Violence answers the wrong question
People will ask, so I’ll answer: the efforts by Albin Kurti’s “Self-determination” to block road crossings between Serbia and Kosovo are violent and unacceptable. The Pristina authorities are right to counter it with their police forces. They should do it professionally to minimize injuries, but they need to do it. Albanians are no more justified in blocking roads than Serbs in northern Kosovo were several weeks ago.
Why is this happening? It is happening because Albin sees votes in it. He has staked out a position in Kosovo politics that includes sharply contesting Serbia at every turn, advocating union with Albania and rejecting the internationally imposed Ahtisaari plan under which Kosovo gained independence. He is entitled to take all these positions, with which I disagree. But he is not entitled to physically challenge the Kosovo authorities.
I have talked with Albin about this and many other issues. I have even pressed for the State Department to give him a visa to come to the U.S., where he would hear from a lot more people like me who think he is doing the wrong things. He wants the visa. But he isn’t going to get one until he stops the violence.
There likely isn’t much chance of that until the people of Kosovo make it clear that violence does not win their votes. Even then, Albin may be so addicted that he will continue, but hopefully associates will rein him in. They would do best to start now, before this ends in tragedy.
The right question for Kosovars today is not how they can best fight Serb oppressors, but how they can best govern themselves. Even in its current democratized form, Serbia has not made that an easy question to answer: it has refused to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence, to withdraw its security forces from the north and to allow Kosovo’s authorities to control the border. But those are issues that need to be solved by negotiation, not violent challenges to Kosovo’s legitimate authorities.
That said, Albin and Self-determination are products of the Kosovo political system. So long as they forswear violence, they are entitled to participate and press their perspective. But they won’t be helping to govern Kosovo the way it should be governed. Voters will have to decide whether to reward them, or not.
Algeria: hoping for reform, not revolution
I missed parts of Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci’s presentation this morning at CSIS–urgent phone calls kept me out at the beginning and the end. But the overall tone was clear: Arab spring in Algeria will bring reform, not revolution.
The minister’s list of planned reforms included:
- the percentage of women in parliament will rise from the current 7% to 30%,
- judges (rather than the government) will run the spring elections,
- there are over 70 newspapers,
- radio and TV will be open to the private sector for investment in 2012,
- there will be increased transparency, economic and political freedom.
He was vague about reforms in the hydrocarbon sector and in the economy more generally. He also justified the rapid rise of imports as necessary to building infrastructure.
Asked about a possible Islamist victory in the elections, the minister said he was certain the military would respect the election results. He also noted that in accordance with the 2005 constitution, approved in a referendum, “those responsible Algeria’s tragedy” would not be allowed back into political life.
Big on non-intervention in internal affairs, the minister claimed Algeria is developing good relations with the new authorities in Libya and has improved relations with Morocco. On Syria, he noted that the Algerian who resigned as an Arab League human rights monitor came from civil society, not the government. Noting some cooperation from the Syrian government and some arming of the opposition, he thought the Arab League should continue its efforts with a view to a political resolution of the crisis.
False patriotism
The airwaves are so crowded with Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta condemning the desecration of Taliban corpses it may come as a surprise that CNN commentator Dana Loesch has no problem with it “as a citizen of the United States”:
Even more surprising to me yesterday was David Welch, a “former Republican National Committee Research Director,” who tweeted:
Marines pee on dead terrorists and this is a story? I could care less. Liberal media at work…
For Welch, blame falls not to disgraceful behavior by a few Marines who dishonor their 240,000 comrades in arms and undermine the moral standing of the United States, but rather to the “liberal media.”
I have to wonder in what world the media would not have run this video and story. North Korea for sure. Russia and China maybe. And if it hadn’t been run by the “liberal” media in America, would it still not have caused enormous damage to the United States abroad?
Lest you think this is an aberration, let me urge you to search for “liberal media” on Twitter and read a few of the tweets and links they contain. Here’s one:
US TROOPS ACCUSED OF URINATING ON AFGHAN CORPSES…MILITARY-HATING SNEAKY LIBERAL MEDIA IN AN UPROAR. COUNTRY APPLAUDS
The link is to a “Russia Today” report on the incident. When did “Russia Today” become the liberal media? And which country was applauding?
David Welch added to me on Twitter:
Now 3 marines who defend our country are going to be destroyed. Feel free to gloat
Spencer Ackerman has noted the uncomfortable atmosphere among Pentagon correspondents, liberal and conservative, yesterday. Anyone who thinks those who–like me and apparently the Pentagon correspondents–are disgusted by the video are “gloating” is mistaken.
But then I realized: Welch doesn’t really think I’m gloating. He thinks saying that will gain him adherents and attention in the great struggle against the liberals (most of whom would regard me as pretty conservative). The larger struggle between good and evil is so important that you just have to ignore a boyish prank by a few Marines, who after all are men who defend their country. This is false patriotism.
Fog of peace
With a gloomy National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan summarized in the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post reporting on resumption of peace talks with the Taliban, and the New York Times unveiling the tortured history of the negotiations so far, it is time to consider again the prospects for a negotiated outcome to the war.
For all the heavy breathing and interesting reporting about the negotiations, there is still a lot that is unclear.
The Americans keep on saying the Afghans have to lead the process, but there is little sign of that. The Americans and Europeans had to bludgeon Karzai into accepting the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar, which is no more than a modest but useful preliminary step in the negotiating process. Karzai seems more than a little concerned that his largely Northern Alliance-originated opposition, which fought the Taliban in the 1990s, is not prepared to accept a settlement that brings the Taliban back into Afghanistan’s political life. Will he run the political risks involved?
It is unclear whether that office will represent all the Taliban, or only Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura. How the Haqqani network, which does a good deal of the damage in Afghanistan, fits in no one seems to know. But the Taliban have already let it be known that the Youtube video apparently showing American Marines desecrating Taliban bodies will not make them shy away from talks.
The role of Pakistan is also uncertain. In the past, Islamabad has gone out of its way to prove that no negotiations can go ahead without its consent. U.S. drone strikes have resumed in Pakistan, but are the Pakistanis ready to support a U.S.-sponsored negotiating effort headquartered in Qatar? Islamabad is absorbed at the moment in its own internal power struggles between the civilian government and the army, which was displeased this week when the prime minister fired one of its favorite defense ministers. Maybe the Pakistanis are distracted? Or are they on board?
The agreement to open the office requires an American quid pro quo: release of several Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo. This is not easy for any American Administration to do, especially as the people the Taliban are asking for presumably really are deadly enemies of the United States. Is President Obama prepared to run the gauntlet of criticism he will get for this in the middle of a reelection campaign?
It is being hinted that the Taliban are prepared to forswear support to international terrorism as part of this deal. A verifiable pledge of that sort would be more than a confidence-building measure. It would represent a major diplomatic achievement: separating the Taliban from Al Qaeda. In principle, this is conceivable, since the Taliban’s ambitions are largely limited to Afghanistan (and Pakistan), whereas Al Qaeda is waging a global war for establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The opening of the office in Qatar is certainly not something Al Qaeda would support. But do we really have a verifiable commitment of this sort?
We also need to remember the difficult choices that lie ahead for the United States. If the Taliban are going to lay down arms, they are going to want something in return. There isn’t much to offer. There is a role in governing Afghanistan nationally, a role in governing provinces where the Taliban are strong, and control over economic resources (drugs, minerals, trade and transport). Or more likely, some combination of those things.
Oh yes: and American withdrawal. It is hard for me to picture the United States, which has sought from Karzai a long-term strategic agreement providing for a continuing American presence after 2014, agreeing to withdraw completely. But it is also difficult to picture the Taliban accepting a continuing U.S. presence, which is what they have always said they are fighting against. Compromise on this issue is theoretically possible: a U.S. military training presence but complete transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghans, for example. But I’m not sure our soldiers are going to be comfortable living and working with an Afghan army that has lots of Taliban reintegrated. Nor is it easy to picture the Taliban comfortable with the kind of presence such a training mission would require.
All that said, I applaud Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Special Representative Marc Grossman, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and their German partner Ambassador Michael Steiner for the enormous effort they have made over the past year to open up a negotiating channel. It would not, of course, have been possible without the extraordinary military efforts the U.S. troops have made. If the Taliban are ready to talk, it is because at least some of them are tiring of the fight.
But we are still far from peace, and the fog is thick.
Heading for Belgrade next week
I haven’t been to Belgrade for a long time. I am looking forward to seeing many friends, meeting new ones and participating in a conference on “What Next for Dealing with the Past in Serbia?” sponsored by the Fund “Biljana Kovacevic-Vuco.”
Here are the questions that are on my mind. As usual I am open to suggestions of others that I should be asking, and any reading I should be doing:
1. What is the political lay of the land? Who is going up, who is coming down? Why? What role do different issues play: economic issues, Bosnia, Kosovo?
2. How far has Serbia’s democratic transition progressed? Are its courts independent? Is its parliament doing the kind of oversight that a European parliament should do? Is its government being held accountable? Are its institutions reformed? Are its army and other security forces under civilian control? Is its press free? Are its civil society organizations having a real impact?
3. What are Serbia’s long-term objectives? Does it continue to believe in the prospect of European Union membership, or is that fading? Is there interest in NATO membership, or not? Is anyone seriously interested in aligning Serbia with Russia?
4. What is Belgrade hoping to achieve in Bosnia? In Kosovo? How does it balance those aspirations with its interest in good relations with the U.S. and Europe? How can the U.S. best use its influence to ensure satisfactory outcomes?
During one of my last trips to Serbia, a prominent civilian of the more nationalist (but anti-Milosevic) variety showed me around Belgrade, pointing out with satisfaction the damage NATO did to security force targets. He praised the accuracy of most of the strikes and bemoaned the hit on the Chinese embassy. I gather attitudes have turned more sour since then. This is not surprising. I don’t expect anyone to appreciate bombing, even if it is accurate. What caused the shift? How far will it go?
Bashar is right, there is a conspiracy
Bashar al Assad is right. There is an international conspiracy to bring him down. The United States, Turkey, much of the Arab League and many European countries want him out. They are providing aid and comfort to the protesters, though so far as I can tell no arms and little encouragement to violence.
The President’s response in his first public statement in more than six months is to double down, attributing the rebellion to the international conspiracy rather than to an international effort to force him out due to his method of dealing with what originated as a nonviolent rebellion. He is not being obtuse. He knows perfectly well what is going on in the streets. He is trying to survive by rallying nationalist Syrians, especially minorities that fear a Sunni Islamist takeover, against the internationals.
The big question is whether the protesters should remain nonviolent in the face of a brutal doubling down. My answer is unequivocal: yes. Self-defense would of course be more than justified at this point. But the use of arms by the protesters will enable the regime to convince its shaky security forces to use more violence, reducing the numbers of people in the street. This is precisely what Bashar al Assad is counting on.
Nonviolence, however, should not mean passive. The protesters need to increase their numbers. The Arab League human rights observers have played a useful role in reducing the potential for overt regime violence and thereby encouraging people to go to the streets. The protesters should be courting them and asking for more, not calling for their withdrawal. The protesters should also be courting the security forces, which can only be done if the protests remain nonviolent.
The Arab League on Sunday called for UN training for its observers but failed to call on the UN Security Council to denounce the violence and send UN observers. It is important that the January 19 Arab League meeting overcome the obstacles to calling for UNSC action. The Syrian National Council should focus on ensuring that it happens.
The continuing splits in the Syrian opposition are mainly these: secularist/Islamist, violence/nonviolence, international military intervention/no international military intervention. My own preferences are clear: I’d choose secularist, nonviolence, no international military intervention, the last because I just do not think it is going to happen. But in the end, what counts is not what I would choose. What counts is that the Syrians somehow transcend these differences. Benjamin Franklin’s advice is apropos:
We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately