Costly delusion
Serbia’s state secretary for Kosovo Oliver Ivanović is quoted on B92:
“It should be clear to everyone, including Kosovo Albanians, that the issue of the Kosovo status has not been solved yet,” Ivanović told Tanjug and added that with all due respect to the U.S. and other influential and powerful countries that have recognized Kosovo’s independence, it was clear that until Serbia did so there would be a serious obstacle to Kosovo promoting itself as independent.
The state secretary noted that the negotiations on the status of Kosovo should not be rushed and that Albanians were slowly coming round to the fact that Serbia had all the keys, which was why they would need to negotiate with it about this matter sooner or later….
He expressed belief that the Cypriot model was the only right solution for the Kosovo issue.
Speaking about the status of northern Kosovo, the state secretary pointed out that this issue would certainly be opened, together with the status of entire Kosovo.
I agree that Serbia is an obstacle to full realization of Kosovo’s independence, both because it continues to control the north and because it stands in the way of General Assembly membership. But to suggest that Serbia has “all the keys” is clearly mistaken, unless Belgrade is willing to give up on European Union candidacy, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel made clear enough this week in Belgrade. And the notion that the EU would accept a Cyprus solution suggests outright delusion. That is precisely what virtually all EU members–especially Serbia’s putative ally Cyprus–will want to avoid.
This is instructive, because it illustrates so clearly how Belgrade paints itself into a corner. The analysis is basically correct, but Belgrade’s influence is exaggerated. Serbia does not have the power to reopen the question of Kosovo’s status, only the status of northern Kosovo, and it can get its way on that issue only if it is prepared to defy Brussels and Washington and sacrifice its own EU hopes.
I’ll be happy to let Serbs decide whether that is in their interest. They will want to take into account that Kosovo seems to cost Belgrade 500 million euros per year, according to Serb sources. It is hard to believe that is worthwhile, and it is certainly not sustainable.
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To the shores of Tripoli
Audio of the Atlantic Council’s session this morning on what Qaddafi’s demise means for Libya, NATO and the Arab Awakening is up. Here are the speaking notes I used:
- The immediate requirements are clear: end the resistance, block revenge killing, stabilize Tripoli, get water and electricity flowing, deal with humanitarian requirements, begin an inclusive political process.
- But at the same time we need some focus on long-term goals. Libyans need to tell us where they are going and begin to discuss what kind of help they will need to get there. European interests most at risk—they should carry the burden.
- A safe and secure environment free of large-scale violence is the first requirement.
- But it is not enough: Libyans will want rule of law. This is no simple matter: retraining and reorganization of the police, judiciary and corrections. Start now, because it takes a long time.
- TNC hodge podge is good. Big tent better, with Islamists in, for writing the rules of the game.
- Roadmap in the constitutional charter already calls for a new constitution within 6 months and elections within 12. This may be overly fast, but if so they will postpone. Municipal elections first. Democratic culture will not develop this quickly—second elections are the real test.
- There has been lots of focus on getting the Libyans the financial resources they need, less on the mechanisms of transparency and accountability that will be necessary to avoid new problems.
- Oil and gas will not flow until companies have reassurance, which Libyans are trying to provide. But citizens also need to know oil revenue will go transparently and accountably to everyone. Too much money can be more harmful than too little.
- The immediate social needs are acute: to provide food, water, shelter and health care to the most vulnerable, especially displaced people.
- But in the long-term social needs are much tougher: documentation and accountability of the past regime for its crimes, and national reconciliation. Strong civil society.
- These longer term goals—a united, democratic Libya under the rule of law with resources used for the benefit of all its citizens in a way that is inclusive, accountable and transparent—need to be laid out, preferably in a UNSC resolution follow on to 1973, which is OBE.
- This kind of Libya will be a model for the region and vindicate—though perhaps not justify—the NATO intervention.
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Does anyone still listen to podcasts?
I did two yesterday:
- One for Irish Radio;
- The other for The Economist.
I confess I thought this format had all but died, but maybe there is still someone out there who listens to podcasts?
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Bashar unabashed
Bashar al Assad, Syria’s beleaguered president continues his crackdown, despite growing international condemnation and pressure. What has happened to Muammar Qaddafi, who is hiding somewhere, and Hosni Mubarak, who is on trial, has likely given him renewed determination to avoid a similar situation. The only way he knows to avoid it is to use violence to repress the demonstrations, which continue even if they are not gaining headlines during this Libya week. The regime even took the trouble to injure a cartoonists hands, a bizarre but telling acknowledgement of its own impotence against the humor and spirit of the protest movement.
The opposition claims to still be moving toward forming a Syrian National Council, but this week’s meeting in Istanbul does not appear to have been a brilliant success. I’m not sure what the problem is, but in my view unity is overrated. There is no reason the opposition today should agree on much more than getting rid of Bashar. There will be time enough in the future to quarrel over politics.
Nor do I think the lack of “leadership” is really a big problem. The demonstrators have been remarkably effective at coordination and coherence without clear leaders. United is important, but regimes enjoy decapitating movements. Only when the time comes to negotiate do they really need an empowered group to undertake that thankless task.
What the Syrian opposition needs now is a program. What are they going to do if Bashar does step aside? The Libyan Transitional National Council did itself a great service when it put out its “constitutional charter,” which included a political roadmap for the next year. It gained some support inside Libya, but just as importantly it enabled the internationals to say they know what the Libyans want. Something like that is needed from the Syrians.
Next week the international community needs to move ahead with European Union sanctions targeting Syria’s energy sector. That would be a serious contribution to depriving Bashar of the resources he needs to continue his brutal repression. But it really isn’t sufficient. Turkey needs to step up its game, which once seemed headed in the direction of toughening but somehow went flaccid in the last ten days or so. There is a lot at stake for Turkey: its “no problems with neighbors” policy is teetering, and it gets 20% of its gas supplies for its booming economy from Syria’s principal supporter, Iran.
There isn’t a lot else out there, though David Schenker offers a few more “incremental” (that means small I think) ideas. I fear that we are going to end up with a long-term stalemate in Syria: the demonstrators unable to unseat Bashar, Bashar unable to repress the demonstrations. This situation will bleed the finances of both Syria and Iran, but it will also bleed the protesters and increase the likelihood of a chaotic sectarian breakdown in Syria.
The Syrian regime continues to portray the uprising as an armed rebellion of terrorists. That is clearly untrue, as the Syrian protesters have chosen a nonviolent course from the first. They are fired up about dignity. The demonstrators haven’t got a lot more than daring, cleverness, unity, and amazing good humor on their side. And me, I’m on their side too!
PS: The question on some minds today is why not have an international intervention in Syria, since it worked so well in Libya? In my way of thinking, it did not work well in Libya: it worked in the end, but only at a high cost in lives and other destruction.
Just as important: the Russians, who have a naval base at Latakia on the Syrian coast, are not going to allow a Security Council resolution to pass authorizing force (they haven’t even let one pass denouncing the regime violence), the Arab League is not on board and the topography of hilly Syria weighs against effectiveness from the air. The Syrians are likely going to have to sustain their efforts until the security forces turn on Bashar and tell him they are not prepared to continue on his behalf.
PS: Ali Ferzat, the cartoonist the Syrian government felt it had to beat up, responds eloquently today with this:
PPS: The UN humanitarian mission to Syria has completed its visit and is calling for protection of civilians, who are under “constant threat.” Not bad for a group shepherded around by government minders.
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Where does Libya go from here?
My piece from Reuters, published today:
With the press focused on scenes of joy in Tripoli and Benghazi, continued skirmishes with regime loyalists, and speculation about where Gaddafi might turn up, it is time to lift our sights and focus on the really difficult transition ahead. If another autocrat succeeds Gaddafi, the transition could be over soon. But if Libya embarks on an effort to create a more democratic state, unified and inclusive in many dimensions, we’ll need to wait the better part of a decade to know whether it has succeeded or not.
There are no magic formulas for how to go about this. Each contingency has its own requirements. We have seen many more partial failures than full successes: think Iraq and Afghanistan.
Certainly in Libya security will be job one. The immediate goal is public order, so that people can move freely without fear of large-scale violence. But there was public order of a non-democratic sort in Gaddafi’s Libya. What the rebels have done in areas liberated in recent months is as clever as it is remarkable: they have organized local councils to try to ensure security and other immediate requirements. This does not always happen in civil wars but it suggests a way forward. There were at least four councils in Tripoli before Gaddafi fell. Can they step in to organize local communities to protect themselves from the inevitable aftershocks of Gaddafi’s fall?
Even if that works, it is only a temporary expedient. Libya will need a retrained and re-oriented police force, one that seeks to serve and protect rather than intimidate and repress. International assistance in this regard has become the rule rather than the exception, but there is little unused international capacity, because of Afghanistan, Kosovo and other requirements. It is tempting to suggest that Arab countries take on this task, but difficult to imagine that they will do it in a way that encourages the kind of community policing that is needed. Even training and retraining 1,000 per year, it will take at least the better part of a decade to put in place a police force Libyan democracy would want.
Even well-trained police are no use if there are no courts where the people they arrest can be fairly tried and sentenced, as well as prisons to put them in. Courts require not only judges but also prosecutors and defense attorneys, not to mention court recorders, registrars and bailiffs. If the formal court system fails to provide fair and rapid justice, Libyans will turn to informal methods of dispute resolution, especially where tribal structures are strong in the countryside. There is nothing inherently wrong with that, but there are difficult issues to be resolved concerning the interaction between tribal and formal justice systems, and the treatment of women in tribal systems.
The justice system is an important part of the state, especially in post-war situations, but it is not the only thing that needs fixing. Libya has only rudimentary state institutions apart from the oil ministry. There is no constitution. All power lay in the hands of Gaddafi and his family. So there will be a need to build the state almost from the ground up. There may be advantages in this, as there will be less to sweep away. The Transitional National Council (TNC) that has led the rebellion has published a good, relatively liberal and democratic constitutional charter. But the TNC needs to reformulate itself to be more representative of parts of the country that have been liberated only recently, including Tripoli. And its capability to implement its good intentions is not yet clear.
The TNC would like to prepare a new constitution within six months and hold elections within a year to help establish democratic legitimacy. The problem with this idea is that a democratic environment and culture cannot be created in such a short time frame, which favors those with an existing organizational infrastructure like Islamists (who will use the mosques) and disfavors those with shallower roots in Libyan society, like secularists. This tension is still being played out in Egypt. It might also be wise to consider holding local elections first, since they produce results more immediately reflective of citizens’ needs and provide a test of both the electoral mechanism and political outcomes. But in the end Libyans will need to decide. I will not be surprised if the one-year time frame gets extended to two, and the real outcomes are not apparent until the second elections, presumably four years later.
All this requires money. Libya’s economy is essentially 100 per cent dependent on oil and gas. It will take time to get production back up to pre-war levels. In the meanwhile, the TNC will need access to the frozen assets of the Gaddafi regime. This is not a simple matter. In many countries, including the United States, it requires not only a decision of the president but also a presentation to the sanctions committee of the United Nations. There are ample funds — well over $30 billion are frozen in the United States alone. But getting them to the TNC, and ensuring that they are spent accountably and transparently will not be easy. There are few well established oil and gas producing states that have managed that trick.
The people of Libya in the meanwhile are living in dreadful conditions. Food, water, health care and electricity are lacking, especially in vulnerable populations like the poor and displaced. The TNC needs somehow to begin to deliver goods and services, especially in the major cities. Libyans will be celebrating for a few days, but then they are going to start to wonder how they are better off. That is a question that will persist even once immediate needs are satisfied. Ten years from now Libyans will be discussing whether justice has been done to those who committed crimes under the Gaddafi regime, and whether the traumas of that regime and the civil war have been healed.
All these decade-long challenges will require an alert and informed Libyan citizenry. The activism and energy that they have shown in resisting the Gaddafi regime needs to be continued and channeled into the development of civil society organizations that can mediate between the citizens and their new state. Hundreds of such organizations have already emerged in Benghazi and other liberated areas. More will emerge in Tripoli. They are vital to keeping a democratic transition on track.
The international role in all of this is still unclear. The United States is trying to limit its burdens. It has too much to do elsewhere and no truly vital national interests at stake in Libya, even if it might have some specific interests in preventing Libya from becoming a source of arms trafficking and a haven for international terrorists. European interests are more compelling: oil and gas, related investments, and the desire to prevent migration from Libya becoming an issue in European domestic politics. The Arab League and its members also have an interest in seeing Libya back on its feet as soon as possible.
The international community, which so far has based its efforts on UN Security Council resolution 1973, needs a clear set of goals and a reasonable division of labor to guide it in the future. Getting Libya right in the post-war decade is going to require a lot of European and Arab support, and the Americans need to be ready to pitch in where they have unique capabilities.
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Tough enough
While I confess to being thoroughly preoccupied with the Libyan revolution, I have tried also to keep an eye on German Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Belgrade. This is important because it is an opportunity to make clear to Serbia what it will need to do in order to gain EU candidacy status, which it hopes will be granted late this year or early next. Any ambiguity will be seen in Belgrade as opening up room for partition in Kosovo, an ambition that Serbia has not yet abandoned.
Merkel appears to have been tough enough: she reportedly asked Belgrade to renew the dialogue with Pristina (that’s easy!), allow the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) to establish its authority on the whole territory of Kosovo (hard for me to understand how that would be difficult for Belgrade, since EULEX regards itself as operating under UNSC resolution 1244) and abolish Serbian “parallel” institutions in north Kosovo, where they essentially govern the majority-Serb population without reference to Pristina (in clear violation of 1244).
It’s this last item that seems to have given Belgrade heartburn. The German ambassador to Berlin is quoted on B92:
Belgrade is not surprised by the German chancellor’s requests. This could be anticipated from the previous messages we were getting, maybe just the sharpness of the request to abolish the institutions in northern Kosovo is something that was not expected….The request is something that Serbian authorities absolutely cannot accept at the moment. They have some calculations and I am afraid that one of them that we are giving in to everything because of the candidacy and our wish to join the Union. We have warned them, but unfortunately the German side’s firm positions remain.
Note that “we have warned them,” as if Serbia is in a position to dictate to Germany what it should say and what not. But note also the “at the moment.” There could be a big opening in those three little words.
I suppose in a back-handed sort of way, Belgrade’s insisting that its institutions have to remain in north Kosovo is an implicit acknowledgement that the rest of Kosovo is lost, but that is little comfort to those who worry that partition of Kosovo could lead to instability in other parts of the Balkans, as different ethnic groups seek to adjust borders to suit their preferences. This is a first-order European and American concern that Belgrade fails to take into account, even though it could well affect southern Serbia and Sandjak.
Kosovo in resolution 1244 is a single entity. Belgrade’s lawyers would do well to note that, and recall all their own pronouncements about how Kosovo cannot be divided. The Church is also adamant against partition, fearing rightly that the enclaves south of the Ibar might also be lost if Kosovo is divided.
That said, there is room for compromise, just not on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pristina may want some of the Serbian institutions to stay in north Kosovo in one form or another, to assist with maintaining Serb education and culture and even to encourage Serbs to remain there, as they have done in the enclaves south of the Ibar, consistent with the Ahtisaari plan. That kind of compromise is something Belgrade will have to discuss with Pristina, not assert as a unilateral fiat.
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