Yemen and Afghanistan
What do Yemen and Afghanistan have in common? They have both reached power sharing agreements in the last couple of days. In Afghanistan, President-elect Ghani has agreed to share power with runner-up Abdullah, who is to be named “chief executive” operating under the President’s authority but sharing the President’s appointment and some other powers. In Yemen, the northern Houthi insurgents are slated to get a bigger slice of power in Sanaa, which they have invested, capturing key installations.
Power sharing is never easy, but sometimes necessary.
In Afghanistan, it will deprive the electorate of what it apparently voted for, which is Ashraf Ghani as president. At the same time, it will avoid a clash that might have become violent, or paralyzing. Abdullah and his supporters are convinced that only fraud could have caused his first-round lead to evaporate. They prevailed on the election commission not to release the final tally, which apparently had the margin as 55/45. Ghani, while insisting on the chief executive reporting to the president will be delegating implementation of government policy to someone he has been criticizing for many months.
In Yemen, the gap is even wider. The Houthi, who are Shia, are expected to share power with the Sunni Islah party. The rivalries among President Hadi, former President Saleh and various military warlords are intricate. Saleh notoriously described governing Yemen as dancing on the heads of snakes. Now Hadi will be dancing with partners on the heads of snakes. But there was no alternative: the surprising military success of the Houthi, who descended on Sanaa from their northern enclave, made it imperative to negotiate a power sharing arrangement, which UN envoy Jamal Benomar obligingly did.
In Ghani’s case, we know in surprising detail what he will try to accomplish. He literally wrote the book on Fixing Failed States. There he put rule of law, a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence and administrative control at the top of the list. Next comes sound management of public finances (he is a former finance minister) and investments in human capital (he is also a former chancellor of Kabul University). Social policy, market formation, management of public assets and effective public borrowing complete his “framework for rebuilding a fractured world.” While I imagine as president Ghani will concentrate his own efforts on the justice and security priorities, he will be an exigent taskmaster in the other areas as well.
No Houthis are writing textbooks in English to my knowledge. The best guidance we have on what is supposed to happen in Yemen is the detailed power sharing agreement itself, which sets out specific deadlines and a detailed process for naming a new, more inclusive, government. It also dictates a series of priority economic, social and electoral reforms as well as security arrangements in Sanaa and other areas of Houthi military activity. The agreement is even more specific than Ghani’s book, which as a generally applicable text needed to maintain a higher level of abstraction. But already the Houthis are said to have refused to sign the annex providing for their own disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
So what are the odds that these agreements will be implemented as written and hold past the next six months or so? Not good. Experience suggests that they will be renegotiated, perhaps repeatedly. But that is the good news. Their purpose is to avoid or end violence. So long as the protagonists are engaged in trying to ensure implementation of an agreement by peaceful means, we should be satisfied that the agreements are serving their main purpose. And in Africa it has been shown that peaceful outcomes after elections correlate not with successful power sharing but rather with repeated renegotiation of power sharing agreements!
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Where strong men rule
I spent most of last week in Moscow talking with Russian Middle East experts. It was a deeply saddening experience. Not because of the Middle East: that is a gloomy subject even in Washington DC. It was above all Ukraine, but more broadly Putin’s Russia that darkened the mood.
First, the good news: Moscow looks good, the Russians I met were friendly and helpful, and the Bolshoi Opera is once again open. Contrary to my expectations, downtown the skyline has not changed much, Lenin is still in Red Square (though it is unclear how often his mausoleum is open or whether anyone bothers to visit it), and traffic is light compared other European capitals. Skyscrapers have not been allowed in the center. I saw them only at a distance from the Foreign Ministry, near the Arbat market. Most of the older buildings in the center are renovated, some like the GUM department store beautifully. Ditto the churches.
Walking streets lined with high-end fashion as well as low-end chic lace the center. As in the Gulf petro-states, the number of customers seems inadequate to support the investment. Recently enforced parking rules have cleared the streets of double parked cars and limited the number of people interested in paying a couple of dollars per hour for a space. Drivers are surprisingly respectful of pedestrians and each other. Public spaces (Red Square, parks, walking streets) are well-groomed. Security guards, private and public, are everywhere. Order prevails, at least in the center.
The smiling Moscow I found on the street evaporated quickly in the meetings I attended. Ukraine cast a long shadow. American and Russian leaders, the Russians said, are not communicating. There is a lack of trust. The media are biased. Russia has pursued integration with the rest of the world only to find itself blocked by sanctions, even after the recent ceasefire in Ukraine. US/Russia relations are at a nadir. Is it wise to sacrifice global issues for the sake of Kiev? Fascism is reemerging in Ukraine, which the West is using as a pretext for blocking Russia. All Russia wants is for Ukraine not to join NATO, for the Black Sea not to become a NATO lake threatening to Russia, and for the Russian navy to remain in Sevastopol. Crimea did not join Ukraine voluntarily. There is no reason why it shouldn’t return to Russia.
From the American perspective, the Russians are in denial. They deny their army has anything to do with the rebellion in Ukraine. They ask Americans to understand that Ukraine for them is an emotionally searing internal question, apparently unaware that this implies that they do not recognize the independence or sovereignty of their neighbor. They deny Ukraine the right to make a free choice about joining the European Union and NATO. They fail to mention the downing of the Malaysian airliner, the deaths of Russian soldiers, or the photographic evidence of Russian army tanks and other heavy equipment crossing the border. They insist that Russia is in no way involved in Ukraine, even while trying to justify anything Moscow and its proxies might be doing there.
The Russian attitude on Ukraine is linked to broader themes. The Russians I spoke with do not regard Moscow as having lost the Cold War. It liberated itself from the Soviet Union, defeated totalitarianism and initiated a democratic transition on its own. While this was achieved under Boris Yeltsin, no one has anything good to say about him. President Putin is viewed as the best available leader, attractive because of his efforts to restore Russian power. Nostalgia for that power is palpable: even a casual conversation produces admiration for the Soviet Union. Czarist Russia is not far behind in the memory pantheon. The opposition to Putin is all more nationalist than he is, claim his defenders. Americans should view Russia as an equal, a superpower that Washington should treat with caution and respect.
It is not easy to convey what the Russians had to say about the Middle East with this static in the air. Harking back to Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy,” we were told rigid American ideologically driven efforts to export democracy triggered the Arab uprisings, even though democracy is inappropriate for traditional societies in which family relations are predominant. The UN, the G7, the G8 and the G20 are all fronts for American ambitions, which are driven by an “energy elite” thirsting for hydrocarbons (no mention was made of America’s soaring energy production and reduced dependence on imports). Ukraine is part of the American democratization program. Ultimately, Washington aims at regime change in Moscow.
The Russians see what is happening in Syria as vindicating their support for Bashar al Assad, even as they repeat the refrain that they are not necessarily attached to him personally. The Russian port facilities at Tartous are not vital to Moscow. The Russians attribute the emergence of Islamic extremists, in particular the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to American mistakes and even to American assistance. At the root of the crisis is the American invasion of Iraq, which gave power to the Shia and incited the Sunni rebellion in both Syria and Iraq.
Fearing that it will eventually infect Russia’s Muslim population, the Russians want ISIS defeated. It will take a long time. The US should team up with Russia for the fight. Russia can be helpful in identifying and blocking foreign fighters, especially Chechnyans coming not only from Russia but also from Austria and other European countries. Bombing ISIS in Syria without permission of Damascus would be wrong and likely counter-productive. Arms sent to the opposition will end up in the hands of jihadists. Rejection of the election results in Syria while accepting them in Ukraine demonstrates America’s double standard. Assad has to play a role in the Syrian transition. Russia may prove useful in promoting intra-Syrian dialogue, though the regime has not yet accepted this idea.
My last night in Moscow was spent at a marvelous performance of Mussorgsky’s “Boris Godunov.” This iconic Russian opera features a guilt-ridden hero who rises to the throne by murdering the heir apparent. Guilt was not something I found in Moscow last week, but confidence in strong men was much in evidence.
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Demonization obscures a good argument
Eric Edelman, Dennis Ross and Ray Takeyh write in the Washington Post:
The Islamic Republic is not a normal nation-state seeking to realize its legitimate interests but an ideological entity mired in manufactured conspiracies. A persistent theme of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speeches is that the United States is a declining power whose domestic sources of strength are fast eroding. In today’s disorderly region, Iran sees a unique opportunity to project its influence and undermine the United States and its system of alliances.
This is nonsense. Ideology and conspiracy theories hardly distinguish Iran from other nation states, including many that are friendly to the US. Nor do speeches by a leader claiming the United States is a declining power whose domestic sources of strength are fast eroding. That is a view many of our friends as well as our enemies hold. Iran’s effort to project its influence and undermine the United States and its system of alliances is the very definition of a state pursuing what it believes are its legitimate interests. Iran may be an an enemy, but it is still a normal nation-state.
This demonization of Iran and its anti-US policies is combined with much more powerful and important arguments against cooperating with the Islamic Republic: its goals are inconsistent with US goals, and such cooperation would reduce the likelihood of gaining the Sunni Arab cooperation necessary to defeat the Islamic State (IS).
The inconsistency of ultimate goals might be overcome. After all, the US cooperates with many countries whose ultimate goals it does not share, provided their cooperation brings net benefits. This is true not only for unavoidable powers like China and Russia, but also for friendly but problematic countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Right now every IS fighter Iran’s proxies in Hizbollah do away with is one less for American allies in Iraq and Syria to deal with. If Hizbollah is going to weaken the IS and do away with a few of its own fighters in the process, realists in Washington should count the result as positive.
Cooperation with Iran could however have a negative impact on the Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria as well as the Sunni participants in the international coalition against IS. That is a strong argument against aligning openly with Iran, even if IS is also their enemy. We would not want a victory for Bashar al Asad in Syria or for Shia militias in Iraq. If Sunnis mistakenly came to believe that we do, they would be far less inclined to fight IS or to support the coalition the US is trying to cobble together.
Secretary Kerry Friday left the door open to contributions from Iran. That would better be done in private than in public, but it is unavoidable. Tehran has compelling interests in helping its friends in Baghdad and Damascus to fight the IS. Washington can’t stop it any better now than it could when it occupied Iraq. But the Americans would be wise to ensure that Syrians and Iraqis of all sorts view the US as helpful, not only in the effort to defeat the IS but also in efforts to rebuild legitimate and friendly democratic regimes in both places. That is where American interests diverge from Iran’s.
Iran has tried for decades to portray the United States as the Great Satan. We are not, and neither are they.
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Gaza isn’t healing
Last month’s fifty day conflict between Hamas and Israel has exacted a punishing toll on Gaza, both in terms of the destruction of homes and infrastructure and in terms of the human cost. The most recent UN report puts the number of number of fatalities among Palestinians at 2104. The report identifies over half of this figure as civilians, with almost a quarter children. This economic and humanitarian damage to Palestinians, combined with the losses sustained by Israelis (mostly soldiers serving with the IDF), has deepened mistrust and recriminations between the two sides. Although a ceasefire has held since August 26, the possibility of a return to violence remains. Low level incidents such as Tuesday’s alleged mortar attack risk re-escalation of tensions, putting a lasting settlement ever further from becoming a reality.
In light of this continued instability, New America Foundation’s discussion on Next Steps for Israelis and Palestinians: Assessing the Impact of the Gaza Conflict focussed on the initial responses of Gazans and Israelis to the recent fighting. Joining Leila Hilal, Senior Fellow of New America’s International Security Program, was Hagai El-Ad, Executive Director of B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, along with Samer Badawi, journalist and writer at the +972 Magazine. To round off the discussion, the panel was augmented by special guest Brian Barber, Advisor to UNICEF and founding director of the Center for the Study of Youth and Political Conflict.
Badawi and El-Ad drew attention to the current mood in Gaza. Though it is clear the civilian population of Gaza has endured a great deal of suffering throughout the fighting, there is a general sense of defiance amongst Gaza Palestinians. Related, though perhaps more significant, are the levels of popular support for Hamas. Badawi made comparisons with the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, noting that while in 2012 a significant number of Palestinians expressed skepticism and even hostility towards Hamas and its actions, today there is little criticism of the group from civilians.
The panelists suggest that this is at least in part due to the belief that Hamas’ attacks have drawn the world’s attention to the ongoing siege in Gaza and the hardships faced by its people. The ever deteriorating conditions following almost eight years of blockade have led to increasing numbers of Gazans subscribing to a stark choice: a slow death accepting the constrictions and collective punishment of the blockade, or the risk of an immediate death as a consequence of defying the besiegers.
The lack of blame for Hamas within the Gaza Strip is in sharp contrast to the official IDF and Israeli government line. El-Ad noted that throughout the conflict, Israeli officials issued statements declaring that Hamas, through its actions, was responsible for all Palestinian casualties. He further suggested that this position has been used to justify – or at least partially excuse – Israeli violations of international law. To El-Ad this approach is part of a tendency by Israel to prioritize managing its public image over making meaningful changes to its policy. Supporting this, he drew attention to the question of the IDF investigating itself over human rights violations, and to its general insistence that such violations occur exclusively at squad level, as opposed to at the policy level.
This PR drive comes in response to an awareness within Israel of its increasingly negative image on the world stage, which however makes little difference to the doctrines and command structures that allowed abuses to occur in the first place. Instead of these heavy handed attempts at appearing to address international and domestic concerns, El-Ad believes that only credible independent inquiries, coupled with a review of those policies which have led to disproportionate deaths amongst civilians, can rehabilitate Israel’s image.
Barber rounded off the discussion with his own concerns for the future of Gaza. In conducting his study into the long term consequences of conflict exposure on Palestinian youths, he has also seen rising defiance and resistance among his subjects to the ongoing blockades – which have now lasted almost eight years. Barber is especially concerned now due to a surge in mental suffering across all sectors of Gazan society. Many report feeling increasingly “broken and destroyed” due to the sanctions, war and deteriorating conditions. If the pressure is not released soon there could well be serious implications, both for the ability for Gaza to rebuild itself and function, and for the chances of a future peace agreement.
With increasing commitment by Palestinians to resistance, and Israel more interested in superficial reviews of the failures of the past months than serious changes in policy or structures, it seems unlikely that the August 26 ceasefire will represent a significant turning point. Meanwhile the humanitarian situation in Gaza is becoming critical. It remains to be seen whether the path to peace can be resumed.
A video of the event may be found here.
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Relief yes, complacency no
Ten days ago I noted the negative impact a “yes” vote in the Scottish referendum would have on Ukraine. It would have encouraged separatists there, as well as in Catalonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and other places. Whatever the merits of independence for Scots, the geopolitical implications would have been dreadful.
So what does the strong “no” vote mean? The message is nuanced. The outcome deprives separatists elsewhere of momentum, which is important in politics. But the “no” came about in part because London was willing to offer more devolution, especially of authority to tax and provide welfare. If fulfilled, this will allow Scotland to pursue its preference for a stronger welfare state than London is inclined to do under its Conservative-led governments. Edinburgh’s tea party wants to spend more, not less.
It is also important that Scotland has essentially no human rights complaints against Westminster. Scots have enjoyed the full benefits of liberal democracy in one of its bastions. That of course is not the case everywhere. The lesson Madrid, Kiev, Baghdad, Sarajevo, Pristina, Tbilisi and other central governments should draw from the Scottish experience is that they should provide maximum freedom to their citizens and devolution to provincial and local governments, consistent with the integrity of the state.
What that last phrase means is the heart of the matter. It will mean different things in different places. Iraqi Kurdistan lies at one extreme. Its Kurdish population has every human rights reason to want independence, including mass atrocities inflicted with chemical weapons, expulsion of its population from the country, and unequal treatment. The main remaining authority Baghdad has over Erbil is to deny Kurdistan oil revenue and prevent it from exporting its own oil, which it has been doing since January. Kurdistan still remains part of Iraq because the Americans, Iranians and (to a declining extent) the Turks insist on it. That geopolitical resistance may not last forever.
In other situations, it may be sufficient to allow minority populations a large measure of local authority (especially over language, culture and education) along with economic and political benefits. This is what Kosovo has successfully done with most of its Serbs, who live south of the Ibar river. It now needs to do the same with those who live north of the Ibar, which includes four municipalities that have always had Serb majorities easy access to contiguous Serbia.
Ukraine is the most difficult case right now. Its constitution requires that any referendum be undertaken in the whole country, not in unhappy provinces. Even Russia–which annexed Crimea supposedly on the basis of a referendum–has not recognized the pseudo-referenda and independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, the two main eastern communities harboring rebels against Kiev’s authority. The paramilitary forces there will have to be demilitarized, demobilized and reintegrated in due course if Ukraine’s territorial integrity is to be preserved. But devolution of authority to local governments is included in the Moscow/Kiev ceasefire agreement and will be important if the hostilities are to be brought to a definitive end.
Maintaining state integrity–in Iraq, Kosovo, Ukraine and elsewhere–will be much easier than if Scotland had approved independence. But nowhere is it easy once abusive or corrupt central authority loses its legitimacy with segments of the population. Relief should not lead to complacency. If state structures are to be preserved, central governments will need to respect the rights and culture of all their citizens while providing tangible political and economic benefits as well as local control over important aspects of their lives.
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Politics, not religion
The Middle East is fraught with governments, non-state actors and ideologues fighting for dominance, with religious identity a major divide between Sunni and Shia. But is it politics or religion? On September 16th, Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Hisham Melhem, the Washington Bureau Chief Al Arabiya, Joyce Karam, the Washington Bureau Chief of Al Hayat and Geneive Abdo, Moderator and Fellow in Middle East and Southwest Asia at The Stimson Center, addressed this question.
Abdo acknowledged that sectarianism is one of the animating principles and dominant themes in Middle East disputes. But she also noted there is a deeper conclusion to be reached about the role of religion.
Though tension and violence within the Muslim ummah is as old as Islam itself, Melhem noted that the development of political Islam is rooted in the 20th century. Some might attribute the Sunni-Shia divide to rivalry as to whose jurisprudence is more true to the faith, but this only comprises a small element. The actual fight is for political power. When analyzing sectarian violence it is essential to look at the manifestations of political tension and influence in a historical context.
Until 1967, the Arab political sphere was “animated” by secular ideology and driven by nationalism, socialism, and Nasserism. Israel’s devastating defeat of the Arabs during the 1967 war caused a resurgence of Sunni political Islam that capitalized on the increasing feeling of insecurity. The Islamists used the waning support of secular ideologies to consolidate support and power. They saw the defeat at the hands of the Israelis as a way to return to Islamic roots.
The 1979 revolution in Iran saw a resurgence of Shia power, reasserting the sect as a “powerhouse in the world.” Using Iraq as a case study, where sectarian violence is rampant, the Sunni-Shia divide can be seen as a means to acquire power. While some argue that the 2003 American invasion created sectarianism in the country, Melhem concludes that the invasion only made it worse and that Iraq was already “broken.”
Kadhim echoed the sentiment that the conflict between the two sects is deeper than an “old story of rivalry” but rather one of “identity politics.” He further claimed that “Iraq is the cradle of the Sunni-Shia rivalry” that dates back to the early 20th century during the British mandate.
Karam shifted the conversation to Lebanon, a microcosm of regional politics. While noting that Lebanon has never had an extended period of peace due to sectarian tensions and regional violence, she highlighted the moment in which sectarian tension “flared up” during the 1975 civil war in Lebanon. The precursor to the war involved not only the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias but included the different Christian factions as well. Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon only made the situation worse as the country continued to struggle with internal issues.
In Lebanon’s second largest city of Tripoli, poverty is pervasive. Karam cites a UNDP report that 57% of residents live in poverty, a city that also happens to have the largest concentration of Sunni population in the country. In addition, Bab Tabaneh, another heavily Sunni populated city with a 87% poverty rate, is where most of the sectarian clashes happen in Lebanon. The socio-economic situation contributes greatly to sectarian tensions.
Following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, a void was left in the Sunni leadership in Lebanon, which some say led to the rise of the Salafist movement (mainly in Tripoli). Radicalization was exacerbated by the spillover of the Syrian war in 2011.
Karam disagreed with Melhem’s assessment that the Iranian revolution was the catalyst for political Islam in the region. Instead she concluded it arose from a generation of disenfranchised, undereducated youth who feel their future has been compromised.
As violence rages on in the Middle East, the real issue is the struggle for political power as states transition away from secular autocracies. The sectarian diagnosis is an overstated simplification.
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