Behind Iraq’s protests, a call for better democracy
Read my op/ed in tomorrow’s Washington Post.
I wrote this originally during my trip to Baghdad in January. It was even more “optimistic” then than the current version, which will strike many as still too rosy-eyed. What I did not see in January was the enormous gap that has opened up between Iraq’s politicians and its people. The politicians were happy with the “national partnership” government, but the people were not seeing anything change in their too real lives.
Maliki seems to have understood this, after the demonstrations. We’ll see how effective he is at getting some results.
I do think there are upsides for the United States if a more or less democratic Iraq can come out of this mess a high-volume oil (and maybe gas) producer that exports to the north and west as well as through the Gulf. That’s not neo neo conservatism. It’s just realism. No need anyway for Iraq to be a model any longer–the Arab countries seem to be in a race to produce democracies left and right. Let’s hope they succeed at least as well as Iraq.
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To intervene or not to intervene
That’s the question today. With Muammar Gaddafi striking out in several directions with superior fire power and aircraft against the Libyan rebels, at least some of the rebel leadership in the east is talking about the need for foreign military intervention, including a No Fly Zone (NFZ), possibly bombing of Gaddafi’s amply hardened bunkers, and weapons. Secretary of Defense Gates has already said “no.” American assets are tied up elsewhere and there is no telling where it will end once we start.
He has a point. The Libyans should take care of Gaddafi on their own. With no clearly and legally constituted Libyan authority to ask for help, it is unlikely that the Russians and Chinese are going to go along with a UN Security Council resolution authorizing even the NFZ, never mind broader use of force. For the U.S. to intervene unilaterally in Libya at this point would be seen as injudicious, even criminal, by a large part of the world. And even with UNSC authorization, it is arguable that we just don’t have the capacity to handle another mess.
But failing to act and watching Gaddafi reestablish control over Tripoli, if not of the rest of the country, is also not an acceptable option. It would prolong the agony, including the agony to the rest of the world of soaring oil prices that threaten to stall the global economic recovery. It would open the possibility of Libya becoming a fragmented and failed state like Somalia, one in which international terrorists might well find comfort and haven. And it would leave Libyans at the mercy of a homicidal non-maniac, one who has long used murder and mayhem purposefully to ensure control.
So what do we do? I find myself sympathetic with former National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, who argued last night on CNN for a more intense diplomatic effort. I’m not really sure what he had in mind, but in my book that would mean in the first instance making sure Gaddafi’s sources of financing are completely closed off. Is oil still being exported? Where are the payments being deposited? Are all those accounts frozen? The U.S. Treasury has likely done its job well, but have the Italians, the Germans, the Maltese, the Cypriots and the Greeks?
I think we also need to talk in the UNSC about a new resolution that would authorize arms exports to the Libyan rebels. Paul Wolfowitz argues that it was a mistake to impose a blanket embargo, thus punishing the rebels as well as Gaddafi, who is already well-armed (and his suppliers won’t balk at violating the embargo). He is right, but it is a mistake that can and should be fixed as soon as possible with some diplomatic exertion, by opening an exception to the embargo for the anti-Gaddafi forces.
I continue to be hesitant about the NFZ, largely because of the difficulty and expense of implementing it. It would be far easier, as I’ve already said, to nail anything Gaddafi flies to the tarmac even before it takes off. In lieu of that, our diplomats should be talking with the Russians, Serbs and Czechs about ending any supplies or technical assistance they might still be providing to Gaddafi’s air force, which they have amply assisted in the past.
None of this can substitute for indigenous efforts to get rid of Gaddafi. Tough as it is to assemble and protest, Friday should not pass without a clear show from the demonstrators in Tripoli that they want him gone.
It would also greatly improve the situation if the Libyans could organize to speak with one voice. It is not yet clear that any of the committees in Benghazi and other cities is more than a local phenomenon. Despite the difficult circumstances, Libyans need to do now what Gaddafi has prevented them from doing for more than 40 years: organize a national institution that can speak legitimately for the Jamahiriya. That may require some international assistance in linking up the various rebel cities in a more coherent way.
If none of this diplomatic effort works, we’ll have to revisit the essential question over the weekend, which means putting the assets needed into place right away.
One intervention needs to start now: relief for the more or less 150,000 non-Libyan refugees who have fled Libya and accumulated on the border with Tunisia, as well as assistance to the many internally displaced Libyans. This will not be easy, but providing food, water, sanitation and shelter to these people is vital if we are to avoid a massive humanitarian catastrophe.
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Mad north northwest
Col. Muammar Gaddafi is widely assumed to be mad. President Ali Abdullah Saleh also laid claim to the adjective today when he said Washington and Tel Aviv were behind the protests spreading throughout the Arab world.
I don’t think either one is nuts. Saleh knows as well as anyone else that both Washington and Tel Aviv are discomforted by the protests, which threaten not only himself but other American and Israeli favorites. But Saleh also knows that labeling the protests as an American/Jewish conspiracy is a good bet for inducing Yemenis think twice about whether they merit support.
Gaddafi’s sartorial tastes and wild-eyed lying about not using violence against the protesters and about how much his people love him certainly merit being labeled as extravagant and delusional. But he knows that dictatorship is in large measure theater, and his efforts to create an alternative reality have served him well for more than 41 years. How Christiane Amanpour gets through an interview with him without laughing in his face I don’t know.
Neither Yemenis nor Libyans seem inclined to fall any longer for their leaders’ tall tales. Going along to get along was a reasonable strategy when you felt alone with your local autocrat and his security apparatus. But once you have 10,000 compatriots with you, the need to go along evaporates, along with the fear.
Unfortunately, there is still reason to fear both Gaddafi and Saleh.
Gaddafi is laying siege to his opponents in Zawiya, a town not far from Tripoli to the west, and is attacking there and farther afield using aircraft. The UN will feel obliged to impose a No Fly Zone if that continues. It would be easier and cheaper to act unilaterally to nail his planes to the tarmac, but I imagine cooler heads will prevail. One of his henchmen should at least try to remind Gaddafi that blocking food to Zawiya and shelling civilians are arguably crimes against humanity, for which he can expect to pay if he survives. Or maybe Christiane can work that into her next set of questions: “Do you know that you might be charged with crimes against humanity if you bomb civilians or deny them food?”
Saleh is a more complicated case. He is offering his opponents a role in government, which they have refused, preferring that he step down. He has been losing tribal support but now and again allows a peaceful demonstration without his thugs attacking it, as he did over the weekend. But his army sometimes shoots at demonstrators, especially if they are in Aden, where international scrutiny is less rigorous.
These are not madmen. They are men so attached to power that they cannot imagine living without it. And likely they are right. While Mubarak is setting a good example by withdrawing to Sharm el Sheikh to lick his wounds, I doubt either Saleh or Gaddafi will find a comfortable retirement home. And both can tell a hawk from a handsaw when the wind is southerly.
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Trying to see the humor in it
Three video items that have come to my attention today, causing my darker humor bone to vibrate:
1. Berlusconi kissing Gaddafi’s hand, courtesy of PressTV (they might have a bit of an ax to grind):
2. Saif al Islam selling snake oil to Christiane Amanpour, who isn’t buying, courtesy of the Daily Beast:
3. A bit of fun at the Saudi King’s expense, courtesy of Emma Sky:
For those interested in more serious fare, try the Ottaways’ Of Revolutions, Regime Change, and State Collapse in the Arab World – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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Think ahead to building a Libyan state
Gaddafi has now become a dead man walking–it is only a matter of time before the rebellion that controls most of Libya catches up with him. That, however, could take some time. By all reports, the Libyans are good tunnelers, so he will have lots of places to hide, like Saddam Hussein.
That is a problem: anyone remember how Saddam’s stay-behind operation wrecked Iraq’s ministries, destroyed its files and its buildings and made it impossible for the Americans to turn over authority to the Iraqis quickly? Libya has much less institutional structure to wreck, but some of it like the oil ministry is presumably vital. The rebellion has to plan its entry into Tripoli with care, trying to ensure that it makes a clean and quick capture of the institutions, as well as the man.
In order to do that, the rebels have to stay united, which will not be easy. Libya’s tribal and geographic divisions will compete for influence within the rebel movement as it gets nearer to Tripoli, where control will provide wealth and power. There is no existing parliament, no constitution to amend and no chief of state position to occupy. If the violence continues to escalate, power will grow from the barrels of guns, which is not often a good place to initiate a move towards democracy. For all the difficulties Tunisia and Egypt are now facing, they are blessed to have civilian institutions whose roles are fairly well understood and more or less accepted, even if they now need changes. When the prime minister steps down, we know pretty much what that means in Tunis or Cairo. It would mean little in Tripoli.
The revolution underway is so far entirely of the Libyans, by the Libyans and for the Libyans, as it rightly should be. The international community has contributed the UNSC resolution, which helps to shape the environment but does not involve direct intervention.
Later on, Libya will likely need assistance when it gets to the institution-building stage, if only to gain control of its own oil production and revenue. But there is likely to be more needed: municipal and national government, political parties, civil society, proper financial institutions, independent courts are all lacking. The Libyans will be able and I hope willing to pay for much of what they need to develop new institutions, but it is not too early for people in Europe, the U.S. and the Arab world to be thinking about the requirements and how to provide them. Generosity should not stop the day the struggle in Tripoli is over.
Libya is likely once Tripoli falls to look more like a society emerging from conflict than either Tunisia or Egypt. We have not done brilliantly well in any of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts of the past 20 years, but a good deal has been learned and could be applied to a Libyan-led effort to establish the country’s own state institutions. It is not too early to start thinking about how to organize the international community’s efforts to help.
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UN 1, Gaddafi 0 but no one knows how much time is left
It didn’t come as fast as I would have liked, but the Security Council resolution on Libya is vigorous and detailed. Carne Ross’ analysis is on the mark, even if I count as a virtue the fact that it mentions international peace and security (the traditional justification for Security Council action) and he likes the Responsibility to Protect (internal conflict) approach. Both are there, so neither of us is disappointed.
The referral to the International Criminal Court is the big novelty under this resolution “1970”, and it comes with a deadline: the ICC prosecutor is to brief the UNSC in two months time. I hope this is not taken as a pro forma effort, but as something more serious.
The asset ban and travel freeze are clearly more than pro forma, including establishment of implementation mechanisms and the possibility of adding names to the lists.
Missing is the no-fly zone (NFZ). But that would not have been worth any delay in what has been approved. NFZs are difficult and expensive to implement, and doing so would allow Gaddafi and his minions to argue that his opponents are just the leading edge of foreign intervention.
With the departure of the ferry carrying their Embassy staff, the Americans seem to have dropped their reluctance to speak and act forcefully. U.S. unilateral sanctions went into effect Friday, but I am still wondering where the Sixth Fleet is. I hope it is close by and that Gaddafi knows it. Menace is more important than action at this point. It will be much better if the Libyans solve this problem on their own.
They have apparently set up a kind of provisional government in Benghazi under former Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel-Jalil. I’m no fan of former Justice Ministers from regimes like Gaddafi’s, but if he genuinely has broad support among the rebels, that’s enough for me for the moment. The main thing is for Gaddafi’s opponents to remain united. Any fragmentation at this point would seriously weaken them, something they cannot afford.
We need to see the end of the Colonel. How and when that will occur is anyone’s guess. He could save all of us a lot of trouble, but that has never been his habit.
PS: Blake Hounshell of Foreign Policy has kindly pointed to reporting that suggests less than unanimity in the former Justice Minister’s backing. The main thing, as I said before, is that Gaddafi’s opponents remain united.
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