A charm of powerful trouble
That’s Shakespeare’s description of the witches’ brew in Macbeth, but it seems apt for what may be brewing in parts of the Arab world these days. Today’s big demonstrations in Egypt aiming to spook President Mubarak and derail his effort to give the presidency to his son follow closely on yesterday’s naming of a Lebanese prime minister (albeit a wealthy, Sunni one) by Hizbollah. We need hardly mention the uprising in Tunisia, whose outcome is still in doubt despite (or maybe because of) the vows of the army chief to defend the popular will. And the pot may still boil over in Algeria or Libya.
To me, there is nothing surprising about people discovering the will to rebel and overthrow oppressive or unrepresentative political systems, however difficult to predict it may be.
What is interesting to watch is the differentiated reaction to events in the West. How is what’s happening in Lebanon less democratic than what’s happening in Tunisia? You’d think from Washington’s reaction that the devil himself had ceased power in Beirut, when all that has happened is naming of a government that can gain a majority in parliament. Hizbollah is not a legitimate democratic political party, since it runs its own army and terrorist cells as well as social services. But does anyone doubt it would be successful politically in Lebanon even without its military dimension?
Washington’s enthusiasm for popular revolt in Tunisia, which otherwise doesn’t count for much in the West, is palpable. We rarely send an Assistant Secretary of State off to ensure free and fair elections in the aftermath of a popular revolt. You’d think we hadn’t spent several decades helping former President Ben Ali avoid the popular will. But I guess there is little else you can do when your man has fled the country. I do hope however that we are keeping an eye on the army chief and trying to ensure that he protects, rather than expropriates, the popular will.
Egypt is a different case altogether. You can watch one tidbit that demonstrates considerable police discipline, and somewhat less than complete determination on the demonstrator side, here:
The blogotwittersphere may be enthusiastic, and critical of Al Jazeera for downplaying today’s events. But official Washington is not going to welcome in Egypt anything like what happened in Tunisia. I do hope however that President Obama will find the gumption to tell President Mubarak that the legitimacy of the succession depends in large part on how open and fair the process is. How it is handled will determine more than anything else whether the result is “Like a hell-broth boil and bubble,” or something more like a democratic opening in the Arab world.
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Israelis are from Chelm
It is going to be really hard to say anything new or interesting about the Palestine Papers released by Al Jazeera. The Guardian gives a clear and concise video account of what it believes it has found in them–and they’ve had more time to read them than anyone else besides AJ.
Matt Duss has an admirable, and admirably short, piece at the Wonk Room, emphasizing how the leaked papers demonstrate the overbearing strength of the Israelis (supported by the U.S.) and the weakness of the Palestinians, which will now be exacerbated because the publication of the papers will embarrass the Palestinian Authority and empower Hamas.
And Michael Collins Dunn at the Middle East Institute graces us with this bit of good common sense: “I suspect the key is going to be finding out not just what’s in the headlines but what the documents actually say.”
Of course the problem is that by the time serious people figure out what the papers actually say others will have exploited them for journalistic and diplomatic purposes, making what they actually say pretty much irrelevant.
So here is my quick take: the papers tell us more about the Israelis than about the Palestinians. They demonstrate what we already knew and commented on, namely that the Israelis have a lot better alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). But that is only true in the near term.
In the long term, not only are we all dead, but in the next generation or the one after that there will no longer a Jewish majority in the territory Israel governs, unless a separate Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza. This is how I put it in November:
Continuing to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank is making it hard to picture a viable two-state solution. Netanyahu says he wants the Arabs to accept Israel as a Jewish state, but his pursuit of his BATNA is putting the country into a demographic trap: the more settlements he builds, the harder it gets to picture a viable Palestinian state, which is an indispensable component of a two-state solution, and the more likely it gets that Israel/Palestine will end up as a single state, which eventually won’t have a Jewish majority.
So Israel and Palestine are careening towards an outcome neither wants, with leadership on the Israeli side that doesn’t want to take the risks required to prevent it and leadership on the Palestinian side that lacks any means to prevent it. Slo-mo train wreck.
So in a way, the papers show an Israeli leadership that, though strong, is not bold and is therefore losing in the longer term a game in which it is dominant in the shorter term. Surely if I knew my Chelm stories well, I’d be able to dredge one up at this point to demonstrate the point through Jewish folklore, in which the residents of Chelm think of themselves as smart but do foolish, self-defeating things. Instead I grabbed this one from Wikipedia:
One Jewish Chelm resident bought a fish on Friday in order to cook it for Sabbath. He put the live fish underneath his coat and the fish slapped his face with his tail. He went to the Chelm court to submit a charge and the court sentenced the fish to death by drowning.
Anyone notice the resemblance to the Israeli negotiators?
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Adult supervision needed
The New York Times reports that President Karzai has agreed to convene Parliament Wednesday, after making a genuine mess of things by trying to get changes made in the results of last September’s elections. Somehow I have a feeling we have not heard the last of this story, but even thus far it tells us something about Afghanistan.
The President had good reason to be unhappy with the outcome of the September parliamentary elections: due to insecurity in the parts of the country where they live, Pashtuns are underrepresented, especially in Ghazni province, and some of his favorites did not get in. The last parliament had become increasingly aggressive in questioning ministers, claiming it had ultimate responsibility for constitutional interpretation, and in general exercising some oversight of the executive branch. This is not fun for any president, especially one who lacks a strong power base of his own and is fighting a counter-insurgency war with allies he regards as fickle while he tries to negotiate a political settlement with the enemy. A little support in parliament would be nice.
What Karzai tried to do was use a panel of judges he appointed expressly for the purpose to outflank the internationally supported electoral commissions that were supposed to have final say on the election results. Normally I might cheer a president who is feisty enough to tell the internationals where to go, but that would not have been the appropriate reaction in this instance. It is hard always to credit the rule of law arguments (“integrity of the electoral process” and all that) my colleagues make, but every once in a while something is so blatantly abusive that we should, if only because the Afghans who did vote are entitled to the parliament they voted for.
So what does this story tell us about Afghanistan? It tells us that the international intervention there needs to maintain its vigilance and act when necessary to counterbalance abuses.
But it also tells us that the Afghans have their own balancing mechanisms–President Karzai apparently backed down after a very long lunch with the people elected to the new parliament, who had been threatening to open their session without him. Maybe, just maybe, the adult supervision that is needed can come in the future a bit more from Afghans than from the foreigners.
We’ve got our own politicians to keep on the straight and narrow. As well as an ex-spy and his friends to rein in.
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Darkest hour before dawn, or just a flop?
Laura Rozen reports in detail on the failure to make progress on nuclear issues in the P5+1 talks with Iran in Istanbul. The press will no doubt say this is a flop.
I certainly wouldn’t argue it is success, but note the absence of more threatened sanctions, the “open door” to further, unscheduled discussions, and the updated fuel swap proposal left on the table for the Iranians to take back to Tehran. This smells to me like the beginning of a negotiation, not the end of one, at least on the P5 end.
The sticking point seems to be recognition of Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium. This is a complicated legal issue that I won’t pretend to elucidate. Suffice it to say that I don’t know of any country that has given up enrichment technology once it has acquired it, even if it may have stopped enrichment or limited its extent. We may not worry anymore about Brazil or Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, but it is not because they have given up their enrichment technology.
Iran won’t either–that is quite clear. The P5+1 are trying to finesse this issue with the avowedly pragmatic swap agreement, which would remove stocks of enriched uranium from Iran and limit the extent of enrichment. But the Iranians are wanting an acknowledgment of their “right” to enrich even as they give up the enriched material. This doesn’t strike me as an insoluble problem–and it has appeared in the recent past that Hillary Clinton was flexible on the issue.
That said, the P5+1 will want to be certain that Iran has seriously abandoned its nuclear weapons program before agreeing, either explicitly or implicitly, to Iran’s continuing to enrich. That would require more intrusive inspections and a more serious statement by Tehran of its commitment. Other countries have moved in this direction–Argentina, Brazil, Libya and South Africa are not such bad analogues.
It is impossible to be hopeful that Tehran will go in their direction. Two factors weigh heavily in the direction of keeping the Iranian nuclear weapons option open: a fragmented but nationalist political leadership that makes it difficult for any one component to compromise without being sharply criticized by others; real regional incentives to gain the power and prestige that some think would accrue to Iran as a nuclear weapons state, or even as a potential nuclear weapon state.
Tehran also had reason to be belligerent and recalcitrant during this particular meeting. The murders of its nuclear scientists, the apparently successful Stuxnet attack on its centrifuges, and Israel’s apparent assessment that Iran would not be able to get nuclear weapons until 2015 have combined to lessen the likelihood of a military attack.
That said I doubt this is the end of the negotiations. Too much is at stake for Iran, Israel and the P5. Before reaching any solid conclusion, let’s wait for Acting Foreign Minister Salehi’s reaction to what the Iranian delegation brings back from Istanbul.
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Do your duty
Here’s something worth watching:
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In just a few words, Aung San Suu Kyi answers a lot of questions about her plans: she advocates negotiations with the Burmese regime and reconsideration of sanctions, based on their political and social impact. Can she pull off this kind of “engagement” strategy? What sort of deal can she hope for from a regime that has everything to lose from democratization? Or is she deluding herself into thinking it has a softer side? Only time will tell, but she is clearly committed to trying the negotiation route, without ruling out nonviolent confrontation.
She also in this clip betrays an acute awareness of the information revolution, and is reportedly getting an internet connection. I’m not a “twitter revolution” kind of guy (though I do tweet @DanielSerwer), and obviously the regime will read everything she types. But they will also hear everything she says. The virtues of electronic connectedness for mass action, even if the regime follows every byte, should not be underestimated. The day they shut her down, they’ll have a big crowd in the street.
In the end, she wants to be remembered as someone who did her duty. Would that all leaders had her concise elegance.
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Karzai is right, but O’Hanlon is wrong
Michael O’Hanlon in The National Interest suggests that the Parliamentary election results from September need to be corrected because security conditions prevented Pashtuns from voting. Citing President Karzai’s concerns, which have caused him to postpone convening parliament, Michael proposes two possible fixes:
One would be to seat all 249 of the members who just won seats according to official tallies (including about 100 Pashtuns, less than their share of the population and less than their 115 seats previously held), but add in some seats on an ad hoc basis for those Pashtun parts of the country like Ghazni that lost representation in the recent voting. A respected group would need to be charged with this task, and no more than ten to fifteen additonal seats should be created as a result, but the fix might otherwise work. A second approach would be to convene a shura in Ghazni to create a balanced provincial delegation—effectively discarding the results of the election for that province only (and, again, perhaps one or two others if truly needed).
Now I can agree with President Karzai and Michael that the lack of representation from Pashtun areas is a problem, but I don’t really think either of his suggested fixes is going to work: either they will alter the political balance in Parliament, in which case the non-Pashtuns will object, or they will not, in which case Karzai will not be satisfied.
In addition to the power balance, there is an issue of democratic legitimacy. Something similar to what Michael proposes was tried in Iraq in 2005, in order to compensate for the lack of Sunni votes (due both to boycott and security conditions) and resulting representation. Sunni members were added to the committee preparing the new constitution, which quickly decided to ignore their input, meet without them present, and proceed with a constitution inimical to Sunni interests. I imagine the U.S. Congress would also react badly if someone proposed adding members to represent the 50 per cent or so of Americans who don’t vote.
The time for Pashtuns to fix this problem was election day, by making the efforts required to ensure security and to go to the polls. The fact that they failed to do so is certainly a problem for Karzai, who already tried to fix it by stuffing the ballot boxes. The kind of post-facto fixes that Michael is proposing will only undermine the integrity of the electoral process and encourage many others to ask for corrections–surely there were security problems in non-Pashtun majority areas as well. It will also validate the already strong Afghan tendency to believe that your own ethnic group cannot be represented by someone of another ethnic group.
Why wouldn’t it be better to ask Karzai to govern with a parliament not altogether to his liking? That is what you get in a lot of democratic systems (especially presidential ones), including our own. And Ghazni’s largely Hazara parliament members won’t have much of a chance of getting reelected unless they begin to take the concerns of their Pashtun constituents seriously, because next time they’ll make the effort to vote.
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