Libya a decade from now
I got tired of writing about first steps in Libya and decided to lift my sights and write about scenarios ten years hence. Here is the result, published by foreignpolicy.com yesterday.
Ten years after the guns have finally been laid down, will Libya still be a mess?
BY DANIEL SERWER | AUGUST 22, 2011
Libya is currently consumed in that strange combination of joy and residual violence that marks the end of war. But instead of fixating on the events playing out on the streets of Tripoli these days, the world should focus on how the postwar scenario will play out over the next decade. What is the best we can hope for? What is the worst that can be imagined? Where in that is Libya likely to settle?
There are many worst-case scenarios. Muammar al-Qaddafi is doing his best, even now, to promote chaos and continued resistance, which in turn could inspire revenge killing or degenerate into internecine warfare. Continued chaos could tempt someone of his ilk — in the army or among the rebels — to seize power and concentrate it in his own hands, under the guise of restoring law and order. Renewed autocracy could engender continued resistance, leading to a downward spiral of violence and repression. An effort to seize power might also split the country. Indeed, Libya like so many places in Africa, was cobbled together from disparate provinces in the early 20th century; it wouldn’t be the first country to come apart along old fault lines.
Chaos, autocracy, and partition are only three of the perils facing Libya. The country has in the past produced a significant number of Islamist fighters and suicide bombers who targeted U.S. troops in Iraq. If Libya remains anarchic, areas outside the central government’s full control could become havens for extremists. The many unguarded weapons floating around Libya could also reach the international arms market, putting Stinger-type missiles or even chemical weapons into unfriendly hands. Worse, Libya’s new rulers could revive the Qaddafi-era nuclear program and make material and expertise available worldwide. And there has been little accounting of just how many weapons have been smuggled in more recently to aid the rebel cause.
Even if the immediate postwar chaos subsides, major risks lie ahead. Libya’s economy is dependent on oil and gas production. Qaddafi seems to have stowed most of the oil and gas revenue in banks abroad, leaving many Libyans destitute. Very few countries in which the government is able to fund itself from natural resources have developed in a liberal and democratic direction. Transparency and accountability are not easy to establish; perhaps only Norway and East Timor can really claim to have mastered this trick.
Nondemocratic states commonly suffer from competition over revenue gathered from natural resources. This struggle can become especially debilitating if the competition is complemented by ethnic, tribal, or regional fractures. There is ample reason to fear this scenario in Libya: While most Libyans are Arabs, some are what Americans call Berbers, who will unquestionably want to express their identity more openly than they were permitted in the past. Tribal distinctions are not strong in Libyan cities, but they persist in the countryside. Qaddafi was skillful at playing the tribes off against each other, but he was far less successful in co-opting the region around the northeastern city of Benghazi. That may become even more difficult in the post-Qaddafi period, as much of the oil and gas production is in the east.
What is the best we can hope for in Libya within the next 10 years?
The Transitional National Council has set out a constitutional charter that clearly points in a liberal democratic direction, albeit with Islam as the state religion and principal source of legislation. Plans call for preparation of a constitution (Libya had none under Qaddafi) within six months and elections within a year. That is overly rapid in my estimation, but if Libyan institutions cannot keep pace with democratization, there can always be postponements, as often happens in postwar situations. The important thing is that Libya not only develops a constitution that distributes power among its institutions and elections that determine who governs the state, but also a democratic culture of freedom of speech and association.
That will take more than a year or two to develop, but it shouldn’t take a decade. If Libya is to sustain a democratic culture, its government will have to learn the difficult art of accountability and transparency for oil and gas revenue. There can be no real democracy if oil and gas revenue goes to the government without any parliamentary control or public accounting, as happens in most Arab oil-producing countries. All citizens, regardless of tribe, ethnicity, or region, will need to feel that they are getting a fair share of Libya’s natural wealth.
Even if this occurs, Libya will still be in need of a major national reconciliation effort. The Qaddafi regime benefited a single family at the expense of a whole country, but significant numbers of people, especially in Tripoli and Sirte, supported the regime and reaped benefits from it in return. These people are going to be the object of discrimination, disdain, and even revenge in post-Qaddafi Libya. At some point in the next decade, the effort to document, discuss, and disseminate the historical record of the Qaddafi regime will be important to ensuring that the population can move beyond the past and enjoy a more promising future.
Where will things likely end up a decade from now? My prediction is that Libya will be messy — but closer to the democratic end of the spectrum than to the chaotic, autocratic, or partitioned outcomes. If the international community and Libyans themselves are clear about the goals they seek — a united and inclusive Libya, based on the rule of law, that can defend and sustain itself, using its oil and gas resources for the benefit of all its citizens — then we will come close to achieving the best-case scenario.
There will be setbacks, as there have been during the past six months, but there is no reason why Libya cannot follow in Tunisia’s footsteps toward a more open and peaceful society. With a great deal of effort and determination, it could even become a model for other Arab societies hoping to replace their brutal, unaccountable leaders with more just systems of government.
PS: Hard to resist posting Qaddafi’s rebel-appropriate golf cart:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=GniABlMmRwM
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Next in Libya
Joshua Foust and I enjoy a tame bloggingheads:
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Rebuilding Libya: the first few steps
Theatlantic.com published my piece this morning:
Aug 22 2011, 6:39 AM ET
The most immediate challenges facing post-Qaddafi Libya
Reuters
Muammar Qaddafi’s finale in Libya is coming faster than even the rebels likely anticipated. They are reported to have arrested Saif al Islam, his favored son. If they take Qaddafi alive, the rebel leadership body Transitional National Council (TNC), or its successor organization, will presumably transfer him and his son to The Hague, for trial at the International Criminal Court. This would be a remarkable end to a 42-year reign as Libya’s chief governing authority and a first opportunity for the court to try a chief of state, even if he did not claim that title.
Some may prefer to try him in Tripoli, but it is going to be years before the Libyan courts are able to meet the necessary international standards. A show trial will not help Libya in its understandable passion to lay the foundations for a freer society.
Qaddafi’s continued resistance risks making the situation inside Libya far more chaotic than it need be. Some of his loyalists may go underground as people harmed by the regime seek revenge, rivalries among rebel groups may emerge, looting and rioting could break out, and criminal gangs are sure to try to take advantage of any disorder. Restoring public order will be job one, with restoring electricity, food, and water close behind. Oil installations will need to be protected, weapons depots guarded, and secret police files preserved. It is certainly a good sign that the rebels are reported to have thrown up a protective cordon around the National Museum.
The rebels say they believe everything will go smoothly, and they appear to have trained some police to protect sensitive infrastructure and maintain law and order. But hope is not a plan. They need to get things under control as quickly as possible, appealing for foreign help if need be.
European governments could step up to this challenge, since they are tied to Libya via gas pipelines that float beneath the surface of the Mediterranean. If Libya succumbs to chaos, it will be to Europe that refugees will flow, and mostly European investments in Libya that will be lost. Unfortunately, Washington seems to have allowed Europe to remain distracted with its own financial problems. There does not appear to be any serious plan for dealing with chaos in Libya, which could quickly turn into a humanitarian disaster. American boots definitely do not belong on the shores of Tripoli, but it has happened before and may happen again.
The TNC will have to be particularly alert to risks of revenge killings against Qaddafi loyalists, and of score-settling among rebels. They have already lost one of their military commanders, apparently to rebel-affiliated attackers who resented his role in Qaddafi’s army. In immediate post-war situations, the urge to exact quick justice is enormous. But allowing vigilantes to even the score will only lead to a spiral of violence that is hard to stop and inimical to democratic evolution.
Virtually overnight, the rebel leadership will need to shift its focus from fighting Qaddafi’s forces to protecting them. In the past few months, the local councils that have emerged in liberated areas have not generally allowed violence against regime supporters. But that is partly because many of Qaddafi’s loyalists have fled from newly liberated towns to Tripoli. Their concentration there and in his hometown of Sirte is going to make the challenge of transition much greater there than anyplace else in Libya.
It is critical that regime loyalists and rebels alike do not grab and “privatize” state assets, as often happens in chaotic moments and takes years to reverse. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the government has been trying for years to recover valuable mines from those who took possession of them during the civil war. The liberty Libyans have fought for will require massive rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and economy, which is in miserable condition. Early efforts to ensure transparency and accountability could help Libya avoid the kind of corruption that has plagued Afghanistan and Iraq.
Only the most selfish and egotistical leader would fail to make arrangements to transfer power and try to avoid bloodshed. Tunisia’s President Zine el-Abidine ben Ali fled, but left the country with a constitutional succession that is enabling a relatively smooth transition. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak tried to leave power in the hands of his vice president, a move negated only when the army stepped in. Yemen’s President Saleh has so far refused to allow a constitutional succession, leaving his country seized with violence.
Qaddafi is still calling on his supporters to fight and vowing to restore his own version of law and order in Tripoli. This is Qaddafi’s last misdeed. There is no constitution in Libya, so no clear constitutional succession. The revolutionaries have wisely written their own constitutional charter, but the real challenge will not be on paper. It will be in the avenues and alleys of Tripoli.
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Qaddafi’s last misdeed
Muammar Qaddafi and his sons have apparently failed to arrange an orderly transition, leaving at least some of their loyalists lashing out in desperation against the inevitable as rebels enter Tripoli. This risks making the situation chaotic, if not desperate or even catastrophic.
While I certainly hope the rebels who believe everything will go smoothly are right, hope is not a plan. The Transitional National Council (TNC) likely now has a big mess on its hands. They need to get things under control as quickly as possible, appealing for foreign help if need be. Widespread looting and disorder would be a bad way to start the new regime, likely opening the door to someone who claims to be able to restore public order. Continuing shortages of food, water and electricity could also undermine the legitimacy and viability of the new regiome.
I have repeatedly hoped that the Europeans would step up to this challenge, since they are tied umbilically to Libya via gas pipelines that float beneath the surface of the Mediterranean, which is their great lake, not one of ours. We seem to have allowed Europe to remain distracted with its own financial problems. So far as I can tell, my recommendation of a several thousand person EU constabulary force for Tripoli will just not happen. I hope this does not mean NATO steps in, but that clearly is about the only backup capacity anyone has. American boots definitely do not belong on the ground in Tripoli, but it has happened before and may happen again.
The TNC needs to be particularly alert to revenge killing of Qaddafi loyalists, and settling of scores among the rebels. In immediate post-war situations, the urge to exact quick justice is enormous. If my children had died in these months of fighting and repression I would certainly be tempted to claim what justice I could rather than wait for a new regime to catch up with the miscreants. But allowing vigilantes to even the score will only lead to a spiral of violence that is hard to stop and inimical to democratic evolution.
The shift from fighting Qaddafi’s forces to needing to protect them will happen virtually overnight. Libyans have thus far been cognizant of this requirement in the areas liberated in the past few months. The local councils that have emerged are not to my knowledge organizing violence against regime supporters. But that is partly because many of Qaddafi’s loyalists have fled to Tripoli. Their concentration there, and the attachment of the Qaddafi leadership to the privilege and property the regime afforded them, is going to make the challenge of transition much greater than anyplace else in Libya.
Only the most selfish and egotistical leader would fail to make arrangements to transfer power and avoid bloodshed. Tunisia’s President Ben Ali fled, but left the country with a constitutional succession. Egypt’s Mubarak stepped down and tried to leave power in the hands of his vice president, a move negated only when the army stepped in, responding in part at least to a demand of the demonstrators. Yemen’s President Saleh has so far refused to allow a constitutional succession, leaving his country seized with violence.
This is Qaddafi’s last misdeed. There is no constitution in Libya. The revolutionaries have wisely written their own constitutional charter, but the real challenge will not be on paper but in the avenues and alleys of Tripoli.
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Step aside
I discussed current events in Syria and the Obama Administration call for Bashar al Assad to step aside, along with a bit of Libya, this morning on C Span’s Washington Journal:
Here are the notes I did for myself on Syria in preparation:
1. The contest continues:
- Military assault is undiminished, security forces still united
- Demonstrators trying to mark beginning of the end
2. The international community is speaking louder and with a more unified voice
- U.S. “step aside” echoed in Europe, Turkey had already given “final warning”
- Arab ambassadors withdrawn: Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi, Tunisia
- Europe getting ready to bar oil imports
- UN fact finding report “scathing”: torture, murder, disappearances, arbitrary arrests, supposedly going this weekend (Navi Pillay and Valerie Amos)
- IAEA found NPT violation
- Unrelated, I think, to current events: Syria disqualified from 2014 World Cup!
- Diplomatic observers possible
3. Bashar still has internal and external pillars intact
- Iran solid, Russia still protecting in UNSC
- Army and business community still backing him
- Republican Guard (10k) and 4th armored division show no signs of cracking: Deraa, Banias, Homs, Idlib
- Shabbiha still active
4. Opposition strong
- Widespread protests
- Still relatively weak in Aleppo and Damascus, but growing
- Good unity: several iterations, now Syrian National Council
- Good nonviolent discipline, though some arms
- Good planning
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Still another Balkans interview?
I did this one for Dejan Kozul of the Croatian weekly Novosti:
Q. You have been in Kosovo. Can you describe general feeling after latest problems in north Kosovo?
A. I was in Kosovo late last week, over the weekend in north Mitrovica, and in Pristina again Monday-Wednesday. People in the north are frightened of Pristina and resentful of what they consider abandonment by Belgrade. People in Pristina are so far satisfied with the results of their initiative at the border but anxious to establish permanently Kosovo’s customs and police authority there.
Q. Serbian press writes about autonomy for north Kosovo but on the other side Serbian officials deny that they discussed it. Do you think that this might be proper solution?
A. A very wide measure of self-governance is provided for the Serb-majority communities in northern Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan. That is still on offer. I imagine there might also be implementation agreements that would meet legitimate concerns of the Serbs in northern Kosovo. But anyone who imagines that northern Kosovo will be allowed to develop into the kind of autonomy that Republika Srpska is claiming in Bosnia is kidding themselves. It isn’t going to happen because Pristina, the EU and the U.S. will not want it.
Q. Can you compare the situation in Kosovo with the situation in Croatia during the nineties where autonomy was also solution for Croatian Serbs but in the end Milan Martic and authorities in Krajina refused it? Could it be compared at all (Krajina was not part of Serbia but Kosovo was)?
A. I think there is some analogy. But the kind of very wide autonomy that Milan Martic refused is not being offered and would not be acceptable to Pristina. Reintegration with self-governance is what is being offered, and it is not a bad deal if implemented correctly.
Q. When we speak about Croatia it is well known that Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor is supposed to visit Pristina. What are the reasons for this invitation and do you think that this is the right time for it?
A. I think it natural that the Prime Minister of Croatia visit Kosovo, which after all is a neighbor, even if not an immediate one. And certainly there is a good deal Croatia can now do to help Kosovo prepare for EU membership. Neither Serbia nor Croatian Serbs should regard a visit of this sort as anything more than routine.
Q. Two customs stamps, a Serbian and a Kosovo Albanian one, are mentioned as one of the possible solutions for stamp problems. Do you think that this might be good solution for beginning and is this problem taken too seriously? There are much bigger problems in Kosovo then the stamp question but it is used as a cause.
A. There are many solutions for the customs stamps, if there is good political will. We’ll have to wait until September when the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue reconvenes to see if that exists. It is important in my way of thinking that Belgrade accept the fact that the Kosovo government is the legitimate authority in all of Kosovo, even if Belgrade still refuses to accept its independence. What is needed in northern Kosovo is cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina to end a lucrative smuggling trade that is financing organized crime on both sides of the boundary/border.
Q. Ivica Dacic few months ago was the first Serbian official who mentioned that splitting Kosovo is the only solution. Do you think that this might be the official Serbian policy? What implications would there be?
A. Serbia denies this is the official position, but it seems clear to me it is what Belgrade wants. Even if you think it might solve one problem, however, it would reopen five or six other problems in the Balkans. Neither Serbia nor Kosovo can afford today to be a source of such instability. The Serb-majoirty communities in northern Kosovo have been offered a good deal under Ahtisaari. They should appreciate it and start negotiating about implementation issues.
Q. Recently, in Macedonia you mentioned that this is the era of reintegration. For something like that Serbia has to change its constitution and admit Kosovo’s independence. Under what condition do you think this might be possible?
A. That’s for Belgrade to figure out: they painted themselves into a corner with a constitution that they claim passed even though the requirement for 50 per cent of registered voters to vote was not met. It would be no easier for Pristina to change its constitution to allow the north to leave Kosovo, a proposition that clearly violates UN Security Council resolution 1244, which Belgrade refers to so often. It will not be easy to change the constitution, but it will, so far as I understand, be necessary before Belgrade can enter the EU.
Q. Do you think that referendum about Kosovo or EU might be solution?
A. That’s for Belgrade to decide. It is a possible solution, but not the only one.
Q. How do you see regional scene? The EU has so many problems. Do you think that Brussels has the will and strength to help the Western Balkans avoid more confrontations and to lead the region to EU membership?
A. The Balkans are an EU burden, but not an enormous one. Several of the countries are already de facto in the euro zone, and the Stabilization and Association Agreements give the Balkans countries many of the economic advantages of membership. What Europe has lacked is clarity about the Balkans. I hope they find it.
Q. It’s not just Kosovo that is a problem. We still have Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country without Government, we are aware that splitting Kosovo might cause other problems in South of Serbia (Presevo, Bujanovac…) and also in Republika Srpska, maybe in Macedonia, Sandzak…?
A. Yes, that is what I was referring to when I mentioned opening up new problems in the region. That would be a grave mistake, one neither Pristina nor Belgrade would want to make.
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