Still running out of time?
This is from Idlib, in northwestern Syria, today. Al Jazeera says:
The first large sign in Arabic reads: “Yes for a national salvation conference, no to dialogue with killers.” Afterwards a large sign in English declares: “Bashar is a vampire. Don’t you see world?”
This is a far more eloquent response to Bashar al Assad’s latest maneuvers to stay in power than the Secretary of State offered, but I’ll include what she said too:
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Christophe, it doesn’t appear that there is a coherent and consistent message coming from Syria. We know what they have to do. They must begin a genuine transition to democracy. And allowing one meeting of the opposition in Damascus is not sufficient action toward achieving that goal. So I am disheartened by the recent reports of continued violence on the borders and in Aleppo, where demonstrators have been beaten, attacked with knives by government-organized groups and security forces.
It is absolutely clear that the Syrian Government is running out of time. There isn’t any question about that. They are either going to allow a serious political process that will include peaceful protest to take place throughout Syria and engage in a productive dialogue with members of the opposition and civil society, or they are going to continue to see increasingly organized resistance. We regret the loss of life, and we regret the violence. But this choice is up to the Syrian Government. And right now we are looking for action, not words, and we haven’t seen enough of that.
Still running out of time?
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Small beans, big potatoes and one more thing
Usually I don’t comment on an agreement or the like until it is published, or at least reliably leaked. But while the few remaining Balkan-watchers are holding their collective breath for the results of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogues, word is circulating widely on what the results might be. So I’m tempted to comment, in a conditional and hypothetical way. I reserve the right to change my mind on any of these points once we’ve got a text. I readily admit that my judgments may change once I see the details, and that I am biased because I am not “status-neutral.” I accept Kosovo’s sovereignty.
Here is what I am hearing:
1. Telecomms: Serbian and Kosovar mobile providers will be allowed reciprocal roaming rights in both Kosovo and Serbia at low rates. Serbia will maintain and provide service over landlines in Kosovo’s Serbian enclaves.
Comment: Reciprocity is always nice, though I suspect it will be hard for Kosovar providers to offer service in any but nearby parts of Serbia. Who cares about landlines? Few people will be using them, but might Belgrade be interested because they can be made more secure than mobiles?
2. Trade: “Republic” of Kosova, which is what the Pristina authorities call themselves, will not be allowed on trade documents or products, but Serbia will accept imports from Kosovo without the “R” word.
Comment: I imagine the trade is worth more than the symbolism.
3. Documents: Serbia will accept Pristina-issued identification cards as valid for entry into Serbia (as Kosovo already does for Serbian ID cards).
Comment: sounds good to me.
4. License plates and car insurance: Serbia will not accept the usual Pristina-issued plates, which are marked “RKS” (as in Republic of Kosovo) but will require that cars entering Serbia use new “KS” plates, issued by Pristina (or cover the offending “R”). Verification of insurance for Kosovo-plated cars that have an accident in Serbia will be handled through EULEX, not directly between the two police forces.
Comment: This is bizarre, and stupid since it will continue to make Serbs readily identifiable by their license plates, putting them at risk inside Kosovo. And inserting EULEX into the insurance verification process is even sillier. But I imagine someone in Belgrade thinks the display of that offending “R” would suggest in Serbia that Belgrade had given something away, and you wouldn’t want any serious cooperation to develop with that Kosovo Police Service, would you?
5. Electricity: Serbia would continue to provide electricity in northern Kosovo, but the company would have to register in Pristina and make payments to the Kosovo electric company.
Comment: Sounds OK to me. I’m told there is a lot of money involved.
6. Official documents: Kosovo will only get copies of the cadastral (real estate property) records and civil registries that Belgrade took in 1999, at the end of the NATO/Serbia war. EULEX, the EU’s rule of law contingent, will verify the copies (but will have no way of being certain that the originals have not been altered).
Comment: I put this in the “yech” category: the original records should be returned to the Kosovo authorities. You don’t have to recognize Kosovo’s independence to appreciate that those authorities are the legitimate ones, democratically validated.
None of this is great, but it should not trouble anyone–Serb or Albanian–too much. These are, as promised, practical issues that are finding–according to my informants–more or less practical solutions, with the occasional impractical prohibition of an “R.” Serbia is still thoroughly hung up on the sovereignty question, to the point of embarassing itself through trivia.
But there are three other things happening at the same time.
1. There seems to be no movement on the EU giving Kosovo what everyone refers to as a “contractual” relationship, that is the possibility of signing agreements with the EU. This is important–without it Kosovo cannot even begin to proceed with a process that could end in EU membership. I know this is hard for an EU where five members have not recognized Kosovo, but they are going to have to get over it. Better sooner than later. How do they expect Serbia to deal with Kosovo in a practical way if they can’t?
2. Nor is Kosovo being given a “roadmap” to obtain a visa waiver program, allowing Kosovars to enter the Schengen area without a visa. Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia already have the visa waiver. Shutting the door on Kosovo encourages pan-Albanian political sentiments (as in “I’d do better if I were an Albanian citizen”) that are not healthy.
3. To add insult to injury from the Kosovar perspective, Serbia is seeking a UN Security Council statement endorsing a EULEX task force to investigate allegations of organ trafficking, including against Kosovo’s sitting prime minister. I am all for the investigation, which I understand has already begun. But this Security Council statement is a dreadful idea, as Belgrade will use it worldwide to prevent countries from recognizing Kosovo until the investigation has been completed, a pitch they are already making. I hear the Americans are saying a loud “no” at the Security Council. I hope they stick with it.
Belgrade on the other hand is rumored to be getting out of this process exactly what it wanted: EU candidacy status and a date to begin membership negotiations. This will put it leagues ahead of Kosovo in the membership “regatta.” No real harm in that, but I do think Kosovo should get a contractual relationship with the EU and the visa waiver roadmap, which are small beans by comparison with Serbia’s big potatoes. And Serbia should be told it will have to settle its problems with Kosovo before entering the EU.
One more thing: Pristina should ask for an office in Belgrade. Serbia has one in northern Kosovo (it was previously in Pristina). It is occasionally necessary, but I would never want to negotiate with a country in whose capital my country was not represented. For both public information and reporting purposes, Kosovo should have a capable Serbian-speaking representative in Belgrade. No need for diplomatic status.
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Here’s another idea for Bosnia
One question plagues every discussion of Bosnia: do Bosnians want to live in the same country? Nationalist leaders of two of the main ethnic groups (Croat and Serb) seem to be saying “no,” while most Bosniaks (that’ s Muslim to most Americans, but without the religious connotation) say “yes.” They are the largest group (44% of the pre-war population).
What would happen if they voted on it?
Of course they did vote on it once, in 1992. The result was 98% for Bosnian independence, with many Serbs boycotting (turnout was 68%). The rules then–and now–are that 50% wins (55% if you are in Montenegro, ask the Europeans why). Boycotts don’t invalidate the results.
Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik has lately pumped up the idea of a new referendum, which he wanted to conduct in the RS on an obviously biased and contentious proposition that would seek to delegitimize institutions of the Bosnian state as well as the international community representative in Sarajevo, thus laying the groundwork for an independence bid. But there is no reason why any referendum on a question concerning the country as a whole should be conducted only in the RS, from which many Bosniaks and Croats were ethnically cleansed and where they still find themselves unwelcome.
This leads me to wonder out loud what the results of a new referendum might be, but one conducted in the whole country on a serious proposition: “do you want to live in a Bosnia and Herzegovina that can become a member of the European Union?” That is the real choice Bosnians face: to split up the state and give up hopes of joining the EU, or stick together and get into the EU some time in the next decade or so.
Of course I wouldn’t wonder out loud if I didn’t think I knew the outcome. I believe well over 50% of Bosnians would vote “yes” in a free and fair referendum of this sort: easily 90% of the more or less 50% of the country that is today Bosniak, plus an overwhelming majority of those refusing to identify ethnically and significant percentages (I’d guess close to half on the proposition as I’ve formulated it) of the Croats and Serbs.
You’ll be able to tell right away if I am correct: nationalist Croats and Serbs will reject this whole-country referendum proposal, knowing well that they would lose. Some Bosniaks will also not like the idea, concerned that it will exacerbate interethnic relations. I may even get a cross-ethnic coalition to oppose me. That would be gratifying, in a perverse kind of way.
Lest there be any doubt about my own views: I know full well no referendum of this sort will be held, and I think breakup of Bosnia would be a disaster for the Balkans and for Europe. It would result in creation of Croat and Serb statelets that the “mother” countries would not want to absorb and an isolated Islamic republic in central Bosnia whose population would radicalize in an effort to survive (and attract Islamic support) in difficult circumstances. There is no prospect of an easy agreement on the borders of these statelets, so violence in the process of breakup would be likely. Nor would it be possible to contain the breakup to Bosnia. Muslim-majority areas of Sandžak in Serbia would grow restive, not to mention possible echoes in Kosovo, southern Serbia and Macedonia.
As I’ve said before in the Kosovo context, best to keep Pandora’s box closed. But that should not prevent us from being realistic about the horrors that lie inside.
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Here’s an idea for Bosnia
Balkans fans will know that Brčko, a northeast Bosnian town, became the knot that couldn’t be untied at Dayton and was therefore referred for arbitration thereafter. The result was an unusual decision in favor of a “condominium”–Brčko became legally part of both the Federation and Republika Srpska and de facto distinct from both, under international (American) supervision. Adam Moore of UCLA has written an interesting paper on the post-war evolution of Brčko, which has become a rare but fraying exemplar of reintegration in Bosnia: Why Brčko became one of the only success stories in Bosnia.
Those who worry about war in Bosnia worry about Brčko. It is vital to Republika Srpska (RS), since it sits in a narrow corridor that joins the eastern wing along the Drina with its western wing south of the Sava. If ever there is a war in Bosnia again, whoever gets Brčko wins: the RS needs it to survive intact, the Federation needs it to make RS independence impossible.
So protecting Brčko and preventing it from being “taken” by either the RS or the Federation should be a priority for the international community. The European force (EUFOR) in Bosnia has limited resources (1600 people “in theater,” whatever that means). Its mission is
…to provide a military presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, manage any residual aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (also known as Dayton/Paris Agreement).
It could pre-emptively begin to concentrate itself in Brčko (in addition to its near-Sarajevo headquarters), thereby providing a serious impediment to RS’s independence ambitions as well as to any pre-emptive move by the Bosniaks to prevent secession. Doing this would help to preserve the still integrated Brčko district and prevent it from fraying further.
A European move to strengthen its heretofore modest liaison and observation team in Brčko would demonstrate to all concerned–including the Americans–that EUFOR is serious and knows where Bosnia’s vulnerabilities lie.
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Two areas agreement
I’m still studying it, but I thought the “framework” agreement reached yesterday in Addis Ababa between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (North) on political partnership and political and security arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan of enough interest to put out there quickly.
Thabo Mbeki led this African Union High Level Implementation Panel effort, which is intended to end the threat of violence in the leadup to Southern Sudan independence July 9 in two northern Sudanese states where sympathies with the South are strong (and some of the sympathizers armed).
Comments from the well-informed on this agreement and its likelihood of implementation would be most welcome.
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Avoiding a September Israel/Palestine train wreck
Doom and gloom over at Woodrow Wilson this morning: Shai Feldman and Aaron David Miller in particular foresee no prospect of agreement under current conditions. Train wreck is more likely, Feldman believes: what happens in New York will trigger youth demonstrations in Palestine. This will threaten the Palestinian establishment (Fatah especially) and force it into a more radical posture. Politics in both Palestine and Israel militate against a conflict-ending settlement. In the absence of some unexpected event, or act of unusual statesmanship, prospects are not good.
Nevertheless, Hussein Ibish suggests that there is some possibility of incremental progress in the fall at the General Assembly. Palestine will not become a member of the UN, because the U.S. will veto. What is important, according to Ibish, is that Palestinian progress in state-building be preserved and sustained. He believes there are real possibilities for avoiding a counter-productive clash at the UN. The Palestinians will not press a General Assembly resolution if negotiations are restarted, and they can accept something less than UN membership in order to back off.
Palestinian unity is not really on the horizon, Ibish suggests. The Hamas/Palestine Liberation Organization agreement is nothing more than an agreement to agree, but in fact there is still no agreement on anything important. They can’t even agree on who should be prime minister, much less on things more important than that, like how to deal with Israel.
Jackson Diehl suggests the U.S. has a good deal to lose from vetoing Palestinian membership in the UN. The Saudis have already warned that they will react. Aaron David Miller asks if there is a way to avoid Washington being put in this position? Is this sufficient reason for Obama to launch a grand initiative to solve the Israel/Palestine conflict? Or, Shai Feldman asks, is there something more modest that could be done, like adopting the Obama parameters (from his speech in May) as the basis for future negotiations? Aaron David Miller suggests this is a real possibility, with the Obama speech (including 1967 borders) as a common frame of reference.
But how close are they to a deal, Diehl asks? Shai Feldman thinks Netanyahu may be focused on demographic trends, which have been presented recently to the Israeli cabinet. The issue for him is not Palestine, whose population he envisages in a separate state, but rather the Arab population of Israel. This is the issue that may pull Netanyahu toward the center, as it has other Israeli leaders, and push him into serious negotiations.
Hussein Ibish thinks the sides are far apart on the issues. There will be no quick breakthrough. But once gaps start closing, they could close quickly. Nothing will happen without restarting the negotiations, so that is the way out of the September train wreck, even if Aaron David Miller suggests though there is nothing worse than another failed negotiation effort.
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