Part 1: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?
Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options. I’ll post it here over the next couple of days. If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper today. Here are the first two parts: strengths and weaknesses:
Getting to Denmark
By
Daniel Serwer
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Iraq is already a proto-democracy. Relatively free and fair elections chose its current parliament, 80 per cent of which are newly elected members. It has in theory an independent judiciary that is supposed to decide issues based on the law. It has lively media that are not entirely government-controlled and a vibrant civil society, including a multitude of political parties and nonprofit associations. Until the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Iraq was arguably the most democratic Arab state. Even today it likely still merits that appellation.
But “the most democratic Arab state” is not saying much. Iraq is still far from Denmark and likely never will meet the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. What will it take to move it farther in that direction and prevent Iraq from slipping back into autocracy?
1. Strengths
Iraq has a state, established in accordance with a constitution adopted by referendum in October 2005. It is an Islamic federal republic, “in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic.” The state is asymmetrically federal, providing a wide degree of autonomy to Kurdistan and somewhat lesser degrees to the 15 non-Kurdish governorates. The state came close to total collapse in 2003 and again in 2006-7 but has slowly recovered since. Today it manages a budget of $82.6 billion, produces oil at a rate of about 2.2 or more million barrels per day, sometimes makes a minimal basket of food available to virtually every Iraqi and produces 8000 MW of electricity.
The Council of Representatives is the supreme legislative body, and there are also provincial, municipal and district councils as well as a Kurdistan parliament. The Council of Representatives has been elected twice under the current constitution, and it has twice chosen the President and Vice Presidents of the Republic as well as approving the Prime Minister and his government.
The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by Article 87 of the Constitution. The Federal Supreme Court is established pursuant to Articles 92 and 94 of the Constitution.
In short, Iraq has the right institutions on paper. Its weaknesses lie elsewhere.
2. Weaknesses
Iraq has little history of democratic governance. While the monarchy was in principle a constitutional one, little of liberal democratic culture survived 45 years of autocracy. The Ba’athist regime led Iraq into three catastrophic wars (with Iran and with two different U.S.-led coalitions) and established a standard for brutality that has rarely been exceeded. It will not be easy to turn the Republic of Fear into the Republic of Hope.
The current Iraqi system of governance is complex. It requires for its effective operation a high degree of cooperation and coordination among different levels of government, and among entities at each level of government. Good governance would not be easy even under ideal conditions.
Conditions are far from ideal. While violence is dramatically down from its peak in 2006/7, it has ticked up recently, as a wave of assassinations has struck security officials and politicians even as suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices continue more indiscriminate killing. The government response is not always respectful of the rule of law, and pressures to crack down hard to repress the violence are strong.
The current government, formed in December 2010, is far from cohesive. It is a broad coalition that includes all the major political coalitions and commands in theory a big majority in the Council of Representatives. But the political coalitions dictated the choice of its members, the prime minister has not named key security ministers so retains those portfolios himself, and political tension is high between Prime Minister Maliki and Iyad Allawi, who head the most key partners in the coalition.
Despite the formation of this “national partnership” coalition with participation from the major Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political groups, sectarian and ethnic tensions continue to plague the government. There is little sign of programmatic coherence in its deliberations, beyond general avowals of support for democracy and human rights. With some exceptions, the ministers seem more committed to protecting their own party, sectarian and ethnic interests than to providing Iraq’s citizens with the kind of good governance many of them would like.
The relationship between Iraqi citizens and their government is in fact tenuous. More than 90% of the government’s revenue comes directly from oil, not taxes. This makes Iraq an oil rentier state with no need to convince citizens of the value of the services it provides in order to obtain revenue. While Revenue Watch has ranked Iraq ahead of other Middle Eastern oil producers in revenue transparency, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index used foreigners’ perceptions to rank Iraq towards the bottom end in “abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”
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Have your cake and eat it too
The President went for the bigger, faster drawdown option in his speech this evening. I commented on The World.
He has tried hard to limit the mission, but it is still an open question whether the Afghans will be ready to take over security responsibility for the country by 2014. He showed no sign that he believes their governance will improve, and he made only passing reference to the economy. Nation-building, he said, is what we should do in the United States. That pretty much sinks the civilian side of the Afghanistan effort, except for “the political settlement.” That I suppose is whatever comes out of the reconciliation efforts with the Taliban.
The President was keen in Iraq on the idea that a timeline would get the Iraqis to stand up to their responsibilities, a strategy that I think worked. So was Leon Panetta during the Iraq Study Group. It looks to me as if they are trying to reproduce that (relative) success, just as they tried to reproduce the (relative) success of the surge. The difference is on the Afghan side of the equation–Kabul seems a lot less ready to take over, and less able to get ready to take over, than Baghdad ever did.
Of course the withdrawal announced tonight is only of the “surge” troops and would leave about 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, twice the number there at the beginning of the Administration. So the President is getting his cake and eating it too. He is offering the Congress (and the American people) a bigger and faster drawdown than anticipated while keeping a substantial number of troops in Afghanistan, albeit fewer than Petraeus, Mullen and Gates seem to have wanted. But they get to decide who comes home first–you bet it won’t be anyone they think particularly useful.
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It’s the mission, smarty
Foreign policy eyes and ears will be on the President’s Afghanistan speech tonight. But I fear the President will focus where the press points: on the size of the troop drawdown. Important though it may be, that is not the fundamental issue. The key thing is defining the mission end-state, as I and others have already pointed out.
Why is this so important? Because it is the mission that determines the number of troops (and civilians). If you only want to kill Al Qaeda, you don’t need many civilians and the troops you need are not regular infantry but rather special forces. If you want to stabilize Afghanistan and build up the state there so that it can continue to keep Al Qaeda out, that is an entirely different mission requiring lots of civilians and substantial numbers of regular army and marines to “clear, hold and build.” And many years.
The President has been consistently ambiguous on the counter-insurgency mission. His emphasis is always on counter-terrorism (killing Al Qaeda), with the occasional coda mentioning stability but without clarity about the end-state. This is not a small issue. It is the heart of the matter, as it determines how much personpower, years, blood and treasure we will have to invest. And that in turn determines the “opportunity costs,” that is what we’ll have to give up in order to achieve our goals in Afghanistan.
President Obama is no dummy. He understands perfectly well that the mission defines the requirements. If I had to bet, he would keep the focus tonight mainly on counter-terrorism, mentioning counter-insurgency in the context of ensuring regional stability. After all, the main problem with leaving Afghanistan before it can defend itself is that militants will begin to use it to attack Pakistan, a big and important country with a substantial nuclear arsenal.
He’ll say yes, Osama bin Laden is dead, but our job is not done. We need to ensure that Al Qaeda cannot return to Afghanistan and that the region is stable, so that never again will extremists harbored there attack the United States. Enabling Afghanistan to defend itself is in the U.S. interest, he’ll argue.
My colleagues in the Twittersphere will snigger and say that it is our very presence in Afghanistan that attracts extremists and enables their recruiting. That is not an argument that can win in a world still governed by Bacevich’s Washington Rules.
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Confusing, and disturbing
Colum Lynch reports yesterday that Sudan seems to be pursuing peace in one province even as it opts for war in another. Khartoum has agreed to the deployment of Ethiopian peacekeepers in the disputed border region of Abyei, where the Sudanese army, provoked by an attack on a convoy by South Sudanese forces last month, has displaced something like 100,000 people. Now, in Southern Kordofan, a province in the North, the Sudanese forces have started attacking forces loyal to South Sudan, apparently fearing that they might seek to secede from the North to join the South.
This has roused the American organizations that follow Sudan to issue a manifesto calling for a tough response to what they regard as primarily the North’s provocations. The list of challenges they cite is impressive:
1. A peaceful and principled resolution to the crisis on the North-South border, including Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile
2. Peaceful resolution of other outstanding separation issues that could lead to a resumption of North-South war, including border demarcation, oil wealth sharing, and citizenship status
3. An end to the crisis in Darfur and a comprehensive peace agreed to by all parties
4. Security for all people in the Republic of South Sudan, including protection from militia violence, and responsible and accountable Southern security services
5. Tangible and measurable steps toward democratic governance in the North and the South
6. Accountability for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide
The solutions suggested mainly involve ratcheting up pressure on the Khartoum, by removing “carrots” and brandishing new “sticks,” as well as helping Juba (the capital of South Sudan) stabilize its territory.
None of that is objectionable, as Khartoum has repeatedly demonstrated bad faith and Juba unquestionably needs help, but you’ve got to wonder whether it is going to work. The problem is that there are too many problems. Virtually none of those described here in January have been solved. When everything is a priority nothing is a priority.
In practice, the urgent prevails over the important. Khartoum is making the border issues urgent, perhaps even with a view to using them as an excuse not to recognize newly independent South Sudan when July 9 comes. It could get a lot worse if southerners start being expelled from around Khartoum, where several million took refuge during the civil war, or if the North cuts off export of the South’s oil. While a full-scale resumption of the civil war seems unlikely–the North has no intention of risking its army once again in the far reaches of the South–independence day may well not be peaceful.
What can be done about all this? Not a whole lot, if you think only military instruments will work. But UN-appointed mediator Thabo Mbeki is trying diplomacy, with support from the Americans, Norwegians, British and other interested internationals. Khartoum seems determined: not to prevent the South’s independence, but to reassert its authority over territory in the North where there are southern sympathizers and to claim as much of Abyei, which produces oil, as possible. The South has been correctly focused on making independence as smooth as possible, though it seems to be having trouble ensuring that its troops and militias don’t provoke the North.
The agreement on Abyei is a positive development, as is South Sudan’s impending independence. But a lot of what is going on in Sudan today is confusing, and disturbing.
PS: A U.S. Institute of Peace paper argues for a more comprehensive, holistic approach focused on reform in the North. I’m afraid the North’s armed forces may be answering that appeal in Southern Kordofan. Not much room for reform when you are killing and displacing your own population.
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Assad is sane but not secure
The headline writers are suggesting that Syria’s Bashar al Assad has lost his mind, and others that his speech today at Damascus University betrays weakness, but I take him seriously. Bashar is determined to stay in power, offering ill-defined amnesty and national dialogue with 100 regime-picked reformers while cracking down on “vandals” and “saboteurs,” who he claims are part of a conspiracy ensconced among the street protesters. The result is regime murder on a scale that dwarfs what happened in Egypt and Yemen, though it is still far from Gaddafi’s homicidal intentions in Benghazi or his siege of Misrata and other Libyan towns.
While many are appalled at what is going on, the international community has so far done little to stop it. The military option is clearly out, not only because of Syria’s problematic topology but also because the Russians–offended by the NATO effort against Libya–are not going to allow a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the necessary means to pass. In fact, they haven’t allowed any resolution to pass, not even one that simply condemns the regime’s violence, because they are afraid of again sanctioning NATO action. They should relax: there is no stomach in Washington and European capitals for another military intervention.
Bashar’s vulnerabilities lie in two areas: arms and money. It appears he has all the weapons he requires, but the loyalty of a substantial portion of the army is in doubt. Its Alawi leadership will stick with the regime, because it has no alternative, but sporadic indications of dissent among the Sunni officers and rank and file offer some hope that the army has its limits. Look for it to show those limits in the provinces first, not in Damascus or Aleppo.
As for money, the Syrian economy is certainly on the ropes, but I imagine Iran will do its damndest to keep Bashar financially afloat. He is an important link to Lebanon’s Hizbollah, which is Iran’s surrogate on the front line with Israel. It is hard to believe that Tehran would let Bashar fall for lack of hard cash.
Tougher international sanctions targeted on the regime’s financial transfers might make some difference, as might a credible threat of an International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment. The ICC though won’t be allowed into the country to collect evidence. It was able to move against Gaddafi only because the rebels welcomed the court into the Libyan territory they control. I hope however that the ICC investigators are interviewing refugees in Turkey and Lebanon.
Would a clear statement from President Obama calling for Bashar to step down make a difference? I think not, and it would put American credibility at risk. We are already taking a beating from Gaddafi’s persistence in power in Libya, as well as Saleh’s in Yemen. Better it seems to me to lean on the Turks, who have influence and have begun to pressure Bashar.
He is unlikely to leave easily or soon, though like any decision by a single person timing is unpredictable. It is clear however that the foundations of his regime are shaken. His promise of amending the constitution to allow a multiparty political system would spell the end of the Ba’athist autocracy. He may try to renege of course, but Syrians show no sign of willingness to accept restoration of the status quo ante. One way or the other, we are witnessing the end of the Assad regime.
PS: Andrew Sullivan quoted this piece at The Dish, apparently having picked it up from Al Jazeera English. Regulars read it here first!
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Afghanistan decision time, again
Douglas Ollivant at foreignpolicy.com is asking the right questions:
What are our national interests in Afghanistan? Which of those are vital?
How much are we willing to pay for them (money, blood, institutional focus)?
What other costs does our policy in Afghanistan incur (e.g., reduced leverage in Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan due to reliance on supply lines through their territory)?
What are the opportunity costs? How might our goals be accomplished in other ways?
Is our policy sustainable to some sort of completion?
And what — if anything — do we owe to the people of Afghanistan who have sided with the NATO effort?
None of these questions is about numbers of troops or about the timeline for withdrawal, which is what the press focuses most attention on. But the troop decision depends on the answers to these prior questions: what do you want them to do, how much will it cost (important to include the opportunity costs, as Ollivant does), and how long will it take?
The New York Times offers at least some insight into possible answers to the first question. If, as President Obama has said many times, our primary objective in Afghanistan is to rid it of al Qaeda, then the mission we need to continue is a counter-terrorism one (find them and kill them) that likely requires relatively few troops. Vice President Biden and a goodly number of members of Congress will line up on that side.
The problem is “gone today, back tomorrow.” If we leave Afghanistan a weak state unable to control its territory, there is every reason to think that al Qaeda will come back. That’s why there has long been a state-building, counter-insurgency component to the mission, though the President has never made it clear what end-state he is seeking to achieve when it comes to governance in Afghanistan. That’s not surprising considering the challenges, currently epitomized by failure of the country’s largest bank. But we could just as easily make reference to the country’s thriving drug trade and endemic corruption. If we stay, and if building the Afghan state is part of the mission, we are going to need to get more precise about what we are trying to accomplish.
Why should we care how Afghanistan is governed? The one-word answer is “Pakistan.” If al Qaeda or other extremists re-establish themselves in Afghanistan, there is every reason to expect them to attack Pakistan, an already fragile state with a large and growing nuclear arsenal. As Trudy Rubin explains in the Philadelphia Inquirer, this is a major reason for continuing the counter-insurgency and statebuilding effort in Afghanistan and presumably explains why outgoing Secretary of Defense Gates seems confident that the President will resist domestic political pressure to reduce troops rapidly.
None of this makes staying in Afghanistan look attractive. As the American ambassador has made clear, President Karzai’s harsh criticism of the American and NATO efforts in his country is taking a toll, as are the mounting costs of the war. I find it hard to fault people who would prefer to get out quickly (my wife has been on that side of the argument for a couple of years now), even if my brain tells me having to return to Afghanistan would be worse than staying.
The one thing I would ask is this: if we are going to stay to stabilize Afghanistan and build its state to the point that it can fight al Qaeda and other militants on its own, we need to be honest about how long it is going to take and how much it is going to cost. The projected date for turning over security in the whole country to the Afghans, 2014, is looking far too soon, even if Washington remains willing to pay Kabul’s security bills. I’ve seen something of “stabilization” in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and I’ve studied it elsewhere. My guess is that we’ll be there at least 10 more years in significant numbers if we want to get a half-decent job done. That’s another trillion dollars, more or less. Even among friends, that’s a lot of money, and a lot of other opportunities foregone.
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