Not yet time to use oil reserves
Dan Yergin is right: it is not yet time to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Why not?
The 727 billion barrel SPR is intended for use in an oil supply disruption. Libya has partially disrupted its own oil supplies, but they are relatively small, about 1.5 million barrels per day of exports. Oil prices are spiking, but not because of the Libyan supply disruption. As Yergin says, they are anticipating risks in the future, risks like demonstrations in Saudi Arabia that might disrupt the massive supplies that come from its Shia-populated Eastern Province.
We should be urging oil exporting countries to increase their production in response to higher prices, which they are likely to do in any case, and holding our own reserves in reserve for the possibility that things will get worse, possibly much worse. The market is telling us that is a real possibility.
I spent the years 1982-85, when oil prices fell sharply, preparing for an oil supply disruption and the resulting spike in prices as the U.S. representative to the emergency committee at the International Energy Agency. I trust the plans we developed then for a coordinated (with friends and allies) draw of oil stocks early in a supply disruption have been much improved since. Relatively small emergency drawdowns of the SPR were authorized during Desert Storm in 1991 and after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Loans and exchanges have been used to meet other exigencies.
I understand that there is a real need for the White House to be seen as doing something to counter the rise in oil prices and defend the economic recovery. But there is a real risk that turmoil in the Middle East will eventually disrupt many millions of barrels per day of oil supply, making things much worse than they are today. I’d wait to see the whites of oil disruption’s eyes before using our most important, but inherently limited, weapon to defend against a price spike.
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Is Maliki becoming a dictator?
While I was publishing an op/ed in the Washington Post optimistic about prospects for democracy in Iraq, my former colleagues (Sean Kane and Jason Gluck) at the United States Institute of Peace were giving interviews to the New York Times for a piece that views Maliki as broadening his powers in ways that threaten Iraqi democracy. Who is right?
My view is that we all are.
There is no question but that Maliki aspires to enhanced powers, and recent constitutional court decisions have given him some. We’ll have to wait and see what he does with the administrative oversight he has gained over the central bank and the electoral commission, about which I have already expressed concern. I’ll be surprised if Maliki can get away with monkeying with the central bank. The electoral commission though is another matter, and especially important. I have little doubt that Maliki, if allowed, will exploit his position in ways that enable him to enhance his power and to stay in office for as long as he likes, which could well mean beyond the 2014 retirement date he has announced. That is what I would expect of any good politician, and certainly Maliki has proven that he is one.
But I also have little doubt that there are other forces at work in Iraqi society, where there is relative freedom for them to work. Most directly relevant is the parliament, which needs to learn how to check the executive’s ambitions. The previous parliament was quite accomplished at this–it had learned how to stop financing the prime minister’s pet projects, some of considerable merit, and thereby exert influence on him. This new parliament will have to learn similar tricks. The parliament would do well to use the power of the purse to force Maliki to appoint Interior and Defense Ministers, portfolios that he is still holding himself.
The collapse of the ill-fated proposal for a National Council for Strategic Priorities, led by Maliki’s archrival Ayad Allawi, enhances the prospects for parliament taking a firmer stand. As Reidar Visser has suggested, it is time for Allawi to focus his attention on checking prime ministerial power, even if his coalition members remain in the government (that’s my view, not Reidar’s).
The constitutional court has unfortunately been a disappointment. Its decision that only the executive can initiate legislation is particularly concerning, but I don’t really see how it can seriously inhibit parliamentary oversight and legislative activism. Presumably any proposed legislation can be amended. Maliki lost many votes in the previous parliament, despite his nominal parliamentary majority. Why shouldn’t he lose them in this one as well?
The demonstrators are another important check on Maliki, whose security forces have handled them badly and committed many gross human rights violations–the parliament would do well to focus some attention on accountability for those. But when Ayatollah Sistani is asking the government to provide better services, it is clear that Maliki cannot ignore the protests, which may well grow.
It is important to remember that all of this is occurring while Iraq is still threatened by both an Al Qaeda-linked insurgency and Iranian-back Shia militias. Maliki isn’t wrong to worry about the demonstrations being exploited by anti-constitutional forces. His responsibility is to protect the country from enemies, foreign and domestic. The protesters, the parliament and the constitutional court should be ensuring that he does it strictly within the limits of the “state of law,” which happens to be the name of his electoral coalition.
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Liar, liar pants on fire!
It is really hard to recommend this superbly done interview with Saif al Islam, who simply lies his way through:
Bravo Al Jazeera English!
The threat of surprises at the end should not be taken lightly. He and his father no doubt have some nasty moves planned.
PS: For those who need an antidote:
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Refighting the Bosnian war
The arrest in Vienna on a Serbian warrant of the Bosnian general who led Sarajevo’s defense at the beginning of the Bosnian war in 1992 is the latest Belgrade effort to rewrite history. Jovan Divjak, an ethnic Serb, is accused of war crimes for an incident in May 1992. During the UN-negotiated evacuation of a Yugoslav National Army (JNA) general an his aides from Sarajevo, the UN-protected convoy, which without authorization from the Bosnian side carried soldiers, weapons and files, was attacked and 18 people killed.
The merits of the war crimes accusations have already been considered in London last year, in the case of Ejup Ganic. The British court found that the Serbian authorities had abused the judicial process and released Ganic, after months house detention.
But if you want to see for yourself Divjak’s role, get the documentary The Death of Yugoslavia (it’s available from Google Videos on line) and watch the general call for those firing on the convoy to stop. It’s in part 4. Start with Divjak at about minute 28, and watch the part about the detention by the JNA of Bosnian President Izetbegovic, which is essential background to the convoy incident at minute 44.
Why would Belgrade pursue this legal case now? Serbia’s current leadership is mainly focused on getting the country into the EU, but it is also determined to satisfy nationalist sentiment by establishing that Serbs were victims during the wars in Yugoslavia. I have no problem myself in acknowledging that: Serbs suffered not only during the war, but also thereafter under the continued autocracy of Slobodan Milosevic.
But it is past time–almost 20 years have gone by–for Serbs to adopt a version of history that is recognizable by their antagonists. Arresting Divjak is as much an abuse of judicial process as the arrest of Ejup Ganic and dishonors Serbia’s democracy.
PS: The thesis that Belgrade is refighting the Bosnian war is elaborated in more detail and with ample support in an RFE piece by Nenad Pejic. He writes
Standing behind all these cases are figures in Serbia’s security organs, police, and military who are backed by far-right political forces….Despite having all these cases dismissed one after another — and the case against Divjak will surely be dismissed as well — the rightists have achieved their goal. Serbian media covered all the arrests with patriotic jingoism, and ethnic tensions across the Balkans were inflamed. Divisions were deepened. Tolerance suffered another setback. The soil was prepared for future conflicts or partitions. And pro-Western forces in Serbia have been sent a strong message about the power of the far right. They are still fighting a war that has been lost.
PPS: I guess if the Austrian Foreign Minister thinks the extradition of Divjak is “unthinkable” that means it won’t happen. But the request is still an embarrassment to Serbia.
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“Bosnia and Herzegovina does not exist beyond the entities”
With gratitude for the translation, I have posted Milorad Dodik’s letter to the Ambassadors of the member countries of the EU and Peace Implementation Council in BiH, in which among many other things he claims that “Bosnia and Herzegovina does not exist beyond the entities.”
The letter has been carefully prepared by Dodik’s lawyers and merits being read in its entirety. Not being a lawyer, I would not want to get into a tussle on the legal issues it raises.
But it is also a political document, one intended to appeal particularly to Americans, whose constitution is cited repeatedly as justification for Dodik’s views.
What are those views? In short, that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina never existed (“The only thing true is that the „Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina“ did never exist at all in accordance with the international law”), that Republika Srpska and the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna were the only legitimate institutions in Bosnia before Dayton (i.e. the Bosniaks who were loyal to the Republic don’t count), that the High Representative is an anti-democratic institution imposed on unwilling subjects, and that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina that emerged from Dayton is nothing more than the two entities, supplemented later by Brcko district, and can have no functions other than those explicitly assigned to it in the Dayton constitution, or delegated to it by the entities. Not once are the requirements of NATO or EU membership mentioned.
I won’t quarrel with this letter point by point–I’ll leave that to others. I’ll just note that the history is dramatically incorrect and even offensive, as the letter is addressed to the representatives of states that had recognized the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the genocidal efforts of Republika Srpska and its Belgrade master to wipe it off the map.
More importantly for the future, Dodik’s views are not compatible with a functioning Bosnia and Herzegovina that can meet the obligations of NATO and European Union membership. For anyone who still believes Dodik can be cajoled into supporting such a state, I recommend reading the whole thing. There is no way.
What Dodik is committed to here (and elsewhere) is the creation of a Republika Srpska that is sovereign in everything but recognition, which he no doubt believes will follow some day when the internationals tire further and finally accept his version of Bosnian history. He is also committed to grabbing enough state property to keep his ship afloat for a few more years, as it is in parlous financial condition.
The question is whether Washington and Brussels will read, understand and react in ways that make it clear that the only Bosnia and Herzegovina they are prepared to accept is one that can negotiate membership in NATO and the EU. That state will need to go beyond Dayton. The next test for Dodik is whether he is prepared to create a Sarajevo government that has all the powers it requires to take on the responsibilities of NATO and EU membership. I’m not holding my breath.
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What will Friday prayers bring?
Tomorrow is Friday again, and across the “greater” Middle East there will be prayers and restlessness. The big questions:
- Saudi Arabia: intellectuals have been signing petitions in favor of constitutional monarchy, but the experts are still betting that people will not go the street–it is illegal to demonstrate, and socially disapproved. We’ll see.
- Libya: most of the country is liberated already, but will crowds risk turning out in Tripoli?
- Egypt: Mubarak’s buddy prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, has stepped down. El Baradei at least is calling this a turning point. Will it open the way for real regime change that the military has been resisting?
- Tunisia: Ben Ali’s buddy prime minister has already stepped down, opening the way for real change, but the country is burdened with refugees from Libya. The Brits are at least trying to relieve that burden.
- Yemen: President Saleh has said he’ll step down in 2013. The political party opposition, buoyed by tribal support, is proposing he do it by the end of this year. Will that be enough to split his opponents and save his tuchas?
- Bahrain: formal opposition parties have presented reform demands in an opening bid for negotiations with the monarchy. Will that split them from the demonstrators?
- Iraq: The violent crackdown last weekend amplified what otherwise might have been relatively quiet demonstrations against corruption and for better services. Has the government learned its lesson?
- Jordan and Syria: little noise, as their king who allows demonstrations and president who doesn’t try to feed a reform half loaf to relatively weak oppositions. Will they succeed?
- Iran: crackdown in full swing with the arrest of Green Movement stars Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and their wives. Ahmedinejad is increasingly dominant and effective against both clerical and lay opponents, inside and outside the regime. Can he keep it up?
I can’t remember a time I looked forward so much to Friday, with anticipation but also with trepidation. The world could be looking very different by Sunday.
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