You reap what was sown
A reader tweets:
Personally I prefer Bosnia to stay one single state. But how can we say YES to #Kosovo but NO to #RS and Croats in Bosnia!?
This in my view is an important and legitimate question, one that merits more of an answer than I am able to fit into 140 characters. A Serb colleague has been asking me this question for many years. So here goes.
The Bosnia and Kosovo outcomes are different because of the different history and evolution of the two places. I am not talking ancient history here, but recent events. And Belgrade played a critical decisionmaking role in these events. I’d even say it was Belgrade that determined the two different outcomes.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belgrade supported the effort of Republika Srpska (RS) to secede by force of arms, starting in 1992 by ethnically cleansing the territory the RS controlled. The leadership and other officers of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) were in fact officers of the then-Yugoslav National Army (JNA). This effort failed in 1995, when an attack on Sarajevo precipitated NATO bombing that tilted the military situation in favor of the Federation (mainly Croat and Bosniak) forces. The Dayton ceasefire that ensued and the Dayton agreements saved the VRS from imminent defeat and gave to Republika Srpska 49 per cent of the territory, in exchange for its remaining inside Bosnia as one of two “entities” (the other being the Federation). Thus Slobodan Milosevic at Dayton snatched a kind of victory from the jaws of defeat, since he would have been blamed had the Federation forces taken Banja Luka and Brcko. But he signed away any right the RS might claim to secession and independence.
What about the Croats? They did not ask for or get a separate entity at Dayton. This I know since I conducted, with Michael Steiner, the Federation negotiations that took place in the first ten days there. Why? Because the Bosnian Croats were getting an excellent deal: half the Federation, when they were far less than half its population, and one-third of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when they likely weren’t at the time of Dayton more than 10 per cent of its population. Tudjman was also concerned to prevent the emergence of an Islamic Republic in central Bosnia, which the Federation did by tying the Bosniaks to a governing structure they shared with the Croats.
In Kosovo, Belgrade tried to prevent the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from gaining independence from Serbia by force of arms, using ethnic cleansing to try to redress the population balance in a province of Serbia that had become heavily Albanian. This effort also ended with a NATO bombing campaign, which in turn ended with a UN Security Council resolution in which Milosevic again snatched a kind of victory from the jaws of defeat, as it put Kosovo under UN administration and appeared to require a new UN resolution to change that outcome. It looked as if Kosovo would, like RS, not be able to secede and declare independence.
So the initial outcomes in the two places were about as favorable to Serbia’s interests as possible under the particular circumstances, which included two failed military campaigns and extensive ethnic cleansing as well as NATO intervention. Milosevic, contrary to what many may think, proved much better at diplomacy than fighting. But post-war developments diverged in the two places.
Kosovo, guided by the UN, U.S. and EU, implemented extensive provisions to protect Serbs and other minorities (standards before status, then the Ahtisaari Plan) and decided to declare independence in February 2008. Seventy-six states have now recognized its sovereignty, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has advised–in response to Belgrade’s request–that the declaration of independence did not violate international law.
Of course RS could also declare independence. But Belgrade at Dayton signed away its right to do so (and RS leaders had authorized Milosevic to speak for them at the negotiation). Any case at the ICJ would likely be decided differently for the RS than for Kosovo. And it is unlikely in any event that under current circumstances RS would get any significant recognition. It has done little to welcome back its Croat or Bosniak populations, and its secession would likely lead to a result that no one in the international community (including Serbia and Croatia) wants: the creation of a non-viable Islamic state in central Bosnia with irredentist ambitions.
Note: I have not above used the legal arguments about whether Kosovo was a “federal” unit of former Yugoslavia or not. Bosnia certainly was a federal unit with the right to independence and declared it in 1992 in accordance with the Badinter criteria, which included a referendum that passed by a wide margin, with many Serbs boycotting. RS was certainly not a federal unit of the former Yugoslavia, so according to the Badinter criteria it did not have the right to secession. Kosovo is arguable both ways. So I’ve chosen not to argue at all.
Note some more: The Badinter Commission was asked:
Does the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right to self-determination?
Its answer, in typically oblique Europeanese, was this:
(i) that the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is entitled to all the rights concerned to minorities and ethnic groups under international law and under the provisions of the draft Convention of the Conference on Yugoslavia of 4 November 1991, to which the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have undertaken to give effect; and
(ii) that the Republics must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups all the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in international law, including, where appropriate, the right to choose their nationality.
In American, that would be “no,” but the Serb community’s minority rights have to be respected.
Bottom line: Kosovo is independent because of what Belgrade tried to do there; RS will not be independent because of what it and Belgrade did in Bosnia and at Dayton.
That’s why the outcomes in Kosovo and Bosnia are different: because their evolution and circumstances, largely determined by decisions made in Belgrade, are different. None of this was done by the people who are today in power in Belgrade, but you reap what was sown.
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Getting Gaddafi out also requires diplomacy
Tony Cordesman’s tirade against the half-hearted effort NATO is making against Gaddafi’s forces in Libya is all the rage today on my twitter feed. I don’t really disagree with anything he says, but I hope his piece does not distract attention from what really matters: the effort to get Gaddafi out of Tripoli and out of Libya, preferably to someplace that will keep him on a short leash.
Cordesman is of course correct that intensifying the military effort is an important part of the effort to get him to leave. But it should not be the only thing we are doing.
It is hard to write about this because whatever is happening is necessarily out of the public eye. While there are rumors of Washington and London looking for a place to park the Gaddafi family, it is to be expected that we won’t know where that is until the time comes. I trust London and Washington will be prepared to ensure that the family has access to the financial resources it might need to live a prosperous life, though not one in which it can continue to hire a mercenary army (or suborn its hosts). Immunity from prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not available (to anyone), but I trust the country that takes the Gaddafis will not be a state party the International Criminal Court.
The problem of course is that Gaddafi may not go. Military means have proven repeatedly and frustratingly ineffective against individuals, whether they be Ratko Mladic (an accused Serbian war criminal), Charles Taylor (who was finally snagged by his Nigerian hosts), Saddam Hussein (who wasn’t captured for more than six months after the U.S. occupied Iraq) or Laurent Gbagbo (the recently surrendered former president of Ivory Coast). Nor is American intelligence much good at predicting where foreign leaders will be so that they can be snagged by the specially trained Special Forces that do that kind of thing.
But if there is something that needs doing besides the intensified military effort that Tony Cordesman recommends, it is an intensified diplomatic effort to get him out of there. I take the Libyan Foreign Minister’s attempt to suggest that Gaddafi might be ready to retire in place, allowing free and fair elections, as a pretty clear sign that the Colonel is feeling the pressure. But it would be foolish to fall for that as a solution. He has to go if Libya is to be free. Even then, it will have a long road ahead.
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If only we had 10 plagues to send
It’s the second night of Passover and Bashar al Assad is still not letting his people go. The notion that he can get away with abolishing the emergency law from the books but continuing to shoot demonstrators illustrates how thoroughly imbued with authoritarianism this supposed paragon of reform really is. As I said yesterday, Syrians can accept it or they can press on for something better.
What they should not do is look to the international community for much help. There is no military option in Syria. The Americans have supposedly been providing assistance to an anti-regime broadcaster operating from London, and in due course it will no doubt come out that someone or other (most likely American or Serbian, maybe Tunisian or Egyptian) has provided training to the protesters in what is properly termed these days “nonviolent conflict.” I have no doubt my own image, which appears repeatedly in the film Bringing Down A Dictator (about the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia) is familiar to both the Syrian police and demonstrators. But none of the above amounts to any substantial assistance.
The Iranians are accusing the Saudis and Jordanians of pumping up the demonstrations. That seems unlikely, to say the least. Amman has its own problems. Riyadh’s preference for stability seems to extend to Bashar al Assad, despite the Saudi rivalry with Damascus for influence in Lebanon and Syria’s alignment with Tehran. The Syrian protesters are mainly on their own, as much as the Tunisians and maybe more than the Egyptians before them.
The lack of substantial foreign support should not discourage. The protesters are better off being genuinely and profoundly Syrian. What they lack is mass, which comes from inside the country. It is mass that protects the protesters and strains the regime. If the demonstrations are going to succeed, the protesters are going to have to convince many more Syrians to join them in the streets and to stay there for an extended period. This will require extraordinary nonviolent discipline, organizational acumen, and good humor.
Unfortunately, there is no modern equivalent of the ten Biblical plagues. I would gladly call them down on Bashar, whose cynical reform/violence trick should not succeed on the merits. But life isn’t fair, and Syrians will have to make their own good fortune.
Second Seder tonight, and you can be sure I’ll be putting in a good word for them.
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The Passover of Arab liberation
Tonight is the beginning of Passover, the holiday celebrating the founding narrative of the Jewish people, which is also regarded by many non-Jews as the archetypal liberation story.
This Passover is the first in my lifetime that we can truly cast Egypt in the liberation story not only as the oppressor but also as the people liberating themselves. I’ve watched and commented enthusiastically for months now on the events unfolding in North Africa and the Middle East. For those of us privileged to live in a relatively free and prosperous country, the courage and conviction of those demonstrating nonviolently for freedom in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria is thrilling. Unlike the ancient Jews, they are not trying to leave the countries that have kept them captive but instead are trying to revolutionize them, creating political systems that will allow far wider margins of freedom to speak, associate and choose their rulers than existed anywhere in the Arab world until now.
Jews of course worry about what the Arab revolutions of 2011 mean for world politics in general and Israel in particular. But my sense of the relatively liberal and secularized community in which I live and pray is that the revolutions have the benefit of doubt. Lots of us anticipate that a liberated Egypt will give greater support to the Palestinian cause, but we may also think that is a necessary ingredient in completing the Middle East peace process. As the Palestinian papers all too clearly reveal, Israel has been less than forthcoming and more than recalcitrant, passing up decent offers from the Palestinian Authority that might have opened the door to resolution.
Americans of all religions also worry about the implications of the revolutions for their interests in political stability, countering violent extremism and reliability of oil supplies. Most it seems to me have gradually tilted towards support for the demonstrators, as has the Obama Administration, even in Yemen. This is made relatively easy by the fact that the revolutions have not yet touched directly on U.S. oil interests: none of the countries so far involved is a major supplier. Where U.S. interests and values have been most at odds–in Bahrain because of the 5th Fleet presence and Saudi Arabia because of oil–the tilt has been in favor of interests. Washington has essentially supported the Saudi and Bahraini monarchies in their efforts to buy off and repress dissent, even if those same monarchies are angry at Washington for promoting revolution elsewhere.
Libya is a special case. There some of the demonstrators chose to respond to violence with violence. The international community has backed them against the Gaddafi regime, but so far at least the results are less than satisfactory. It can be very difficult to dislodge an autocrat with violence, as that is their preferred method. They can and do escalate. The Gaddafi regime will not win in Libya, but it has already created a mess that will be difficult to repair. While Tunisia and now Egypt seem headed down paths that will lead to more open and democratic societies, Libya will need a lot more help to find its way after its devastating experience under Gaddafi and the war that will end his rule.
The outcome in Syria is also in doubt. As I noted yesterday, Syrians need to decide what they really want: the promise of responsiveness from a still autocratic regime, or real choices about how they are governed. Liberation will not be easy, as Bashar al Assad is brutal, determined and marginally more “enlightened” than some of the other autocrats in the Middle East. The benign despotism he is offering may well attract some Syrians, especially those who thrive under the current regime.
My message for Bashar and for all the other leaders on this Passover of the Arab rebellions, is simple: let your people go!
Here they are, in Homs, Syria, today:
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What do Syrians want?
While the Arabist is certainly correct in noting the banality of President Bashar al Assad’s speech to his new council of ministers yesterday, I confess I read the whole thing on al-bab.com
What he presents is basically his reform program, which is offered in a more or less explicit trade for an end to the demonstrations. The major features of the reform program are these: citizenship for Syrian Kurds, lifting the state of emergency, a law regulating demonstrations (one that he anticipates will eliminate the need for organizing demonstrations!), possibly a law permitting political parties, a law on local administration and another on media, plus of course all the implementation required.
Like most political speeches, this one is most notable for what it omits: no freedom of speech or association, no free and fair elections, little consideration of corruption (none at the higher levels, but mention of bribes at the lower levels), and nothing to speak of on rule of law or an independent judiciary.
In fact, the concept of the state that Bashar puts forward would be inconsistent with these ingredients. He says at the opening:
What’s important at this stage is for us to reach a state of unity, unity between the government, state institutions and the people. We are supposed to be moving in parallel when we move in the same direction. In this case we maximize the outcome and the achievement. The more we distance ourselves from the Syrian population, the weaker our strength and the less our achievement.
And this appears towards the end:
What’s important is that we and the population are one party, not two parties. The citizen is our compass, and we get along with our citizens in the direction they identify. We are here to serve our citizens; and without this service there is no justification for the existence of any one of us. What is important is for the citizen to feel his or her citizenship in every sense of the word.
But clearly your citizenship does not allow for expressing your opinions freely, or having your disputes settled fairly by independent judges observing the rule of law, or voting freely. Rather your citizenship consists in state officials detecting your needs and responding to them.
This is an authoritarian concept of the state, perhaps even a totalitarian one. The question for Syrians is whether this is what they are demonstrating for, or whether they want a government that they choose freely rather than one provided by an allegedly benevolent Bashar. We’ll see in coming days whether the bargain Bashar offers–a state that is not created by its citizens but is purportedly responsive to them, in exchange for quiescence–is what Syrians want.
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Bosnia: fix thyself
Sead Numanovic of Dnevni Avaz, a Bosnian daily, has suggested I address the question I asked Friday about the Arab protests–how long can this go on?–about Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “it” I take to be President Milorad Dodik’s threats to take Republika Srpska (RS) in the direction of independence, whether by referendum or other efforts to assert that the Bosnian state and the international community have no say in how the RS is governed, denying in particular that jurisdiction of the Bosnia and Herzegovina judicial system extends to RS.
This has already gone on for a long time. Dodik has been unequivocal in his assertions of RS’s defiance of the High Representative–the international community’s designated guarantor of Dayton agreement implementation–for a couple of years now. He has made it absolutely clear that he rejects any constraints imposed by the High Rep or by the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus asserting de facto independence of an entity that in the international community view gave up any chance of independence at Dayton, in return for international community acknowledgement of its existence and authority within the limits imposed by the Dayton constitution.
But the international community has foolishly disarmed itself and no longer possesses the tools required to enforce its decisions on the RS. It has become a paper tiger, and Dodik is calling its bluff.
So what are the remaining limits on Dodik’s push for RS independence? There are three: the presumably limited patience of the majority of Bosnians, the financial resources at the RS’s disposal, and the unwillingness of other states to recognize an independent RS.
I am no expert on either of the first two limits, but people who are tell me that the crunch is coming.
Republika Srpska got 49 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory at Dayton. This was a dramatic increase from the territory it actually controlled at the end of the war, which was down to 34 per cent and shrinking rapidly as Croat and Bosniak (aka Federation) forces advanced towards Banja Luka. The Federation forces gave up 15 per cent of the territory to RS at Dayton, in exchange for RS’s incorporation in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If RS is now trying to leave that state–whether de facto or de jure–I would expect a substantial number of people, especially in the Federation, to oppose its effort. It is clear enough to me that a majority of Bosnians want to continue to live in a single Bosnian state: best guesstimates put the percentage of Muslims and “others” in Bosnia and Herzegovina today at over 50 per cent. They favor a single Bosnian state by a wide margin. Substantial numbers of Croats in Central Bosnia and Serbs wherever they live in the Federation also favor a single Bosnian state, since partition would mean they would likely have to move.
If a majority of Bosnians favor a single state, some percentage of that number will be prepared to take up arms to oppose Dodik’s attempt to walk away with 49 per cent of the territory. Their focus will be Brcko, which links the two wings of the RS. So long as it is not in his hands, Dodik cannot hope for independence. That is why he is aiming to squeeze Brcko dry, hoping to preempt his opponents by ending the multiethnic administration there.
Before it gets to violence, RS may well run out of money. Its finances are far from transparent, but those who study them tell me they can’t last long. The belt-tightening measures instituted so far are unlikely to buy the RS much time. This is one reason why Dodik so aggressively pursues state and defense property, which he hopes to sell off to refill his coffers, as he has done previously with other state assets. We are talking here about no more than a year or so more before the RS faces the real prospect of going to Sarajevo for help. Obviously that help would come only if Dodik abandoned his push for independence.
The third limit is the one I know most about: the prospects for international recognition of the RS as an independent state. Here I can be unequivocal: unless there is a dramatic change whose cause I cannot imagine, few sovereign states will recognize an independent RS. While there are people in Belgrade egging on Dodik, including Foreign Minister Jeremic and sometimes President Tadic, even Serbia would have to think three times before recognizing the RS, as doing so would end Belgrade’s hopes for EU membership for the foreseeable future. Serbia absorbing the RS would have the same result.
So Dodik’s best bet is to achieve as much autonomy as possible, desisting from a formal move towards independence until the moment is ripe, while trying to raise the funds he needs to keep the RS going and stopping just short of provoking Bosnians committed to the current state of Bosnia and Herzegovina from taking up arms. That seems to me an accurate description of what he is up to. I can’t tell you how long the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina will put up with this, but they should not rely on the international community to take action. It figures there is no need, as it has the final say by withholding recognition.
If Bosnians want to save their state, they’ll need to do it for themselves, either by cutting a financial deal with Dodik or enforcing the bargain made at Dayton. Dodik is serious about seeking independence for RS. How serious is the rest of Bosnia about preserving the Dayton state? If it is, it will need to do something definitive within the next year.
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