The good news from Iraq
I am not sure which is the better indicator: the arrest of extremists in advance of the (mostly) Shia holy day of Ashura and the relative quiet yesterday and today, or the Economist’s report that traffic accidents are up and the authorities are again issuing drivers’ licenses in Baghdad.
These non-events signal that things are improving in Iraq and that the Iraqi security forces are beginning to be capable of protecting the citizenry. Another good indicator: complaints about corruption are on the rise (but see this critique of Transparency International’s rating of Iraq before reaching conclusions about how it ranks overall). Corruption is not something you worry about when mass murder is occurring.
Of course the week was not entirely peaceful, and tomorrow there could be another horrific event. But give credit where it is due–my hat is off to Prime Minister Maliki, Interior Minister Bolani and the others responsible for security, as well as to ordinary Iraqis for their long suffering and fortitude. Ashura has been a particularly bad moment for violence in Iraq since 2004. To pass the week without the kind of multiple, politically significant attacks that Al Qaeda likes to direct against Shia worshippers is good news in my book.
Iyad Allawi has agreed to join the governing coalition if there is genuine power-sharing. Now if Prime Minister Maliki can name a government and get it approved in parliament by Christmas eve, when his 30 days runs out, that would be the icing on the cake.
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No real Afpak strategy review
Okay, now I get it. There is nothing more than the five-page “overview” being released from the Administration’s Afpak strategy review.
This is disreputable, even if it tells us more than any 100-page tome about how badly things are going. Yes, there is a fairly recent progress report to the Congress (bless them for requiring it!), and the intel materials have leaked all over the New York Times. But to give the public nothing on the legitimacy of the Karzai government? Nothing on negotiations with the Taliban? Precious little on Pakistan’s support, or lack of support, for going after Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Nothing on progress in particular communities in promoting local governance and economic development?
Silence tells us most of what we need to know. But what should be said about those who commented yesterday on the five pages as if it was the whole thing? Maybe nothing, as that too speaks for itself.
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Has anyone really read the Afghanistan report?
I’ve been hoping all day to offer analysis of the Afghanistan strategy review, but I can’t find the full text. That hasn’t stopped anyone else.
So far as I can tell, everyone is commenting on the five-page “overview” as if they’ve read the whole thing. The Washington Post tells you it hasn’t seen the whole report. PBS Newshour doesn’t make any claims, but doesn’t post the whole report, so I’ve reached my own conclusion. Democracy Arsenal claims to have read the thing, but then says nothing that hints at content beyond the five pages. So I thought I should say a few words on why it is not a good idea to comment based on an overview.
The overview is 80 per cent spin. The higher ups in the U.S. Government don’t do a lot of rummaging around in paragraph 178 of a report, but they do look at what is more commonly called the “executive summary.” And they make sure it says what they want it to say, whatever is in the report. Then they get that five pager out to the press and commentators (some of them get it earlier than others of course) in the often justified hope that they can keep the news coverage on side.
The most important part of any government report is what it does not say. You can’t really tell that from the summary, overview or whatever you want to call it. But I’ll guess: judging from this “overview,” it says nothing about corruption and lack of legitimacy of the Karzai government; it says relatively little about local governance and economic development; it says little about lack of cooperation from Pakistan or negotiations with the Taliban.
I don’t really see how a strategy review can be useful (except for PR purposes) without dealing with those issues, so I’m inclined to give this one a failing grade, without having seen it. But that wouldn’t be fair, would it? Maybe we should all withhold judgment and give ourselves some time to read the whole thing, calmly and thoughtfully.
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Afghanistan: love it and leave it
National Security Network Executive Director Heather Hurlburt and General Paul Eaton in Politico today offer a very sensible eight points of broad agreement among recent reports on Afghanistan. As I was about to have a look through them to determine where they agreed and disagreed, I find this timely and useful.
Meanwhile, the New York Times is busy leading the effort to make news of supposed differences between the intelligence community and the military on how successful the Afghanistan “surge” is. This is silly, as the author of the article acknowledges in the fine print: the cut-off date for the intel assessment is earlier than for the military assessment, and in any event intel analysts are paid to anticipate problems while military people are paid to solve them.
Eaton and Hurlburt (caveat emptor: she is married to my first cousin once removed) are playing the better game, even if they fail to deal with my favorite question: is Karzai worth it? Their eight points add up to this: however successful the military “surge,” we need to negotiate a way out (with all deliberate speed, as the Supreme Court would say) with support from the neighbors, having done what we can to improve local governance, revive the economy and train the Afghan security forces, thus leaving behind a regime that will not harbor transnational terrorists.
They talk about “political progress,” but it is unclear what they mean by it. Maybe this is code for President Karzai cleaning up his, and his government’s act, or maybe it is progress in the reconciliation department, which is the label generally given to efforts to bring the Taliban in from the cold. Or maybe it also covers efforts to get Pakistan to take stronger action against the Taliban. Hurlburt and Eaton accept the judgment of several of the reports that failure to make progress should lead to quicker withdrawal and conversion to a counter-terrorist (i.e. kill the terrorists from afar) rather than a counter-insurgency (i.e. protect and serve the population up close) effort.
At this point, I don’t see any chance that the Administration will change its timeline, which will begin turnover of security responsibilities to the Afghans next July and aim to complete the process by the end of 2014. The NATO decision boxed us in to that schedule, which is what the Administration presumably wanted. It seems to have had the great virtue of removing Afghanistan from the domestic political debate, which is no place for rational discourse and decisionmaking these days.
What we could use now–tomorrow’s publication of the Administration “review” would be a good moment to start–is an honest assessment of where we stand on the main factors to which Hurlburt and Eaton point: negotiations with the Taliban, cooperation by Afghanistan’s neighbors, strengthening of local governance and the economy, buildup of the Afghan security forces. A bit on why Karzai merits $120 billion per year and the lives of American soldiers and civilians would be useful too.
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Kosovo gets complicated
What should we make of allegations “of inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo” by a Council of Europe rapporteur, Swiss politician Dick Marty?
The report merits being read in its entirety: it raises serious questions, not only about the specific crimes cited in its title but also about alleged Kosovo Liberation Army involvement in them, including involvement of current Prime Minister Hashim Thaci.
The best I can do in reacting is to quote the report itself (paragraph 175): “Our task was not to conduct an [sic] criminal investigation -we are not empowered to do so, and above all we lack the necessary resources – let alone to pronounce judgments of guilt or innocence.”
Would that the rapporteur had observed this restraint in the rest of the report, which not only pronounces judgments but presumes guilt at the higher levels without providing much more than a thread of connection–an American court might regard much of it as inadmissible hearsay–between the prominent politicians named and the crimes allegedly committed. I do not deny those connections–I have no basis on which to do so–but they need to be demonstrated in a court of law on the basis of real evidence, not in a parliamentary committee report.
If the report serves to generate a serious investigation, with proper forensic tools and witness protection, it will have served a useful purpose. The international community has hesitated too long to determine what really happened–allegations of trafficking in human organs have circulated for a long time.
In the meanwhile, Mr. Marty’s report will complicate the process of government formation in Kosovo, already made more difficult by allegations of vote fraud on the part of Thaci’s party. What looked to me a few days ago like an opportunity for Kosovo to demonstrate its democratic credentials is turning rapidly into a debacle. Kosovo’s citizens deserve better.
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Iraq’s security, now and future, in the balance
Asharq Alawsat reminds us that the important Ashura holy day, which for Shia Muslims commemorates the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali at the battle of Karbala in 680, occurs this week (starting Wednesday evening through Thursday afternoon). The holiday is often marked by security problems in Iraq as pilgrims converge on Karbala (in the millions) and on Shia sites throughout the country. Jerry Bremer interrupted a meeting with my colleagues and me during Ashura in March 2004 when one of the first suicide bombings in Baghdad produced a loud detonation audible in his office.
This year for the first time Iraqis will be unequivocally in charge of security arrangements throughout the country during Ashura. If the Iraqis are able to control the situation effectively, it will mark an important step forward. If they fail, it will irritate inter-sectarian relations and complicate the government formation process, which is struggling to make its Christmas eve deadline.
In the meanwhile, the Americans seem to be dropping their studied indifference and have begun, according to David Ignatius, pressing the Iraqis (Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen was in Baghdad yesterday) to sign up to a longer-term strategic relationship with the United States, one that would presumably allow U.S. troops in some number to remain past the current end 2011 deadline to help train and support the Iraqi security forces. This, too, could complicate the government formation process, since the Sadrists–a vital part of Maliki’s proposed coalition–have vigorously opposed the U.S. military presence and will have a hard time approving an agreement to have it remain.
The Sadrists changed their minds on supporting Maliki, but that decision was precipitated by a change of heart in Tehran. It is hard to see how Tehran is going to want the Americans to remain in Iraq, but it is possible that the Sadrists will bend for the sake of gaining a strong position in the new government. And the Sadrists I’ve talked with want the Americans to fix Iraq, by adequately arming security forces not unfriendly to them, before they head for the exits.
Ironically, if Ashura passes relatively peacefully, the Iraqis may see less need for a continued American presence. If however pilgrims are attacked as in the past, they may see more need for the foreigners.
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