Beware the tradeoffs
Important decisions are pending the next few days on Syria. The two key immediate questions are these: will the Arab League extend its human rights monitoring mission? Will the UN Security Council finally condemn the crackdown?
The Arab League mission has not been able to protect civilians or notably reduce the intensity of the crackdown. But the observers are bringing out large crowds of peaceful demonstrators and documenting abuses, which are two good results. The Arab League should decide the issue of whether their mission should be extended not on the basis of whether they have “succeeded,” but rather on the basis of what will be most helpful to peaceful protests and civilian protection. Syria needs more observers for these purposes, not fewer. UN training for them is just beginning. At least another month is required before the Arab League gives serious consideration to abandoning the mission, and even then it will be important to consider the consequences for peaceful protest and civilian protection. No one should be fooled by the Qatari advocacy of armed Arab League intervention: it isn’t going to happen.
A UN Security Council resolution on Syria would vastly improve the odds for real success of the Arab League mission. The day Bashar al Assad feels the cold hand of Prime Minister Putin pushing him aside is the day the game changes fundamentally in Syria. But Russia has little interest in handing the West a victory in Syria, especially if it would mean losing an important naval base on the Mediterranean. Putin will move against Bashar only if doing so will help to save this asset, not lose it. That is a high price for the Syrians to pay, but it may not be avoidable. That’s one tradeoff.
Then Bashar would have only Iran as a key pillar of international support. Americans think of Syria and Iran as two separate issues, but to Tehran they are just related theaters of struggle with the U.S. Loss of Syria as an ally and link to Hizbollah in Lebanon would be a serious blow to Iran, which is in a spiral of heightening tensions with the U.S. over the strait of Hormuz, planned sanctions that will reduce Iranian oil exports and most fundamentally the Iranian nuclear program. July 1 is emerging as the consensus date for Europe and the U.S. to implement new sanctions. That will be in the midst of a U.S. electoral campaign in which the Republican candidate–most likely Mitt Romney, but it really doesn’t matter who it is–will be pushing for military action.
Iran is supposed to meet with the Americans and Europeans in Turkey still this month to discuss the nuclear impasse. Even the Israelis seem to think the Iranians have not yet decided to build nuclear weapons. Syrians should want to watch that closely: it is not impossible that they will be sold out in exchange for a nuclear deal. It is hard to picture the U.S. winning on both the Syrian and nuclear fronts, but if the Administration succeeds at that I’ll be the first to offer heartiest congratulations!
Let there be no doubt: if Washington has to choose between stopping Iran short of a nuclear weapon and toppling Bashar al Assad, it will choose the former, not the latter. That’s a second possible tradeoff.
Beware the tradeoffs. They are a lot of what diplomacy is about.
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Do candidates help or hinder diplomacy?
The press is asking today about the effect of the Republican presidential candidates’ statements on foreign affairs. One journalist puts it this way:
I’m trying to put together a quick story today on how the somewhat bellicose tone on foreign policy in the GOP debates is playing overseas – Turkey’s government put out a statement today denouncing Rick Perry, for instance, for saying Turkey is a country ruled “by what many would perceive to be Islamic terrorists.”
There’s also been a lot of tough talk on China and Iran.
…How meaningful this is – does it matter that other countries get upset, do such statements have long-term implications, etc.
I think the general reaction among foreign policy analysts is that this election is about domestic issues, and it shows. Rick Perry’s remark about Turkey is only the latest—and maybe the most egregious—in a series of uninformed statements on international issues, some clearly made to pander to domestic campaign donors (Palestinians don’t exist, all the people in the West Bank and Gaza are Israelis, etc). No one with any brain matter would perceive the government in Turkey as Islamic terrorists, and they are not.
Some of this display of ignorance is plainly so ridiculous that it causes ripples but no permanent damage. I’d put the Perry remark about Turkey in that category. Other statements are more damaging: if Palestinians don’t exist, there is no need for a two-state solution, which casts doubt on the American commitment to that outcome. I would have a hard time believing that either Newt Gingrich or Rick Santorum is committed to a two-state solution after their statements on the Palestinians, who surely would find it even harder to believe.
The belligerence towards Iran risks boxing the United States into war before it has exhausted diplomatic means, including ratcheting up the sanctions. While it is hard to believe that Americans would be happy to engage in another Middle East war, that is clearly what most of the Republican candidates (exception: Ron Paul) are pressing for. They know Obama will resist, so it is a good game: if he doesn’t destroy Iran’s nuclear installations, they can say he looks weak. If he does, they’ll have to line up to salute, as they have on the killing of Osama bin Laden, but that won’t help Obama much if the consequences are negative for the United States.
On China, I imagine that Beijing has gotten so used to the bashing that there is little these candidates can say that will surprise them. I know from my experience abroad as a U.S. diplomat that it can be useful to show that there is a domestic U.S. constituency to which our diplomacy has to be responsive. The question is when does it become counter-productive, hardening the adversary and exciting his own domestic constituency on the other side of the argument? There really is no problem in candidates saying that they are concerned about American jobs and see unfair Chinese competition (exchange rate manipulation, working conditions) as part of the problem. It is when they start specifying remedies that won’t work or will cause an effect opposite to what is intended that things get dicey. Our relationship with China, which holds an inordinate amount of U.S. debt, is a delicate one. Indelicate statements risk doing some real harm.
My bottom line: sometimes they help, sometimes they hinder. But ignorance really never shows well.
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I condemn excessive force
This is the third in a series of posts about violence in Kosovo Saturday. I wrote yesterday:
I may need to adjust my view, but I’d like someone who was there to tell me that there was no physical provocation of the police, even after the police started to try to disperse the protesters.
Today, Amnesty International has condemned excessive use of force by the police, but noted:
Some media reported that protestors started to throw plastic bottles and other objects at the police at Besian, but all reports confirmed this took place only after the Kosovo police had intervened.
Good of Amnesty to add this bit, but it leaves me in a complicated situation. I join Amnesty in condemning any excessive use of force by the police, but that does not negate the main point of my posts yesterday and the day before: violence by the demonstrators is not justified, permissible, advisable, or otherwise a good idea. The Amnesty press release demonstrates my point: if the demonstrators had not resorted to violence, there would be nothing but an unequivocal condemnation of excessive police force.
I should note that I am a paid-up (not actually card-carrying) member of Amnesty International, so obviously I think they generally do a fine job. But I confess also to be suspicious about the assertion plastic bottles were thrown at the police: only plastic bottles? Numerous press accounts mention rocks and metal bars.
I also find it moderately annoying that Amnesty International does not list Kosovo as a country (it does list Taiwan, so it is not General Assembly membership that determines the list). There is something for deputy prime minister Paciolli to concern himself with: recognition by Amnesty International, and while he is at it he should try for Googleanalytics as well.
So there you have it: my adjusted view is that I condemn any use of excessive force by the Kosovo Police. In fact, I wonder on reflection why they did not just leave the demonstrators where they were–it was cold enough to make them move sooner or later. But I repeat what I said earlier: nonviolence is nonviolent. It needs to stay that way, almost no matter what the provocation.
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This week’s peace picks
2. US-Israel and Iran: Looming Military Confrontation? Atlantic Council, January 17, 3-4:30 pm January 17, 2012
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force on January 17 for a public briefing on the rising conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran. Tensions are mounting as the United States and Europe tighten economic sanctions against Iran, and Iran responds with a ten-day naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, and threatens to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the United States and Israel are preparing for their own joint military exercise, “Austere Challenge 12.” Are the chances for a military confrontation between Israel and Iran and between the United States and Iran increasing? Would Israel consult the United States before attacking the Iranian nuclear program? What would be the consequences for the region and world economy?Panelists will discuss these issues, the impact of the domestic political climates in Israel and the United States on Iran policy, and possible diplomatic approaches to the Iranian nuclear program.
The Iran Task Force, co-chaired by Atlantic Council Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel and Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape, its role in the region and globally, and any basis for an improved relationship with the West.
A discussion with
Michael Eisenstadt
Director, Military and Security Studies Program
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Bruce Riedel
Senior Fellow
Brookings Institution
Introduction by
Shuja Nawaz
Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council
Moderated by
Barbara Slavin
Senior Fellow, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council
To attend, RSVP with your name and affiliation (acceptances only), to southasia@acus.org.
3. “The Western Balkans and the 2012 NATO Summit,” U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearing, B318 Rayburn, January 18, 2 pm
As the United States and other NATO allies prepare for their summit in Chicago on May 20-21, this hearing will assess the current relationship with NATO of each of the countries of the Western Balkans with the goal of deeper engagement and further enlargement. While further enlargement of the European Union after Croatia’s entry next year remains a more distant goal, greater Euro-Atlantic integration has the potential to increase stability in the Western Balkans now, and strengthen the Alliance in the process. The focus of the hearing will be on what Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia need to do meet their respective Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including the building of democratic institutions and adherence to the rule of law at home. The hearing will also look at the potential contribution each could make to the NATO alliance, as well as NATO’s continuing role in deterring further violence and conflict in the Western Balkans.
Witnesses Scheduled to Testify:
Nida Gelazis, Senior Associate, European Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Daniel Serwer, Professor and Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (will particpate via Skype)
Ivan Vejvoda, Vice President for Programs, German Marshall Fund of the United States
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, is an independent agency of the Federal Government charged with monitoring compliance with the Helsinki Accords and advancing comprehensive security through promotion of human rights, democracy, and economic, environmental and military cooperation in 56 countries. The Commission consists of nine members from the U.S. Senate, nine from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.
4. Author Event: Arsalan Iftikhar, “Islamic Pacifism” Busboys and Poets, January 18, 6 pm.
Arsalan Iftikhar will discuss and sign his book, “Islamic Pacifism: Global Muslims in the Post-Osama Era”. Arsalan Iftikhar is an international human rights lawyer, global media commentator, founder of TheMuslimGuy.com and global managing editor of The Crescent Post. Additionally, he is also a regular weekly legal affairs/political commentator for the National Public Radio (NPR) show Tell Me More with Michel Martin and a contributing writer for CNN.com and Esquire Magazine (Middle East edition). Co-sponsored by the Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). http://bbpbooks.teachingforchange.org/book/9781463553128. Free and open to everyone.
5. Taiwan’s Presidential and Legislative Election: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations, U.S. Policy and Domestic Politics.
Featuring FPRI Senior Fellows
Shelley Rigger Davidson College
Vincent Wang University of Richmond
Terry Cooke GC3 Strategy, Inc.
Jacques deLisle Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania
Register for webcast/teleconference
In the January 14, 2012, elections, Taiwanese voters faced a choice between giving a second term to Ma Ying-jeou—who has pursued a policy of closer economic ties and broader rapprochement with the Mainland and who has drawn criticism for lackluster leadership, economic inequality and drawing to close to the PRC—and Tsai Ing-wen—whom Beijing and opponents in Taiwan portray as reckless proponent of independence and a threat to the economic gains achieved or promised by Ma’s policies. In voting for a legislature—for the first time held jointly with the presidential election, the Taiwanese electorate face a similar choice between retaining a supermajority for Ma’s KMT or giving Tsai’s DPP a larger share.
FPRI Senior Fellows Shelley Rigger, Vincent Wang, Terry Cooke and Jacques deLisle assess the elections’ meaning and implications: Why did the winners win and the losers lose? What does the outcome portend for cross-Strait relations during the next four years? What is likely to be the impact on U.S. policy toward, and relations with, Taipei and Beijing? What are the implications for the future of Taiwan’s democracy and for the significant economic, social and foreign policy decisions Taiwan’s government faces in the near term?
Shelley Rigger is the Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College in Davidson, North Carolina. She has a PhD in Government from Harvard University and a BA in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University. She has been a visiting researcher at National Chengchi University in Taiwan (2005) and a visiting professor at Fudan University in Shanghai (2006). Rigger is the author of two books on Taiwan’s domestic politics: Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (Routledge 1999) and From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001). She has published articles on Taiwan’s domestic politics, the national identity issue in Taiwan-China relations and related topics. Her current research studies the effects of cross-strait economic interactions on Taiwan people’s perceptions of Mainland China. Her monograph, “Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics and ‘Taiwan Nationalism’” was published by the East West Center in Washington in November 2006.
Vincent Wang is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Department at the University of Richmond, specializing in international political economy and Asian studies. He has been a Visiting Professor or Fellow at National Chengchi University (Taipei), National Sun-Yat-sen University (Kaohsiung, Taiwan), El Colegio de Mexico, and Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University (Seoul, South Korea). He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. His latest and forthcoming publications cover the China-India rivalry, the rise of China, and China-Taiwan relations.
Terry Cooke is a Senior Fellow in FPRI’s Asia Program and the principal director of GC3 Strategy, Inc., an international consultancy specializing in sustainability-related technologies and capital linkages between Asia and the U.S. Previously, Dr. Cooke was Director of Asian Partnership Development for the Geneva-based World Economic Forum. He has advised the Lauder Institute on global business outreach as a member of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School’s Department of Management. Dr. Cooke was a career-member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, with postings in Taipei, Berlin, Tokyo and Shanghai.
Jacques deLisle is Director of FPRI’s Asia Program and Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, specializing in US-China relations, Chinese politics and legal reform, cross-strait relations, and the international status of Taiwan.
Particpants will be able ask questions online or via the telephone. You may also submit questions via email: questions@fpri.org.
Friday, January 20
12:00 – 1:30 p.m. Eastern Time
This event is available exclusively
via webcast and teleconference.
Register for webcast/teleconference
- For more information contact 215 732 3774, ext 102 or fpri@fpri.org.
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Nonviolence is nonviolent
I’m taking flak for yesterday’s post on the violence between Albin Kurti’s demonstrators and the police in Kosovo yesterday. Most of the criticism is based on misunderstanding or distortion. I don’t know what RTK read over the air during the evening news, but I would urge those who were upset by it to read the entire original, then compose and submit a reasoned comment. I’ve published a few already. In the meanwhile, I’ll try to respond to what I have heard so far.
First, I wasn’t there, so I depended on news reports that the demonstrators were throwing rocks, which in my book is a violent act. Here is a BBC account:
Police said more than 30 officers were injured after protesters hurled rocks and metal bars at them in the town of Podujevo, and at the nearby border crossings of Merdare and Dheu i Bardhe….Police responded with tear gas and water cannon and a Reuters reporter saw several injured protesters in the ensuing clashes.
It is Martin Luther King day tomorrow in the U.S., so this is a fine weekend to make this point: nonviolence is nonviolent. It requires the demonstrators to resist the temptation to throw rocks, push the police, whack them with baseball bats or attack them in any way. This requires training and discipline.
The first time I sat down in a street for a cause was 1964 in Cambridge, Maryland, then a segregated city in which the police and National Guard were not on our side. We were civil rights demonstrators advocating equal treatment for the Black population. The National Guard, which was under state (not national) authority at the time, was armed with tear gas and bayonets. Yes, fixed bayonets. Had we in any way provoked them, there would surely have been a much worse mess than yesterday in Kosovo, including deaths. Had we tried to remain seated in the street, they would have dispersed or arrested us, or both. We would have had to remain nonviolent throughout that process as well, not resisting arrest or trying to escape, even when the tear gas burned and the billy clubs (or the bayonets) got used.
It appears to me that Albin is not exerting the kind of nonviolent discipline that nonviolence requires. He seems to me to be trying to provoke the authorities, knowing full well that they will hesitate to use lethal force. If I am correct about that, I stand by every word of what I wrote yesterday. If I am wrong, I may need to adjust my view, but I’d like someone who was there to tell me that there was no physical provocation of the police, even after the police started to try to disperse the protesters. As a citizen, you are not entitled to use force against the authorities just because they use force against you. The monopoly on the legitimate means of violence is theirs, even when they are in the wrong. You have the right to resist passively (not actively!) and sue them in court after the fact.
Of course Albin may reject this view and challenge the authorities with rocks or other means. If he does, he can expect to be arrested and tried.
I’ve also been challenged on grounds that I showed bias toward the Serbs by opposing the Albanian blockage of the border crossings and not the Serb embargo of Kosovar goods. This is wrong. I have decried the Serbian blockade of Kosovo and urged that it be lifted.
I have been told the underlying cause of what happened is that Prime Minister Hashim Thaci has refused to implement a parliamentary resolution calling for reciprocity with Serbia. All the demonstrators were trying to do is ensure that reciprocity.
There is a big difference in the American system of government between a Congressional resolution, which the executive branch can ignore, and a law, which it cannot. Even with a law, there is often some leeway in implementation. In a case like this, where implementation requires the cooperation of another sovereign government, it may well take time and effort to get results. Thaci’s government has chosen the route of negotiation without (further) unilateral action. Whether that is wise or not, Albin is entitled to demonstrate against it, to speak against it in parliament, but not to try to implement the resolution by blocking the roads.
A final concern I heard yesterday was that this might lead to civil war within Kosovo. That I take very seriously. Kosovars, from Albin Kurti to Hashim Thaci, should take stock now and come to the realization that further incidents of this sort are in no one’s interest. The Serbs have already done themselves tremendous damage by blocking the roads in northern Kosovo and challenging the international authorities, which has put at risk their hopes for European Union candidacy. How much sympathy with Kosovo do you think will survive in Washington, Brussels or even Tirana if you continue to fight with each other when there are so many more important things to do?
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Burma gets real, but how real?
There can be no doubting the significance of Burma’s moves in the past day or two: a massive release of amnestied political prisoners and a ceasefire with Karen ethnic insurgents. There have already been some smaller prisoner releases and cancellation of a Chinese-built dam, which was the subject of local protests. Elections for a limited number of parliamentary seats are scheduled for April 1. Aung San Suu Kyi, a political prisoner for decades, has agreed that her political party will participate.
A military junta has run Burma for almost 50 years. It was only in March that the junta turned over some authority to a “civilian” government. The current president, Thein Sein, spent his entire career embedded in the autocratic regime, mainly as a military officer. Among other distinctions, he ran the much criticized relief effort after Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
Thein Sein seems to have the backing of the generals for a dramatic shift in Burma’s course, one that has already elicited from the United States a Secretary of State visit and an intention to name an ambassador. There has been none in Burma since 1990, in protest of military regime policies, but the embassy remains open under a Chargé d’Affaires.
I am not a great believer in brilliant diplomatic strokes. Most seem that way only in retrospect. Diplomacy is usually a long, hard slog. When the full story is told, this one too may turn out to be more Sisyphean than Herculean.
But I still can’t help but note the incredible difference with what is going on today in Syria or Yemen (and what went on previously in Libya). The Burmese autocratic leadership, after many years of using brutal repression, has decided to go in a different direction. The Middle East would look very different today if Bashar al Assad and Ali Abdullah Saleh had decided likewise before it was too late. Burma has at least an opportunity now to go down the well-trodden Asian road to a more open political system. South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and others have achieved democratic reform and improved economic prosperity without violent revolution.
Still, it is not clear how far the Burmese generals intend things to go. Are they opening up the system in a way that will lead to their own loss of power? Or is this an effort to open a restricted space for civilian political competition and governance, with the generals keeping at least control of security and foreign policy? How will they react to efforts to establish accountability for past abuses of human rights? What if it proves difficult to extend the ceasefire with the Karen and other ethnic groups into political settlements? Some of the political prisoners released yesterday had been released years ago, only to be re-arrested. Could it happen again?
What is happening in Burma is real, but just how real is not yet clear.
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