it keeps a tight lid on dissent. It is an autocracy, not a dictatorship, one that relies on elections in which candidates are screened and debate is circumscribed even if vigorous. The country’s biggest internal threat is ethnic strife, since barely more than 50% of the population identifies as Persian. Just yesterday there was trouble from Arab separatists in Khuzestan, a particularly sensitive area on the Gulf adjacent to Iraq. But Iran has also seen a broad-based, non-ethnic, pro-democracy movement that it crushed violently in 2010.
The US and Europe cannot ignore the misbehavior of Iran both at home and abroad. As sanctions are lifted, Tehran’s capacity for trouble making will increase with its oil exports, though perhaps not as much as expected because Iran’s renewed production may drive prices down further. Iran would be wise to spend any increased revenue on improving the lot of its own population, which has suffered big declines in standard of living.
But if Tehran chooses instead to unleash the IRGC even further to help Bashar al Asad, to counter the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen or to make trouble for Israel, the West needs to be prepared to respond. It may have been wise to isolate these issues from the nuclear talks until now, but it would be a mistake to allow Iran to use the resources it gets from the nuclear deal to further roil the region.
America’s friends and allies in the region, both Sunni Arab and Israeli, will rightly not let us forget that Iran continues to try to export its Islamic revolution. They regard the end of sanctions on Iran and its return to a more normal international status as strengthening the Islamic Republic. They at times seem more concerned with this return to normality than with the far greater strengthening that would result from Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. But there are real issues: Russia, for example, may transfer advanced air defenses to Tehran once sanctions are lifted. The conventional military balance in the Gulf favors the Sunni Arabs and Israel, but the end of sanctions may enable Iran to improve its standing.
No good deed goes unpunished. Iran and the US are at best at the beginning of a long road. It is not clear where the road leads. There will be many bumps along the way. Tighten your seat belts.
PS: Here is President Obama’s defense of the pending agreement.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Unprecedented
Caveats and qualifications. This is only a “framework” agreement. A lot of details are still missing, and that’s where the devil lies. But I claim some qualifications for expressing an opinion on it: bachelor’s and master’s degrees in physical chemistry, plus seven years as a science counselor in American embassies abroad, where one of my primary responsibilities was preventing the transfer of technology that might enable one country or another to develop nuclear weapons. I’ve done my share of climbing around reactors, fuel fabrication facilities, enrichment laboratories, and reprocessing plants, not to mention talking with would-be bomb builders as well as their enablers.
The Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program is remarkably detailed and exhaustive in specifying restraints on Tehran and their duration. I counted 32 specific Iranian commitments, including no enrichment above the level needed for power production for 15 years, a limited stockpile of that low enriched uranium for 15 years, a dramatic reduction in the number of centrifuges available for enrichment, verifiable conversion of Iran’s underground enrichment plant to other purposes for 15 years, permanent and intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, restrictions on nuclear imports, and reconfiguration of Iran’s heavy water reactor to limit severely its production of plutonium as well as a ban on reprocessing.
Nothing like these restrictions has ever before been agreed to by a potential nuclear weapons state. They are truly unprecedented.
The one all-too-obvious gap is this sentence:
Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Iran has stiffed the IAEA on accounting for its suspected secret nuclear activities many times. This sentence offers nothing more than has been pledged many times in the past. That is too bad, as no state has ever developed nuclear weapons in an IAEA-monitored program. Accounting for past clandestine activities is important. But there are three months now to make good on the pledge–I trust Washington will insist.
On sanctions, the promise to Iran is vague: “relief, if it abides by its commitments.” Presumably Iran can expect China and Russia to press in particular for removal of UN Security Council sanctions at an early date, but that will require US, British and French concurrence. In addition:
U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
The US at least maintains human rights and other non-nuclear sanctions, so at least some will not be suspended. But this sentence appears to promise an “early harvest” of unspecified sanctions relief if everything is going smoothly.
As I read it, this is about as good an agreement as anyone had any hope of achieving. The question is whether it is better than no agreement, which would have left Iran free to generate enough highly enriched uranium to build at least one nuclear weapon within a few months. A 15-year delay in getting to that point seems a significant achievement to me. I see no sense in which this deal “paves the way” to the bomb, as Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu claimed in his speech to the Congress.
Without this deal, we would have faced an Iran forging ahead unconstrained to make weapons grade uranium and possibly plutonium. Sanctions would be fraying. The only option left would be war, which might set Iran back a few years but cause Tehran to redouble its nuclear weapons efforts, as Saddam Hussein did after the Israelis* bombed the Osiraq reaction in 1981. That sounds much more like paving the way to nuclear weapons than this deal, even without the precious details on Iran’s past clandestine activities.
This is an unprecedented achievement, but I don’t expect the Congress, Israel or the Gulf Arab states to readily agree. President Obama has got his work cut out for him, both to fill in missing details and sell the package to domestic political adversaries and Middle Eastern friends.
*I originally wrote “French” here. Hazards of hasty drafting. The reactor was French. The bombs were Israeli. Apologies.
PPS: Jeb Bush’s statement on the Iran deal, with {my comments}:
Today, the Obama administration has agreed to remove U.S. and international sanctions {it agreed to still unspecified sanctions relief and suspension, not removal}, while permitting Iran to enrich uranium using most {less than one-third} of the centrifuges in use today, conduct research into faster, next generation centrifuges {but not deploy them for 10 years}, maintain an underground, hardened facility at Fordow {but not use it for enrichment}, and expand its ballistic missile capabilities {which are not included in the agenda of the talks}. It fails to obtain a guarantee of sufficient inspections {apparently Mr. Bush thinks insufficient the most intrusive inspection regime available to the IAEA, in addition to access to “suspicious sites” and uranium production facilities, monitoring of nuclear imports and early notification of newly constructed facilities}. Iran isn’t required to disclose its past weaponization activities and many of the deal’s provisions will expire in the near future {the failure to answer IAEA questions about weaponization is a serious issue that should be solved before the final agreement is concluded in June, but I can’t find any of the deal’s provisions that expire in anything I would call the near future, unless a decade is your idea of the near future}.
This statement is a sad commentary on Bush’s ability to respond quickly and accurately to an admittedly technical subject.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Macedonia and Europe
In addition to the remarks of Ambassador Alexandros Mallis and me, last weekend’s conference of the Democratic Union for Integration in Skopje heard from Pieter Feith, now associated with the European Institute of Peace. Here are his speaking notes:
1. Salute President Ahmeti. Thank you for fourteen years of friendship and your responsible leadership following the signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Thank Artan [Grubi] for inviting us and for organizing the convention. We are together in the midst of national controversy and possible upheaval. Time for serious, but also constructive forward looking discussion. Ready to advise and help all political forces in the country.
2. Europe is facing serious, existential threats. We therefore have a collective responsibility to maintain stability and prosperity in this neighborhood. MK [Macedonia] not on top of the international agenda, which in a way is a good sign. But if anything, Europe doesn’t need another crisis in the Balkans right now.
3. After 23 years independence and thanks to the leadership of this party and its chairman, Macedonia achieved number of successes:
• Dealt with serious ethnic divide in 2001, successfully avoided sustained ethnic violence.
• Started with low socio-economic base, progressively applied reforms and was recognized as EU candidate.
The perspective of membership of NATO and EU is still open.
Now time for looking ahead in the interest of the country and the contribution the party can make.
4. Today, Macedonia faces number of challenges:
1. resolving the name issue hampering Euro-Atlantic Integration efforts. This is urgent and justified, but not an excuse to slow down domestic reform process; remind that in 2012 Štefan Füle proposed accession negotiations to start running in parallel to name dispute negotiations.
Opportunities to close the matter were missed in the past – by both sides. Given the internal situation in Greece and Macedonia, the outlook for making progress in the short term seems, realistically speaking, less than promising. Please do not link this issue with the reform process, in the interest of your country and people.
2. dealing with institutional weaknesses common to neighborhood;
3. improving inter-ethnic relations as tensions persist;
4. as of late, serious weaknesses in rule of law, democratic governance and parliamentary dialogue. The institutions of the country, in particular an independent judiciary and the Parliament, should deal with this.
5. Current political situation is:
• Followed with concern by international community, including the three EU institutions – Council, Commission and the European Parliament – and of course by the US; they are aware of the need for outside help.
• On the international side, there is willingness to facilitate an inclusive national dialogue in order to revamp the democratic process. Inclusive means with the participation of your party, DUI. The Parliament must resume its democratic functions without boycott or other forms of obstruction and, together with an independent judiciary, exercise democratic oversight over an accountable executive.
In the longer term, Brussels will expect from the Macedonian political leadership strong national commitment to integration and good neighborhood policies. This should be done, as a matter of priority, by removing remaining domestic challenges to accession talks. President Ahmeti’s remarks reassured me that he is ready to do so.
6. Let us look once again at the October 2014 EC Progress Report:
• Recognized high level of alignment with legislative acquis; and recommended opening accession negotiations.
• Outlined three serious challenges:
o “increasingly divisive political culture”;
o “fragile inter-ethnic situation”;
o “politicization” and government control over state institutions and media.
7. Under the present circumstances, removing technical obstacles to accession negotiations should be the strategic priority for the short and medium term;
Include particular attention to Copenhagen criteria:e.g. democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities and media freedom.
• Continue to secure the support of the international community.
• In so doing and tactically, Macedonia can narrow down the constraints to moving towards opening accession negotiations.
• Let me highlight two issues:
8. Gaps in implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement:
• Decentralization process requires funding and effort to strengthen administrative capacity of some municipalities:
• Education reforms require increased political support and state funding:
• Another census or administrative registry is needed, at the appropriate moment.
• The OFA Review – stocktaking of implementation of all requirements needs to be finalized and published.
• We, the European Institute of Peace (EIP), stand ready to assist the government, the communities and civil society in their efforts to improve the Commission’s assessment in its next Progress Report.
• We also need to prevent the current crisis spilling over into the ethnic divide. The EU has given EIP its full support in helping facilitate the inter-ethnic dialogue.
9. Good neighborly relations:
o Good relations with Western Balkan neighbors, but relations with Greece and Bulgaria remain strained.
o Positive developments towards finalizing the bilateral treaty with Bulgaria.
o Agreed are questions related to protection of minorities and use of languages;
o Outstanding is the issue of shared historic narrative.
10. In closing: Need for national unity and consensus:
As the president of DUI said just now: The party faces a dilemma. Co-governance in a coalition will help ensure respect for the Ohrid requirements. Justifiably, you are keen to preserve the Ohrid legacy. But it also imposes responsibility and accountability for the whole range of government policies. You cannot remain silent. Therefore I urge you to continue to speak up on the democratic values, norms and principles for which you stand. For inter-ethnic tolerance and reconciliation. And to make sure the government works on the basis of consensual democracy in accordance with the Constitution.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What stalled Lausanne
I did gigs for both CCTV and CNBC Asia yesterday on the Iran nuclear deal. I’m pleased with how this one for CNBC came out (maybe the CCTV one was okay too, but I haven’t got a link yet):
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
A Greek in Skopje
As regular readers know, I spoke last Saturday via Skype to the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) conference in Skopje. Also addressing the conference were several Europeans. Here are the notes Ambassador Alexandros Mallias, a former Greek diplomat, used:
Ali Ahmeti builds bridges while others build statues
Ιt is an honour for me to be invited to the DUI first Thematic Congress and to such a fascinating and distinguished panel.
Allow me at the outset to thank Ali Ahmeti.
I will never forget our first meeting, 13 or 14 years years ago, somewhere in Tetovo, while he was still prohibited to leave his ”safe haven” and visit Skopje .
Since then, Baskimi Democratik per Integrim (DUI) managed to transform itself from a guerilla movement to a well established and performing political party .
Ali Ahmeti himself is much respected as an accountable and thoughtful political leader, in Skopje, in Brussels and in Athens as well .
While others are spending money, political capital, energy and time in building statues, Ali Ahmeti managed to build bridges, including with Greece. In fact, he is the only political leader from your country that has paid several official visits to Athens since 2007.
I have no intention of talking today about the 2001 events. My views and personal account have been published in the newspapers here in Skopje, in Tirana, in Prishtina and in a more detailed manner in the book I published in 2013 .
As modesty is not a flower often growing in Greek gardens, allow me to state that the fact that DUI included the then Balkan Affairs’ Political Director of Greece in today’s panel speaks for itself. It reflects the engagement and positive role played by Greece on stage and behind the scenes in 2001.
I want also to acknowledge here around this table the presence of personalities who by their word and by their sword, by their commitment and by their deeds shaped or influenced the political shaping and reshaping of the Balkans. They have also much contributed to the stabilization process of your country. To my regret, this is today deliberately forgotten. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Deal or no deal
Everyone is anticipating a nuclear deal with Iran today, or not. Either way it is the big news.
I’d bet 60/40 on a “framework” political commitment that lays out some basic and well-known parameters: limits on enriching and stockpiling uranium, slowing of plutonium production, lifting of sanctions and limits over a decade or more, and International Atomic Energy Agency verification.
I don’t expect much on what I regard as the most critical question: answers to the IAEA questions about “possible military dimensions.” No IAEA-safeguarded nuclear program has ever generated the material used in a nuclear weapons program. All proliferation has been accomplished in secret. Iran has still not clarified some of its past activities, but that issue is treated separately between Tehran and the IAEA, not in the P5+1 talks.
Any agreement is going to be difficult for both the US and Iran. Hardliners abound in both countries. Distrust is the rule, not the exception. President Obama needs to be able to argue credibly that framework agreement will in fact prevent Iran from gaining the material needed to make a nuclear weapon in less than a year, as well as ensure that we will know if a decision to produce nuclear weapons is made. President Rouhani will have to be able to argue credibly that Iran’s basic rights have been respected and sanctions significantly alleviated.
Both Tehran and Washington will need to be able to argue that a deal is better than no deal. Washington’s argument will include the inevitable fraying of the sanctions regime if there is no deal. Tehran’s argument will include the inevitable additional damage to Iran’s economy and the (unmentioned but still important) possibility of domestic instability. Both will want to avoid war, which would be devastating for Iran but also embroil the US in still another Middle Eastern conflict, without setting the Iranian nuclear program back more than a few years.
Within the P5+1 team, China and Russia will weigh heavily towards a deal that is generous to Iran. The UK, France and Germany will be closer to the US position, with France apparently arguing for a tougher stand on sanctions than the US. These other participants will be able to influence the shape of what is proposed, but it will ultimately be up to Iran and the US to accept or reject it.
I won’t be surprised if there are last-minute hitches that extend the negotiations, at least for a few hours. That is common in all international negotiations, not least because officials in capitals–in this case Presidents Obama and Rouhani as well as Supreme Leader Khamenei–will need to give a final green or red light. But it is also true that the temptation to throw in a last demand at midnight is great, since the other side by that time is anticipating a result.
Whatever is decided, or not, today or early tomorrow in Lausanne will need further technical elaboration in the months to come before the end-June deadline for a full agreement. Technical details are important. We can expect further drama in the weeks and months to come.
Iran and the US remain at odds on other Middle East issues, including most notably at the moment Syria and Yemen. Even in Iraq, where both are fighting against the Islamic State, their fundamental interests diverge. Even with a deal, peace is unlikely to break out. But a deal might well prevent things from getting much worse.
RSS - Posts
