This week’s peace picks
With thanks to former student Jeff Jorve (who suggested it), I’ve decided to try to highlight a few Washington, DC events each week as interesting to those who follow peace and war issues. I’ll welcome volunteers to write any of these up for peacefare.net Just let me know (daniel@serwer.org) if you are intending to do a writeup, so that I can avoid duplicates.
Warning: some of these events require invitations, membership and/or RSVPs. I don’t arrange those. I advise checking with the host organization before going. I’ve included links to their web sites when I could figure out how to do it.
Here are this week’s peace picks:
1. The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict: Perspectives from the Ground, Carnegie Endowment, October 3, 9:15-10:45
Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program event with Archil Gegeshidze, senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), and Lira Kozaeva, director of the Association of South Ossetian Women for Democracy and Human Rights, South Ossetia. Susan Allen Nan, assistant professor at the Institute for Conflict Alalysis and Resolution (ICAR), George Mason University, serves as discussant. Carnegie senior associate Thomas de Waal moderates.
2. Egypt After Mubarak, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 3, 12-2
Of all the momentous developments in the Middle East this year, none was more riveting than the sight of Egyptian “people power” forcing Hosni Mubarak from the presidential palace. But since those heady days, Egypt has entered a period of uncertainty as military leaders and newly unchained civilian parties alike wrestle with the responsibilities of democratic rule and the enormous problems facing the country.
Abdel Monem Said Aly is president of the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo and a senior fellow at Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies. His most recent publications include The Paradox of the Egyptian Revolution (PDF).
David Schenker, the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute, is author of Egypt’s Enduring Challenges: Shaping the Post-Mubarak Environment.
3. Share the Water, Build the Peace, World Affairs Council at Lindner Commons, GWU, October 3, 6:30-8:30 pm
The extraordinary Gidon Bromberg of Friends of the Earth Middle East followed by a panel.
4. The Impact of Sanctions on Iran, the U.S., and the Global Economy, Rayburn HOB, October 4, 9-10:30 a.m. 2237
Speakers: Robert Pape – Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Lucian (Lou) Pugliaresi – President of the Energy Policy Research Foundation Bijan Khajehpour – Iranian Political and Economic Analyst and Chairman of Atieh Group Moderator: Barbara Slavin – Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation
5. Why Al Qaeda Is Winning: The War We’re Fighting, and The War We Think We’re Fighting, Barnes and Noble, 555 12th St NW, October 4, 6:30 pm
Carnegie’s Nathan J. Brown will present his new paper on al-Azhar, Egypt’s leading religious institution, and analyze Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Georgetown University’s Jonathan AC Brown will discuss his recent research conducted in Egypt on debates over Islam’s role in society, with a focus on Sufi and Salafi groups. The Brookings Institution’s Khaled Elgindy will discuss politics and Islam. Carnegie’s Marina Ottaway will moderate.
8. What Next?: the Palestinian U.N. Bid, Israel and Options for the U.S., U.S. Institute of Peace (also webcast), October 7, 9:30 am
On September 23, President Mahmoud Abbas submitted an application to the U.N. Secretary-General for Palestine’s admission as a full state member of the United Nations. The United States, which sought to prevent this step, has threatened a veto in the Security Council, and there have been calls for a suspension of U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority over the matter, currently worth more than $500 million per year.
The Middle East Quartet has proposed a re-launch of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations with the goal of achieving a final agreement by the end of 2012.
However, the two sides continue to adhere to opposing views on even the conditions for returning to the table. What is needed to move the peace process forward? Is the diplomatic track in sync with the Palestinian state-building effort? What are the options for U.S. policy?
The United States Institute of Peace is pleased to host the below panel of discussants to explore these questions.
- Elliott Abrams, Discussant
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations - Dr. Ziad Asali, Discussant
President, American Task Force on Palestine - Neil Kritz, Discussant
Senior Scholar in Residence, U.S. Institute of Peace - Congressman Robert Wexler, Discussant
President, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace - David Sanger, Moderator
Writer-in-Residence, U.S. Institute of Peace
9. Taking Stock of Iran’s Nuclear Program: What Does it Mean, and What are the Implications? Linder Family Commons, rm 602, Elliott School (1957 E Street NW), October 7, 9:30-11 am.
David Albright, Founder and President, Institute for Science and International Security
David Albright, a physicist, is founder and president of the non-profit, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He directs the project work of ISIS, heads its fundraising efforts, and chairs its board of directors. In addition, he regularly publishes and conducts scientific research. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. Albright has published assessments in numerous technical and policy journals, including the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Science, Scientific American, Science and Global Security, Washington Quarterly, and Arms Control Today. Research reports by Albright have been published by the Environmental Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. and Princeton University’s Center for Energy and Environmental Studies.
RSVP at: http://bit.ly/odf93s
Sponsored by the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies and the Nuclear Policy Talks
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The friends we need in Islamabad
If all roads lead to Islamabad, which one do we take to get out?
Max Boot says we have to begin treating our “frenemies” in Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate the way we do Iran’s Quds force in Iraq:
Apply economic sanctions against its vast range of business interests. Limit the travel and freeze the assets of its leaders, starting with its current head, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha. A designation of the ISI as a formal state sponsor of terrorism might also be in order. No doubt the Pakistani military would react angrily to such steps, but many civilians in Pakistan—including President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani—who chafe under heavy-handed military dominance might quietly welcome them.
Vali Nasr understands the temptation, but urges that we make nice anyway, in order to keep to our 2014 date for drawdown from Afghanistan:
Confrontation with Pakistan presents Washington with a dilemma that will make leaving Afghanistan harder. If the United States truly wishes to change Pakistani behavior for the greater good of the region, then Washington has to be prepared to do what it takes to get that job done. That includes potentially keeping large numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan indefinitely to protect that country against the fallout from our policy and to convince Islamabad that it is futile for Pakistan to pursue its own goals in Afghanistan.
But if our goal is to leave Afghanistan in short order, then the prudent course of action is a return to stability in U.S.-Pakistan relations. That would have to start with ending the recent public acrimony but also confronting head-on what Pakistan is after in Afghanistan.
This is as sharp a policy choice as diplomats ever face. Which option is the right one?
Neither Max nor Vali discusses the issue I would regard as paramount: Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Nothing about Afghanistan–even our withdrawal–is more important than making sure they do not threaten the United States. This could happen if the Pakistani government were to fall under extremist control or if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear technology or materials to people who would use them against the United States. For those who think that unlikely, it is important to remember that Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan already transferred sensitive technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea in the 1990s.
It seems to me that what we need to ensure our interests are protected is a two-pronged approach. We should isolate and target (I would say even with military means) those who insist on supporting the Haqqani network and other Taliban forces, as Max suggests. At the same time, we need to make nice, as Vali suggests, to both civilians and military in the Pakistani government who understand the responsibilities of a nuclear power and are prepared both to cut off support to extremists and ensure that Pakistan’s weapons and technology remain under tight control. We will also have to provide Pakistan with assurances on limiting the role of India in Afghanistan and with a role in any peace negotiation there.
It is no easy matter to make these distinctions. What if we don’t find reliable civilians and military in the Pakistani government willing to opt unequivocally against extremism? Then, as Vali suggests, full withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes impossible and we’ll need to hunker down for a long confrontation across the Durand line that marks the border with Pakistan. That is an unattractive proposition that should make us try all the harder to find the friends we need in Islamabad.
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Whose side are we on?
While Admiral Mullen has been raising questions about whose side Pakistan is on in the Afghanistan war, it is fair to ask whose side we are on in Yemen and Bahrain. Are we pressing for serious political change in these two very different but profoundly autocratic societies? Or are we willing to back President Saleh because he helps us against Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa because Bahrain hosts the Fifth Fleet and helps us in other ways to counter Iran?
I don’t mean this as a rhetorical question. The jury is still out. The killing in Yemen today of Anwar al Awlaki, an American-born terrorism suspect, provides us with an opportunity to choose. While there are surely other targets in Yemen, whack-a-mole is not a winning strategy over the long term. We need to consider seriously whether our national security interests are better served by continuing our heavy emphasis on the drone war there, which requires that we help Saleh stay in power and tolerate a consequently chaotic Yemen, or by trying to push Yemen towards political change, with the hope that will eventually bring stability and stronger governance.
In Bahrain, the Administration has chosen to proceed with a substantial arms sale, which certainly implies trust and support for the king. But it does not preclude a renewed effort in favor of political reform. The Sunni monarchy has chosen to pursue a very tough line against its mostly Shia reform movement. Yesterday its courts condemned doctors who had treated protesters to long prison sentences. Will we use the leverage provided by the arms sale to get the King to move in the direction of political reform, or will we subordinate our interest in supporting reform to what Arabs like to call “the security file”?
These are the tough questions that should be on the minds of our diplomats today in Sanaa and Manama. I suspect the sheer bureaucratic weight of the Pentagon will tip their judgment in favor of the more immediate security interests. So I’ll push in the other direction: with Awlaki gone, shouldn’t we take the opportunity to reassess and rebalance our approach, get Saleh to step down and start a serious process of political change? Shouldn’t we make it clear that our ability to continue arms sales to Bahrain depends on the government there being perceived as legitimate by Shia as well as Sunni?
Getting the balance right with people who help us with security but mistreat their own populations is difficult. But the lesson of the Arab spring is that tilting too far towards accepting autocracy, as we did for decades in the Middle East, does not ensure long-term stability. Tilting the other way will not be easy or risk free, but it might well be more effective and less burdensome in the long term.
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Is the U.S. still enabling dictators?
Several of the Arab protest movements look set to fail: Bahrain’s already has, Yemen’s is engulfed in civil war and Syria’s faces long odds. To what degree is the U.S. enabling outcomes that leave dictators in place?
The most problematic case is Yemen. There the U.S. has armed and trained military forces that President Saleh and his son have used both against unarmed protesters and tribal rivals. It is hard to believe that the U.S. could not do more to restrain the army, but Washington’s interest in continuing the effort against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has limited the constraints it is willing to impose on Saleh and son. We keep mouthing off about the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for Saleh to pass power to his vice president, in preparation for elections. That clearly is not going to happen. Gregory Johnsen proposes a radical reset to prioritize getting rid of Saleh and reaching a political settlement. It is hard to picture the intelligence community and the Pentagon concurring, unless they’ve learned a lesson or two from Pakistan’s relationship with the Haqqani network. They should be worrying about whether we end up with Yemen looking much like Somalia or Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan: a free fire zone for our drones with an increasingly radicalized population and little prospect of stability.
In Bahrain, the U.S. has essentially stood down from its early support of political reform and dialogue proposed by the Crown Prince. We are now getting ready to sell arms to a monarchy that has dissed its Shia population, which it refuses to recognize as a majority (and won’t bother counting either). The only remaining hope is the international commission of inquiry led by Cherif Bassiouni, which is supposed to report soon. Some will object that the King is not really a dictator, and that both the economy and speech are relatively free in Bahrain. I’d suggest talking with some of the protesters about that. The issues in Bahrain have more to do with concentration and abuse of power, discrimination and prejudice than legal restrictions. We should be continuing to press the monarchy for serious reform.
It would be unfair to accuse the U.S. of enabling Bashar al Assad, who is not a favorite in Washington, and President Obama has now said all the right things. But well-informed commentators think we still haven’t done all we could to organize a concerted multilateral effort against him. My own proposition is for diplomatic observers. If Bashar doesn’t accept them, he embarrasses himself. If he does, they are likely to embarrass him. Meanwhile, the protesters seem increasingly to be taking up arms, a move likely to fail and also ignite sectarian and ethnic violence. That’s a worst case outcome from the American perspective.
So whether by commission or omission, Washington is still not doing all it could to make things come out right. I’m not one who denounces the Administration for leading from behind–the White House is correct to expect Yemenis, Bahrainis and Syrians to take point. But especially in Yemen and Syria, where demonstrations continue daily despite ferocious repression, we should do more to lend a hand to those who have the courage to continue to protest nonviolently.
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Libya redux
Reuters published this piece of mine yesterday under the heading “What’s Behind Libya’s Fast March to Democracy?” It would not have been my choice for a headline. Because one of the commenters on the Reuters website claimed I had never been in Libya, I’ve included at the end some snapshots, which are so bad that it really is inconceivable that someone else took them and sent them to me.
In a trip to Libya this month, just weeks after Muammar Qaddafi’s fall, I found peace coming fast to Tripoli, despite continued resistance in several Libyan towns. Ten days ago, families with children mobbed Martyrs’ square, where Qaddafi once held forth, to commemorate the hanging 80 years ago of Libya’s hero of resistance against the Italians, Omar Mukhtar. Elementary schools opened last week. The university will open next month. Water and electricity are flowing. Uniformed police are on the street. Trash collection is haphazard but functioning.
This is the fastest post-war recovery I have witnessed: faster than Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq or Afghanistan. Certainly faster than Somalia, Sierra Leone or Rwanda.
Why this rapid recovery in a country marked by four decades of dictatorship? Why does Libya seem on track while Egypt seems to have gone off the rails?
Libya has at least three important advantages: good leadership and clear goals at the national and local levels, careful planning and adequate resources.
Libyans believe Mustafa Abdel Jalil, who leads the National Transitional Council (NTC), is uncorrupted and uninterested in continuing in power. He has pledged not to seek future office. He has visited the liberated cities to celebrate the single goal of freeing Libya from the Qaddafi regime. The NTC has replaced Qaddafi’s green flag with the red, black and green banner emblazoned with the star and crescent that was Libya’s flag at independence. The revolution in Libya was not interested in compromise or a managed transition. It wanted a clean break: Qaddafi out and a new, more democratic regime, in.
The NTC and a clandestine Tripoli local council planned carefully for the military takeover of Tripoli and the restoration of services in the aftermath. With three hundred mosques playing CDs chanting “Allahu akbar!” Qaddafi’s forces on the evening of August 20 found themselves confused and then attacked from both inside and outside the city, which fell far more easily than anticipated.
In the weeks since, the new, unpaid local administration has achieved a great deal. It sent technicians hundreds of kilometers to the south with support from local tribesmen to reactivate the wells that pump water into Qaddafi’s “Great Man-made River,” which supplies Tripoli and other population centers. The national government is making the usual social welfare payments. Flour and oil subsidies have been maintained, so bread is cheap and available. Only partial withdrawal of salaries from banks is permitted, but Libyans are confident about the country’s economic future, based on its oil and gas resources.
Libyans know what to expect next. The NTC has promised elections for an interim assembly by April 2012 and presidential elections by April 2013. It has published a constitutional framework that establishes Libya as both Islamic and democratic.
The contrast with Egypt, where I spent a week earlier this month, is striking. Egypt is a much larger, more complicated and poorer country. There unity around the demand for President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation deteriorated quickly once he resigned. Little planning had been done.
The protesters asked the army to take over. Unprepared, it had to postpone elections even as the protest movement split, with secularists demanding a constitution, or at least constitutional principles, before elections and Islamists preferring it the other way around. Egyptians now do not know what to expect, though the first round of elections is now promised for November.
Some of the protesters have now targeted Israel, diverting attention from Egypt’s own problems and scaring off European and American tourists. The economy is in a nose dive. Resources are highly constrained.
Things could go wrong in Libya. We are still in the early days. Qaddafi’s forces could go underground and conduct the kind of insurgency that Saddam Hussein’s secret services ignited in Iraq. Fighting could erupt among the many militias that constitute the NTC’s military forces. Many of them came from outside Tripoli. They may refuse to go home or to disarm.
But Libya is less than one-tenth the population of Egypt and has vast funds deposited abroad by Qaddafi that are beginning to flow to the NTC. If Qaddafi’s forces can be defeated soon and the militias either integrated into a new Libyan army or demobilized and disbanded, there is real hope for success. Libyans, who have lived under an idiosyncratic and cruel dictatorship for more than forty years, deserve no less.
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They lead, we support
The European Union Institute for Strategic Studies asked “what’s next and whose job is it?” for transformations in the Arab world. Here is how I replied:
It is not for Europeans and Americans to lead. It is the citizens whose rights have been abridged who have to in the first instance lay claim to better.
First and foremost the next step is the job of the Arabs: the Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans in the first wave, the Yemenis and Syrians in what I hope will be a second wave. They know what they want better than we do, and judging in particular from the Tunisians and Libyans they are quite capable of setting the direction. The situation in Egypt is much less clear, as the protesters settled for a military takeover and are now having second thoughts, even as others try to pull Egypt in a nationalist direction that most of the revolutionaries would not want to pursue.
That said, they are going to need help. It seems to me that interests dictate that Europe take the lead on Libya and Tunisia while the Americans play a stronger role in Yemen and Egypt. The odd one out is Syria; sustaining the protest effort there for long enough to bring about real change will require commitment from both the Americans and the Europeans. In all these cases, Western influence will have to contend with Arab efforts that may sometimes pull in opposite directions.
Nor should the West forget the need for reform elsewhere: Bahrain of course, but also Saudi Arabia. The ageing Saudi monarchy (not just the ageing king) and the ferocious crackdown in Bahrain pose real questions about longer-term stability. The Americans stand on the front line with both of these questions, as they also do with Iran. There is no reason why the spring should only be Arab.
Barack Obama, like his predecessor, has made it clear that “all men are created equal and endowed with inalienable rights” does not stop at the water’s edge. It is written in our political DNA and we carry it abroad, like it or not. But the imperative does not stop at the ideal. If we care about the long-term security of our energy supplies, we’ll have to be ready to support those who cry out for their rights and avoid being caught on the wrong side of history.
But it is not for Europeans and Americans to lead. It is the citizens whose rights have been abridged who have to in the first instance lay claim to better. We can only support their efforts. And we’ll have our hands full doing even that much.
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