Context matters, and so does U.S. support
I gave a talk yesterday at West Virginia University’s Law School on U.S. policy towards democracy-seeking rebellions. The star attraction at the conference was Erica Chenoweth, co-author of Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. Some of you will have seen my tweets summarizing her talk, which I won’t try to reproduce here. Suffice it to say that she provides hard statistical evidence that nonviolent civil resistance really does work, even against the most repressive regimes, and she gives a coherent rationale for why. She also notes that foreign monetary assistance does not appear to work well.
I was asked to address the U.S. policy response, in particular to the Arab Spring. Here are my speaking notes, which of course do not represent exactly what I said:
West Virginia University
November 10, 2011
1. While I am an admirer of Dr. Chenoweth’s quantitative methodology, I am going to rely today on the much less impressive techniques of the historian and diplomat: stories, I would call them, rather than “cases.”
2. Arab spring is far from over yet, but I’ll try to focus on the transition phase: that is, the phase after a regime falls and before a new one has yet emerged.
3. I am thoroughly convinced of the efficacy of what Dr. Chenoweth calls civic resistance in the earlier phase.
4. But things get much more complicated when that resistance has to turn into something more constructive.
5. There are three cases already in the transition phase, more or less: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Each is quite different.
6. In Tunisia, the autocrat left the scene quickly and the regime was pushed aside fairly easily. First elections have already been held and there is a clear roadmap ahead. A classic, fairly smooth case, with no sign of counter-revolution on the horizon. Good chance of consolidating a democratic regime.
7. In Egypt, the autocrat also left pretty quickly, but the regime was not pushed aside easily and the protesters called on the army to manage the transition. It is doing so, but in a way that consolidates its control over some aspects of governance (security, foreign policy) and a big piece of the economy. I’d say much less likelihood of success in the transition. Might be rather like Serbia, where a similar deal was made with the security forces and the transition has been slow and halting as a result.
8. In Libya, there was a violent revolution that has the advantage of having swept the old regime away completely, with foreign help. There has been good leadership, decent planning and ample resources. I give the Libyans a decent chance at success in consolidating a democracy, albeit less probability than Tunisia.
9. What of Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, all of which are still in progress?
10. Yemen has turned violent, even if the protesters themselves have stuck with nonviolence. The odds of successful transition to democracy seem to be small, because the opposition to Saleh most likely to take power is the violent one, which is no more inclined to democracy than he is.
11. Syria could be headed in the same direction, though there is still some hope of keeping it on a nonviolent course. That’s vital for success. Violence will lead to sectarian and ethnic breakdown (similar to Iraq) that will be difficult to overcome.
12. Bahrain is an odd case. The protesters have been nonviolent, but the crackdown was effective, unlike Syria and Yemen. A lot depends on the Bassiouni commission report: will it revive nonviolent resistance, or will the regime be able to keep the lid on?
13. What of the other monarchies: Morocco and Jordan? Saudi Arabia and Oman?
14. These four, each in its own way, is attempting to preempt resistance with reform, albeit minimal reform in the case of Riyadh. So far, they are largely succeeding.
15. I do think the monarchies have some advantage in this respect: not because they are somehow nicer, but because their legitimacy is understood not to derive from elections but rather from heredity.
16. It is much harder for a republic to claim that there is no need to change who is in power in order to reform the system.
17. But that does not mean the monarchies will succeed forever. The fact that all Saudi Arabia experts agree that it can’t happen there, that the succession is ensured, is a clear earlier indicator that it may well happen there.
18. If I were advising the Saudis and the other monarchies, I would suggest they get ahead of the curve and stay ahead, by taking truly meaningful steps to redistribute power and ensure that their security services are shifting from protecting the rulers to protecting the ruled.
19. If there is one mistake common to all the Arab Spring successes so far—and also to those places where rebellion is still in progress—it is the use of regime violence against the population.
20. These guys need to learn that legitimacy comes from the people, who will be much more inclined to confer it on those who protect them than on those who attack them.
21. We should also be thinking about how we can encourage security sector reform in advance of rebellion and revolution—it would be far cheaper and more effective than doing it after the fact.
22. America should certainly be supporting those who demonstrate nonviolently for their rights, but I confess to doubts that it should be done through embassies.
23. Robert Ford, our ambassador in Syria who has bravely gone to “observe” demonstrations, is the exception that proves the rule.
24. The rule is that embassies need to stay on good terms with the host government, even if it is an autocracy. They cannot be implicated in support to revolutionaries.
25. Assistance to democracy and human rights advocates should flow not through embassies but through nongovernmental organizations, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute as well as non-American counterparts.
26. The more these can be made distinct from our official representation, the better.
27. America is condemned to spreading democracy. If you really believe that all people are created equal, you have no choice but to sympathize with those who claim their rights. But the specific modalities for when and how to do it depend a great deal on context.
PS: In answer to a question, I said yes it can happen in Iran, but American efforts to support it there are problematic because of our fraught relationship with Tehran, which includes both concern about nuclear weapons and attempts to foment ethnic strife inside Iran. In the end, I think Obama got the reaction to the Green Movement about right in the end: rhetorical support without repainting it red, white and blue.
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No no-brainer
Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery argue that President Obama should “take out” Iran’s nuclear program:
The closer Iran gets to acquiring nuclear weapons, the fewer options will be available to stop its progress. At the same time, Iran’s incentives to back down will only decrease as it approaches the nuclear threshold.
This is an argument to be taken seriously, as it is surely also being made inside the United States government. Dismissing it summarily, as commenters on the Foreign Affairs website have done so far, is foolish.
There are two propositions here: 1) fewer options in the future to stop Iran’s progress; 2) Iran’s incentives to back down only decrease as it approaches the nuclear threshold. There are problems with both.
Even after Iran develops and deploys nuclear weapons, we would have the option of striking their key nuclear facilities and as many of their nuclear weapons as we could find. The difficulty with doing this is that it invites a nuclear counter-strike with any surviving weapons, at Israel if not at the U.S. But even if we strike now, we are unlikely to be 100% successful, and we would be giving Iran an enormous incentive to accelerate their nuclear program as best they could with whatever facilities they had remaining. The danger of an Iranian counter-strike might not be immediate, but it would be just as real. This takes us down the road of repeated strikes on Iran. I’d like to discuss the regional consequences of that before assuming it is preferable to strike now.
As for Iran’s incentives, I think it likely they can achieve as much or more of what they want by approaching the nuclear threshold but not going over it, which in effect is what they say they are doing. Having the material and technology to produce nuclear weapons will give Iran regional prestige and clout without necessarily setting off the regional arms race that Edelman, Krepinevich and Montgomery fear. Going over the threshold will not only precipitate nuclear programs by far richer countries, it will also cause the U.S. to target Iran with nuclear weapons (let’s assume Israel already does), vastly increasing Tehran’s uncertainty about what might happen.
Edelman et. al. put the bottom line this way:
Given these trends, the United States faces the difficult decision of using military force soon to prevent Iran from going nuclear, or living with a nuclear Iran and the regional fallout.
Even in this formulation, the answer is by no means self-evident. But to imply that there will not be regional fallout from using military force is clearly wrong. I might reformulate it this way:
The United States faces the difficult decision of using military force soon and repeatedly to prevent Iran from going nuclear, or continuing to ratchet up sanctions, cyberattacks and other efforts in convince the Iranians that crossing the nuclear threshold will be injurious and not beneficial to their national security.
We are going to have to live with regional fallout, which will be different but substantial whichever choice we make. This is not a no brainer.
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Best freebie next week
Game Changer: Policy and Politics
For a New Middle East
The Grand Hyatt Hotel
1000 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Thursday, November 17, 2011
8:45am-5:30pm
Conference Schedule
8:45am-9:00am – Opening remarks
Ambassador (ret.) Wendy Chamberlin, Middle East Institute President
9:00am-10:30am – After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy in the Middle East
Steve Clemons, New America Foundation, The Atlantic
Ambassador (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Princeton University
Ambassador (ret.) Ron Schlicher, Former US Department of State
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Deputy Assist. Secretary of State-NEA
10:45am-12:15pm – The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
Esraa Abdel Fattah, Egyptian Democratic Academy
Michele Dunne, Atlantic Council
Larry Diamond, Stanford University
Radwan Masmoudi, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
2:15pm-3:45 pm – Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
Abdelkhaleq Abdalla, UAE University
Jamal Khashoggi, Al-Arab TV
Haim Malka, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mohsen Milani, South Florida University
Paul Salem, Carnegie Middle East Center
4:00pm-5:30pm- Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
Adel Abdellatif, UN Development Programme
Odeh Aburdene, OAI Advisors
Iman Bibars, Ashoka/MENA
Ambassador William B. Taylor, US Department of State
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Addio, addio
It has taken far too long for Italy to say goodbye to Silvio Berlusconi. It will take a bit longer while the Parliament approves the austerity plan and the former crooner tries to wriggle out of his promise to resign.
As it seems finally to be happening, I couldn’t resist posting this 1962 Claudio Villa entry in the Eurovision song contest:
Or maybe you prefer the operatic version from Rigoletto:
Apart from my own 10 years in Italy, I find this hard to connect to war and peace, the touchstones of www.peacefare.net But here is a try:
The Italians, who have participated in virtually every UN peacekeeping operation for decades (as well as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and other operations), are going to be in rough financial shape for the better part of the next decade. They are not going to be able to carry as much international burden as they have in the past. Europe generally is going to be as hard up for funds as we are, if not worse.
The frugal superpower is going to have frugal allies.
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IAEA suggests Iran going nuclear
This IAEA report sounds pretty tame in bureaucratese, but it in effect says the UN agency can’t confirm that Iran has no nuclear weapons program and suggests Iran is violating its Non-proliferation Treaty obligations and developing nuclear weapons. The Annex on “Possible Military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Programme” is particularly eye opening. I still think this is all in preparation for ratcheting up sanctions rather than a military attack, but if the sanctions don’t get ratcheted up or don’t slow Iranian progress…
Here is what the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded (bolding is mine):
52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs [locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used] declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
53. The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.
54. Given the concerns identified above, Iran is requested to engage substantively with the Agency without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme as identified in the Annex to this report.
55. The Agency is working with Iran with a view to resolving the discrepancy identified during the recent PIV [physical inventory verification] at JHL [Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory].
56. The Director General urges Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; suspension of heavy water related activities; and, as referred to above, addressing the Agency’s serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
57. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
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Arab spring needs economic reform
Economic factors cannot entirely explain the Arab Spring, though they certainly played an important role. Whether positive change ultimately prevails will depend on the economic policies advanced by leaders emerging from revolutions and their counterparts in still stable Arab states.
Yesterday at Carnegie, a panel of economists and political scientists, including Marina Ottaway from Carnegie, Caroline Freund of the World Bank, Masood Ahmed from the IMF, and Undersecretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs Robert Hormats, discussed these issues while Uri Dadush moderated.
There is general agreement that economic conditions did not trigger recent upheaval in the Arab world on their own. On par with other developing countries, macroeconomic indicators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, did not by themselves augur revolution, Hormats points out. Due mainly to what Freund characterizes as regional and international economic segregation, these countries weathered the global recession far better than developed Western states. Of course, as Ahmed reminds us, if economic indicators are disaggregated, this idyll gives way to a gloomier picture of high youth unemployment rates, rampant corruption, and highly stratified inequality. But this problem is as much political as it is economic or demographic, a balance that is visible in the broader contours of the recent revolutions.
Where economic conditions become far more crucial is in the future trajectory of the Arab Spring. Most of the panelists agree that regional instability will keep growth rates and other indicators down for the near future. Oil importing states such as Egypt and Tunisia traditionally received billions in private investment, but large capital outflows are starving these countries of cash. For Ottaway, wariness over accepting loans from international institutions such as the IMF, as was the case in Egypt, only exacerbates this shortage. Freund insists that the World Bank is prepared to help, but isn’t sure that the money will be spent wisely or, as in Libya, is even necessary. Now that countries have exhausted their own resources, as well as loans from GCC neighbors, Ahmed predicts that governments will turn increasingly to the World Bank, IMF, and international markets. Unfortunately, as Hormats interjects, the tragic coincidence of the Arab spring with the European debt crisis and budget cuts in the U.S. may prevent an Arab recovery from resembling that of Eastern Europe after 1989.
However, there are important steps that governments, both inside and outside the region, can take to ensure long-run growth. In line with previous recovery programs, Hormats emphasizes the need to differentiate between stabilization and structural reform. Stabilization of fiscal conditions must come first, and international institutions will have to provide significant financing. Equally important will be shifting subsidies away from energy, which tend to be inefficient and overly concentrated on the middle and upper classes, toward food and other basic necessities. This will help reduce budget deficits to more sustainable levels.
In terms of structural reforms, facilitating intra-regional trade must be a centerpiece. Not only will trade allow countries to exploit comparative advantages, Ahmed points out, but it will also provide the basis for economies of scale that enable new global trade opportunities. Similarly, Fruend adds, attraction to large markets will bring investment from the West and Asia. In light of the failed attempts to create a free trade bloc, Ottaway is skeptical that regional politics will allow for such integration, but she nonetheless supports the plan in theory.
Investing in entrepreneurship will also be crucial. Too often, states favored large corporations run by well-connected individuals over SMEs more representative of the middle class. This was partly a failure of education systems, which did not equip graduates with the skills they needed to be competitive in the modern labor market. But it was also a matter of priorities, both on behalf of regional governments and assistance donors. Governments must abandon the theory that corruption is a source of power and align themselves with the movement towards transparency and accountability. And donors must ensure their funds are directed towards the same purposes.
Structural economic reform will be particularly difficult in the Arab world, since it will require governments to embrace an ideology that helped catalyze revolution in the first place. Mobilizing the private sector will be crucial to future growth, but privatization, especially in Egypt, is precisely what led to corruption and inequality. Freund is nervous that privatization and the private sector have become pejorative terms, and that this will make socialist economic policies politically expedient. Leaders will thus have to convince citizens, as Ahmed argues, that the implementation of economic liberalization, and not the process per se, caused the economic conditions protesters so forcefully rejected.
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