Actions now count more than words
While Tripoli’s Foreign Minister had initially announced acceptance of UN Security Council resolution 1973 and implementation of the ceasefire it called for, Colonel Gaddafi’s spokesman has rejected it:
Tripoli’s forces apparently continued to fight, entering Benghazi in tanks as well as activating “sleeper” cells in the still rebel-held city.
None of this should surprise: Gaddafi’s penchant for duplicity is legendary. What is disturbing is the lack of readiness on the part of those taking on the responsibility to enforce Resolution 1973 militarily. President Obama set out explicit redlines in his speech yesterday that have already been crossed. Militarily, it is much harder to do something about a tank in the streets of Benghazi than in the desert sands surrounding it. French and British planes are said to be beginning their efforts today–they need to make haste.
What should they do? We are past the point at which the no fly zone (NFZ) is an adequate response. Resolution 1973 authorizes all necessary means to protect civilians. I’ll leave it to the military planners–if they’ll work quickly–to decide what actions will have the biggest effects, but in addition to obvious targets like armored vehicles I would think taking out the supply convoys for Gaddafi’s force moving east would be both appropriate and effective. A tank doesn’t run long without fuel, and soldiers need water. And there shouldn’t be many civilians in a military supply convoy.
There is also the question of Tripoli’s command and control. So long as it is giving orders to attack civilians, it is a legitimate target. The responsibility to protect will mean little if Gaddafi continues to defy the Security Council. Taking out communications facilities can be amazingly effective–ask the Bosnian Serb Army, which turned and fled once its communications nodes were bombed by NATO in 1995. Even if Gaddafi is not there, it may be symbolically important to destroy his main bunker at Bab Al Aziziya. It might even be wise to give warning, if there is concern about collateral damage. Once Gaddafi is on the run, maintaining control of Tripoli is going to be very difficult for him. Saddam, remember, fell from power well before he was captured.
Of course none of this should take place without a parallel diplomatic effort to enforce the sanctions more vigorously and get Gaddafi out of Libya. The sooner he leaves, the better. Neither Libya nor those enforcing 1973 will benefit from extended military action.
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Thinking ahead to New Libya
Some will be surprised that Gaddafi’s Foreign Minister announced an immediate ceasefire in response to the UN Security Council resolution. This is no surprise. Gaddafi’s forces hold most of Libya–a ceasefire in place favors them, not the rebels. Moreover, Gaddafi likely hopes to prevent strikes from taking down his air defenses, the necessary prelude to real enforcement of the “no fly, no drive” zone.
In the meanwhile, his forces continue to fire on rebels in Misrata. That too should be no surprise.
What is surprising is that NATO is apparently behind the curve in getting organized for the air campaign. The UK and France are expected to take the lead. U.S. NATO Ambassador Ivo Daalder tweets: “#NATO will meet this morning to discuss #UNSCR 1973 authorizing “all necessary means” to protect civilians in #Libya. Busy days.” I should say so. Why isn’t all this ready?
There is real peril here. If Gaddafi perceives that there is a window of opportunity to advance further, he may well take it. Anticipating negotiations, he’ll want to control as much territory as possible.
On the rebel side, the military effort is looking weak and exhausted. Let’s hope they are better at the negotiating.
What they need is for Gaddafi to leave Libya. This he will do if he sees a real threat in Tripoli, either from demonstrators or from those within his regime who are starting to see the handwriting on the wall. Demonstrators who braved the streets this morning were shot for their courage. I assume he’ll do the same to any of his inner circle who turn on him. This is a situation in which a few brave souls count for a lot.
President Obama is to speak on Libya at 2 pm. He has reason to vaunt American diplomacy’s success at the Security Council last night. But he likely also wants to make it clear that this is not a U.S. operation. I won’t be surprised if he says UK, France and others will take the lead on military operations.
Who is working on the post-war efforts? Libya is a country without a state. It is going to need a lot of help–not money–once Gaddafi is gone.
Who is going to maintain law and order? How will revenge killings be prevented? How will accountability for past crimes be pursued? Are the Libyan courts and prisons functioning? How will state property be protected from regime elements who will try to walk away with it? Is there a social safety net that needs to be rescued quickly? How will a new constitution be written? Will foreign workers be invited back, or should Libyans fill their jobs? Lots of questions for a post-Gaddafi government.
The Benghazi Transitional Council looks like the best bet for a new government, but is it fully representative? Will Tripoli embrace it? How can it be made more so? What about local governance? Can the Gaddafi-era local committees be used, or reconstituted with different people?
Who will take the lead in supporting all this in the international community? The Americans and Europeans have clearly maxed out their state-building capacity. What about the Arab League? UN?
Of course there is also a possibility that a new dictator will emerge from the wreckage of the old regime or from the ranks of the rebels. But it is hard to see how Libyans who have tasted freedom are going to be stuffed back into an autocracy. Libya is going to need help getting it together after this war.
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Even good resolutions don’t suffice
The Libya Security Council resolution no. 1973 that passed this evening looks very good to me, though I confess I failed to notice that the arms embargo applied to the rebels when the last one passed (and I don’t think this one fixes that problem). I guess the Egyptians are fixing it. I would also note that a cease-fire in place really favors Gaddafi’s forces, but I have my doubts it will take effect any time soon.
The important thing is that this resolution authorizes all necessary means, short of an occupation, to protect civilians. It also tightens the arms embargo as well as the financial and other sanctions. It passed, with five abstentions, including China, Russia, Brazil, India and Germany. That is a remarkable achievement, and my hat is off to US Permanent Representative Ambassador Susan Rice.
The key thing now is implementation. The Srebrenica UNSC resolution (no. 819 of 1993) looked pretty good to a lot of people too, and its purpose was remarkably similar to this one: to protect civilians from murderous thugs. But Colum Lynch listed it last year as among the 10 worse UN Security Council resolutions ever.
The difference, if there is to be one, has to come from implementation. The problem with the resolution declaring Srebrenica a “safe area” was not the objective–it was the lack of ways and means to achieve the objective. When the U.S. did eventually seek to protect the UN safe areas in Bosnia by bombing the Serb forces in response to an attack on Sarajevo, it quickly shifted the tide of war and led to a very rapid advance by the Croat and Bosniak forces.
Precious little has been said so far about implementation of no. 1973. There are rumors the French will begin acting tonight, but there are also rumors that NATO is not yet ready. Some Arab countries are said to be willing to participate in military action, but that is not confirmed. It is not clear whether the U.S. will participate, or whether it will do so in stand-off fashion with cruise missiles and the like.
So the Benghazis do well to celebrate, but this fight isn’t over yet, and its outcome is still very much in doubt.
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Libya is turning into a long term problem
Steve Metz in a piece published yesterday in The New Republic looks at scenarios for Libya, assuming a protracted struggle between a continuing rebellion and a regime that fails to fully suppress it. None of the scenarios are attractive: his models are northern and southern Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Afghanistan and Somalia. All are expensive, one way or another, to American interests and ultimately to our bank accounts.
Of course it is also possible that Gaddafi will succeed in repressing the rebellion. That too would be a long-term mess: the US and Europe at the least would maintain sanctions, even as some of the Europeans (Italy in particular) try to bypass them. China would also certainly be tempted to return to business as usual and gain an upper hand on Libya’s oil supplies. Libya might not want to return to its terrorist or WMD past, but it could certainly be tempted to return to making trouble in its neighborhood, which includes Chad and Sudan.
Secretary of State Clinton this morning on NPR was at pains to emphasize that the only viable way of taking action on Libya is with multilateral support. This is certainly preferable, but what if it isn’t available, or isn’t available in a time frame that would enable it to be effective?
The usual American approach to defending its interests is “multilaterally when we can, unilaterally when we must.” Taking the option of unilateral action off the table is not wise–several UN Security Council members will lean heavily in the direction of authorizing stronger action if they believe it will prevent the Americans from acting on their own.
That said, should we? If we consider American interests pre-rebellion in Libya, they don’t look substantial enough to warrant the more vigorous types of military intervention. But we are not going to be able to return to the status quo ante in Libya. If Steve Metz’s scenarios, or a complete victory for Gaddafi, are in the cards, we certainly need to consider whether some of the less costly, non-military options, non-military options not yet being pursued are worthwhile.
On the military options, no fly zone (NFZ) advocates haven’t convinced me that it is worth the considerable enforcement burden it imposes on the United States. Destroying Gaddafi’s air force on the ground would be easier, cheaper and send a stronger message. The Administration is said this morning to be considering a “no drive” option for Gaddafi’s tanks and other heavy weapons. Something along those lines is likely needed if Benghazi is to be saved from Gaddafi’s revenge. More vigorous enforcement of existing sanctions, including by naval blockade, should certainly be on the agenda.
Not doing anything more is also an option, one we have so far adopted. It too has consequences. It looks as if they include a messy and expensive outcome in Libya, one that will keep us busy for years to come. I hope those who have advocated for it will be ready and willing to pay its costs when the time comes.
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US and UN too slow, Benghazi at risk
Since Saif al Islam is predicting the fall of Benghzai within 48 hours, it seems a good time to put up this rap, courtesy of the Russian channel RT:
Senator Kerry said today at the Carnegie Endowment that international efforts to oust Gaddafi will not end even if he represses the rebellion and that his survival will not reverse the tide of democratci change sweeping the Middle East. I trust he is correct, but Saddam Hussein survived sanctions for a long time, which gave heart to many of his fellow dictators around the world.
Remember Machiavelli? He wrote on this very subject in Chapter 3 of The Prince (Wooton translation):
Of course it is true that, after a ruler has regained power in rebel teritories, he is much more likely to hang on to it. For the rebellion gives him an excuse, and he is able to take firmer measures to secure his position, punishing delinquents, checking up on suspects, and taking precautions where needed. So, if the first time the King of France lost Milan all that was needed to throw him out was Duke Ludovico growling on his borders, to throw him out a second time it took the whole world united against him…
To the Senator’s credit, he too noted that if Gaddafi stayed on it might cost us more in the end than if we acted now.
Kerry also made it clear that he thought the U.S. and the UN were acting too slowly on Libya. There was little hint he expected any acceleration. It would be nice to think that Saif will have to eat his words come Friday, but I doubt it. Wishing won’t make it so.
On Bahrain and I think Yemen (I confess my live-tweeting got in the way of my hearing), Kerry advocated dialogue. Morocco and Jordan he thought were adopting reasonable reform measures. He had harsh words for Iran, but thought the U.S. had not been sufficiently responsive to measures Syria has taken.
Kerry’s main point in today’s talk was the need for a substantial new political and economic aid program for Egypt, Tunisia and other countries trying to establish democracy, akin to the successful SEED program for Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is a fine idea, if its backers (Kerry/McCain/Lieberman) can get it past the House Tea Party.
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Bad gets worse
Think things couldn’t get worse? Think again:
- One or more of Japan’s nuclear plants now looks sure to melt down, with at least one breaching the reactor containment vessel and spewing radioactive material. How much attention do we think Arab revolutions will get after that happens?
- Gaddafi’s forces are at the outskirts of Benghazi. We can hope that the rebels will succeed in cutting his now long supply lines, but I wouldn’t bet on it.
- The crackdown has gotten brutal in Bahrain, with the Saudi and UAE forces seeming to remain in the background guarding the royals while the King’s forces enforce martial law with tanks and machine guns.
- Yemen is at least as bad, with firing on demonstrators and no sign of serious negotiations yet.
Yes, they are still discussing a no fly zone at the Security Council, thus preventing anything else meaningful from getting through that august body.
Also notable: the European Union, freshly equipped with reforms that were supposed to unify its foreign policy, has rarely sounded less coherent or less effective: UK and France want a no fly zone, Germany doesn’t and Italy does and doesn’t.
Nor are the Americans sounding much more coherent and effective. Still in listening mode, which means not ready to do anything.
Don’t forget: Egypt votes on constitutional amendments Saturday. If they approve, a good deal of the old regime can hope to survive; if they don’t, things will again be up in the air. I might vote for up in the air, but I don’t live in Cairo.
I know you all prefer it when I post those funny videos, but this morning is hard to take lightly. I’ll look for some this afternoon.
PS: I should have mentioned it earlier but forgot: one of the consequences of Saudi/UAE intervention in Bahrain is a sharp rise in sectarian tensions, reflected in statements by Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki and Grand Ayatollah Sistani but also felt in Iran. That does not bode well.
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