This week’s “peace picks”
1. International Responsibility After Libya, January 9, 10 -11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
The question of international responsibility for protecting civilians at risk has long been a topic of heated debate within the global community. From the protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates to the principle of “responsibility to protect,” the international community has grappled with the question of its role in protecting people when their governments are unable or unwilling to do so. The NATO-led operation to prevent Muammar Qaddafi’s forces from inflicting mass atrocities on Libyan civilians was the first United Nations-authorized military intervention which explicitly invoked the “responsibility to protect” principle as grounds for action.
The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement will host a discussion on what the Libyan intervention means for future international efforts to protect civilians. Panelists include Edward Luck, the United Nations special advisor on the responsibility to protect; Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard Williamson; Jared Genser, an international human rights lawyer; and Irwin Cotler, a Canadian member of Parliament and expert on human rights law. Genser and Cotler are co-editors of The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Times (Oxford University Press, 2011). Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
2. Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, January 10, 9 – 11:30 am, Center for New American Security
Grand Ballroom
1401 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004
American interests are increasingly at risk in the South China Sea. The geostrategic significance of the South China Sea is difficult to overstate – the United States and countries throughout the region have a deep interest in sea lines of communication that remain open to all, both for commerce and for peaceful military activity. Yet China continues to challenge that openness through its economic and military rise and through concerns about its unwillingness to uphold existing legal norms.
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) will release the report Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, which examines the future of U.S. strategy in the South China Sea and the impact of territorial disputes on the maritime commons. The event will feature a keynote address by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, followed by a discussion with a distinguished panel of experts chaired by Richard Danzig, former Secretary of the U.S. Navy, and including Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to the United States, and report co-authors Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program and Robert D. Kaplan, Senior Fellow, both of the Center for a New American Security. RSVP here or call (202) 457-9427.
Copies of Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea will be available at the event.
3. Reframing U.S. Strategy in a Turbulent World: American Spring? January 11, 12:15 – 1:45 pm
The New America Foundation’s American Strategy Program, in association with Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, cordially invites you to join a brown bag lunch U.S. Grand Strategy discussion.
Participants
Featured Speakers
Charles Kupchan
Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University
Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Rosa Brooks
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Bernard Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation
The Hon. Tom Perriello
Former Member, U.S. House of Representatives
CEO, Center for American Progress Action Fund
Bruce W. Jentleson
Professor, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University
Co-Author, The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas
Moderator
Michael Tomasky
Editor, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas
Special Correspondent, Newsweek/The Daily Beast
Opening Comments
Steve Clemons
Washington Editor-at-Large, The Atlantic
Senior Fellow & Founder, American Strategy Program, New America Foundation
4. Democracy Promotion Under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat? January 12, 12:15-1:45 pm, Carnegie Endowment
Register to attend
Despite their initial inclination to lower the profile of U.S. democracy promotion, President Obama and his foreign policy team have had to confront a series of urgent, visible cases, from political upheaval in multiple Arab countries and unexpected events in Russia to thwarted elections in Côte d’Ivoire and beyond. Has the Obama administration succeeded in crafting a line that effectively balances U.S. interests and ideals? Or have they—as some critics charge—pulled back too far in supporting democracy abroad?
The discussion marks the launch of a new report by Thomas Carothers, Democracy Promotion under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat? Copies of the report will be available at the event.
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The limits of R2P
The Arab League, meeting today in Cairo, got it right: it is not their human rights monitors who have failed, it is the Syrian government that has failed to fully implement its commitments to withdraw from cities, stop the violence and release prisoners. More monitors are needed. Their withdrawal would allow the regime to intensify its crackdown.
Unfortunately the League failed to ask the UN Security Council to weigh in, a potentially important step towards a resolution condemning the regime’s repression of the demonstrations. It will be far more difficult for Russia to block such a resolution if the Arab League calls for it.
Is military intervention in the cards? I don’t think so, and I think it is a mistake for anyone to encourage the demonstrators to think so. One of their signs reportedly called for an alien invasion. Syrians are desperate and don’t understand why there is so much international hesitation.
This is why:
- Russian opposition to anything that might lead to a U.S. or NATO military strike against the Assad regime, which provides Moscow with an important naval base at Latakia.
- Chinese opposition, which likely has more to do with not wanting a precedent for a military strike on Iran, a major oil supplier.
- American interest in cutting back military commitments and nervousness about precipitating a civil war in Syria, where the opposition to the regime is still not strong and united.
- European concerns of the same varieties, especially at a moment of great concern about budget deficits and the stability of the euro.
- Anxiety in the region and elsewhere that military action could have unintended, negative consequences for Turkey, Israel, Iraq and Lebanon.
So, yes, of course we need a Security Council resolution that denounces the violence and calls on the regime to implement fully the Arab League agreement. It would be good if it also called for deployment of UN human rights monitors, either alongside or within the Arab League contingent. But it won’t be backed up with the threat of force.
Some will complain that responsibility to protect (R2P), the UN doctrine under which the NATO led the intervention in Libya, requires military action against the Assad regime. But responsibility to protect is a principle that applies in the first instance to the authorities of the state in which rights are being abused. How quickly, even whether, it leads to outside international intervention depends on the particular circumstances, which are not favorable in the Syrian case.
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Righting the civilian/military balance
Someone might imagine that I would be unhappy with the President’s strategic guidance for the Defense Department, released last week. It reiterates many of the U.S. military’s more traditional roles: counter-terrorism and irregular warfare, deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power, countering weapons of mass destruction, maintaining nuclear deterrence. It also re-emphasizes some relatively new areas: outer space and cyber space as well as support to homeland defense. Its implications in many of these areas are unclear, maybe even still undetermined. Certainly who watch the Defense budget more than I do aren’t sure yet.
But it includes a clear and unequivocal step back from stability operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan (and before in Bosnia and Kosovo), the design and implementation of which preoccupied me for at least 15 years. This is the President’s guidance on stability and counterinsurgency operations:
In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless
be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required,operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
In another section of the document, the guidance also suggests that U.S. forces will be:
...able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a
transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing
forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.
Surprise: I find all of this eminently reasonable, provided the civilian and reserve capacities are built up in a serious way. It is a mistake to use active duty fighting forces in roles that might be carried out at least as effectively by civilians, whether government officials or contractors. Our non-military means are however still lacking. Despite Hillary Clinton’s well-intended Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, we are still far from having in the State Department and USAID the capabilities required.
This matters. It was the lack of civilian capacity to deal with post-victory stability and governance in Afghanistan that allowed the Taliban to regroup and regenerate. It was the lack of civilian capacity to deal with post-victory stability in Iraq that turned a quick victory into an eight-year nightmare. If ever we need to deal with a post-war or post-revolution Iran or Pakistan (whether the war involves the U.S. as a belligerent or not), or even post-Assad Syria, we will clearly lack adequate civilian capacity, and the military’s reservists won’t suffice either.
So yes, let’s get the military out of the peacebuilding/statebuilding/nationbuilding/postconflict stabilization/reconstruction business as much as possible. Let’s use reservists when possible, as we have for years in Kosovo and Bosnia. As civilians in uniform, they have talents and experience that active duty forces often lack. But let’s not forget that we might still have to do these things, despite the best intention of the Administration to avoid it. If even 10 per cent of what the military saves in following the President’s strategic guidance were to be spent on civilian capacity, it might be enough. But there is no sign of anything like that happening yet.
So yes, I am happy with the strategic guidance, but it has to be backed up with budgetary allocations to the civilian side of our foreign policy apparatus to make it practical. Righting the balance requires not just words but money and people.
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Libya on track, but delay may be wise
Geoffrey Curfman reports, from the Carnegie Endowment yesterday:
Ali Tarhouni, former finance and oil minister in the National Transitional Council (NTC) and briefly prime minister, gave an upbeat rendering of current and prospective circumstances in Libya at the Carnegie Endowment yesterday. He was optimistic that widespread turmoil seen in other parts of the Arab world would not afflict Libya, but concerned about whether transition to a democratic regime could be accomplished within the established timeframe.
Though remarkably stable for a grassroots movement lacking fundamental sources of cohesion other than ousting an autocrat, Libya’s revolution still faces challenges. Armed militias are hesitant to relinquish their weapons. Most want to disarm, but are worried others will renege. Foggy prospects for integration into a national army and the benefits that would accrue therefrom only increase their reluctance.
Political prospects are also uncertain. Tarhouni hopes a coalition embracing centrist principles will form. Otherwise, the country could splinter or fall to the Muslim Brotherhood, by Tarhouni’s reckoning the only organized political entity in Libya today. To level the playing field, the NTC has considered allocating funds to emerging civic organizations and political parties. But the question of who receives limited financial resources, a point of contention even in a thriving democracy, is especially controversial given the absence of a legitimate legislature in Libya.
Tarhouni is nevertheless optimistic. Fragmentation along tribal lines is a figment of Western imaginations. Tribal divisions exist, but inter-tribal marriages have blurred many of the lines that may have prevailed in the past. Sectarianism is far less evident in Libya than, say, Iraq or Saudi Arabia. A Sunni by birth, Tarhouni points out that his own name, Ali, is one of the most popular in Libya and is traditionally Shi’a. Islam plays a more moderate role than elsewhere in the Arab world. Individual relations with God are emphasized above interactions between the state and religion. For these reasons, a precipitous decline into civil war, which may occur in Syria, Iraq and even in Egypt, is less likely in Libya.
Libya is a wealthy country. Unlike Egypt, which has been forced to borrow heavily from domestic banks and foreign markets, Libya’s oil revenues can finance the bulk of government services rendered to its small population. Wealth, however, does not guarantee societal prosperity. Resources are still somewhat frozen given the inertia of transitional politics. State domination of the economy under Qaddafi all but eliminated a once vibrant private sector. What remains survived on corruption, now woven into Libya’s cultural fiber.
The NTC has worked to lay the foundation for transparency, which Tarhouni sees as an important prerequisite of free markets in Libya. Laws protecting property rights and requiring the publication of all oil contracts will be crucial. Just as corruption became a cultural phenomenon over time, so too will transparency emerge gradually.
Forming an inclusive coalition is a priority, but who is included and how disparate actors might be brought together is still an open question. This much is clear: in five months, 200 representatives will be elected to draft a constitution, which will then be revised based on recommendations from the NTC. Once the NTC approves a draft supported by an up-or-down vote taken in the drafting body, the constitution will be put to a referendum before being ratified, thereafter providing the framework for future political activity. It is important for this process to occur in a timely manner, since only then can the economic activity required to restore normality in Libya ensue.
But more important than the speed of state formation are the underlying politics. Whether Libya’s new government is sustainable will depend on its legitimacy in the eyes of the people, which itself will be a product of the extent to which society is involved in the formation of the new state. State formation cannot be an exercise restricted to elites and intellectuals, even if they play a strong leadership role. This is especially true given the success Qaddafi enjoyed in driving many elites out of the country during his reign, thereby removing them from day-to-day life in Libya. Elites must interact with society and account for its various preferences, which will take time to develop.
For a country that has been systematically de-politicized over the last forty years, the current timeframe might be too hasty. The unavailability of public funding to stimulate civil society reinforces the need to allow time for an organic process to develop. A democratic government can invite the activities characteristic of democratic politics, such as the formation of civic organizations, special interest groups, and political parties. But this only occurs if societal groups buy into the governmental arrangement in the first place. If not, they’ll work outside the system and undermine it.
What happens in the interim is more important than the amount of time elapsed. In Tunisia, the elected assembly is now drafting a “mini-constitution,” which includes legislation governing institutional procedures that will apply until a permanent constitution is ratified. This “low stakes” effort allows different actors to enter the political fray and influence negotiations without immediately cementing a permanent order.
Political unraveling in Iraq is providing a stark example of the dangers attached to premature political settlements. Libya would be wise not to repeat these mistakes.
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A stage for a lying murderer?
Burhan Ghalioun, head of the Syrian National Council (SNC), suggests “an international conference on Syria to stop the atrocities and the killings,” in the likely event that the SNC plea for a “safe area” goes unheeded. I’d be the first to admit that the record of international conferences in stopping anything is mixed at best. Certainly the international conference on Yugoslavia in the 1990s was not 100% effective, though some of its spinoffs like the Badinter commission played an important role in clarifying the rules of the game.
I wonder whether this is an idea worth exploring, admittedly out of desperation. So far, the Russians and Chinese have stymied the UN Security Council. It is much harder for them to stymie an international conference, where there is no formal veto and a good deal of pressure to come up with a consensus statement. The Iranians may even be tiring of what Bashar al Assad is costing them. If the Syrian government refuses to attend, as well it might, that would enable the SNC to speak for the Syrian people.
The Americans would want to go to such a conference knowing exactly what they could hope for by way of results. It seems to me a conference statement denouncing violence on all sides (yes I know that the regime is by far the bigger offender), endorsing the mission of the Arab League human rights monitors and noting the failure of the Syrian government to cooperate fully with them is not out of reach. I don’t know that it would help much, but anything that undermines the legitimacy of the Assad regime is at this point useful.
Could a conference give Bashar al Assad a bully pulpit that would be useful to him in reaffirming his legitimacy on the world stage? Yes, but that’s what we’ve got diplomats for: to stage manage this so he comes off as the lying murderer he is.
Tomorrow is Friday. Let’s hope the demonstrators turn out in numbers, building on last week’s extraordinary showing. Here are Arab League monitors documenting violations by the Syrian Army near Deraa yesterday:
Or if you prefer, here is first-hand testimony of a former Defense Ministry official:
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Yemen: hard to be hopeful
I spent the morning with people who know a lot more about Yemen than I do. Nothing about the discussion convinced me that Yemen is any less complicated and difficult than I’ve already said. But here are some interesting points from the discussion:
- It is not yet clear what President Saleh will really do. He still controls a lot of guns and is not entirely reconciled to the “dignified exit” the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement in principle provides. He signed the agreement because he thought the UN Security Council resolution presaged sanctions if he did not. Things remain pretty much as they were six weeks ago, when he finally signed. His interest in coming to the United States for medical treatment was genuine, but motivated in part by wanting to be out of Yemen during the transition. He would however not be able to stay past the February 21 presidential election, when he would presumably lose diplomatic immunity as a sitting head of state.
- The impunity/immunity provisions of the GCC agreement remain problematic. The UN is uncomfortable with them because they cover things like crimes against humanity, human rights abuse, war crimes, genocide and gender-based violence, from which there is supposed to be no immunity. The Yemen parliament may balk at passing the necessary immunity legislation, which would give Saleh the excuse to renege on other aspects of the agreement.
- There is no real political settlement underlying the GCC agreement. The young protesters, Houthi rebels from the north and separatists from the south were not at the negotiating table. The protesters and separatists are so fragmented that it would have taken years to get them there. The Houthis may realign with Saleh. Islah, one of the main opposition parties, is strong among the protesters, but it does not control them.
- The agreement is basically between Saleh’s political party (General People’s Congress or GPC) and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the official “opposition.” The political dynamics inside the GPC are not yet clear. The JMP is fractious and may not hold together. A political realignment, even one that strengthens Saleh’s GPC, is possible. Islamist strength is not clear, though given the overall trend in the Arab Spring it would surprising if they did not emerge as a political force. Ali Mohsen and Hamid al Ahmar, the military/tribal leaders who have played a key anti-Saleh role in recent months, are on board with the GCC agreement and are still important players. It is not clear what their future political ambitions might be.
- No “democratic center” has yet emerged. Setting up the rules of the game so that it does is a major challenge. There is also a real need for transitional justice measures, even if immunity holds, to establish the facts, clarify accountability and begin to enable reconciliation. None of this will be easy.
- Al Qaeda continues to occupy territory around Zinjibar. This could be good news: it keeps them preoccupied with local issues and less able to launch attacks on the United States.
Much credit to those who deal with Yemen. At least they’ve got an agreement on which to base their efforts and backing from the Security Council. But is hard to be hopeful, even if Saleh does leave power, given the dimensions and complexity of the problems there.
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