Iran’s generational divide
Broadcast live streaming video on Ustream
Yesterday’s talk at the Woodrown Wilson Center on Iranian domestic politics by Nicola Pedde, director of the Institute for Global Studies in Rome, provided much needed insight into the generational change in Iranian politics and its implications for Iran’s relations with the West. The shift from a political class deriving from Iran’s theocratic apparatus to a younger generation of political figures emerging from the institutions of the revolutionary structures themselves is radically changing Iran’s engagement with the West, which is at the same time becoming more open and more confrontational. In light of these changes, Pedde argued that our perceptions of Iranian politics need to be heavily revised. Particularly, the idea of the Islamic Republic as a monolithic entity must be dispelled, and engagement must be sought with all elements of the regime – including those emerging forces that are more skeptical of Western intentions. Unless the West adapts to and engages with the new Iran, the future of any Western-Iranian agreement will be at risk.
A full event write-up can be found on the Woodrow Wilson Center’s webpage.
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Peace picks January 19-23
- A Year in Crisis: The Middle East in 2015 | January 20 | 9:30 – 11:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East, already the world’s most volatile region, faces some of its toughest challenges in a century: Borders have been redrawn in Syria and Iraq. States from Libya to Yemen are collapsing. Autocracy is again on the rise in Egypt. And diplomacy is teetering with Iran. Meanwhile, the United States is being sucked back into the region. Come hear four top experts explore the crises of 2015, the stakes, and where they’re headed. The panel of speakers includes Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar, Marina Ottaway, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, Shaul Bakhash, Professor of History, George Mason University and David Ottaway, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Managing, Ending and Avoiding Wars in the Middle East | Tuesday January 20 | 13:00 – 15:30 | Middle East Policy Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Policy Council is organizing its 79th Capitol Hill Conference on the management and resolution of conflict in the Middle East. The conference will feature Michael Hayden, General, USAF (ret.), former Director, CIA and Principal, the Chertoff Group, Daniel Bolger, Lt. General, US Army (ret.), Dafna H. Rand, Deputy Director of Studies, Center for a New American Security and Francis Ricciardone, Vice President and Director, Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. It will be moderated by Omar M. Kader, Chairman of the Board, Middle East Policy Council, and Thomas R. Mattair, Executive Director, Middle East Policy Council will be the discussant.
- Breaking the Cycle: Creating Solutions for Water Security in the Middle East | Wednesday January 21 | 9:30 – 11:30 | Hollings Center for International Dialogue | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Often overshadowed by political turmoil, the Middle East faces increasing environmental and resource-based challenges, notably its depleting water resources. Overuse enabled by government subsidies, growing demographic challenges and misuse of what scarce resources do exist challenge the long-term sustainability of the region’s resources. Despite the gravity of the issue, many innovative ideas for solutions do exist and technological improvements provide hope for addressing these challenges. Please join us for a conversation exploring these potential solutions. The panelists are Raymond Karam, Program Associate at EastWest Institute, Scott Moore, International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations and Paul Sullivan, Adjunct Professor of Security Studies, Georgetown University. The talk will be moderated by David Dumke,Director, Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd Program for Strategic Research and Studies, University of Central Florida, with introductions by Michael Carroll, Executive Director, Hollings Center.
- New Challenges for Islamist Movements | Thursday January 22 | 12:00 – 14:00 | POMEPS| REGISTER TO ATTEND | From the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to the regional suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and decline of Ennahda’s prominence in Tunisia, Islamist movements across the Middle East are confronted by new challenges at the start of 2015. Join POMEPS for a panel discussion on the organizational challenges facing Islamist movements and how Islamists, from youth members to senior leadership, are responding. The panelists are Khalil al-Anani, Adjunct Professor of Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Raphaël Lefèvre, Gates Scholar, University of Cambridge, Monica Marks, Doctoral Researcher, Oxford University and Quinn Mecham, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brigham Young University. The discussion will be moderated by Mark Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.
- Once Upon a Revolution: An Egyptian Story | Friday January 23 | 13:00 – 14:30 | New America Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In his new book, Once Upon A Revolution: An Egyptian Story,Thanassis Cambanis tells the inside story of the 2011 Egyptian revolution by following two courageous and pivotal leaders—and their imperfect decisions, which changed the world. In January 2011, in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, a group of strangers sparked a revolution, but had little more than their idealism with which to battle the secret police, the old oligarchs, and a power-hungry military determined to keep control. Basem, an apolitical middle-class architect, jeopardized the lives of his family when he seized the chance to improve his country. Moaz, a contrarian Muslim Brother, defied his own organization to join the opposition. While Basem was determined to change the system from within, becoming one of the only revolutionaries to win a seat in parliament after new elections were held, Moaz took a different course, convinced that only street pressure from youth movements could dismantle the old order. This book launch features a discussion with Thanassis Cambanis, Fellow, The Century Foundation, moderated by Nadia Oweidat, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation.
- Politics, Comedy, and the Dangers of Satire | Friday 23 January | 16:00 | Georgetown University’s Davis Performing Arts Center | The Laboratory for Global Performance and Politics will host this timely forum, presented in association with the U.S. premiere of Ajoka Theatre of Lahore’s Amrika Chalo (Destination USA). Ajoka Theatre has been the target of violent threats, and Pakistani authorities have banned Nadeem’s Burqavanza for the play’s criticism of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Nadeem himself lived in exile until 1993 because of violent responses to his satirical plays. The tragic incidents in Paris provide a bracing reminder and a highly charged political and ideological context for the complex and essential role satire and freedom of expression play in our society. The forum will feature Shahid Nadeem, Executive Director, Ajoka Theatre, Nikahang Kowsar, Iranian-Canadian cartoonist previously imprisoned in Tehran for his satirical cartoons and Imam Yahya Hendi, Georgetown University Muslim Chaplain. The forum will be moderated by Prof. Derek Goldman, Co-Director of the Laboratory for Global Performance and Politics.
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Europe takes a turn
Sead Numanovic of the Bosnian daily Avaz yesterday asked some questions about the visit of Foreign Ministers Hammond (UK) and Steinmeier (Germany) to Sarajevo to press implementation of their initiative to hasten reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I replied:
1. What do you think on Hammond-Steinmeier initiative on Bosnia? What is good, what is bad in it?
A: I think it is good the Europeans are showing interest. But I have doubts an initiative that ignores the defects of the Bosnian constitution will succeed in generating serious reforms. I’ll be happy to be proved wrong though.
2. Is there a willingness among Bosnia’s politicians for reforms?
A: In theory yes. In practice, it depends on which ones. They dislike proposals that weaken their own hold on power and patronage. But only by doing that, in particular with respect to state-controlled companies, can Bosnia begin to function more effectively.
3. Is the request from EU for reform through this initiative modest or far reaching one?
It seems to me modest in conception. Brussels is trying to make these initial steps easy, in order to get Bosnia into the EU accession process faster. It did something similar for Serbia. I wish it would do it for Macedonia, which truly deserves it.
4. What does the US think about the initiative (I was told US are not so happy about it)?
A: I think well-informed Americans would have preferred something more far-reaching, including amendment of the constitution to reduce ethnic vetoes and clarify the central government’s authority to negotiate and implement the acquis communitaire. The Americans are more pro-European than the Europeans, at least right now.
5. Is an idea to reform economy and social sector, without at this stage touching constitutional issues, a wise one?
A: Let’s wait and see. Those of us who have wanted constitutional changes haven’t produced brilliant results. Let someone else try a new trick.
6. What if this initiative fails?
A: I suppose someone will propose something else. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina is falling well behind in the regatta to join the EU. That is unfortunate, but its citizens need to find a way to take the helm and get the politicians to row harder.
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Not in the cards
Yesterday I published a piece by Matthew Parrish suggesting that Iraqi Kurdistan (plus some of Syrian Kurdish territory) is headed towards independence. He imagines the path may be a relatively easy one, compared to the painful history Kurdistan has already endured.
I don’t agree.
My objections have nothing to do with the Kurdish case for independence. That is pretty good: they were promised it at the end of World War I, they have been mistreated both within Iraq and Syria for long periods, they were chased from their homes and out of Iraq, and they were gassed by the Baghdad government. This is a history comparable to Kosovo’s (though the Albanians were never gassed).
Unlike that former Serbian province, the Kurds do not have a UN Security Council resolution that promises them an eventual decision on their political status and the UN did not administer their territory for the better part of a decade. But they were protected by a UN-authorized no-fly zone that allowed them to develop substantial and relatively democratic governance. The distinction amounts to little net difference.
The case against Kurdistan’s independence is not based on Kurdistan’s merits but on geopolitical factors. Turkey, as Matthew suggests, has already accepted Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto independence and deals with it pretty much as an independent state. It remains unclear what its reaction to de jure independence would be, but let’s assume it would accept (though recognition would only come if independent Kurdistan forswore any pretensions whatsoever to Turkish territory, as Matthew suggests).
That is the only good news. Matthew’s presumption that Iran would somehow come around is dubious. Tehran has made it absolutely clear that it fears the irredentist sentiment Kurdistan’s independence would unleash, endangering the peace and stability that has generally reigned in the Iranian province of eastern Kurdistan and uncorking other ethnic resentments throughout a country whose Persian population is likely no more than 60% of the total. Iran is not going to welcome an independent Kurdistan.
Just as important: Arab Iraqis would not accept an independent Kurdistan either. The presence of large oil reserves in territory that the Kurds now control, which Matthew cites as a plus for independence, is one reason. Another is Sunni fear of what would be a large Shia majority in an Iraq without Kurdistan. The Sunnis would be unlikely to secede from Iraq without Kirkuk and Baghdad, which they would fight for. Peaceful separation, like that of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, requires prior agreement on the lines of separation, which doesn’t exist today in Iraq and isn’t likely to exist in the future.
Nor would the international community welcome an independent Kurdistan. The Americans will oppose it because of the precedent it would set for the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The Russians will oppose it because of the implications for its ethnically non-Russian republics. The Europeans will be worried about Catalonia. The Chinese about Tibet. Kosovo, which still is not a UN member, was an exception that proves the rule, not a new rule.
In any event, the Kurds aren’t likely to go for independence anytime soon. At current oil prices and production levels, Kurdistan is not financially viable. While Matthew may imagine peaceful coexistence with the Islamic State (yes, he does), few in Turkey or Kurdistan can. Ankara and Erbil as well as Baghdad all know that they need American, European and Gulf help to defeat the self-declared caliphate. Complicating matters by declaring independence will not improve the Kurds’ prospects for needed assistance.
Could things change? Of course. Certainly oil prices can go up, though likely not as high as they were, because anything above $80 per barrel will open the “tight” oil and gas spigot. Kurdistan will need something like that price (and 10 years or so of drilling) to be better off with 100% of their own oil revenue than 17% of Iraq’s. Kurdistan could come to terms with Baghdad on where to draw its border, which would remove one important casus belli. Turkey could settle its problems with its own Kurds and Syria could throw out the Islamic State. Iran could turn into a cream puff. But little of that is likely to happen in the foreseeable future.
Bottom line: Kurdistan is not headed towards independence anytime soon, despite the merits of its case.
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Towards Kurdistan independence
This piece comes to peacefare.net from Matthew Parish, identified in full at the end.
The Kurds are an atypical people. The geographical area they populate is essentially contiguous, but they have not enjoyed their own state in modern times. Since the early sixteenth century their territory and population has been divided between the Safavid (Persian) and Ottoman Empires. They stayed much that way until the Treaty of Sèvres, a European plan for dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire that anticipated a Kurdish nation amongst several new emergent states at the end of World War I. The existence of such a state was a corollary of Woodrow Wilson’s theme of self-determination for previously colonized peoples. Sèvres anticipated that a Kurdish state would emerge under joint Anglo-French suzerainty, but Ataturk buried the abortive treaty through success in the Turkish War of Independence.
The Kurds remained without autonomy, divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, for some decades afterwards. In the 1950s and 1960, the Kurds took advantage of the chaos surrounding Sunni minority rule in Iraq, and in particular the military coup of And al-Karim Qasim against the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 and his subsequent execution in a Ba’ath party coup in 1963. The First Iraqi-Kurdish war reached a conclusion after nine years in 1970, with establishment of a federal Kurdish entity within Iraqi borders.
The Kurds’ luck ran out with the seizure of absolute power in Iraq by Saddam Hussein in 1979.The humiliation of the Iraqi central authorities by the Kurds would not be forgotten during his totalitarian reign. De jure Kurdish autonomy would be progressively eroded until Iraqi Kurdistan fell entirely under the writ of Baghdad. This course culminated in the 1988-89 Al-Anfal military campaign to defeat the Kurdish Peshmerga (the region’s autonomous military), which involved the widespread massacre of civilians including use of poisonous gas attacks.
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No loophole
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, who has worked at Princeton since 2009, is the moderate voice of the Iranian regime, which lacks an ambassador (other than at the UN), in the United States. He said yesterday, in an interview with Die Welt (Moussavian provided the English translation):
R&D on nuclear weapons is not prohibited by NPT. NPT prohibits building, storage and the use of nuclear weapons. For many years Germany is doing R&D on nuclear weapons under IAEA’s supervision. Because Berlin wants to know the consequences of possible use of nuclear bomb against Germany by other nuclear powers. It is legitimate as long as the nuclear powers maintain thousands of nuclear weapon.
To me, this is one of the most interesting remarks in a lengthy presentation that helpfully and clearly outlines main parameters of a possible nuclear agreement with Iran: limiting Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to meeting its practical requirements (and thereby making the time it would take to achieve a nuclear weapons capability at least a year) in exchange for lifting of sanctions, starting with European oil and financial sanctions.
Whereas those parameters may be mostly agreed, as Moussavian suggests, the parties seem far apart on the question of nuclear weapons research and development, if Moussavian’s remarks represent accurately what people in Tehran are thinking.* Germany certainly does conduct research on the impact of ionizing radiation, a subject on which its scholars have been leaders since the discovery of X-rays in 1896 (I should know: I wrote my doctoral thesis at Princeton on the early history of protection against ionizing radiation). That is quite different from conducting research on how to initiate a nuclear detonation, which is what the Americans think Iran was up to at Parchin before 2003.
While a great deal more attention has been paid to the number of centrifuges and the quantity of enriched uranium Iran will retain under a possible nuclear agreement, the issue of clandestine nuclear weapons research is really far more important. I don’t know of a single case of nuclear proliferation due to materials and facilities monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moussavian is correct in believing that an agreement that limits enrichment and reprocessing and enables the agency to keep tabs on all of Iran’s declared facilities should be adequate to provide at least a year of warning if there is any attempt at diverting material to a nuclear weapons program.
But that is not sufficient, especially if Iran is now claiming a right to conduct nuclear weapons research. I know of no such right in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nor to my knowledge has the IAEA ever agreed to monitor the nuclear (e.g. initiators) or non-nuclear (e.g. high explosive) research needed to develop nuclear weapons. Such research would be inconsistent with the purposes of the treaty. The IAEA’s interest in Parchin is not in order to monitor the activity but to understand Iran’s intentions. I won’t claim non-nuclear states have never done experiments of the sort Iran is accused of conducting at Parchin, but Iran is not just any non-nuclear state. It can expect no US relief from sanctions if it insists that conducting nuclear weapons research is legitimate. I doubt even the Europeans will fall for that one.
That comes from someone who would very much like to see an agreement within the parameters Moussavian suggests reached by the June deadline. But ending nuclear weapons research in Iran permanently and verifiably has to be part of the deal. Anything less leaves a giant loophole.
*PS: on this point, Moussavian writes: “Iran neither had research on nuclear weapons nor has such agenda. As a scholar, I stated my personal interpretation from NPT which I believe it is correct. It has nothing to do with Iran’s position.”
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